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Mauritania 
We welcome this year’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 
report and especially the fact that three more States 
Parties have fulfilled their Treaty obligations for survey and 
clearance. The record global clearance achieved in 2019 is 
similarly to be applauded. In the ten years since the entry  
into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) close 
to one million submunitions have been destroyed during land 
release operations. We are making solid progress towards 
a world free of cluster munition remnants (CMR), even in the 
most heavily contaminated States. 
The main reason for improved programme performance 
is the evidence-based survey that is being increasingly 
employed to good effect. High-quality survey enables the 
effective targeting of clearance and efficient use of resources. 
Unless we deploy our resources in areas with confirmed 
contamination, we are not fulfilling the objective of the CCM, 
ultimately at the expense of affected populations. Every 
affected State needs a good baseline so it can plan effectively. 
Lao PDR, the country with more CMR on its territory than 
any other, is in the process of a nationwide survey that 
will, for the first time, produce a credible baseline of the 
massive explosive threat from CMR. Moreover, operators 
are destroying huge numbers of unexploded submunitions 
handing precious land back to communities for safe use.
That is not to deny the critical challenges that our sector 
still faces. The Coronavirus pandemic is impacting the mine 
action sector, just as it is countless other sectors worldwide. 
The extent of its impact on survey and clearance operations 
in 2020 and beyond is unclear. But we do know that the 
pandemic will make the poor poorer, increasing an already 
growing inequality. Funding the critical work of survey and 
clearance may become an even harder task in the years to 
come. It is a fact that mine action and disarmament save lives 
and enable development. But we know we are going to have 
to work harder to make our case and convince donors to 
remain committed to empower us to free affected countries 
and territories from the hazardous legacy of CMR and 
anti-personnel mine contamination.
This year’s research has shown, once more, that the sector 
needs to improve its approach to, and understanding 
of, diversity. It is time to not only advance gender 
mainstreaming, but also to achieve measurable progess 
on diversity. As operational demining organisations, we 
know that this is an essential component of effective mine 
action. It is key to ensuring that the benefits of mine action 
employment and deployment accrue to all communities  
and groups without discrimination, and that we, as a sector, 
make the greatest possible contribution to peacebuilding. 
The First Review Conference of the CCM in 2015 led 
to clear commitments in the Dubrovnik Action Plan to 
consider humanitarian and developmental needs during 
implementation of the Convention. There was never a 
question about what constituted completion; it was about 
maximising the positive impact en route. Linking mine action 
and development planning is now, rightly, the norm and 
must remain central to our work in the decade leading to the 
culmination of the Sustainable Development Goals in 2030.
The same needs to be true of mine action’s links to the 
environment. It would be a profound mistake to see 
disarmament and the environment as anything other than 
interdependent. The mine action community must address  
its impact on the environment, reducing travel emissions  
and mitigating any negative impact from operations, while 
also assessing where mine action can enhance environmental 
protection and support conservation efforts. The sector 
should also apply approaches and methods developed 
for conflict sensitivity to environmental sensitivity, taking 
bolder and more concrete steps to reduce the unintended 
environmental consequences of releasing previously 
contaminated land for safe and productive use.
This Convention has shown that being a State Party brings 
benefits as it provides support to address the impact of CMR 
– from clearance through to victim assistance. It has played 
a role in drawing our organisations, and others, together 
with this aim. With more than a dozen affected States outside 
the Convention, there are great benefits in their joining the 
collective success of the CCM. Let us work together over the 
next five years and remain bold and committed to make the 
goal of total global clearance of CMR an ever nearer reality.
As this publication was going to press, information was coming 
to light of new use of cluster munitions in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. We call on all parties to all armed conflicts to refrain 
from any use of cluster munitions in order to protect civilians  
as International Humanitarian Law demands.
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KEY FINDINGS
 ■ In the 10 years since the entry into force of the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in 2020, a 
total of more than 766 square kilometres of cluster 
munition-contaminated area has been cleared. During 
survey, clearance, and spot task operations nearly  
one million unexploded submunitions have been 
destroyed. Countless lives and limbs have undoubtedly 
been saved as a direct result, as well as the broader 
contribution to development.
 ■ In 2019 alone, a global total of more than 130 square 
kilometres was cleared of cluster munition remnants 
(CMR), a new record, beating the previous high (in 2018) 
by nearly 2km2. An impressive number of unexploded 
submunitions, more than 132,000, were destroyed 
during clearance, survey, and spot tasks in 2019 (slightly 
less than in 2018). The true total area of clearance is 
probably considerably greater, given that several States 
not party have either not reported at all on clearance 
progress or have done so only partially or inaccurately.
 ■ No State Party completed CMR clearance in 2019, but 
in 2020, three States Parties to the CCM—Croatia, 
Montenegro, and the United Kingdom—fulfilled their 
Article 4 obligations, all within their original 10-year 
treaty deadlines. Croatia and Montenegro both completed 
clearance of known CMR-contaminated areas and the 
United Kingdom1 confirmed that UK bombing data for the 
Falkland Islands shows there is no evidence that cluster 
munitions were dropped on the four remaining minefields 
in Yorke Bay which the United Kingdom is clearing as 
part of its Article 5 obligations under the Anti-Personnel 
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).
 ■ In total, ten States Parties and one State not party have  
been declared free of cluster munition-contaminated 
area in the last 10 years.2 Mauritania, which had 
reported fulfilment of its Article 4 clearance obligations 
in 2013, was added back to the list of affected States 
Parties after discovering cluster munition-contaminated 
areas in territory under its jurisdiction or control.
 ■ As at 1 October 2020, 25 States and three other areas 
were confirmed or suspected to have CMR-contaminated 
areas under their jurisdiction or control,3 an overall 
decrease of two States on the previous year. While 
Croatia, Montenegro, and the United Kingdom were 
removed from list, Mauritania was added. 
Thanks to the progress under the CCM to date, of the 
110 States Parties to the CCM, only ten had cluster 
munition-contaminated areas to release: Afghanistan,  
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Chad, Chile, Germany, 
Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia.
 ■ Of the ten affected States Parties, only Lao PDR is 
massively contaminated (defined as covering more than 
1,000km2 of land), while heavy contamination exists in 
Iraq (covering more than 100km2). In all other affected 
States Parties, the extent of contamination is medium  
or light.
 ■ As in previous years, the highest amount of clearance 
took place in the world’s most CMR-contaminated State, 
Lao PDR, with more than 45km2 of CMR-contaminated 
area released through clearance (excluding commercial 
clearance) along with destruction of more than 80,000 
submunitions during survey, clearance, and spot tasks. 
To help put the scale of this clearance achievement into 
perspective, 45km2 is close to three times the size of the 
city of Geneva. Very significant clearance also occurred 
in States not party Vietnam and Cambodia.
 ■ No clearance was recorded or reported for 2019 in three 
States Parties: Chile, Mauritania, and Somalia. While 
Chile did not clear any CMR contamination in 2019, it 
did cancel a significant amount of land found not to be 
contaminated, which marks the first progress in Article 
4 implementation since Chile became a State Party to 
the CCM in 2011. As mentioned previously, Mauritania 
reported discovering cluster munition-contaminated 
areas in territory under its jurisdiction or control and 
planned to investigate the contamination. But again in 
2019, Somalia made no progress in survey specific to 
CMR or clearance of submunitions.
1 The United Kingdom had not considered itself to have an obligation under Article 4 of the CCM and had reported that it considered that it had made every effort  
to identify all cluster munition-contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, prior to becoming a State Party to the CCM. It believes any remaining CMR,  
if found to exist, to be residual.
2 States Parties: Croatia, Colombia, Rep. of Congo, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Montenegro, Mozambique, Norway, United Kingdom (see note 1 above), and Zambia 
(Zambia completed CMR clearance in June 2010 prior to entry into force of the CCM on 1 August 2010). In addition, State not Party, Thailand, also completed  
CMR clearance.
3 Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, DR Congo, Germany, Georgia, Iraq, Iran, Kosovo, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania,  
Nagorno-Karabakh, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Vietnam, Western Sahara, and Yemen. States Parties to the CCM  
are in bold; signatories are underlined; and other areas are in italics.
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 ■ As at 1 October 2020, only two of the ten affected States 
Parties, Afghanistan and Mauritania, seemed likely to 
meet their existing treaty deadlines without the need  
for an extension.
With the exception of the two most heavily contaminated 
States Parties, Lao PDR and Iraq, the remaining affected 
States Parties (BiH, Chad, Chile, Germany, Lebanon, and 
Somalia) should be in a position to fulfil their Article 4 
obligations by the Third Review Conference of the CCM 
in 2025. But it will require strong national ownership, 
elaboration of concrete action plans, application of 
efficient land release methodology, and sufficient and 
sustained funding through to completion.
 ■ In Mine Action Review’s assessment of national mine 
action performance in 2019, two States Parties had 
demining programmes rated as very good: Croatia 
and Montenegro, both of which fulfilled their Article 
4 obligations in July 2020, within their original treaty 
deadlines. Four were assessed to be good: Afghanistan, 
Germany, Lao PDR, and Lebanon. Programmes in BiH 
and Iraq were ranked Average while in Chad, Chile, and 
Somalia they were ranked as Poor. Only in BiH did the 
scorings for 2019 decrease compared to the previous 
year. The performance of State Party Mauritania has  
not been scored due to the fact it only reported the 
discovery of new CMR contamination in 2020. 
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OVERVIEW
SUMMARY OF PROGRESS
The year 2020 marks the tenth anniversary of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). Adopted on 30 May 2008, the 
Convention entered into force as binding international law on 1 August 2010. Its implementation has encompassed sustained 
action to rid the world of cluster munitions. Mine action programmes over the past decade have cleared a total of more than 766 
square kilometres of cluster munition-contaminated area, with the destruction of nearly one million unexploded submunitions. 
Countless lives and limbs have undoubtedly been saved as a direct result, as well as the broader contribution to development.
Significant progress was achieved in 2019 and the first half of 2020 in clearance of cluster munition-contaminated area 
and the destruction of cluster munition remnants (CMR). The area cleared in 2019–130.1km2–set a new record, beating 
the previous high (in 2018) by nearly 2km2. An impressive number of unexploded submunitions, more than 132,000, were 
destroyed during clearance, survey, and spot tasks in 2019 (slightly less than in 2018). In 2020, three States Parties to the 
CCM–Croatia, Montenegro, and the United Kingdom–fulfilled their Article 4 obligations, all within their original 10-year treaty 
deadlines. Croatia and Montenegro both completed clearance of known CMR-contaminated areas and the United Kingdom1 
confirmed that UK bombing data for the Falkland Islands shows there is no evidence that cluster munitions were dropped on 
the four remaining minefields in Yorke Bay which the United Kingdom is clearing as part of its Article 5 obligations under the 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).
In total, ten States Parties and one State not party have been declared free of cluster munition-contaminated area in the 
last 10 years. Thanks to the progress to date, as at 1 October 2020, of the 110 States Parties to the CCM, only 10 had cluster 
munition-contaminated areas to release: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Chad, Chile, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, 
Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia. Aside from Lao PDR, where the extent of contamination is massive and Iraq, where 
CMR contamination is heavy, the other affected States Parties should all be able to complete clearance within the next five 
years. Mauritania, which had previously completed CMR clearance in 2013, reported in 2020 that it had discovered further 
CMR-contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control. 
GLOBAL CMR CONTAMINATION
As at 1 October 2020, 25 States and three other areas were contaminated by CMR globally, as listed in Table 1.
Asia (including the Middle East), is the most affected continent both in terms of the number of affected countries and the extent 
of the CMR contamination, with 13 CMR-contaminated States. Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Lao PDR are all States Parties. 
Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Georgia, Iran, Libya, Syria, Tajikistan, Vietnam, Yemen are all States not party.
Africa is the second most affected 
region with seven States and Western 
Sahara (the Sahrawi Arab Democratic 
Republic) remaining contaminated with 
CMR. Chad, Mauritania, and Somalia are 
all States Parties to the CCM; Angola 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
are signatories; and South Sudan and 
Sudan are States not party; along with 
other area Western Sahara.2
In Europe, four States and Kosovo 
and Nagorno-Karabakh are still 
CMR-affected. The two States Parties 
are BiH and Germany. Affected States 
not party are Serbia and Ukraine, 
as well as other areas Kosovo and 
Nagorno-Karabakh. 
In the Americas only one State Party, 
Chile, remains affected by CMR.
Table 1: Global CMR contamination (at 1 October 2020)
States parties Signatory states States not party Other areas
Afghanistan Angola Azerbaijan* Kosovo
BiH DR Congo Cambodia Nagorno-Karabakh













2 signatory  
states
13 states  
not party 3 other areas
*Clearance believed complete in areas under government control.
1 The United Kingdom had not considered itself to have an obligation under Article 4 of the CCM and had reported that it considered that it had made every effort  
to identify all cluster munition-contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, prior to becoming a State Party to the CCM. It believes any remaining CMR,  
if found to exist, to be residual.
2 The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is considered a State by the African Union but not by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), who is the 
depository of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
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Mauritania, which had reported fulfilment of its Article 4 clearance obligations in 2013, was added back to the list of 
affected States Parties after discovering cluster munition-contaminated areas in territory under its jurisdiction or control. 
Afghanistan added four previously unrecorded hazardous areas to the database in 2019, more than the amount of cluster 
munition-contaminated areas released and resulting in a rise in the amount of contamination remaining, but remained on 
course to meet its Article 4 deadline. In Tajikistan, the national estimate of CMR-contaminated area increased significantly  
in 2019, up to more than 1.5km2.
In late September 2020, hostilities broke out again in Nagorno-Karabakh, between Azerbaijan and Armenia and 
Armenian-supported forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, with reports that cluster munitions were again being fired into Stepanakert. 
Amnesty International ascribed the new use to Azerbaijan.3 This raises concerns that significant new CMR contamination could 
be added to pre-existing contamination in Nagorno Karabakh, in addition to the direct and significant risk to civilians arising 
from the new use of cluster munitions.
Table 2 summarises what is known or reasonably believed about the extent of contamination in affected States Parties. It is 
therefore an assessment by Mine Action Review of the extent of CMR contamination based on available evidence, as opposed  
to the claims of governments or mine action programmes, some of which do not stand up to scrutiny. 
Of the ten affected States Parties, only Lao PDR is massively contaminated (defined as covering more than 1,000km2 of land), 
while heavy contamination exists in Iraq (covering more than 100km2). In all other affected States Parties, the extent of 
contamination is medium or light.
There is no reliable estimate for global CMR contamination, although the total affected area certainly exceeds 2,500km2.








(<5km2) or extent of contamination unclear





STATES THAT HAVE COMPLETED CMR CLEARANCE
In 2020, three States Parties, Croatia, Montenegro, and the 
United Kingdom fulfilled their Article 4 obligations under 
the CCM, bringing the total to 10 States Parties and 1 State 
not party that have completed survey and clearance of 
CMR-contaminated area in territory under their jurisdiction 
or control in the last decade. State Party, Zambia, completed 
CMR clearance in June 2010, ahead of the Convention’s entry 
into force on 1 August 2010, and the remaining States Parties 
all completed survey and clearance within their original 
ten-year treaty deadlines (see Table 3). 
As noted above, Mauritania has been removed from the list, 
having newly reported the discovery of CMR-contaminated 
area in territory under its control in 2020. Four of the States 
that have fulfilled their Article 4 obligations are from Africa; 
four are from Europe; two are from the Americas; and one 
is from Asia –Thailand, the only State not party to have 
completed CMR clearance on its territory.
Table 3: States Having Completed CMR Clearance Since 
2010 (at 1 October 2020)













* The United Kingdom had not considered itself to have an obligation under Article 
4 of the CCM and had reported that it considered that it had already made every 
effort to identify all cluster munition-contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or 
control, prior to becoming a State Party to the CCM. 
** State not party to the CCM.  
*** Completed CMR clearance in June 2010 prior to entry into force of the CCM  
on 1 August 2010.
3 Amnesty International, “Armenia/Azerbaijan: Civilians must be protected from use of banned cluster bombs”, 5 October 2020, at: bit.ly/30DvCl3.
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CMR CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, a total of 130.14km2 of CMR-contaminated area was cleared with the destruction of more than 132,000 submunitions 
(see Table 4). This exceeds the previous year’s record clearance output of 128.3km2, but with a 2.6 per cent decrease in the 
total number of submunitions destroyed.






Comparison to 2018 
clearance (+/-km2) Comment
Afghanistan 1.65 273 -2.59
BiH 0.45 85 +0.01
Chad 0.84* 28* +0.84 *Based on data provided by 
Mines Advisory Group (MAG).
Chile 0 0 0
Croatia 0.05 186 -0.81 CMR subsequently completed in 
July 2020.
Germany 1.21 1,814 +0.45
Iraq 4.74* 9,905 -2.45 *Based on Mine Action Review 
calculation.
Lao PDR 45.77 80,140 +9.57
Lebanon 1.26 4,037 +0.11
Mauritania 0 0 N/A Reported discovery of 
CMR-contaminated areas in 2020.
Montenegro 0.27 64 +0.25 CMR subsequently completed in 
July 2020.




States not party 
and other areas









South Sudan 3.29 2,733
Yemen 3.12* 7,071 *Also includes clearance of mines 
and other explosive ordnance.
Western Sahara 1.59 923
Kosovo 1.26 156
Other programmes 0.87 1,137
Sub-totals (States not 
party and other areas)
73.90 35,760
Grand Totals 130.14 132,292 +1.85
* Including destruction during spot tasks and survey. 
As in previous years, the highest amount of clearance took place in the world’s most CMR-contaminated State, Lao PDR, 
with more than 45km2 of CMR-contaminated area released through clearance (excluding commercial clearance) along 
with destruction of 80,140 submunitions during survey, clearance, and spot tasks. To help put the scale of this clearance 
achievement into perspective, 45km2 is close to three times the size of the city of Geneva in Switzerland. But very significant 
clearance also occurred in States not party Vietnam and Cambodia. In Vietnam, more than 38km2 of CMR-contaminated area 
was cleared (excluding clearance by Vietnam’s military) while in Cambodia the figure was over 25km2. 
Chad provided an estimate of the size of cluster munition-contaminated areas and reported the first clearance of land 
containing CMR in five years. In Iraq, land released through survey and clearance dropped in 2019 compared with the  
previous year. Operators also confirmed 21.6km2 of CMR contamination in two governorates. 
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While Chile did not clear any CMR contamination in 2019, 
it did cancel a significant amount of land found not to be 
contaminated, which marks the first progress in Article 4 
implementation since Chile became a State Party to the  
CCM in 2011. But again in 2019, Somalia made no progress  
in survey specific to CMR or clearance of submunitions.  
A planned review of survey records in the national database 
by the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) was 
still ongoing as at August 2020. 
In fact, though, given that several States not party have 
either not reported at all on clearance progress or have done 
so only partially or inaccurately, the global figure is likely 
higher. Mine Action Review figures are, though, conservative, 
to avoid exaggerating progress. 
That said, in nearly all affected States, the COVID-19 
pandemic had been impacting negatively to some degree 
on mine action programmes in 2020, whether through the 
mandatory halting of operations under national lockdown 
rules, reduced operations due to distancing measures in 
place to help prevent the spread of the virus, difficulties 
in international staff returning to or visiting mine action 
programmes due to travel restrictions, or other impacts. 
Survey and clearance results for the year are therefore 
likely to evidence a reduction in output, although the extent 
of the impact is, as yet, unknown and will vary between 
affected countries. The COVID-19 pandemic has, however, 
also revealed the adaptability and resilience of the mine 
action sector, with national authorities, operators, and 
implementing partners striving to find ways to continue land 
release operations, training, capacity development and more, 
whenever possible and where required, remotely.
CMR CLEARANCE IN 2010–19
The CCM was adopted in 2008 and entered into force in 
2010. Table 5 summarises progress in clearance of cluster 
munition-contaminated areas from 1 January 2010 to the  
end of 2019. In total, the decade saw clearance of more  
than 767km2 with the destruction of nearly one million 
unexploded submunitions. 
Table 5: CMR Clearance in 2010–19












* Rounded to the nearest decimal place. ** Including destruction during spot tasks 
and survey. 
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of CMR clearance over the 
course of the decade.
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PROGRESS IN ARTICLE 4 IMPLEMENTATION
Table 6 summarises the current status of Article 4 implementation. Lao PDR and Germany were each granted a five-year 
extension to their respective Article 4 deadlines in 2019; the first such extensions to Article 4 deadlines since the Convention 
entered into force. BiH, Chile, and Lebanon were all seeking to extend their respective clearance deadlines at the Second 
Review Conference of the CCM in November 2020. 
As at 1 October 2020, only two of the ten affected States Parties seemed likely to meet their existing treaty deadlines without the 
need for an extension. Afghanistan was on track to meet its March 2022 deadline while Mauritania should be able to complete 
clearance before the expiry of its deadline of 1 August 2022, if the planned assessment of cluster munition-contaminated areas is not 
too severely delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic. With the exception of the two most heavily contaminated States Parties, Lao PDR 
and Iraq, the remaining affected States Parties (BiH, Chad, Chile, Germany, Lebanon, and Somalia) should be in a position to fulfil their 
Article 4 obligations by the Third Review Conference of the CCM in 2025. But it will require strong national ownership, elaboration of 
concrete action plans, application of efficient land release methodology, and sufficient and sustained funding through to completion.
Table 6: Progress in Implementing Article 4 Obligations
State Party Article 4 Deadline Status of progress Implementation priorities
BiH 1 March 2021 18-month Article 4 
deadline extension 
requested to 1 
September 2022
BHMAC should develop an effective evidence-based work plan 
for the release of all remaining CMR-contaminated areas as  
soon as possible and no later than 1 September 2022, including 
the area that is also contaminated with depleted uranium. 
Lebanon 1 May 2021 Five-year Article 4 
deadline extension 
requested to 1 May 
2026
Lebanon should conduct evidence-based survey prior to 
clearance, to ensure CMR-contaminated areas are released  
as efficiently as possible. LMAC should also determine how 
it plans to address CMR contamination in especially difficult 
terrain, such as deep and very steep canyons and cliffs.
Chile 1 June 2021 One-year interim 
Article 4 deadline 
extension requested 
to 1 June 2022 
Chile should complete the restructuring of its national mine 
action programme without delay and proceed as soon as 
possible to conduct technical survey to further clarify the  
extent of the remaining CMR contamination. 
Afghanistan 1 March 2022 On track Afghanistan should ensure it secures the required funding, if 
necessary from national sources or alternative donors, in order 
to maintain progress in survey and clearance and release all 
known remaining CMR-contaminated areas before its deadline.
Mauritania 1 August 2022 On track Mauritania should clarify whether the CMR-contaminated areas 
it has reported are currently under its effective control. If so, 
and they are also under its jurisdiction, the authorities should 
proceed to undertake an assessment mission as soon as funding 
and restrictions regarding COVID-19 permit. If, however, the 
areas are under its effective control, but not also under its 
jurisdiction, discussions need to be held as a matter of urgency 
with others concerned, in particular Morocco and the Saharawi 
Arab Democratic Republic.
Chad 1 September 2023 Unclear whether  
on track
Chad should elaborate a completion strategy for Article 4 
implementation, together with a clear annual work plan for the 
survey and clearance of remaining CMR-contaminated areas. 
Iraq 1 November 2023 Not on track Iraq should seek to ensure that it secures sufficient funding and 
capacity for survey and clearance of CMR to fulfil its Article 4 
obligations. The United States and its NATO allies could provide 
useful support to survey, planning, and clearance by providing data 
on their cluster munitions strikes in the course of the Gulf Wars.
Germany 1 August 2025 Unclear whether  
on track
Germany should continue to ensure it deploys adequate 
demining capacity to meet its annual CMR clearance targets and 
fulfil its Article 4 obligations before its extended deadline of 1 
August 2025.
Lao PDR 1 August 2025 Not on track and 
will require multiple 
extensions to its 
deadline
The National Regulatory Authority should strengthen 
coordination and prioritisation systems to support the CMR 
survey and clearance process, including elaboration of annual 
sector-wide work plan. It should also streamline procedures for 
issuing, amending, or renewing memoranda of understanding to 
avoid inefficiencies and excessive delays. 
Somalia 1 March 2026 Not on track Somalia should elaborate a strategic plan for Article 4 
implementation, including determining a comprehensive baseline 
of CMR contamination and mobilising resources to release 
contaminated areas.
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Four States not party to the CCM—Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tajikistan—should also be able to complete CMR clearance 
on their respective territories in the next five years, along with other areas Kosovo and Western Sahara.
PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE IN AFFECTED STATES PARTIES
To help affected States Parties and their partners focus their capacity building and technical assistance efforts on areas of 
weakness, and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of survey and clearance programmes, a performance scoring 
system is used by Mine Action Review. The scoring criteria were developed in consultation with the Mine Action Review’s 
Advisory Board Members (The HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)), and with  
input from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), including the Gender and Mine Action 
Programme (GMAP). 
Mine Action Review assesses mine action programme performance in affected States Parties according to a set of seven core 
criteria: Understanding of contamination; National ownership and programme management; Gender and diversity; Information 
management and reporting; Planning and tasking; Land release system; and Land release outputs and Article 4 compliance. 
In the scoring, additional weighting is accorded to Understanding of contamination; Land release system; and Land release 
outputs and Article 4 compliance. An average is then calculated that determines the overall score. A score of 8 or more is 
ranked Very Good. A score of 7.0–7.9 is ranked Good. A score of 5.0–6.9 is ranked Average. A score of 4.0–4.9 is ranked Poor.  
A score of less than 4 is ranked Very Poor. 
The text box on pages 9-10 outlines the seven programme performance criteria and key factors in detail. The results of the 
scoring for 2019 are summarised in Table 7. The country-specific assessments of the seven criteria, which should be viewed 
alongside the Recommendations for Action in the country reports, are intended as an implementation tool, offered in the spirit 
of openness and constructive dialogue, to assist States Parties to identify and overcome challenges and fulfil their Article 4 
obligations as efficiently as possible. 
Table 7 scores and ranks performance 
in affected States Parties for 2019. 
Two States Parties – Croatia and 
Montenegro – were ranked as Very 
Good. Both States fulfilled their Article 
4 obligations in July 2020, within their 
original treaty deadlines. Programmes 
in Afghanistan, Germany, Lao PDR, 
and Lebanon were ranked as Good. 
Programmes in BiH and Iraq were 
ranked Average while in Chad, Chile, 
and Somalia they were ranked as 
Poor. No State Party had a ranking 
of Very Poor for 2019, whereas in 
last year’s report Chad, Chile, and 
Somalia were all ranked as Very Poor. 
Only in BiH did the scorings for 2019 
decrease compared to the previous 
year. The performance of State Party 
Mauritania has not been scored for 
2019, as it only reported discovery of 
new CMR-contaminated areas in 2020 
after previously completing clearance 
in 2013.








Afghanistan Good 7.8 7.8 +/- 0
BiH Average 5.4 5.7 - 0.3
Chad Poor 4.3 3.3 + 1.0
Chile Poor 4.9 3.8 + 1.1
Croatia Very Good 8.3 7.8 + 0.5
Germany Good 7.2 6.9 + 0.3
Iraq Average 5.8 5.3 + 0.5
Lao PDR Good 7.1 7.0 + 0.1
Lebanon Good 7.5 7.1 + 0.4
Montenegro Very Good 8.1 6.6 + 1.5
Somalia Poor 4.0 3.9 + 0.1
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Mine Action Review Criteria to Assess National Programme Performance of States Parties to the Convention  
on Cluster Munitions





(20% of overall score)
Has a national baseline of cluster munition remnant (CMR) contamination been established and is it up 
to date and accurate?
If no national baseline, or only a partial or inaccurate baseline, exists, is survey and/or re-survey 
being conducted or is it planned?
Are CMR-contaminated areas disaggregated from areas with other types of explosive ordnance  
(e.g. other explosive remnants of war (ERW) or mines)?
Is CMR contamination classified into suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous 
areas (CHAs), based on whether there is indirect or direct evidence of CMR respectively? 





(10% of overall score)
Is there a national entity, such as a national mine action authority, overseeing mine action? 
Is there a national mine action centre coordinating operations? 
Are the roles and responsibilities in mine action clear and coherent within the national programme? 
Is the mine action centre adequately staffed and skilled? 
Are clearance operators involved in key decision-making processes?
Does national legislation, or other suitable administrative measures, effectively underpin the mine 
action programme?
Have the authorities created an enabling environment for mine action? 
Has the government facilitated the receipt and efficient use of international assistance?
Is there political will for timely and efficient implementation of Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions (CCM)?
Does the affected State contribute national resources to support the cost of the mine action centre 
and/or survey and clearance of CMR-contaminated areas?
Does the affected State have a resource mobilisation strategy in place for Article 4 implementation?
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
Does the national mine action programme have a gender policy and implementation plan? Do the main 
mine action operators have one? 
Is gender mainstreamed in the national mine action strategy and national mine action standards? 
Are women and children in communities affected by CMR-contaminated areas consulted during survey 
and community liaison activities?
Are survey and community liaison teams inclusive and gender balanced, to facilitate access and 
participation by all groups, including women and children?
Are the needs of women and children in communities affected by CMR-contaminated areas taken into 
account in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities?
Are ethnic or minority groups in communities affected by CMR-contaminated areas consulted during 
survey and community liaison activities?
Do survey, clearance, and community liaison teams include representatives from different ethnic or 
minority groups, to facilitate access and participation by all groups?
Are the needs of ethnic or minority groups in communities affected by CMR-contaminated areas taken 
into account in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities?
Is relevant mine action data disaggregated by gender and age? 
Is there equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams, 




(10% of overall score)
Is there a national information management system in place (e.g. IMSMA), and is the data accurate  
and reliable?
Are data collection forms consistent and do they enable collection of the necessary data?
Is data in the information management system disaggregated by type of contamination and method  
of land release? 
Is the data in the information management system accessible to all operators?
Are ongoing efforts being made to ensure or improve the quality of data in the mine action database?
Does the affected State Party to the CCM submit accurate and timely annual Article 7 reports on 
Article 4 progress?
Are Article 4 extension requests of a high-quality and submitted in a timely manner?
Is the survey and clearance data reported by the affected State Party (e.g. in Article 7 reporting) 
accurate and disaggregated by type of contamination (i.e. CMR from other ERW and landmines)  
and method of land release?
Does the affected State Party report on progress in Article 4 implementation at the Meetings of States 
Parties and is reporting accurate and consistent between reporting periods?
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Criterion Key Factors Affecting Scoring
PLANNING AND 
TASKING
(10% of overall score)
Is there a national mine action strategy in place and does it include realistic goals for land release?
Is there a realistic annual work plan in place for land release?
Are there agreed and specified criteria for prioritisation of tasks? 
Are key stakeholders meaningfully consulted in planning and prioritisation?
Is clearance of CMR tasked in accordance with agreed prioritisation?
Are task dossiers issued in a timely and effective manner?
Where relevant, is there a plan for dealing with residual risk and liability? Is it realistic and sustainable?
LAND RELEASE 
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
Does the affected State have national mine action standards in place for land release? 
Do the standards enable or impede efficient evidence-based survey and clearance?
Are national standards reflected in SOPs?
Are standards and SOPs periodically reviewed against IMAS and international best practice, in 
consultation with clearance operators?
Is there an effective and efficient: i) non-technical survey capacity, ii) technical survey capacity,  
iii) clearance capacity in the programme? Does this include national capacity?
Are areas being cleared that prove to have no CMR contamination?
Where relevant, is there national survey and clearance capacity in place to address CMR 
contamination discovered after the release of CMR-contaminated areas or post completion?
Is there an appropriate range of demining assets (manual, mechanical, and animal detection systems) 
integrated into land release operations?
Is there an effective quality management system in place for survey and clearance operations?
Where an accident has occurred within a mine action programme was there an effective investigation? 





(20% of overall score)
Is the affected State seeking to clear all CMR from territory under its jurisdiction or control, including 
along national borders, in and around military installations, and in hard to access areas etc.?
Have national mine action authorities set a target date for the completion of CMR clearance and is this 
within the State Party’s Article 4 deadline? 
Is the target date for completion realistic based on existing capacity?
Is the target date sufficiently ambitious?
What were the outputs of survey and clearance of CMR-contaminated area in 2019, and were they 
greater or lesser than the previous year and why?
Are survey and clearance outputs in line with plans and Article 4 obligations?
Is the affected State on track to meet the target completion date and/or Article 4 deadline?
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
In this year’s research, Mine Action Review has seen an 
improvement in the availability and quality of information on 
gender provided by national authorities and their implementing 
partners, compared to last year when we started to ask 
questions related to the gender sensitivity of mine action 
programmes for the first time. Furthermore, in this year’s 
assessment of programme performance for 2019, Mine Action 
Review has also assessed diversity alongside gender, as 
initially intended. While we have received some information on 
measures national authorities are taking to consider diversity 
in mine action programming, the information received on 
diversity has lagged behind that on gender. It is essential 
that diversity is also mainstreamed within mine action 
programmes, alongside gender, especially in CMR-affected 
countries where conflict has been on ethnic grounds.
Some progress was registered in advancing gender and 
diversity in CMR clearance programmes. In 2019, MAG 
employed Chad’s first female deminer as a team leader, 
overseeing survey and clearance tasks, conducting on-site 
quality control and reporting data. She had been trained 
in Benin to EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal] Level 3. 
MAG also employed women in community liaison and 
administrative functions. 
Chile has taken steps to mainstream gender across the armed 
forces with women working at all levels of the mine action 
programme. However, the number of women employed in 
demining in 2019 was just 4%. In a positive step, however, 
Chile stated in its 2020 CCM Article 4 deadline extension 
request that due to its awareness of the increasing importance 
of the implementation of gender perspectives in the field of 
disarmament, the Ministry of National Defense will promote 
women to the teams that will conduct CMR clearance.
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In Iraq, the Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) has had a 
Gender Unit since 2017. It was led in 2019 by the deputy head 
of the Planning Department and is said to encourage women 
to apply for employment in mine action. The UN Mine Action 
Service (UNMAS) conducted a baseline assessment of the 
DMA’s gender policy and practice in 2019, which concluded it 
had succeeded in raising awareness of gender both internally 
and in other government institutions engaged in explosive 
hazard management. Despite that progress, UNMAS 
observed challenges remained for recruitment, promotion 
and involving women in all levels of decision-making.  
The Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency is also reported  
to have established a Gender Committee in 2019 and  
UNMAS reported developing terms of reference setting  
out responsibilities and a reporting structure.
In early 2019, Lao PDR finalised a manual for trainers on 
gender mainstreaming in the UXO Sector. The government 
also partnered with the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC) 
to deliver a Regional Workshop on Gender Equality and 
Empowerment in mine action in October 2019, in Vientiane.  
Of the 41 employees at the National Regulatory Authority 
(NRA), 13 (31%) are women. Clearance operators in Lao PDR 
have gender policies in place, disaggregate mine action data 
by sex and age, and consult with women and girls during 
survey and clearance operations.
In Lebanon, the Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC)  
has taken action to mainstream gender in its mine action 
programme, including through data disaggregation,  
inclusive survey, and participation in courses at its regional 
demining school. Gender and diversity considerations  
are included in the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 
and LMAC has appointed a new gender focal point who will 
help mainstream gender-sensitive policies and procedures, 
and monitor their implementation, in the mine action centre. 
LMAC acknowledges in the strategy that mine action  
“is a male-dominated environment and we have therefore  
a particular responsibility to empower women and ensure 
that we have a gender sensitive approach to our work”.
But in other affected States Parties, progress remains 
extremely challenging. In Afghanistan, while women are hired 
in community liaison and risk education, only one operator 
has employed women in clearance and recruitment of women 
in Afghanistan’s deeply conservative society continues to be 
limited. The Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) 
employed only four women among its staff of 194 as at the 
middle of 2019. That said, the mine action programme has 
had a policy of including gender in mine action since 2014 and 
set gender mainstreaming as one of four goals of its 2016–20 
strategic plan.
In BiH, where the legal description for gender equality in 
employment is a minimum of 40% women, of the national 
mine action centre (BHMAC)’s 171 employees, only 42 (25%) 
were women. Of its 107 operations staff in the field, only 
10 (9%) were women. In a welcome development, however, 
two of the three members of the newly appointed Demining 
Commission are women. The Civil Protection Administration 
of Republika Srpska reported that nearly 22% of its staff 
were female, including 20% of managerial/supervisory 
positions, but this was the case in only 5% of operational 
roles. Problems extend to international non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) operators. NPA reported that the overall 
gender split of its staff as at March 2020 was 118 men and 
10 women, which represents only 8% female staff. Of its 82 
operational staff deployed in the field, three medic positions 
and one community liaison position are held by women. NPA 
explained that it rarely received applications from women for 
vacant operational roles. 
In Germany, there is equal access to employment for qualified 
women and men for EOD clearance, but women only make 
up a small proportion of the sector, especially in terms of the 
number of qualified female EOD technicians with a licence 
for commercial EOD, who reportedly number fewer than 10. 
This has in turn limited the number of women employed in 
Germany’s CMR clearance operations at the former Soviet 
military training area at Wittstock.
Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 
recognises gender and diversity as cross-cutting issues for 
the national mine action programme. The Plan recognises the 
importance of conducting context analyses in areas of mine 
action operations to clarify important gender and diversity 
issues, such as clan affiliation, movement patterns of local 
populations, and barriers to participation for different gender 
and age groups. But SEMA informed Mine Action Review  
that it does not have an internal gender or diversity policy  
or implementation plan. This is a significant gap that should 
be filled, with the support of SEMA’s UN and NGO partners.
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TEN YEARS OF THE CCM: KEY DEVELOPMENTS AND LESSONS 
EVIDENCE-BASED LAND RELEASE METHODOLOGY
Unexploded submunitions, the mainstay of the CMR 
threat, are located in cluster munition strike zones. Such 
contamination, whether delivered by ground-based systems 
or from the air, has a footprint (the area covered by the 
submunitions when they hit the ground). The size of a 
footprint from one cluster munition strike depends on a range 
of factors (e.g. the type and age of the cluster munition used, 
the method of delivery, soil conditions, vegetation, and terrain 
fluctuations), but normally does not exceed a length of 300 
metres and a width of 200 metres.
The survey of cluster munition-contaminated area is usually 
simpler than is the case for mined area. Where, for example, 
it is known that no mines are present, surveyors are typically 
allowed to enter the suspected area with detectors to search 
for unexploded submunitions. Moreover, unlike mines, all 
submunitions contain a high amount of metal, making their 
detection more straightforward, with fewer false positive 
signals. Informal or emergency clearance without careful 
recording of individual submunitions that have been removed 
may, though, distort the footprint. Multiple overlapping 
footprints may impede accurate identification of each of the 
footprints. Bombing data have proven fairly accurate in some 
contexts but less accurate or even non-existent in others. 
Clearance should only be conducted where there is direct 
evidence of cluster munition remnants. A set fade-out distance 
is cleared outwards from each submunition found. Unexploded 
submunitions should generally be destroyed in situ.
Since the adoption of the CCM, methodology for the survey 
and clearance of CMR has significantly improved. The 
scale and nature of cluster munition contamination in 
South-East Asia, which dates back decades, necessitated 
a more systematic evidence-based survey response 
that confirms contamination based on direct evidence. A 
specific methodology for identifying and confirming CMR 
was developed, known as Cluster Munition Remnants 
Survey (CMRS). CMRS is the application of all reasonable 
effort, through non-technical survey and technical survey 
procedures, to identify and define confirmed hazardous areas 
(CHAs), based on direct evidence of CMR contamination. 
CMRS results in a more accurate understanding of the scale 
of contamination and the time and resources required for 
clearance. Based on this data, authorities and operators are 
able to make more informed decisions when planning for and 
prioritising clearance operations.
Since it was first introduced in South-East Asia in 2008, the 
CMRS process has, and continues to be, improved by sharing 
successes and challenges in implementation and discussing 
lessons learned. CMRS is being employed in Cambodia, Lao 
PDR, and Vietnam. A modified form has, more recently, been 
employed also in Iraq, Kosovo, and Tajikistan. In August 
2019, a regional workshop on CMRS took place in Vietnam, 
convened by the US Department of State, facilitated by NPA, 
and attended by national authorities and operators from 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam, as well as by GICHD. The 
workshop helped to identify, develop, and share best practice 
in South-East Asia.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
The Information Management System for Mine Action 
(IMSMA) has become the de facto standard database for mine 
action programmes. Of the 10 affected States Parties with 
Article 4 obligations, eight use IMSMA. Of the remainder, 
BiH is in the process of migrating from its own information 
management system to IMSMA Core while Germany uses 
its own information management system to record the 
special distribution of CMR, including use of a Geographic 
Information System (GIS). Afghanistan and Lebanon are both 
in the process of upgrading from IMSMA New Generation 
(NG) to IMSMA Core. Lao PDR has introduced IMSMA VPN, 
which is now used by all international clearance operators, 
and has helped improve the accessibility of data and the 
speed and quality of data entry and the reporting process. 
A sophisticated database does not, though, mean that the 
data it contains are accurate and up to date. Accordingly, in 
many affected States Parties, efforts are ongoing to correct 
historical data and address missing records.
The importance of ensuring a high-quality information 
management database is essential both for effective planning 
and prioritisation of survey and clearance operations and 
also for managing residual risk post-completion or after 
CMR-contaminated areas have been released through survey 
or clearance (see ‘Residual Risk and its Management’ below).  
In keeping with their legal obligations under the CCM, all 10 
affected States Parties submitted Article 7 transparency 
reports in 2020, covering 2019, although several contained 
inaccuracies or inconsistencies. Either this was due to 
different figures to those provided to Mine Action Review or 
as a result of errors and inconsistencies within the Article 
7 report itself. The quality of land release reporting under 
Article 7 is not facilitated by the format of the CCM reporting 
template, which could be improved. Proposed plans to 
review and update the Article 7 template during the United 
Kingdom’s presidency of the Tenth Meeting of States Parties 
are welcome. 
In this year’s Article 7 reporting, covering 2019, Chad failed 
to clearly distinguish between CMR and other explosive 
ordnance when reporting CMR survey and clearance. 
BiH, Lao PDR, and Lebanon, did not disaggregate the 
CMR-contaminated area released through technical survey 
from that released through clearance, as best practice 
requires. Germany again reported cumulative CMR clearance 
output to date, rather than the annual clearance output 
for the year, as the Convention requires. In reporting their 
baseline of CMR contamination, several affected States 
Parties do not report suspected hazardous areas and (SHAs) 
and CHAs in a manner consistent with IMAS.
As in previous years, Mine Action Review continued to see 
disparities between the 2019 land release data reported by 
national authorities and data reported by clearance operators 
directly. In some cases, such as in Iraq, the discrepancies 
were significant. 
OVERVIEW
mineactionreview.org   13
RESIDUAL RISK AND ITS MANAGEMENT
Article 4 obligations are fulfilled when an affected State Party has completed clearance of all confirmed and suspected 
CMR-contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control. However, this does not mean that every submunition (much less 
every item of unexploded or abandoned explosive ordnance) has been found and destroyed. In States that were once heavily 
contaminated, munitions will be found after completion has been declared. Affected States must plan for this and establish 
sustainable, long-term national capacity to address contamination discovered post completion, and this must be commenced  
well in advance of completion. Clearance depths need to be set that are appropriate to the context and should also be recorded  
in information management databases for future reference. But changes in land use mean that submunitions may still be 
discovered deeper than the stipulated national clearance depth in some instances.
Thus, the majority of States Parties with Article 4 obligations should already be taking measures to plan for capacity to address 
residual risk, assessing where such capacity is best placed (be it with the armed forces, police, or civil protection, or another 
appropriate entity). Failure to do so could result in significant cost, such as unnecessarily requiring international clearance 
operators to address what should be dealt with nationally and creating a problem which is both predictable and avoidable. 
Equally important is consideration of where the information management database will be housed, ensuring that when CMR 
are discovered post completion or on land which has been released through survey or clearance, it is possible to see what,  
if any, operations have been conducted on the location in question.
INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION STANDARDS (IMAS)
The International Mine Action Standards have ensured that demining programmes can attain an acceptable standard of 
competence, efficiency, and safety. These standards, which have been developed collaboratively, continue to evolve, and 
promote minimum good practice – most recently in Minimum Data Requirements – which are an appendix to the IMAS on 
Information Management.4 
Fenix Insight, a UK-based mine action company, has developed a valuable online repository for IMAS. All of the  
normative references in the IMAS (“shall”, “should”, and “may”) have been incorporated in a searchable database at  
https://mineaction.net. The IMAS serve as an invaluable tool for helping national authorities develop their own national  
mine action standards (NMAS) and standing operating procedures (SOPs) and Fenix’s online repository makes the IMAS  
more accessible than ever, providing a valuable tool for the mine action sector. 
COUNTRY COALITIONS AND OTHER COUNTRY-FOCUSED APPROACHES
Since the First CCM Review Conference in 2015, there has 
been a growing appreciation of the importance of adopting a 
country-focused approach to Article 4 implementation. In 2017, 
Germany launched the concept of the Country Coalition during 
its presidency of the CCM Seventh Meeting of States Parties. 
Country-focused initiatives enable national authorities 
and implementing partners in-country to collectively and 
constructively discuss local progress and challenges to 
Article 4 implementation. Regular in-country workshops 
that bring together relevant stakeholders and present 
progress reports and updates on Article 4 implementation 
can help improve coordination and demonstrate strong 
national ownership and political commitment to completion. 
There is a common misconception that such forums already 
exist in most affected States Parties; they do not. Whether 
called “Country Coalitions”, as promoted under the CCM, 
or “National Mine Action Platforms” (NMAPs), as promoted 
under the APMBC, such forums should be established in 
affected States Parties wherever there are multiple land 
release actors.
A “Mine Action Forum” has been established in Lebanon in 
close partnership between the Lebanon Mine Action Centre 
(LMAC) and Norway, providing an informal platform for LMAC 
to pursue dialogue and collaboration with donors, clearance 
operators, and partner organisations, and to discuss 
priorities and needs in cluster munition and mine survey and 
clearance at the national level. It is an example of a Country 
Coalition, but in the case of Lebanon it was agreed the forum 
should be broadened to include landmines, and not just focus 
on CMR. The GICHD facilitated the initial Mine Action Forum 
workshops and the forum now meets twice a year, with the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) designated 
as the secretariat to follow up and develop progress reports 
between meetings. The Lebanon model is worth considering 
by other CMR-contaminated States. 
Fulfilment of Montenegro’s Article 4 obligations was 
facilitated by the creation of a Country Coalition in 2018, 
between Montenegro, Norway (as the lead support State/
donor), and NPA as the implementing partner. This Coalition 
provided an excellent forum in which to effectively plan for 
completion of clearance by Montenegro’s 1 August 2020 
Article 4 deadline. The approach included establishment of a 
joint working group to support the planning and prioritisation 
of CMR tasks; a clear division of roles and responsibilities; 
transparent discussions and sense of common ownership; 
and an enabling environment for mine action. NPA supported 
the capacity development of the national authorities through 
refresher training on destruction of BLU-97 and MK118 
Rockeye submunitions, and the development of new SOPs  
for both non-technical and technical survey.
4 IMAS 05:10 on Information Management for Mine Action, IMAS, available at: bit.ly/3bRGIaP.
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THE SECOND CCM REVIEW CONFERENCE
The Second CCM Review Conference in Lausanne in 
November 2020 is expected to adopt an Action Plan to 
guide the work of the States Parties for the coming five 
years. Fulfilling the obligations in Article 4 will be high on 
the agenda. The Conference will need to consider extension 
requests by BiH (which has requested an eighteen-month 
deadline extension to 1 September 2022), Chile (a one-year 
interim request to enable necessary technical survey to 
occur) and by Lebanon. Lebanon has requested a five-year 
extension, and in line with its new national mine action 
strategy, now aims to complete clearance by the end of 2025. 
Synergies between implementation of Article 4 of the CCM 
and Article 5 of the APMBC are numerous. The APMBC’s 
Oslo Action Plan benefitted from drawing many of the 
positive developments in the Dubrovnik Action Plan adopted 
at the CCM’s First Review Conference. In a similar way, 
the Lausanne Action Plan has drawn on the developments 
reflected in the Oslo Action Plan.
As at 1 October 2020, all but three of the 110 States Parties 
to the CCM (Cuba, Lao PDR, and Lebanon) are also States 
Parties to the APMBC. Of the 10 CCM States Parties which 
have CMR-contaminated areas and thus Article 4 obligations, 
all but two (Chile, which completed anti-personnel clearance 
in February 2020, and Germany) also have anti-personnel 
mine contamination. States contaminated by both mines 
and CMR typically address this under a single national mine 
action programme, with one combined national strategic 
plan, set of national standards, and information management 
database. There is typically one group of donor stakeholders 
and organisations undertaking land release. 
The effective implementation of the two disarmament treaties 
is thus best served by ensuring coherence between action 
plans and initiatives such as the CCM Country Coalition or the 
APMBC National Mine Action Platform. In this way, priorities 
can be set in accordance with established humanitarian 
and development criteria. Both treaties can and should be 
implemented at the same time, in harmony not dissonance.
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KEY DATA LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
CLEARING CLUSTER  
MUNITION REMNANTS 
2020
(INCLUDING 187  
THROUGH SPOT TASKS)
(MINE ACTION REVIEW 
CALCULATION)
CLUSTER MUNITION  
CONTAMINATION: LIGHT
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Afghanistan added four previously unrecorded cluster munition hazards to the database in 2019, more than the amount  
of cluster munition-contaminated areas released and resulting in a rise in the amount of contamination remaining.  
Clearance dropped significantly in 2019 from the previous year’s level, attributed by the Directorate of Mine Action (DMAC)  
to funding constraints.  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Afghanistan should ensure funding, if necessary from national sources or alternative donors, to achieve the earliest 


















































ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2022 
ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
AFGHANISTAN













(20% of overall score)
9 9 Afghanistan has a small amount of known cluster munition-contaminated area to 
clear to fulfil its Article 4 obligations although it continues to identify previously 
unrecorded hazards, underscoring the possibility further areas for clearance will 
emerge over time. 
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
8 8 The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) is nationally managed but most 
DMAC salaries and operations are funded by international donors and CMR clearance 
has been funded by one donor, the United States.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
6 6 DMAC is committed to mainstreaming gender which features in the 2016–20 
strategic plan but national operators have made slow progress putting the plan into 
practice. While women are hired in community liaison and risk education as well as 
administrative positions, only one operator has employed women in clearance and 
recruitment of women in Afghanistan’s deeply conservative society continues to be 
limited. Mixed-gender explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) and survey teams 




(10% of overall score)
8 8 DMAC has an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New 
Generation database and is preparing to upgrade to IMSMA Core with support from 
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Operators 
say DMAC’s data entry can be slow but it provides a range of reports and extensive 
disaggregated information. Afghanistan routinely submits comprehensive Article 7 
transparency reports, though often late. 
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
8 8 DMAC’s national work plan for 2020 provided for clearance of all remaining seven 
cluster munition-contaminated areas, subject to availability of funding and access 
to tasks in conflict-affected areas. Two hazardous areas added in 2020 might also 
be cleared in 2020 depending on funding. DMAC remains confident of completing 
clearance by late 2021. 
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
7 7 The MAPA has national mine action standards in Dari and English that are subject 
to regular review. CMR survey and clearance are addressed in AMAS 06.02 (Battle 
Area Clearance).
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 4 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
8 8 The amount of cluster munition-contaminated area released in 2019 dropped by one 
third compared to the previous year, which DMAC attributed to lower funding. But it 
remains confident of completing clearance by October 2021, several months ahead of 
its Article 4 deadline of 1 March 2022.
Average Score 7.8 7.8 Overall Programme Performance: GOOD
CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority 
(ANDMA)
 ■ Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC)
 ■ Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation  
in Afghanistan (AREA)
 ■ Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA)
 ■ Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA)
 ■ Mine Detection Centre
 ■ Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan 
Rehabilitation (OMAR)
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Danish Demining Group (DDG)
 ■ The HALO Trust
 ■ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
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UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Afghanistan had more area affected by cluster munition remnants (CMR) at the end of 2019 than a year earlier after 
non-technical survey resulted in the addition to the database of four hazardous areas in eastern areas covering almost 
3.26km2. This raised the estimate of total CMR contamination to seven areas affecting more than 5.8km2 (see Table 1) , 41% 
more area than at the end of 2018.1 DMAC added two more CMR-contaminated areas in Nangahar province to the database  
in June 2020. These two confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covered a total of 1.67km2.2
Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area (at end 2019)
Province District CHAs Area (m2)
Nangarhar Pachier Agam 3 2,559,660
Paktia Zurmat 4 3,259,627
Totals 7 5,819,287
The additions in 2019 and 2020 point to the continuing possibility survey will reveal additional previously unrecorded 
contamination. DMAC reported assigning a survey team to check reports of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in remote  
parts of Panjshir province.3
All remaining CHAs are said to contain remnants of the 1,228 cluster munitions containing some 248,056 BLU-97B 
submunitions dropped by the United States between October 2001 and early 2002.4 Operators conducting demining and battle 
area clearance tasks also report encountering scattered Soviet-era cluster munitions dropped during the decade-long war in 
the 1980s.5
CMR make up only a small part of Afghanistan’s extensive explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination, which includes 
a wide range of other unexploded ordnance (UXO). There are also hundreds of square kilometres of anti-personnel and 
anti-vehicle mine contamination, including mines of an improvised nature (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 
report on Afghanistan for further information). 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA), 
originally established in 1989, is led by DMAC, which comes 
under the Afghanistan National Disaster Management 
Authority. DMAC fulfils the role of a national mine action 
centre. From its headquarters in Kabul and seven regional 
offices, DMAC manages and coordinates the work of national 
and international implementing partners. 
DMAC provides strategic planning and annual work plans, 
sets priorities and standards, accredits operators, conducts 
quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC), manages the 
mine action database, and conducts resource mobilisation. It 
coordinates closely with operators through technical working 
groups that address planning and priority setting, survey, 
mechanical clearance, risk education and victim assistance. 
In 2018, it set up a separate technical working group to deal 
with AIMs.6
The MAPA is nationally managed but in 2019 remained 
almost entirely internationally funded. Since 2012, it has 
transitioned from being a project of the United Nations Mine 
Action Service (UNMAS) to national management, a process 
formally completed with the transfer of the last positions 
from UNMAS to DMAC in June 2018. The government paid 
salaries of 13 members of DMAC’s total staff of 144 people. 
Most of the remainder are paid by UNMAS and a small 
number (27) by the international Voluntary Trust Fund 
(VTF).7 The government earmarked a payment of AFS20 
million (approximately US$250,000) for a humanitarian 
mine clearance project for the first time in 2019 but lengthy 
bureaucratic procedures meant the funding was not received 
until 2020.8 The government pledged additional funding 
of about US$500,000 in 2020 for demining operations in 
Nangahar province’s Achin district.9
UNMAS continued to support DMAC in 2019 employing 32 
national and 3 international staff in 2019 providing technical 
advice, training, and capacity building. It expected to add 
two more international and one national staff in 2020. It also 
remained a major channel of funding, providing US$17.4 
million to the MAPA through the VTF for projects including 
survey, clearance, quality assurance, and risk education.10




GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
The MAPA has had a policy of including gender in mine  
action since 2014 and set gender mainstreaming as one 
of four goals of its 2016–20 strategic plan. It states that 
“achievable targets, reflecting prevailing circumstances 
and conditions, will be adopted to support and encourage 
progress wherever possible.”11
Progress in promoting gender and diversity, however, 
appears to be slow. DMAC employed only four women 
among its staff of 194 as of the middle of 2019 while the 
MAPA employed only 167 women out of a total workforce of 
6,772.12 Women work in operational as well as administrative 
roles but employing women in field operations in particular 
remains challenging in Afghanistan’s deeply conservative 
society. Female deminers were employed for the first time in 
2018 but operate in only one province, Bamyan. Mixed-gender 
explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) and survey teams 
are, however, working across the country.
The gender strategy and Afghanistan’s national mine action 
standards (AMAS) for community liaison underscore the 
importance of including women and girls as well as boys and 
men in non-technical survey, and pre- and post-clearance 
impact assessments and for equal access to employment 
for women. The strategy called for implementing partners 
(IPs) to identify forums in which to access under-represented 
groups, including women and girls, and to ensure data 
collection and reporting was disaggregated for gender and 
age.13 The AMAS also refer to the importance of consulting 
representatives of different groups, such as tribal and 
religious leaders.14 EORE teams are required to include a 
female and male trainer.15
DMAC has a technical working group on gender and diversity 
working with IPs to promote implementation. DMAC’s review 
of IP project proposals also ensures gender issues are 
considered in operational planning. It operates a hotline 
taking calls from affected communities which it said also 
allows interests of minorities to be taken into account.16 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
DMAC operates an Information Management System for 
Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation database (IMSMA 
NG) database and continued working with the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in 
2019 on cleaning up data as well as preparing to upgrade the 
database to IMSMA Core. DMAC expected the transfer to be 
completed in 2021.17 DMAC also worked with the GICHD on 
installing the Mine Action Reporting System (MARS), a mobile 
system designed for data entry in the field. DMAC conducted 
two workshops with UNMAS and IPs to introduce the 
system, which was due to go into service after IPs completed 
field testing in 2020. DMAC had planned to introduce a 
cloud-based data warehouse in 2020 but reported the project 
was delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic.18
Afghanistan submits comprehensive Article 7 reports 
annually and DMAC’s information department produces a 
range of monthly, quarterly, and annual reports as well as 
reports on request and maps.19 DMAC also holds monthly 
data coordination meetings which IPs said had resulted 
in improvements, but that entry of survey and clearance 
data continued to be slow because of a shortage of trained 
information management staff in DMAC. 
PLANNING AND TASKING
DMAC’s strategic plan for 2016−20 sets out four basic aims20 but identifies mine clearance as an “overarching goal”. 
Afghanistan’s Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request, drawn up with participation 
of implementing partners, foresaw completion of clearance of all known mine and ERW contamination by the requested Article 
5 deadline of 2023 and this remains a benchmark against which DMAC measures progress. 
DMAC also sets annual work plan with more specific targets determined by a matrix of indicators that takes account of civilian 
incidents, blockages caused by contamination, proximity to communities, and device types. For Afghan year 1398 (1 April 
2019–30 March 2020), they included building capacity for tackling abandoned improvised mines, strengthening the quality 
management system, setting up a research and development unit to explore the application of new technologies, investigating 
new tools and methods for survey, finalising a policy on liability, and setting up a database to record details of all trained 
deminers.21 A shortfall in donor funding and insecurity ensures Afghanistan will not meet its APMBC Article 5 deadline but 
DMAC still aims to complete CMR clearance within its CCM Article 4 deadline.22 
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Afghanistan has comprehensive national mine action standards that are International Mine Action Standard (IMAS)-compatible 
and subject to regular review. CMR survey and clearance are addressed in AMAS 06.02 (Battle Area Clearance).23 
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Two national IPs cleared CMR in 2019. Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA) conducted five of the six tasks during the year 
and Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC) the other.24 Most operators tackle some residual CMR in the course of clearing mined 
and battle areas. 
Only manual clearance of CMR is conducted in Afghanistan.
DEMINER SAFETY
No accidents occurred during cluster munition clearance in 2019 but insecurity continued to pose a major threat to the sector 
and blocked access to many areas. The MAPA reported 22 security incidents in 2019 in the course of which three deminers 
were killed and a fourth was injured. DMAC said the three deminers who died were killed in an airstrike while working on their 
land. Fourteen deminers were abducted as part of extortion attempts by armed groups but later released unharmed after 
negotiations by community elders.25
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Afghanistan released 2.72km2 of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2019, all of it through clearance.26 However, of the 
2.72km2 cleared, Mine Action Review considered 1.65km2 to be CMR clearance and 1.07km2 to be clearance of other ERW.
SURVEY IN 2019
No cluster munition-contaminated area was cancelled or reduced through survey in 2019. Instead, non-technical survey 
identified four hazardous areas in the remote north-eastern areas covering a total of 3,259,627m2.27
CLEARANCE IN 2019
Although DMAC reported a total of 2.72km2 for 2019, Mine Action Review does not consider the 1km2 of clearance by DAFA in 
Nangarhar province as CMR clearance but as clearance of other ERW since only two submunitions were destroyed among total 
destruction of 1,207 items of unexploded ordnance. The 1.65km2 considered by Mine Action Review as CMR clearance in 2019 
was therefore a significant drop on the 4.24km2 cleared the previous year, a decline that DMAC attributed to reduced funding. 
The 5.82km2 of clearance recorded in Afghanistan’s initial Article 7 Report (covering 2019)28 represented the total area of tasks 
completed in 2019, including some started in 2018, and included area cleared in the previous year.29
Contamination on the six tasks tackled in 2019, resulted in clearance of 86 submunitions, compared with 217 destroyed in 2018. 
Another 187 remnants were destroyed in spot tasks, three times the number destroyed in spot tasks in 2018.30 










ATC Takhar 1 160,655 3 81
DAFA Nangarhar 1 1,072,230 2 1,205
DAFA Takhar 4 1,488,370 81 210
Totals 6 2,721,255 86 1,496
UXO = unexploded ordnance other than submunitions




ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR AFGHANISTAN: 1 MARCH 2012
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
Afghanistan had more cluster munition-contaminated area 
to clear at the start of 2020 than a year earlier following the 
addition of four hazards to the database in 2019 bringing the 
total to seven. DMAC added two more CHAs totalling 1.67km2 
in June 2020. DMAC said it had received pledges of funding 
from the United States for clearance of CHAs in Paktia and 
from UNMAS for clearance of the CHAs in Nangahar.32 As 
a result, DMAC remained confident that Afghanistan would 
meet its March 2022 Article 4 deadline and set a target of 
completing clearance by the end of October 2021.33
The main question marks over achieving that goal remained 
funding and security. Afghanistan reported the United States 
had agreed to fund clearance of the seven remaining cluster 
munition-contaminated areas during 2020.34 It also expressed 
the hope that peace negotiations between the government 
and Taliban would help to facilitate access to cluster munition 
hazards in areas of conflict.
Table 3: Five-year summary of CMR clearance
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KEY DATA LAND RELEASE OUTPUT




Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)’s new national mine action strategy for 2018–25 was adopted by the Council of Ministers in 
January 2019. It included the operational goal of completing cluster munition remnants (CMR) clearance by BiH’s Convention 
on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 clearance deadline 1 March 2021. However, BiH will not meet its clearance deadline and 
submitted an 18-month deadline extension request to 1 September 2022, which will be considered by States Parties at the 
Second Review Conference of the CCM in November 2020. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ BiH should adopt, without further delay, the amended demining law drafted in 2017.
 ■ BiH should implement the recommendations of both the 2015 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment, and the 2016 performance audit report of the Audit Office 
of the Institutions of BiH,1 which remain valid. In particular, BiH should continue reforming and strengthening the 
governance and management of the mine action programme.
 ■ The Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) should develop a detailed and costed Article 4 work plan, 
with concrete milestones for the release of all remaining CMR-contaminated area, including the area that is also 
contaminated with depleted uranium.
 ■ BHMAC should report more accurately and consistently on the extent of CMR contamination and on release of  
CMR-contaminated areas. This should be done using the classification of suspected hazardous area (SHA) and 
confirmed hazardous area (CHA), and by disaggregating CMR-contaminated area reduced through technical  
survey from area released through clearance, consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
 ■ BIH should fully embrace the “Country Coalition” approach, in partnership with Germany, which can provide 
a forum for regular dialogue among all mine action stakeholders to strengthen coordination and identify and 
overcome challenges. 
 ■ BHMAC should strive to improve gender balance in the sector, at the least by meeting the target of 40% 














































CLUSTER MUNITION  
CONTAMINATION: LIGHT
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2021 


















(20% of overall score)
6 5 In 2019, BiH removed 3.6km2 of contamination from individually fired submunitions 
from its CCM reporting (as this does not fall under the provisions of the Convention), 
thereby reducing the contaminated area remaining to be addressed under its Article 
4 obligation. BiH’s national baseline of CMR contamination is not classified into CHA 
and SHA, consistent with IMAS.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
6 7 National ownership of mine action in BiH falls under the responsibility of the 
Demining Commission and BHMAC. BiH’s National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 
was adopted in January 2019, but as at August 2020, the amended demining law 
(2017) was still awaiting parliamentary adoption. Governance of the national mine 
action programme needs to be strengthened and Article 4 implementation better 
coordinated to ensure early completion. 
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
5 6 The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 supports the 2003 Law on Gender Equality. 
BHMAC has stated that, under its leadership, relevant actors will include gender in all 
phases of all mine action activities. Two of the three members of the newly appointed 
Demining Commission are women. However, within BHMAC’s own programme, and those 
of clearance operators too, women make up only a small proportion of the total number 




(10% of overall score)
5 6 BHMAC is in the process of migrating from its own information management system to 
the new web-based system, IMSMA [Information Management System for Mine Action] 
Core, with the support of UNDP and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD). BHMAC does not report accurately and consistently on the extent 
of anti-personnel mine contamination or on survey and clearance output. BiH’s Article 
7 report covering 2019, contained errors in table totals for both contamination and 
clearance data. In addition, land released through technical survey was not disaggregated 
from release through clearance in the BiH’s reporting, as best practice demands.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
6 6 BiH adopted its National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 in January 2019, which 
foresees fulfilment of Article 4 by 1 March 2021. However, BHMAC failed to effectively 
plan for completion of CMR clearance early enough; and it appears to have been 
accorded less priority than mine clearance, which does represent by far the greater 
challenge in BiH. A “completion initiative” to address CMR contamination was finally 
elaborated in 2019, with BiH Armed Forces, entity Civil Protections, and Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA) tasked to release CMR-contaminated area. However, output has 
not been sufficient for BiH to be able to meet its deadline. Furthermore, progress 
in survey and clearance of CMR contamination in 2020 was being impacted by the 
COVID-19 pandemic. BiH will not complete CMR clearance by its March 2021 Article 4 
deadline and has requested an 18-month extension to 1 September 2022.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
6 6 BHMAC has in place national standards and standing operating procedures (SOPs) 
for survey and clearance of CMR, which are adapted to the local threat and context. 
There is sufficient available capacity for survey and clearance of CMR, with the BiH 
Armed Forces, entity Civil Protections, NPA, and other operators all accredited, but 
release of CMR-contaminated area has been insufficiently prioritised and BiH will not 
meet its March 2021 deadline. 
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 4 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
5 5 The rate of CMR clearance has been unacceptably slow, with less than 1.75km2 
of CMR-contamination cleared in the last five years. In comparison to landmine 
contamination, CMR in BiH was far less extensive and could have easily been 
addressed within the initial 10-year deadline given sufficient political will and 
commitment. However, planning for CMR completion came too late to meet its 
original Article 4 deadline and BiH has requested an extension to 1 September 2022.
Average Score 5.4 5.7 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE 
CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ The Demining Commission (representatives from three 
ministries (Civil Affairs, Security, and Defence) elected 
to represent BiH’s three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, 
Croats, and Serbs))
 ■ Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Armed Forces of BiH
 ■ BHMAC
 ■ Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska
 ■ Federal Administration of Civil Protection (FACP)
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR)
 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)
 ■ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
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UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
As at the end of 2019, BiH reported a total of 2.31km2 of 
CMR-contaminated area (see Table 1), with no disaggregation 
of CMR-contaminated area into CHA and SHA.2 In its Article 4 
deadline extension request, submitted in September 2020, it 
was stated that CMR-contaminated area had been reduced to 
below 2.14km2.3
This compares to 2.9km2 of contamination reported in 
September 2019 at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties,4 and 
contamination as at the end of 2018 of 6.3km2.5 The reduction 
in the estimate of contamination since the end of 2018 is 
mostly explained by the removal of 3.6km2 of contamination 
from items projected in an improvised manner from BiH’s 
baseline of CMR-contaminated area.6 This contamination was 
the result of individually launched KB-1 submunitions fired 
from modified AK-47 rifles,7 and was originally reported as 
2.7km2,8 and then as 2.1km2, but was subsequently confirmed 
as 3.6km2 through non-technical survey by Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA) and BHMAC.9 When used in this way, 
individual KB-1 submunitions do not fall within the definition 
of a cluster munition covered by the CCM, and, as such, are 
not governed by the treaty clearance obligations.10 BHMAC 
included reference to this contamination in its National Mine 
Action Strategy 2018–2025,11 and legitimately removed it from 
its Article 7 transparency reporting covering 2019. 
BiH’s remaining CMR to be addressed under Article 4 does, 
however, include a CMR-contaminated area that also contains 
depleted uranium, located in Japaga – Han Pijesak  
in Republika Srpska.12










Total Federation BiH 1.81
Total Republika Srpska 0.49
Total 2.30
A total of 0.65km2 of remaining CMR contamination is in areas 
which also contain mines.14 
CMR contamination dates back to the conflicts of 1992–95 
related to the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.15 A survey and initial general assessment of 
cluster munition contamination was jointly conducted by 
BHMAC and NPA in 2011, which estimated the total area 
containing CMR at more than 12km2, scattered across 140 
areas. This estimate was subsequently revised upwards 
to 14.6km2 following the start of land release operations 
in 2012.16 Of this, around 5km2 was deemed actually 
contaminated and marked for clearance.17
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
BiH is also contaminated by unexploded ordnance (UXO) other than unexploded submunitions and by anti-personnel and 
anti-vehicle mines (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on BiH for further information).
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Demining Commission, under the BiH Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, supervises the State-wide BHMAC and represents 
BiH in its relations with the international community on 
mine-related issues.18 The Demining Commission is composed 
of representatives from three ministries (Civil Affairs, 
Defence, and Security) elected to represent BiH’s three main 
ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs). Whereas the 
Minister for Civil Affairs remains ultimately responsible for 
mine action, the Demining Commission is the strategic body 
responsible for setting mine action policy, and it proposes 
the appointment of BHMAC senior staff, for approval by the 
Council of Ministers.19 
According to a 2016 audit office report, however, “The 
Commission has not developed a methodology on how to 
monitor the work of the BHMAC”.20 BHMAC, established by 
a 2002 Decree of the Council of Ministers, is responsible for 
regulating mine action and implementing BiH’s survey and 
clearance plans.21 BHMAC operates from its headquarters in 
Sarajevo, and two main offices in Sarajevo and Banja Luka, 
and eight regional offices (Banja Luka, Bihac, Brčko, Mostar, 
Pale, Sarajevo, Travnik, and Tuzla).22 
Since 2008, efforts have been made to adopt new mine action 
legislation in BiH with a view to creating a stable platform for 
mine action funding by the government and local authorities. 
As at June 2020, however, an amended text from 2017 was 
still awaiting parliamentary adoption. Clearer legislation on 
liabilities related to mine action activities would be beneficial 
to all mine action stakeholders in BiH.
The governance of BiH’s mine action programme needs 
to be strengthened and would benefit from improved 
communication and coordination with clearance operators, 
including through the re-establishment of technical working 
groups (TWGs), which provide a platform for operators to 
discuss, learn from each other, and work in synergies on 
matters related to operations. In addition, it is hoped that the 
“Country Coalition” established between BiH and Germany, on 
which there was an introductory meeting in February 2020,23 
will provide a forum for regular dialogue among all mine 
action stakeholders, help demonstrate national ownership, 
strengthen coordination of APMBC Article 5 and CCM Article 
4 implementation, and identify and overcome challenges, and 
monitor progress against the 2018–25 strategy. 




BHMAC is funded by the common institutions of BiH and 
other institutions at State level.24 BiH national State funding 
also supports survey and clearance of CMR. Operations of 
the BiH Armed Forces are supported by the State budget of 
BiH, while the Government of the Federation of BiH finances 
the operations of Federal Administration of Civil Protection 
(FACP).25 The Civil Protection Administration of Republika 
Srpska is financed by the Government of Republika Srpska.26
On 7 April 2020, it was announced that €10 million of 
European Union EU funding under the Instrument for 
Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) 2018–20 programme, which 
had been intended for humanitarian demining, had been 
diverted to COVID-19 and migration issues. The EU funds  
had been intended for support of mine action in BiH, including 
the procurement of protective equipment and supplies 
for BHMAC’s work, the entity Civil Protections, as well as 
financing of demining projects of priority areas.27
In its 2020 Article 4 extension request, BiH has said that 
it requires funds totalling 4.5 million BAM (approximately 
US$2.68 million) in order to fulfil its Article 4 obligations 
by its requested deadline of 1 September 2022. Part of the 
funding will be allocated from state budgets for the Armed 
Forces of BiH and the entity Civil Protections, and part will  
be sought from donors.28
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 specifies 
that: “Under the leadership of BHMAC, relevant actors will 
include gender and diversity into all phases of planning, 
realisation and follow-up of all mine activities”.29 The mine 
action strategy considered and supported the 2003 Law on 
Gender Equality in BiH, which includes equal treatment of the 
genders and equality of opportunity, and prohibits direct and 
indirect discrimination on the grounds of gender. The Law 
on Gender Equality determines that equal representation 
of men and women exists when the percentage of either 
gender in bodies at all levels in BiH (State, entity, cantonal, 
and municipality level) is at least 40%. BiH’s national mine 
action strategy also considered the 2017 Gender Equality 
Action Plan.30 However, as at August 2020, of BHMAC’s 171 
employees, only 42 were women (25%).31 Of BHMAC’s 107 
operations staff in the field, 10 were women (9%).32 BHMAC 
reported that it has a gender and diversity policy and that 
BHMAC upholds the Law on Gender Equality and routinely 
includes it in the development of strategies and standards.33
BHMAC has reported that it consults all groups affected 
by CMR, including women and children, during survey 
and community liaison activities, and BHMAC’s survey 
and community liaison teams are inclusive with a view to 
facilitating this. BHMAC also reported that relevant mine 
action data is disaggregated by gender and age.34 In a 
welcome development, two out of three of the new members 
of BiH’s Demining Commission, adopted on 30 April 2020, 
are women.35 Except for one reference to the provision of 
adequate gender- and age-sensitive mine risk education,36 
there was no other mention of either gender or diversity 
in BiH’s Article 4 deadline extension request submitted in 
September 2020.
The Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska 
reported that nearly 22% of its staff were female, including 
20% of managerial/supervisory positions, but only 5% 
of operational roles. It reported that during survey and 
community liaison activities, it cooperates with the local 
population, regardless of ethnicity; and where needed has 
representatives from different ethnic groups.37
NPA reports promoting gender equality in all aspects of its 
programme activities in BiH. Mixed gender representation is 
an obligation for NPA teams conducting community liaison 
and risk education.38 That said, NPA reported that the overall 
gender split of its staff as at March 2020 was 118 men and 
10 women, which represents only 8% female staff. Of its 82 
operational staff deployed in the field, three medic positions 
and one community liaison position are held by women. NPA 
explained that it rarely received applications from women for 
vacant operational roles.39 NPA says it is driving to achieve 
a gender balance, and that the programme encourages 
the employment of women, including into managerial and 
operational staff positions. Five managerial positions in 
the NPA BiH programme are held by women.40 During the 
implementation of its activities, NPA teams organise meetings 
with female representatives in smaller groups, to provide 
a forum in which women may feel more comfortable to talk 
about potentially contaminated areas in their community and 
NPA’s interventions.41
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
As at June 2020, BHMAC was using its own information 
management system, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine 
Action Information System (BHMAIS), but with the support of 
UNDP and the Geneva Institute for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD), and with financing from the EU, BHMAC was in the 
process of migrating to Information Management System for 
Mine Action (IMSMA) Core.42
The joint development of IMSMA Core in BiH began in 2019. 
Data from the country assessment project was originally 
expected to be transferred in March/April 2020 and the new 
database operational by mid 2020.43 As at May 2020, however, 
the transition from BHMAIS to IMSMA Core was only partially 
complete and the target was then set for completion by the 
end of the year.44 GICHD training in the new system was 
also planned for BHMAC staff, and will take place once the 
situation with COVID-19 permits.45 Once in place the database 
should be sustainable, through the programme will still be 
susceptible to potential challenges stemming from turnover 
of key staff positions in the BHMAC IM department. 46 
In addition, UNDP has developed a Geographic Information 
System (GIS) mobile application, which was also expected to 
be released in the course of 2020.47
BHMAC does not report consistently on CMR contamination 
by SHAs and CHAs, in a manner consistent with IMAS. In 
addition, there are frequent inaccuracies in BHMAC reporting 
on land release.
Information in BHMAC’s information management system 
is made available to clearance operators.48 However, NPA 
reported in March 2020 that data relating to CMR SHAs was 
being reviewed, with its support, and that BHMAC data on 
CMR-contaminated areas was neither accurate nor up to date.49 
In its September 2019 Article 4 extension request BHMAC did, 
however, provide more detailed information on the location 
and size of the remaining CMR-contaminated area.50
BiH submitted a CCM Article 7 report covering 2019, but 
failed to submit an Article 7 report the previous year, 
covering 2018.
PLANNING AND TASKING
In 2017, BiH developed a new national mine action strategy 
for 2018–25, with support from the GICHD, which addresses 
all mine and cluster munition remnant contamination. The 
previous BiH Mine Action Strategy for 2009–19 guided mine 
action in BiH, but did not mention CMR clearance specifically. 
The new strategy 2018–25 was formally adopted in January 
2019.51 Strategic goal three of the strategy on survey and 
clearance, includes a commitment to complete CMR clearance 
obligations by 1 March 2021, in line with BiH’s CCM Article 4 
deadline.52 However, the strategy did not contain an action 
plan or concrete milestones towards completion of CMR 
clearance.53 The strategy was due to be revised in 2020  
and 2023, to consider progress and adjust for any changes  
in context.54 
There was a “completion initiative” plan, agreed with BHMAC, 
the BiH Armed Forces, the FACP, and NPA, which aims to 
complete clearance of all remaining CMR-contaminated areas 
by 1 March 2020.55 The completion initiative received support 
from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swiss 
Government, and Norwegian cooperative COOP Norge SA.56 
However, progress in implementing the completion initiative 
was slowed by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and as 
a result of the failure of the Council of Ministers to appoint 
a Demining Commission to renew demining accreditations, 
including those of the BiH Armed Forces, the FACP, and 
NPA.57 The COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted survey 
and clearance operations, which were paused in the Spring 
and only recommenced in mid 2020. It also impacted BHMAC, 
which worked at reduced capacity.58 Furthermore, the 
completion initiative did not include the CMR-contaminated 
area with depleted uranium contamination,59 which is, 
however, still covered under BiH’s Article 4 obligations.
The completion plan fell behind schedule and BiH will not 
fulfil its Article 4 commitments before the March 2021 
deadline. BHMAC has requested to extend its deadline by 
18 months to 1 September 2022. The extension request, 
submitted for consideration and approval by States Parties in 
November 2020, included a work plan for release of remaining 
CMR-contaminated areas,60 but it lacks concrete milestones. 
The six CMR-contaminated areas, totalling 651,480m2, which 
also have anti-personnel mine contamination, will be cleared  
of mines first and then of CMR.61
The 2020 Article 4 extension request also includes reference 
to the CMR task that has contamination from depleted 
uranium, but does not say how BiH intends to address  
this task.62
According to BHMAC, cluster munition-contaminated areas 
are prioritised for clearance based on agreement with local 
communities and municipalities.63





STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In 2016, the Demining Commission formally adopted three revised chapters of the national mine action standards (NMAS)  
on land release, non-technical survey, and technical survey, drafted in cooperation with EU technical assistance through  
the Land Release pilot project, UNDP, and the GICHD.64 The Demining Commission adopted new standards for CMR at the 
beginning of 2017.65 
In 2015, BHMAC adopted a new national SOP for non-technical survey of areas suspected to contain CMR, based on NPA’s own 
SOP.66 In October 2016, BHMAC made updates and improvements to national SOPs for CMR clearance and technical survey, 
also based on NPA’s SOPs.67 In April 2018, the new SOP for non-technical survey was adopted by the Demining Commission.68 
BHMAC reported that survey or resurvey of hazardous areas suspected to contain CMR is conducted as standard, as part of  
all land release operations.69 According to NPA, national mine action standards in BiH are suitably adapted to the local threat 
and context, and enable efficient evidence-based survey and clearance of CMR.70
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Land release operations on CMR-contaminated area in 2019 
were conducted by non-governmental organisation NPA; 
entity Civil Protections; and the BiH Armed Forces.71 In its 
Article 4 deadline extension request, BHMAC said that the 
remaining CMR contamination will be released by these  
same entities. However, it also stated that CMR operations 
can be performed by Centar za humanitarno razminiranje, 
Detektor, In Demining NGO, and Stop Mines NGO, and that 
these organisations could be accredited and engaged, if  
and when a tender is issued for removal of the remaining 
CMR contamination.72
BHMAC asserts that the BiH Armed Forces and the FACP are 
equipped with necessary demining equipment and capable, 
trained personnel for CMR clearance.73 However, both have 
suffered from logistical challenges and equipment deficits in 
the past, which prevent them from working at full capacity.74 
Since 2010, NPA has increasingly focused on building the 
capacity of the Army’s Demining Battalion. This involves 
transfer of knowledge through operational planning of 
clearance and technical survey operations; direct operational 
support; and provision of mine detection dogs (MDDs) and 
equipment, among other things.75 The BiH Armed Forces 
require ongoing support to secure personal protective 
equipment, batteries for detectors, and fuel for demining 
machinery, since the Army’s own complex procurement 
system often cannot ensure delivery in time.76 In August  
2020, the Demining Battalion received a donation of 180 
demining visors from the US government, enabling 18 
manual clearance teams to be equipped.77
As at June 2019, two of the thirty-four BiH Armed Forces’ 
ten-strong demining teams (eight deminers, plus a team 
leader and a medic) were specialised and deployed in CMR 
clearance.78 Under the completion initiative, a third team was 
equipped for CMR survey and clearance operations, thanks 
to the provision by NPA of eight magnetic detectors, under 
a Swiss-funded contract. NPA also loaned the Demining 
Battalion its Digger D-250 and provided direct operational 
support for mechanical ground preparation.79 The Demining 
Battalion also receives support from Austria, France, Italy, 
and the United States, as well as European Union Force 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR), which alone provides 
90% of total support.80 Furthermore, deminers in the BiH 
Armed Forces are forced to stop demining at the age of 38 
(this upper limit, until recently, had been 35). This results in 
experienced deminers being forced to retire at a very early 
age and results in a high turnover of personnel.81 
The Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska 
conducts survey and clearance of mines, CMR, and other 
explosive remnants of war (ERW). One manual clearance 
team, of eight deminers, was used for technical survey of 
CMR in 2019, as well as for mines.82
In 2019, NPA deployed two manual teams (each with 10 
clearance personnel), for technical survey and clearance of 
CMR-contaminated area in BiH.83 As mentioned above, since 
2010, NPA has also focused on building the capacity of the 
Armed Forces Demining Battalion.
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) received operational 
accreditation in April 2017, and began demining in May 2017, 
but is engaged in landmine survey and clearance only.
The Demining Commission is responsible for considering 
the periodic re-accreditation of field operators, following the 
recommendation from BHMAC. Any delay in the appointment 
of the Demining Commission can therefore impact the 
re-accreditation process and have a knock-on impact on 
survey and clearance operations.84 This was the case from 
late October 2019, when the previous Demining Commission’s 
term expired, until 30 April 2020, when the new Demining 
Commission was put in place and accreditations could again 
be renewed or approved. The delay in appointing the new 
Demining Commission negatively impacted CMR operations, 
in some instances preventing the initiation of CMR clearance 
at the start of the demining season.85 
Quality control (QC) and quality assurance (QA) is conducted 
by BHMAC.86
No animal detection systems or mechanical assets were used 
in CMR survey or clearance operations in BiH in 2019. This 
is despite the fact that in 2017, BiH announced that technical 
survey and CMR clearance would also be conducted with the 
use of special detection dogs (SDDs), through NPA.87
In 2014, NPA successfully piloted using SDDs for technical 
survey and clearance of CMR-contaminated areas.88 It 
recommended the use of detection dogs in technical survey 
(both targeted and systematic investigation).89 However, 
as at August 2020, BHMAC had yet to make the necessary 
amendments to the national standards.
No cluster munition-contaminated area was reported to have 
been released by the FACP in 2019.90 
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of 0.72km2 of CMR-contaminated area was released in 2019: 0.27km2 through technical survey and 0.45km2 through 
clearance, during which 85 submunitions were destroyed. No area was cancelled through non-technical survey.91 
SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, 0.27km2 of CMR-contaminated area was reduced through technical survey, as reported by BHMAC to Mine Action 
Review and included in BHMAC’s Article 4 deadline extension request.92 In BiH’s Article 7 report, however, the amount of land 
released in 2019 was reported as a combined total of technical survey and clearance (see Table 2), rather than disaggregated 
and reported separately, as Article 7(1)(i) of the CCM and international best practice require.93 No CMR-contaminated area was 
cancelled through non-technical survey in 2019. 
CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, 0.45km2 of CMR-contaminated area was cleared, as reported by BHMAC to Mine Action Review and included in 
BHMAC’s Article 4 deadline extension request.94 In BiH’s Article 7 report, however, the amount of land released in 2019 was 
reported by BiH as a combined total of technical survey and clearance (see Table 2), rather than disaggregated and reported 
separately, as best practice requires.95
A total of 85 unexploded submunitions and 13 items of other UXO were destroyed during technical survey and clearance  
(see Table 2).96 
The 2019 land release output was, overall, a slight decrease on 2018, when a combined 0.75km2 was released (0.44km2 through 
clearance and 0.31km2 through technical survey).97
Table 2: CMR-contaminated area released through technical survey and clearance in 201998
Canton Area cleared (m²) Submunitions destroyed Other UXO destroyed 
Neretva 388,504 57 8
Tuzlanski 187,866 4 0
Total Federation BiH 576,370 61 8
Total Republika Srpska 144,063 24 5
Totals 720,433 85 13
BHMAC reported that all cluster munition-contaminated area cleared in 2019 contained CMR.99
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR BIH COUNTRY: 1 MARCH 2011
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2021
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: NO (MUST SEEK EXTENSION TO DEADLINE)
Under Article 4 of the CCM, BiH is required to destroy all CMR 
in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, 
but not later than 1 March 2021. BiH will not meet this 
deadline and has requested an Article 4 deadline extension 
to 1 September 2022 for consideration at the Second CCM 
Review Conference in November 2020.100
The rate of CMR clearance has been unacceptably slow, with 
less than 2km2 of CMR-contamination cleared in the last five 
years (see Table 3).
Table 3: Five-year summary of CMR clearance











A “completion initiative” plan was developed in 2019, between BHMAC, BiH Armed Forces, FACP, and NPA, aimed at fulfilling 
BiH’s obligations by the 1 March 2021 Article 4 deadline. However, as it was only elaborated in 2019, it left very little margin for 
delay. The impact of COVID-19 and delays to operations caused by the failure to appoint the Demining Commission in a timely 
fashion, which renews accreditations, means that the completion initiative will not be realised by the clearance deadline. 
BiH’s September 2020 Article 4 deadline extension request includes reference to the CMR task in the municipality of Han 
Pijesak, in the Republika Srpska, which also contains depleted uranium munitions remaining from NATO air strikes. However,  
it does not provide details of how BiH plans to address this contamination.101 The presence of depleted uranium complicates 
CMR clearance as deminers must be adequately trained and protected against exposure to the uranium. Previously, in 
February 2020, BHMAC had said it was discussing the possibility of assistance from NATO to clear this area.102
Given the relatively small scale of CMR contamination in BiH, especially compared to the far greater contamination from mines, 
BiH could have completed clearance within its original 10-year Article 4 deadline, had there been greater political will, national 
ownership, and commitment from BHMAC, the Demining Commission, and their superiors in the government. 
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
The National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025 includes a section on management of residual contamination, which requires 
the development of a strategy for the management of residual contamination by 2022. 
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Chad provided an estimate of the size of cluster munition-contaminated areas and reported the first clearance of land 
containing cluster munition remnants (CMR) in five years. The clearance was conducted by Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and 
Humanity and Inclusion (HI). European Union (EU) funding supported work by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) to 
clean up the national mine action database and improve reporting. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Chad should elaborate a completion strategy for Article 4 implementation, together with an annual work plan  
for the survey and clearance of remaining CMR-contaminated areas.
 ■ Chad should introduce national standards specific to CMR survey and clearance.
 ■ Chad’s Ministry of Economy and Planning should develop a resource mobilisation strategy for the mine  
action sector. 
 ■ Chad’s national mine action authority should disaggregate CMR from other explosive ordnance in reporting  
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ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 SEPTEMBER 2023 
UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
CHAD
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(20% of overall score)
4 3 Chad has for the first time reported the estimated extent of cluster 
munition-contaminated area. The basis for the estimate and the full extent of CMR 
contamination, however, remained unclear.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
3 3 Chad’s mine action authority coordinates the sector and carried out some 
restructuring to increase effectiveness in 2019 but government financial support 
is limited to paying staff salaries and some administrative costs while operations 
depend wholly on donor funding.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
4 4 Gender issues do not appear in Chad’s national plans but women are employed in a 
number of roles, including in managerial- and supervisory-level positions, though 




(10% of overall score)
5 3 The National Commission for Demining (HCND)’s mine action database has benefitted 
from FSD’s support through extensive data clean-up and improvements to reporting 
forms but official data and reporting of CMR survey and clearance do not clearly 
distinguish between CMR and other ordnance. Chad has submitted Article 7 reports 
for each of the past five years.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
3 3 Chad shows intent to tackle its explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination, 
including CMR, but has not developed a strategy for fulfilling its Article 4 obligations.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
5 5 Chad has International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)-compatible national standards 
but none specific to CMR survey or clearance.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 4 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
5 2 Chad reported release of cluster munition-contaminated areas for the first time in 
five years but inconsistencies in reported results left uncertain the precise extent. 
Average Score 4.3 3.3 Overall Programme Performance: POOR
CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ National Commission for Demining  




 ■ Humanity and Inclusion (HI) 
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
 ■ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ None




UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Chad informed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) 
signing conference in 2008 that it had “vast swathes of 
territory” contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance, 
including cluster munitions,1 but the extent remains unknown. 
Chad identified 146,638m2 of cluster munition-contaminated 
area in 2019, almost entirely located in the northern Ennedi 
region (see Table 1).2 In addition, some cluster bomb 
containers were spotted in the Wouda area of Borkou in 
March 2019, the first such items reported since 2015.3 
Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by region  
(at end 2019)4




Chad’s cluster munition contamination dates back to conflicts 
with Libya, which occupied northern areas between 1980 
and 1987. Chad stated in 2012 that while the precise extent 
of CMR contamination was not known, it was certain cluster 
munitions had been used in the Fada region and highly likely 
they had been used in other parts of the north.5 Chad also 
reported that, after Libyan troops withdrew in 1987, members 
of the French Sixth Engineers Regiment found and destroyed 
CMR around former Libyan positions and it suspected 
additional contamination remained in the Tibesti region.6
Chad said there was heavy CMR contamination in palm 
groves around Faya Largeau, which had caused many 
casualties.7 In January 2015, four children (three girls 
and one boy) were reportedly injured after handling a 
submunition in Faya Largeau.8 Also in 2015, MAG identified 
and destroyed a limited number of CMR, including two empty 
RBK-250-275 cluster bomb containers in the Tibesti region 
and an AO-1-SCh submunition in the Borkou region.9 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Chad’s mine action programme is coordinated by the National Commission for Demining (HCND), which comes under the 
Ministry of Economy and Development Planning.10 The HCND is responsible for preparing a national demining strategy, annual 
work plans, and proposing a budget to support them.11 The National Demining Centre (Centre National de Déminage, CND), 
which earlier conducted clearance operations, appears to have been dissolved. 
Government funding for mine action is limited to payment of salaries for national staff.12 Threats by former deminers over 
non-payment of salaries prevented some planned survey and clearance activities from proceeding in 2018.13 The long-running 
strike by deminers included threats by former personnel that have prevented operations in areas of Tibesti earmarked for 
survey and clearance.14 
A June 2019 decree provided for re-organisation, resulting in four main divisions covering: Operations and Logistics, Planning, 
Administrative and Financial Affairs and Human Resources.15 Operators say constant changes in coordination staff have 
hampered efficiency.16 They also report lengthy delays obtaining the permits required to import equipment as well as in other 
bureaucratic procedures. 
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
Gender was not discussed in Chad’s latest Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request 
and recruitment of female staff is not a priority for the HCND, 
which has undergone drastic downsizing in the past two years 
and still faces demands for back pay from staff. 
Nine women were among the 207 personnel working 
for the HCND in 2019; they were employed in a range of 
management, administrative, and field roles. They included 
the HCND’s assistant director, the administration and finance 
assistant director, and the head of risk education.17 The 
lack of women in HCND’s operational staff limited options 
for international operators whose deminers are seconded 
from HCND. As a result, HI employed women in managerial 
and administrative roles, including its country director, 
a human resources coordinator, and assistant finance 
director.18 The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) is advising HI’s programme in Chad on the 
mainstreaming of gender and diversity in their activities.19
In 2019, MAG employed Chad’s first female deminer as a team 
leader, overseeing survey and clearance tasks, conducting 
on-site quality control and reporting data. She had been 
trained in Benin to EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal] Level 
3. MAG also employed women in community liaison and 
administrative functions.20 
Operators report that risk education targeted all members of 
the community and that the resulting data was disaggregated 
by gender.21 MAG community liaison teams conduct focus 
group discussions with women, since they are better placed 
to provide information on contamination in some areas such 
as wadis where they collect water and firewood. Discussions 
led by a female community liaison officer identify women’s 
priorities for mine action interventions.22
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The HCND uses an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database but poor maintenance meant data 
available from it was unreliable because of lost reports and duplication. A clean-up of the database undertaken by FSD under 
the EU-funded PRODECO project that started in 2017 has now resulted in cancellation of large numbers of duplicate entries.23 
FSD also supported data entry and correction and the production of maps of SHAs, and helped to compile tables for Chad’s 
APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request. IMSMA forms were reviewed, updated, and approved at a workshop in 2019.  
With FSD support, the HCND also introduced standardised forms to be used by operators for weekly and monthly reporting.24 
But data and reporting of progress and output in CMR survey and clearance by the national authorities do not clearly 
distinguish between CMR and other ordnance. Chad has submitted Article 7 reports for each of the past five years.
PLANNING AND TASKING
Chad does not have a strategic plan for cluster munitions. Chad has said it plans to conduct non-technical survey in 2020–21  
to identify the location of cluster munition containers in Tibesti and Ouaddaï regions and to clear any contamination found in 
those areas.25
Since September 2017, Chad’s mine action programme has focused mainly on implementing the four-year (2017–21) EU-funded 
mine action project (PRODECO), which is being implemented by a consortium of three international operators and one national 
operator.26 HI was due to focus on survey and clearance in the Borkou and Ennedi regions; MAG was to work in the Tibesti and 
Lake Chad regions; and FSD would provide training and support for information management, while Secours Catholique et 
Développement (SECADEV) would address victim assistance.27 
Those objectives subsequently changed due to insecurity in Tibesti, which prevented MAG from gaining access and forcing 
it to redirect its demining teams to the Lake Chad area in the west of the country. The HCND acknowledged in its APMBC 
Article 5 deadline extension request that mine action in Chad had lacked a strategic vision, operational planning, and effective 
coordination, resulting in a loss of confidence locally and internationally.28 
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Chad has national mine action standards that are International Mine Action Standard (IMAS)-compliant but has no  
CMR-specific standards. 
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The HCND is Chad’s biggest demining operator, employing a total staff of 320 people in 2019, of whom 113 were seconded to 
HI and MAG.29 The HCND informed Mine Action Review that combined mine and ERW operational capacity at the end of 2019 
amounted to four manual demining teams with 72 personnel, two non-technical survey teams with six personnel, and two 
teams operating two mechanical assets with a total of seven personnel. Other capacity included two EOD teams with a total of 
16 technicians.30 Additional national EOD capacity is available from the Chad armed forces’ combat engineering battalion, which 
received training in demining and improvised explosive device (IED) clearance in May 2019 from two French army engineers.31 
The mine action component of the PRODECO programme funded by the EU was the only demining operation active in Chad in 
2019. HI, the PRODECO consortium lead agency, operated with a total staff of 76 people. These included 35 deminers in three 
multi-task teams and a survey team of five people who conducted survey and clearance of mined areas in the Kirdimi and 
Faya districts of Borkou province.32 The HCND said it would remain in the province in the first half of 2020 and work in Ennedi 
throughout the year.33 HI is understood to have used drones fitted with infrared cameras to conduct survey34 but provided no 
further details.
MAG worked with three 12-strong teams of manual deminers, four community liaison staff, and 24 support staff focused on 
clearance and risk education in northern Chad’s Borkou region, including road clearance to enable communications between 
towns in the north. MAG was supposed to have operated in Tibesti but was prevented from doing so by local conflicts. In 
consultation with the HCND and HI, it identified alternative areas and carried out an exploratory mission to Borkou in March 
2019 before starting operations in June. In 2020, MAG expected to shift operations to Ennedi region.35 




As part of the PRODECO programme, 10 HCND deminers were sent to the Centre de Formation au Déminage Humanitaire 
(CPADD) in Benin for training. Of those, nine qualified for EOD Level 3, the first time Chadian deminers have qualified at this 
level. Two other HCND staff qualified as quality assurance officers.36
FSD, working with four international and five national staff in 2019, focused on building capacity in the national authority with 
particular attention to information management, operations management, quality assurance, logistics, and administration.  
In 2019, FSD also supported production of maps, tables, and analysis for Chad’s APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request.37 
The HCND’s work plan for 2020 also called for FSD support for non-technical survey and technical survey in Salamat, Sila,  
and Wadi Fira.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
The HCND reported release of 4,658,723m2 to Mine Action Review in 2019. Of this, 520,801m2 was said to have been reduced 
through technical survey and 4,137,922m2—close to 90% of the total area—was released through clearance.38 That result, 
however, appeared to combine release of cluster munition tasks and battle area clearance (BAC). It was also inconsistent  
with Chad’s Article 7 Report, which recorded release of a total of 4,332,954m2.39
SURVEY IN 2019
Chad’s Article 7 report recorded cancellation of 100m2 
through non-technical survey and reduction of 29,727m2 
through technical survey.40 This was not consistent with 
reports from operators.
MAG reported that it had reduced an area of 510,506m2 in the 
course of technical survey in Borkou region during 2019.41 
The HCND reported to Mine Action Review area reduction of 
520,801m2.42 MAG agreed that it reduced a total of 520,801m2 
but said the cluster munition-contaminated area reduced 
through technical survey amounted to 510,506m2.43
Table 2: Reduction through technical survey in 201944




Chad cleared cluster munition-contaminated area for the first time in five years in 2019 but how much it released was unclear. 
Official data put areas released through clearance variously at 4.14km2 (reported by the HCND to Mine Action Review)45 and 
4.3km2 (reported in Chad’s Article 7 report).46 Those figures, however, appear to represent all BAC, rather than solely clearance 
of CMR. MAG said it cleared a total area of 3,780,512m2, of which 837,453m2 contained CMR. In the process, MAG destroyed 28 
submunitions, the only CMR destroyed in 2019.47 
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CHAD: 1 SEPTEMBER 2013
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 SEPTEMBER 2023
UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE 
Chad conducted modest survey and clearance in 2019 which 
represented significant progress after years without any 
movement on cluster munitions (see Table 3), but inconsistencies 
in data prevented a precise determination of the extent. 
The absence of any comprehensive or baseline data on the 
extent of CMR contamination in Chad also prevents a clear 
understanding of prospects for achieving completion within 
its Article 4 deadline. Chad needs to accelerate survey 
and clearance but lacks a clear strategy for optimising 
deployment of the limited capacity and resources available. 
A major concern is the future of international donor support. 
Mine action operations currently depend on a single donor, 
the EU, and its funding through the PRODECO project, which 
is due to expire in 2021. 
Table 3: Five-year summary of CMR clearance







* Based on MAG data
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In 2019, Chile released cluster munition remnant (CMR)-contaminated area for the first time since becoming a State Party 
to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in 2011, cancelling through non-technical survey 32.27km2 found not to be 
contaminated. In July 2020, Chile submitted a revised request for a one-year interim extension to its CCM Article 4 deadline. 
In its extension request, Chile provided information on the cluster munition-contaminated area and its survey and clearance 
capacity, detailing a plan to conduct technical survey in 2021, if sufficient resources can be secured. Chile will then submit  
a follow-on extension request, which will include a plan for clearance. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Chile should prioritise and complete the restructuring of its national mine action programme without delay,  
to ensure that the necessary management structure is in place to support the survey and clearance of  
CMR-contaminated areas. 
 ■ Chile should ensure that it dedicates sufficient resources to complete technical survey by its new interim  
Article 4 deadline.
 ■ Chile should submit a more detailed annual work plan once technical survey has been completed, including the  
actual capacity the Army, Navy, and Air Force plan to deploy at each of the four sites per year and annual targets  
for land release.











































CLUSTER MUNITION  
CONTAMINATION:
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2021 
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE: INTERIM EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 1 JUNE 2022
CHILE
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(20% of overall score)
5 3 Chile conducted non-technical survey in 2019 on the military ranges with cluster 
munition remnants (CMR) contamination and cancelled approximately one third of 
the total area. The contamination figure is still likely to be an overestimate as some 
clearance has already been carried out by the military.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
4 3 The Division of International Relations of the Undersecretary of Defence manages 
the implementation of the CCM. CMR survey and clearance will be carried out by 
the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units of the Army and Navy, and the recently 
created Air Force EOD unit. Technical coordination will be the responsibility of the 
new Defence Disarmament Commission which, as at September 2020, had still to be 
established. Chile carries out and funds all of its own mine action activities.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
6 6 Chile has taken steps to mainstream gender across the armed forces with women 
working at all levels of the mine action programme. However, the number of women 
employed in demining in 2019 was just 4%. Chile should take the next steps and 




(10% of overall score)
6 6 Chile uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database 
it updated in 2017. Chile has submitted CCM Article 7 reports annually since 2012. 
In January 2020, Chile submitted an initial draft Article 4 deadline extension 
request to 2026, but in July 2020 it submitted a revised request, seeking an interim 




(10% of overall score)
5 3 Chile has a National Plan for Demining and Clearing Military Polygons 2020–26 that 
includes goals for CMR survey and clearance. Chile included plans for technical 
survey of CMR-contaminated areas in 2021 in its revised extension request, as well 
as basic information on its survey and clearance capacity and an estimated budget  
to complete CMR clearance.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
5 5 Chile says it is guided by the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). It has 
designated survey and clearance responsibility for the CMR-contaminated areas 
to specific units within the Army, Navy, and Air Force with non-technical survey 
capacity deployed in 2019.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 4 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
4 2 Chile conducted non-technical survey of the CMR-contaminated areas for the first 
time in 2019, resulting in the cancellation of 32km2. Chile has stated that technical 
survey will also be conducted but cautioned that it is resource dependent. It is 
expected that Chile may be able to fulfil its clearance obligations quicker than 
expected if the CMR-contaminated area can be further reduced.
Average Score 4.9 3.8 Overall Programme Performance: POOR
CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ Division of International Relations, Undersecretary 
of Defence (Subsecretaría de Defensa, División de 
Relaciones Internacionales)
 ■ National Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional  
de Desminado, CNAD) 
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Demining Units of the Army Corps of Engineers
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STATES PARTIES
CHILE
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Chile reported that at the end of 2019 it had almost 65km2 of cluster munition remnant (CMR)-contaminated area in three of 
its fifteen provinces (see Table 1).1 This is a huge decrease from the almost 97km2 recounted in its previous Article 7 report 
submitted at the end of March 2019.2
Contamination is the consequence of deployment of cluster munitions on military training ranges. Since the reported extent 
represents the total area of military land used for training, and cluster munitions were only deployed in the impact areas or target 
areas, it is very likely that the actual extent of the contamination is still significantly smaller than the revised estimate. Chile has 
reported that, according to military procedures, clearance of unexploded submunitions or other unexploded ordnance (UXO) 
present in these areas has been conducted after use so it is unclear how much CMR contamination remains. The contaminated 
areas remain within military enclosures so are inaccessible to the public. In Arica and Parinacota, MK-II LAR 160 cluster munition 
rockets were used, while in Tarapacá and Magallanes and Antártica Chilena CB-250K cluster bombs were dropped.3 
Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by province (at end 2019)4
Province Military range SHAs Area (m2)
Arica and Parinacota Pampa Chaca Este 1 30,560,000
Tarapacá Delta 1 28,291,563
Tarapacá Barrancas 1 2,669,542
Magallanes and Antártica Chilena Punta Zenteno 1 3,090,019
Totals 4 64,611,124
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Chile is also affected, to a limited extent, by other UXO. On 27 February 2020, Chile declared itself free of anti-personnel mines, 
meeting its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 
report on Chile for further information).5
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The national mine action programme is managed by the National Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional de Desminado, 
CNAD), which is chaired by the Minister of Defence. Chile’s obligations under the CCM have, so far, been the responsibility of 
the Division of International Relations of the Undersecretary of Defence.6 It was initially planned that CNAD would assume 
responsibility for coordinating the demining units from the Armed Forces that would conduct survey and clearance of CMR. 
Under national law, however, CNAD may only manage the survey and clearance of anti-personnel mines and it was determined 
that a new body should be created to coordinate clearance of CMR and other ERW.7 A Defence Disarmament Commission (CDD) 
will be created and will act as an advisory body to the Ministry of Defence and as an inter-ministerial coordinator of Chile’s 
responsibilities under the CCM, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), and the APMBC. The DDC will have  
a Disarmament Work Unit (UTD) which will act as the national mine action centre.8
Chile is funding all its survey and clearance operations. For 2019, it budgeted approximately US$205,000 for explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) training and non-technical survey of CMR-contaminated areas.9 In its latest Article 7 report and 
revised Article 4 extension request, Chile is seeking financial assistance of approximately $1.4 million from the international 
community to replace and service demining equipment between 2021 and 2023. Chile has stated that it has made this request 
due to social challenges within Chile, such as those resulting from the COVID-19 outbreak.10 Chile has estimated that it will 
require approximately $10.5 million to complete clearance of CMR. In 2020, no financial resources have been allocated to CMR 
survey or clearance due to the COVID-19 outbreak. It is hoped that national financial resources will be allocated in January 
2021 to conduct technical survey next year, but it is not yet known if this will occur.11
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
While there is no specific gender policy within CNAD, Chile’s policy of integrating women into the armed forces has been in 
place since 2000. As at May 2019, 14.4% of total armed forces personnel were female. In 2016, restrictions on the type of 
military positions a woman could hold were lifted and legislation was adopted to modify the military grading system, allowing 
women to be promoted in the same way as men. Women have been working in demining in Chile since 2004 across all types  
of roles, including as deminers and in managerial/supervisory roles. 
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In 2007, the first woman was appointed as Manual Demining Section Commander in Arica. In May 2018, a woman was appointed 
as Demining Company Commander in Arica. Chile has made it easier for women to work in the sector by, for example, adapting 
demining equipment to better suit female specifications, providing childcare, and eliminating the gender wage gap.12 Chile 
reported that in 2019 of the 246 personnel carrying out roles within the demining units ten were women (4%). This included 
two demining section commanders and four women in support roles (one medic, two nurses and one paramedic).13 In a positive 
step, Chile stated in both its 2020 CCM Article 4 deadline extension requests that due to its awareness of the increasing 
importance of the implementation of gender perspectives in the field of disarmament, the Ministry of National Defense will 
promote women to the teams that will conduct CMR clearance.14
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Since 2003, Chile has been using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). During 2017, Chile upgraded  
to Version 6 of IMSMA after starting the MARS (Mine Action Reporting System) application that replaced IMSMA Mobile.  
This application has, CNAD says, equipped Chile with high-quality geographic information to support decision-making  
around clearance.15 This system was deployed in 2019, along with non-technical survey, to calculate the area of possible  
CMR contamination.16
Chile has submitted its CCM Article 7 transparency report every year since 2012. The past two Article 7 reports were the 
first to contain plans and updates on CMR survey and clearance. In January 2020, Chile submitted a first Article 4 deadline 
extension request to June 2026. Then in July 2020, Chile submitted a revised, interim request for a one-year extension to June 
2022, with a plan to submit another extension request once the estimate of remaining contamination has been established.
PLANNING AND TASKING
Chile stated in its July 2020 extension request that it will conduct technical surveys to further clarify the extent of the 
remaining CMR contamination during 2021. Chile will then formulate a plan for clearance of CMR that is dependent upon  
the results of the technical survey.
The four military ranges with CMR contamination are the responsibility of different military EOD units (see Table 2).
Table 2: Military units responsible for the release of CMR-contaminated areas17
Military range Unit responsible Estimated area (m2)
Pampa Chaca Este UDH Arica (Army) 30,560,000
Delta UDH Calama (Army) 28,291,563
Barrancas UDH FACH (Air Force) 2,669,542
Punta Zenteno UDH POMTA (Navy) 3,090,019
Total 64,611,124
The National Plan for Demining and Clearing Military Polygons 2020–2026 includes a set of provisions to comply with Chile’s 
obligations under the CCM, the APMBC, and the CCW. The plan is aimed at the implementing partners within the armed forces 
and government agencies.18 In its 2019 work plan, the National Directive for the Execution of Demining Activities, Chile included 
plans for non-technical survey of CMR-contaminated areas.19
In 2019, Chile trained 20 personnel in EOD Level 220 and 21 personnel in EOD Level 321 and conducted non-technical survey 
of the areas suspected to contain CMR.22 Information for the non-technical survey was derived from a desk assessment 
of military records of cluster bomb deployment and subsequent clearance; interviews with relevant parties; and a visual 
inspection of the terrain.23




STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Chile is guided by the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).24 In addition to the IMAS, Chile also follows the provisions 
and regulations as set out in the “Humanitarian Demining Manual of the Chilean Army” and the “EOD Procedures Manual”.25
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Survey and clearance of explosive ordnance is conducted by the EOD Units of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Navy and  
the Air Force. In 2019, only non-technical survey was conducted, with four units totalling eleven personnel deployed for  
the purpose.26
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
In 2019, Chile deployed four military EOD units to the suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), which cancelled 32.27km2 of SHAs 
through non-technical survey. No clearance of CMR-contaminated area took place.27 In 2018, no survey or clearance of 
CMR-contaminated area took place.
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CHILE: 1 JUNE 2011
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2021
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE EXTENSION SOUGHT (INTERIM ONE-YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED): 1 JUNE 2022
Under Article 4 of the CCM Chile is required to destroy all 
anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction 
or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 
2021. It will not meet this deadline and submitted a request 
in July 2020 for an interim one-year extension to its Article 
4 deadline, until 1 June 2022, in which it plans to complete 
technical survey of CMR-contaminated areas. Chile submitted 
this interim request due to uncertainty over the availability of 
financial resources for CMR survey and clearance due to the 
impact of COVID-19, which has damaged the national economy 
and diverted resources to other areas. In addition, as at 
July 2020, Chile was restructuring the national mine action 
programme, a process that it says will need to be completed 
before any land release can take place.28
In 2019, for the first time since becoming a State Party to the 
CCM in June 2011, Chile conducted non-technical survey of the 
CMR-contaminated area, cancelling approximately one third of 
the total estimated area. Chile has reported that the military 
ranges which are contaminated with CMR had previously been 
cleared following weapons deployment. However, as it is not 
known whether previous clearance of CMR contamination 
was conducted according to international standards, Chile is 
required to undertake technical survey and clearance to meet 
its Article 4 obligations to make “every effort” to identify and 
clear all cluster munition-contaminated areas. 
Table 3: Five-year summary of CMR clearance







PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
As at August 2020, Chile had not provided information on whether it had a plan in place for dealing with residual risk following 
completion. It is expected that this capacity will come from the Chilean military.
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3 Ibid.
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8 Ibid., p. 20.
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11 Revised Article 4 deadline Extension request, July 2020, p. 6.
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Juan José López Demuth, Executive Secretary, CNAD, 22 and 27 June 2019.
13 Carlos Rivera Bugueño, Senior Sub-Officer, CNAD, 6 August 2020.
14 2020 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 6; and Revised Article 4 deadline Extension request, July 2020, p. 5.
15 Email from Col. Andres Caceres Cuadra, CNAD, 12 July 2018.
16 Revised Article 4 deadline Extension request, July 2020, p. 4.
17 Ibid., p. 6.
18 Email from Col. Juan José López Demuth, CNAD, 27 June 2019.
19 Email from Col. Juan José López Demuth, CNAD, 22 June 2019.
20 Under IMAS 09:30, this includes the ability to determine when it is safe to move and transport munitions and to conduct simultaneous disposal of multiple items 
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21 Under IMAS 09:30, this includes the ability to render safe a wider range of munitions.
22 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.
23 2020 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Appendix 2, p. 1.
24 Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form F.
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27 2020 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 13; and Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.
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Croatia has reported fulfilling its Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 obligations, completing clearance of 
remaining cluster munition remnants (CMR) on 10 July 2020, several weeks ahead of its 1 August deadline. Completion in  
time was the result of strong national ownership and political will, national funding, and effective planning. While Croatia  
has cleared all known CMR-contaminated areas, remnants may be discovered post completion (residual contamination),  
and, as of writing, Croatia was planning for a sustainable capacity and systems to address this possibility. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Croatia should ensure that sustainable capacity and systems are in place to address any residual CMR threat that 
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COMPLETED CLEARANCE OF ALL  
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ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2020 
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CROATIA
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(20% of overall score)
9 8 On 10 July 2020, Croatia completed clearance of its last known CMR. As recently 
as 2019, however, areas of previously unrecorded CMR contamination continued to 
be discovered and Croatia recognises the importance of managing the residual risk 
from CMR.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
9 9 Croatia demonstrated strong national ownership and political will to complete 
fulfilment of its Article 4 obligations within its initial 10-year deadline, and with 100% 
national funding for CMR survey and clearance operations in 2019. In January 2019, 
Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) and the Office for Mine Action (OMA) were 
integrated within the Civil Protection Directorate under the Ministry of Interior.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
4 5 Gender policies and implementation regarding mine action in Croatia are addressed 
under the national Gender Equality Act, which includes guidelines on gender equality 
and regulates against gender-based discrimination. However, the proportion of 
women employed in mine action, both at Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC 
and in the commercial demining companies, is extremely low. In addition, CROMAC 




(10% of overall score)
9 9 Croatia has an information management system that is compliant with the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and which allows disaggregation by type 
of contamination and method of land release. Croatia provided regular, accurate, and 
consistent updates on its progress in Article 4 implementation at CCM meetings and 
in its Article 7 reports.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
9 9 Croatia has elaborated a new national mine action strategy, which it expected to 
adopt by the end of 2020 to replace the previous strategy that expired in 2019. In 
addition, Croatia had annual operational work plans for CMR survey and clearance.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
8 7 The 2015 law on mine action encompasses national mine action standards. CMR 
clearance in Croatia was focused on confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and Croatia 
maintained sufficient demining capacity to enable it to release remaining known CMR 
contamination in July 2020, ahead of its Article 4 deadline.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 4 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
9 8 On 10 July 2020, Croatia completed clearance of the last known CMR-contaminated 
area, fulfilling its Article 4 commitments ahead of its 1 August 2020 deadline. In 
2019, the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC cancelled all remaining cluster 
munition-contaminated area in Lika-Senj country and a further 45,563m2 was cleared 
by commercial operators in Sisak-Moslavina county, before completing land release 
operations in 2020. Croatia is planning how it will deal with residual risk and liability.
Average Score 8.3 7.8 Overall Programme Performance: VERY GOOD
CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ Ministry of Interior, in which CROMAC and OMA were 
integrated within the Civil Protection Directorate, 
effective as at January 2019
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Forty-four commercial demining companies are 
accredited for mine and CMR clearance operations.  
Of these, five were engaged in CMR clearance operations 





 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD)
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CROATIA
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Croatia was contaminated with unexploded KB-1 and Mk-1 
submunitions by the conflicts in the 1990s that followed the 
break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.1 It 
completed clearance of its last known CMR contamination on 
10 July 2020, thereby fulfilling its obligations under Article 4 
of the CCM.2 
At the end of 2019, Croatia had only three remaining 
confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) containing CMR, covering 
a total area of 33,079m2, across four counties (see Table 1).3 
This compared to reported contamination a year earlier of 
less than 266,116m2.4 During 2019, the county of Lika-Senj 
was declared free of CMR, through non-technical survey by 
the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC.5 All remaining 
cluster munition-contaminated area was then released in 
2020, ahead of Croatia’s 1 August 2020 deadline. However, 
small areas of previously unrecorded CMR contamination 
continue to be discovered, such as the 10,911m2 of previously 
unrecorded CMR contamination added to the database 
in 2019, and Croatia recognises the possibility of further 
unforeseen CMR findings.6
Table 1: Cluster munition- contaminated area by county  
(at end 2019)7





OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Croatia is heavily contaminated by unexploded ordnance (UXO) other than submunitions and by anti-personnel mines  
(see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Croatia for further information on the mine problem).
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In August 2018, the Croatian government formally concluded 
that some 54 government agencies, including Croatian Mine 
Action Centre (CROMAC) and the Office for Mine Action (OMA), 
were to be integrated within existing state administration 
bodies. This was formally concluded through two pieces of 
legislation enacted in December 2018 and which entered into 
force on 1 January 2019.8 As a consequence of these laws, 
CROMAC and OMA ceased to exist as separate government 
entities and CROMAC became an “operational sector” 
within the Civil Protection Directorate, under the Ministry 
of Interior.9 The main rationale for this was said to be “the 
establishment of a more relevant and operationally wider 
national institution (Civil Protection Directorate) that could 
more efficiently and effectively tackle all of the aspects of 
civil protection in the Republic of Croatia, including mine 
action activities”.10
Prior to 2019, both CROMAC (established in 1998 as the 
umbrella organisation for mine action coordination),11 and the 
OMA (created in 2012 as a government focal point for mine 
action),12 had operated as independent entities. 
A new law on mine action was adopted by the Croatian 
parliament on 21 October 2015.13 While the 2015 Law, which 
was initiated by the OMA with the text drafted by the Ministry 
of Interior, marked an improvement in certain respects 
(for instance, by permitting land release through technical 
survey), there were concerns that the new law would impede 
efficient and effective mine action.14 
Regarding accreditation, the Ministry of Interior now  
provides three separate permits: approval for manual  
mine detection; approval for mechanical mine detection;  
and approval for operations by mine and explosive detection 
dogs (MDDs and EDDs). This replaces the former unified 
accreditation licence.15
In 2019, some €70,000 was spent on survey and clearance 
of CMR-contaminated area. Funding for CMR land release 
operations is said to have been fully resourced in Croatia’s 
annual demining plan.16
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
As an integral part of the Ministry of Interior, the Civil Protection Directorate implements the Gender Equality Act (Official 
Gazette 82/08 and 69/17), which establishes national guidelines for gender equality, regulates against gender-based 
discrimination, and creates equal opportunities for men and women, including with regard to employment.17
According to the national authorities, women, men, boys and girls are all effectively consulted during survey and community 
liaison activities.18 CROMAC survey data are not, however, disaggregated by sex and age.19
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Within the Civil Protection Directorate of the Ministry of Interior, CROMAC employs 91 people, of whom 12 (13.2%) are women. 
As at April 2020, no women were employed in managerial or supervisory level positions in CROMAC. Furthermore, CROMAC’s 
27 deminers and 2 auxiliary workers were all men.20
As at 30 March 2020, there were 45 accredited commercial demining companies, employing 443 deminers. Only six deminers 
(1.4%) were female and of the 131 work-site leaders/deminers, just one was a woman. Of the 78 auxiliary workers, 6 (7.7%) 
were female.21 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
For the purpose of information management, CROMAC established a mine information system (MIS), which is said to be 
compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and customised to meet CROMAC’s needs. The MIS uses 
databases and a geographic information system (GIS) to deliver a fully integrated information management system.22 
Croatia submitted accurate and consistent annual Article 7 transparency reports and provided valuable updates on its 
progress in Article 4 implementation at the CCM meetings of States Parties.
PLANNING AND TASKING
Croatia’s national mine action strategy for 2009–19 was drafted by CROMAC with the agreement of concerned ministries, 
the OMA, the National Protection and Rescue Directorate, and local administration and self-administration bodies whose 
responsibility covers regions with hazardous areas.23 The strategy, which was adopted by the Croatian Parliament, included 
among its main goals the completion of mine clearance by 2019, which was not achieved.24 
The Ministry of Interior has elaborated a new strategy, covering 2020–26 which it expected to be adopted by the Croatian 
Parliament by the end of 2020, assuming no unforeseen events.25 
Based on approved funding, the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC drafts annual work plans, which are submitted to 
the responsible ministries and other State bodies for comment and approval.26 All CMR-contaminated areas were said to be 
cleared in accordance with county and State priorities.27 
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The 2015 law eliminated the need for standing operating procedures (SOPs), as all aspects of mine action were defined  
in detail.28 National mine action standards are also encompassed within it.29
CMR clearance in Croatia was focused on releasing CHAs. In 2019, submunitions were discovered and destroyed in all 
CMR-contaminated areas that were cleared.30
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Non-technical survey in Croatia is conducted by the Civil 
Protection Directorate – CROMAC. In 2019, it had one 
non-technical survey team with two personnel, for survey of 
cluster munition-contaminated areas.31 In 2018, CROMAC had 
deployed nine non-technical survey personnel.32 The decrease 
was the result of personnel employed by CROMAC not being 
taken on by the Ministry of Interior following CROMAC’s 
integration within the Civil Protection Directorate at the start 
of 2019. Some of the survey personnel previously employed by 
CROMAC were retired or moved to other companies.33
In 2019, 44 commercial companies were accredited to 
conduct mine and CMR clearance.34 Of this, five companies 
were engaged in CMR clearance operations in 2019 (see Table 
2).35 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are barred from 
competing for commercial tenders as CROMAC views their 
subsidy by other funds as unfair.36
Table 2: Clearance capacity (at end 2019)37
Operator Manual teams No. of deminers
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CROATIA
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of 243,948m2 of CMR-contaminated area was released in 2019, of which 45,563m2 was cleared and 198,385m2  
was cancelled through non-technical survey. No CMR-contaminated area was reduced through technical survey in 2019.  
In addition, almost 10,911m2 of previously unrecorded CMR contamination was added to the database in 2019.38 
Croatia completed clearance of all known CMR contamination on 10 July 2020.39
SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, 198,385m2 was cancelled through non-technical survey in Lika-Senj county (see Table 3), resulting in the county 
becoming free of CMR. This was a significant increase on 2018, when 16,436m2 of CMR-contaminated area was cancelled  
by non-technical survey.40 No CMR-contaminated area was reduced through technical survey in 2019 or 2018.41
In addition, 10,911m2 of previously unrecorded CMR contamination was added to the database in 2019.42 
Table 3: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 201943
County Operator Area cancelled (m²)
Lika-Senj Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC 198,385
Total 198,385
Cancellation through non-technical survey in 2019 was the result of comprehensive analysis of the location of previous CMR 
and containers in the surrounding area, which were precisely defined, in addition to new information and data collected in the 
local community.44
CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, Croatia cleared 45,563m2 of CMR-contaminated area in Sisak-Moslavina county, destroying 186 KB-1 submunitions and 
1 other item of UXO (see Table 4).45 This was a significant decrease in output on 2018, when 860,308m2 of CMR-contaminated 
area was cleared, destroying a total of 571 KB-1 submunitions.46 
Table 4: CMR clearance in 201947
County Operator Area cleared (m2) Submunitions destroyed
Sisak-Moslavina Alfa Razminiranje, Fas, Fas-pro,  
Fossio, Loco, and Taurus
45,563 186
Totals 45,563 186
All cluster munition-contaminated areas cleared in 2019 were found to have CMR.48 
As part of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks and the continued “less arms, fewer tragedies” programme, the 
Croatian police (under the Ministry of Interior), and in partnership with the UNDP, also collected 12 submunitions, 103 
anti-personnel mines, and 38 anti-vehicle mines, along with items of UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance. All munitions 
were transported to Croatian military facilities and destroyed.49
PROGRESS IN 2020
Clearance of all remaining known CMR contamination was completed on 10 July 2020.50 Detailed results of survey and 
clearance in 2020 have not yet been provided.
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ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CROATIA: 1 AUGUST 2010
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2020
REPORTED HAVING FULFILLED ARTICLE 4 OBLIGATIONS ON 10 JULY 2020
Croatia completed CMR clearance on 10 July 2020, fulfilling 
its obligations under Article 4 of the CCM, three weeks 
ahead of its 1 August 2020 deadline. In its communiqué to 
the Implementation Support Unit of the CCM, dated 31 July 
2020, Croatia said that “due to the pandemic COVID-19, the 
Declaration of Compliance is still being finalized and will be 
officially transmitted at a later stage”.51
Croatia cleared a total of approximately 3.55km2 of 
CMR-contaminated area over the past five years (see Table 5). 
Challenges to CMR clearance were posed by rocky, forested, 
and mountainous areas, which prevented use of demining 
machines. In addition, use of demining machinery is not 
permitted in areas designated as protected for conservation.52 
Table 5: Five-year summary of CMR clearance







PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
In 2019, the Civil Protection Directorate continued research cooperation and discussions with the Geneva Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) on the issue of national survey and clearance capacity to address explosive ordnance 
discovered after the release of contaminated areas or post completion (i.e. residual contamination). In August 2019, a joint 
study entitled “National capacities and residual contamination in Croatia” was published, documenting progress so far and 
highlighting the importance of a participatory and transparent long-term strategic planning progress.53 The integration of 
CROMAC within the Ministry of Interior, which took effect from January 2019, is reported to be one of the first steps to deal  
with residual risk and liability, and it is believed that this will elevate the importance of the issue within the Ministry of 
Interior.54 The integration also means that the challenge of residual risk will be handled within the responsibilities of the 
Ministry of Interior – Police Directorate EOD teams and the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC.55
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KEY DATA LAND RELEASE OUTPUT




In 2019, Germany made solid process in clearance of cluster munition remnants (CMR) at the former military testing facility 
at Wittstock. Working with a capacity of 120 personnel, 1.21km2 of contaminated area was cleared in 2019, a 60% increase on 
output in the previous year. In addition to submunitions, the site is also contaminated with a range of other explosive ordnance 
which has to be cleared along with the CMR. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Germany should assess ways in which it can speed up release of cluster munition-contaminated area, to ensure  
that it fulfils its Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 obligations before its extended deadline of 
1 August 2025. This could involve amending national legislation to allow international contractors to conduct 
clearance more quickly. 
 ■ For ease of reference, Germany should ensure that its annual Article 7 transparency report includes the amount  
of CMR contamination remaining at the end of the reporting period and the annual clearance output, rather than  













































ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2025 
UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
GERMANY














(20% of overall score)
8 8 Germany has a good understanding of the extent of its sole CMR-contaminated area 
in a former Soviet military training area at Wittstock in the east of the country. Due 
to the lack of detailed data on the former testing of weapons at the site, and the 
significant amount of other unexploded ordnance (UXO), Germany has not been able 
to more accurately determine the extent and density of CMR.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
8 8 There is now strong national ownership and commitment to release the sole 
CMR-contaminated area. Roles and responsibilities for clearance are clear, coherent, 
and entirely funded by the federal government, albeit at a relatively high cost. 
German law prevents the contracting of overseas commercial clearance operators 
or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for CMR clearance.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
7 7 There is equal access to employment for qualified women and men for explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD), including of CMR, though women only make up a small 
proportion of the sector in Germany, particularly in EOD positions. At Wittstock,  
two woman hold an EOD licence, and a further eight female UXO specialists are 
engaged operationally – an increase on the previous year. The on-site project 
management and clearance supervision company employs one female engineer  




(10% of overall score)
7 6 Germany has reported on progress to survey and clear CMR contamination in both 
its Article 7 reports and in its Article 4 deadline extension request. The request 
submitted and granted in 2019 was of a high quality, with clear annual milestones 
for clearance, through to Article 4 completion. However, in its Article 7 reporting, 
Germany should reduce the annual contamination baseline of CMR contamination, 
which has remained at 11km2 for several years, to reflect land released annually 
clearance as work progresses. In addition, Germany should report annual clearance 
output in its Article 7 reporting, as the CCM requires, and not solely cumulative 
clearance output to date.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
8 8 Germany has a completion plan in place to address the remaining CMR 
contamination, with realistic annual clearance goals, based on forecast capacity  
and output. 
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
7 7 Germany is restricted from conducting technical survey or from using mechanical 
assets, due to the high level of explosive ordnance contamination at the site, which 
includes different types of UXO, with varying spatial distribution of contamination, 
resulting from overlapping contamination from multiple weapon types.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 4 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
6 5 In 2019, Germany requested and was granted a five-year extension to its Article 4 
clearance deadline until 1 August 2025. It plans to complete CMR clearance before 
the end of 2024, based on existing capacity and subject to available burnt area for 
clearance, favourable weather conditions, and the density of the contamination 
discovered. In 2019, it cleared 1.21km2, a 60% increase on the previous year, but still 
below the annual target in its Article 4 deadline extension request.
Average Score 7.2 6.9 Overall Programme Performance: GOOD
CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ The Wittstock site is administrated and project managed 
by the Federal Forestry Agency as a subdivision of the 
Institute for Federal Real Estate (BImA), with support 
from the Central Office of the Federal Government for 
UXO Clearance and a consulting engineer. 
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Commercial UXO clearance contractors: Röhll 
Munitionsbergung GmbH (Brandenburg (Havel)) and 
Schollenberger Kampfmittelbergung GmbH (Celle)
 ■ On-site project management/clearance supervision 
company
 ■ Destruction of CMR and other ordnance is the ultimate 
responsibility of the Brandenburg state explosive 
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UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
As at the end of 2019, Germany reported 8.56km2 of remaining 
cluster munition-contaminated area at a former Soviet 
military training area at Wittstock, Brandenburg, in former 
East Germany.1
In its latest Article 7 transparency report, covering calendar 
year 2019, Germany reported approximately 11km2 of area 
suspected to contain CMR, unchanged from the original 
contamination level, despite clearance in 2017–19. However, 
while Germany did not specify the amount of remaining CMR 
contamination as at the end of 2019 in its Article 7 report, as 
required under the CCM, it did report the cumulative CMR 
clearance output at Wittstock to-date (2.44km2), allowing 
calculation of the remaining contaminated area as at the end 
of 2019.2
A wide range of Soviet-era submunitions have been found 
at Wittstock: AO-1 SCh, AO-1 M, AO-2.5, AO-2.5 RTM, AO-10 
SCh, ShOAB-0.5, PTAB-1, PTAB-1 M, PTAB-2.5 M, PTAB 2.5 TG, 
PTAB-10.5, ZAB 1-E, ZAB 2.5M, ZAB 2.5 S, and ZAB 2.5.3
CMR were discovered “by chance” at Wittstock and declared 
in June 2011, first at the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC) intersessional meetings and then a week later at 
the CCM intersessional meetings.4 From 2011 to early 2014, 
suspected CMR contamination was reported to total 4km2.5 
In August 2014, however, Germany reported that the total 
suspected hazardous area (SHA) was actually 11km2.6 The 
increased estimate was ascribed to discovery of submunitions 
during non-technical survey across a wider area than 
previously reported.7 According to Germany, the dense 
vegetation cover and the special hazards posed by CMR and 
other explosive ordnance did not allow for technical survey.8
The entire Wittstock site, which extends over 120km2, is 
heavily contaminated with various kinds of unexploded 
ordnance (UXO), in varying special distribution and overlapping 
contamination, as a result of use of the site for military training 
purposes in 1945–93.9 The 11km2 of CMR contamination is in 
the area of a mock airfield within the site, which was used by 
the air force for bombing practice; by the army for artillery 
firing exercises; as well as for general military exercises and 
training. Usage involved a wide range of munitions over a 
period of four decades. Only general information on historical 
use of cluster munitions at the site is available and the degree 
of contamination from submunitions and other UXO is not 
known for a large part of the hazardous area.10 
In early October 2011, ownership of Wittstock was transferred 
from the military to the federal government authority in 
charge of real estate, Institute for Federal Real Estate (BImA). 
BImA implemented a risk education programme that included 
marking the perimeter and preventing civilian access to the 
area, based on a “danger prevention plan”.11 Once safely 
released, the site is due to remain part of a “nature protection 
area” in the Kyritz-Ruppiner-Heide, managed by BImA as part 
of the Europa NATURA 2000 site, under the European Union 
(EU) Habitats Directive.12 
Persistent delay in initiating clearance of CMR at Wittstock 
until March 201713 was ascribed to extensive preliminary 
work needed to prepare the area for CMR clearance. Due 
to the dense vegetation in the contaminated area, Germany 
opted to burn the area in sections, to ensure an unobstructed 
view of the ground.14 Preparation for burning and clearance 
in turn necessitated a desk study and creation of an 
evacuation and access road network in 2013–15, to make the 
SHA accessible for clearance operators.15 
This was followed in 2015–16 by the creation and maintenance 
of an internal site-wide system of firebreaks surrounding 
and subdividing the area suspected to be contaminated 
with CMR, to prevent uncontrolled forest fires during 
prescribed burning of the CMR-contaminated area.16 Owing to 
contamination from large items of UXO, the fire-breaks were 
created using an unmanned, remote-controlled caterpillar by 
an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) contractor in 2016.17 
This was completed in 2016, with the exception of a small 
forested area on the eastern edge of the SHA.18 In total, 14 
ShOAB-0.5 explosive submunitions were discovered during 
site preparation, which lasted until the end of 2016.19
The prescribed burning of the first sections of the SHA 
started in 2017 and will continue periodically to prepare land 
for clearance. It requires special meteorological conditions to 
keep the fire under control, and, as such, prescribed burning 
can only take place on a few days each year.20
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Germany has full national ownership of its land release efforts. The Wittstock site is administrated and project managed by  
the Federal Forestry Agency as a subdivision of the BImA. The BImA is an institution incorporated under public law and which 
is wholly owned by the federal government.21 The Federal Forestry Agency’s responsibilities include project coordination  
and control, risk management, and budget planning. Support is provided by the Central Office of the Federal Government  
for UXO Clearance and a consulting engineer.22 Commercial UXO clearance contractors are contracted and managed by the 
local branch of the Federal Forestry Agency, Bundesforstbetrieb Westbrandenburg.23 The Regulatory Agency of the County  
of Ostprignitz-Ruppin is responsible for public security under the police law of the federal state of Brandenburg.24
In Germany, the clearance and disposal of UXO is a security task that is under the control of the police and administrative 
legislation and is therefore the responsibility of the respective federal states. Almost all federal states have set up a 
corresponding state agency for EOD for these tasks. In Brandenburg, this is the KMBD (an abbreviation for, in English, the 
Brandenburg state war material disposal service), which is part of the Brandenburg police. Under German legislation, the 
federal government is not allowed to maintain an agency for EOD.25 Contracting foreign companies for CMR clearance in 
Wittstock is also not possible under German law.26 This limits Germany’s ability to upscale demining capacity by preventing  
the contracting of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or overseas commercial expertise.





All CMR clearance costs are, though, paid for by the federal BImA. National funding to complete CMR clearance has been fully 
secured and is said to cover unforeseen cost increases. Clearance costs were expected to increase from 2021, due to price 
inflations expected as part of the new tender planned for commercial UXO clearance.27 CMR clearance costs have increased 
from more than €1.6 million in 2017, to over €9.5 million in 2018, and over €11.5 million In 2019,28 reflecting the upscaling of 
clearance operations. As at October 2018, total forecasted clearance costs to address CMR contamination at Wittstock were 
estimated to be more than €67 million, of which €60 million was budgeted for clearance by commercial contractors; €3 million 
for engineering costs; and €4.3 million for the disposal of ordnance.29
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
There is equal access to employment for qualified women and men for EOD clearance in Germany, but women only make 
up a small proportion of the sector, especially in terms of the number of qualified female EOD technicians with a licence for 
commercial EOD, who reportedly number fewer than 10.30 At Wittstock, two woman hold an EOD licence (required under 
the state law on explosives), and a further eight were working operationally as UXO specialists in 2019 (up from one woman 
holding a licence and 5 female UXO specialists working operationally in 2018).31 The on-site project management and clearance 
supervision company employs four engineers: one woman and three men.32 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Germany uses its own information management system to record the special distribution of CMR, including use of a 
geographical information system (GIS).33
Germany provides regular updates on its progress in Article 4 implementation, both in its annual Article 7 reports and in 
statements at the Meeting of States Parties. However, in its Article 7 report for 2019,34 Germany again reported cumulative 
clearance output for 2017–19, rather than the annual clearance output for the year, as the Convention requires.
Germany submitted a detailed, comprehensive, and timely Article 4 deadline Extension Request, which was considered 
and granted by States Parties at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in September 2019. The request detailed progress in 
addressing CMR contamination, identified the extent of contamination remaining, and included a detailed and costed work  
plan covering the additional time sought, with measurable benchmarks for the extension period.
PLANNING AND TASKING
Germany has developed a national plan for the release of the CMR-contaminated area, as detailed in its extension request, with 
annual milestones for the release of areas confirmed or suspected to contain CMR. Based on current clearance projections of 
1.5–2km2 per year, CMR clearance is currently expected to be completed by the end of 2024, with associated documentation to 
be finalised in 2025.35
A project coordination committee meets on a weekly basis with its core members and monthly with an extended group, to 
assess the status of clearance progress as well as the quality of clearance, costs, and milestones compared to the project 
plans. Fortnightly reports are disseminated to document clearance and progress.36
Nature conservation requirements limit the controlled burning to a maximum of 200–300 hectares (2–3km2) annually, which, 
for safety reasons, is limited to few days per year. Germany plans to burn approximately 250 hectares (2.5km2) per year, to 
build up a reserve of burnt areas for clearance.37 In 2019, an adequate amount of heathland was burned, to guarantee sufficient 
area for CMR clearance operations in 2020 and 2021.38
Germany planned to clear some 1.2–1.4km2 of CMR-contaminated area in 2020.39 Detailed planning of the specific sections of 
the CMR-contaminated area to be cleared is not possible beyond annual planning, because it is determined by the location of 
areas that have been burnt, which in turn is contingent on weather conditions on the day of burning.40
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
CMR clearance in Germany is conducted in accordance 
with German federal legislation and legislation of the state 
of Brandenburg, occupational safety standards of the 
German Statutory Accident Insurance Association (Deutsche 
Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung, DGUV), and the construction 
technical guidelines on UXO clearance of the federal 
government (Baufachlichen Richtlinien Kampfmittelräumung 
des Bundes). According to Germany, federal and state 
legislation is binding and takes precedence over the application 
of international health and safety or technical standards.41
The “Guidelines for the Clearance of Unexploded Ordnance 
on Federal Properties” are the legal basis for the clearance 
of UXO on federal government properties and thus apply to 
action on the Wittstock site. In addition, site-specific work 
instructions, approved by the KMBD, include detection of  
UXO (instruments and their use); handling of submunitions 
and other UXO (on-site transport, storage, and disposal);  
and documentation.42 
The entire area suspected to be contaminated with CMR 
has been divided into 50 x 50 metre boxes, each of which 
is subject to prescribed burning, followed by sub-surface 
clearance.43 CMR clearance started in an area where the 
occurrence of CMR was known from earlier finds, and was 
conducted outwards in 50 x 50 metre boxes. According to 
Germany, to date CMR have been found in almost every 
parcel cleared, and therefore technical survey has not been 
deemed useful thus far. Germany has declared that if, during 
future clearance, areas are often encountered which do not 
contain CMR, the method of land release will be changed  
to technical survey.44 The smallest target for detector 
sensitivity for clearance has been defined as a half sphere  
of a ShOAB-0.5 submunition.45
Under state regulation on war material 
(“Kampfmittelverordnung”), the transport and disposal 
of explosive ordnance in Brandenburg state is the sole 
responsibility of the KMBD.46 
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In Germany, site clearance (search, discovery, identification, 
recovery, and preparation for handover to state agencies  
for demolition) is typically conducted by commercial 
contractors that meet the requirements of the law on 
explosives. There are reportedly only around 1,500 people 
working in commercial ordnance clearance in Germany; 
mostly small enterprises, which are active regionally.47  
Two commercial UXO clearance contractors won the 
public tender for CMR clearance at Wittstock: Röhll 
Munitionsbergung GmbH (Brandenburg (Havel)) and 
Schollenberger Kampfmittelbergung GmbH (Celle). On-site 
project management and supervision are provided by a 
separate company, which includes a consulting engineer.48  
As previously mentioned, disposal, whether through 
destruction or other means, is conducted by the KMBD.49 
CMR clearance commenced at Wittstock in March 2017, with 
nine personnel, which increased to forty in the summer of 
2017, and to one hundred in April 2018. As of June 2018, 
capacity stood at 120 personnel, with an average daily 
clearance rate per person of between 50m2 and 60m2.50 
Capacity as at the end of 2019 remained at 120 personnel.51 
There are staff shortages for deminers in Germany, in 
particular for the specially licenced team leaders required 
by German law.52 The 150 demining personnel planned 
for deployment at Wittstock represent around 10% of the 
overall EOD personnel available in Germany.53 In its Article 4 
deadline extension request, Germany has assumed an annual 
effective clearance capacity of 140 demining personnel, who 
will each work 225 days a year.54 While the current capacity 
of 120 is a significant increase since demining operations first 
started in 2017, it is still less than 140 personnel clearance 
capacity projected in Germany’s extension request.55 
Germany did, however, expect to bring on board additional 
clearance personnel in 2020, increasing capacity to 135 
deminers and then up to 140.56
Subsurface CMR clearance at Wittstock is conducted only 
manually. According to federal guidelines, while mechanical 
clearance would be possible for clearance of CMR, it is not 
possible at Wittstock due to the presence of large quantities 
of air-dropped and shaped-charge munitions, which would 
pose a hazard to both the operators and the equipment.57
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of 1.21km2 of CMR-contaminated area was cleared in 2019, with the destruction of 1,814 submunitions, all detonated in 
situ. No area was released by survey.58
SURVEY IN 2019
No CMR-contaminated area was cancelled through non-technical survey or reduced through technical survey in 2019 or in the 
previous year.59
CLEARANCE IN 2019
Germany cleared 1.21km2 of CMR-contaminated area in 2019 and destroyed 1,814 submunitions.60 Clearance output in 2019 was a 
significant increase on the previous year, when 0.76km2 of CMR-contaminated area was cleared and 1,537 submunitions destroyed.61 
The increase is due to a continued increase in personnel during 2018, which then remained constant throughout 2019.62





Of the 1.21km2 cleared in 2019, nearly 0.36km2 was cleared by Röhll Munitionsbergung (Brandenburg (Havel)) and more than 
0.85km2 by Schollenberger Kampfmittelbergung GmbH (Celle). In addition to the 1,814 submunitions destroyed, 16,780 items 
of other UXO (grenades, rockets, fuses, etc.) and 18 metric tons of fragments were also found and destroyed during CMR 
clearance operations in 2019.63
CMR clearance is subject to internal quality control (QC) by the commercial contractors and to external quality control by  
an independent engineering company of between 10% and 20% of each 50 x 50 metre clearance box.64
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR GERMANY: 1 AUGUST 2010
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2020
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 AUGUST 2025
UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
Under Article 4 of the CCM, Germany is required to destroy 
all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as 
possible, but not later than its extended deadline of 1 August 
2025. Germany has said that it is on track to complete CMR 
ahead of its Article 4 deadline.65
After extensive and lengthy preliminary work for preparation 
of the site for clearance, including survey and a creation of a 
fire protection system, Germany finally began CMR clearance 
in March 2017. A total of 2.44km2 of CMR contamination 
has been cleared since clearance of CMR contamination at 
Wittstock commenced (see Table 1).
Table 1: Five-year summary of CMR clearance







Germany predicts it will take between five years (meaning 
completion of clearance in 2023) and six years (completion 
of clearance in 2024), based on the estimated 980 hectares 
(9.8km2) of remaining CMR contamination as at the end of 
2018, and an estimated annual clearance capacity of 140 
personnel, working 225 days per annum, at a clearance 
rate of 50–60m2 per person per day. This corresponds 
to clearance of 1.5–2km2 per annum. Reporting and 
documentation relating to clearance efforts are predicted  
to be finalised in 2025.66 
While clearance output of 1.21km2 in 2019 was a significant 
increase on the previous year, when 0.76km2 was cleared, 
it still fell short of Germany’s planned clearance output, 
indicating that Germany may be falling behind target on its 
planned Article 4 implementation.
Potential obstacles that could impact Germany’s ability 
to meet its new deadline of August 2025 include the very 
high levels of CMR and other UXO contamination, including 
different spatial distributions and potentially higher levels 
of contamination than expected and addressed to date.67 
Germany’s clearance plan also assumes that a sufficient 
amount of controlled burning is able to take place to meet the 
planned clearance output, which has so far been the case. 
There is also the potential for the planned clearance schedule 
to be negatively impacted due to metrological conditions, 
in particular, extended periods of frost, resulting in frozen 
ground that cannot be cleared.68
As previously mentioned, there are also challenges posed in 
acquiring suitably qualified personnel for clearance, which 
could potentially lead to staffing shortfalls. EU procurement 
requirements will likely require new tendering of the 
clearance at Wittstock in 2020, which could further impact 
the number of personnel available.69 Germany confirmed that 
a new tender for CMR clearance was planned in 2020.70 
As at September 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had not 
had any specific impact on Germany’s CMR clearance 
operations. Germany has, however, taken measures to adapt 
its clearance programme since early February/March 2020, 
including by ensuring that:
 ■ Employees of the two demining companies are only 
allowed to meet in justified exceptional cases.
 ■ Permanent clearance teams have been formed within the 
two companies. Personnel exchanges are only possible in 
exceptional cases.
 ■ The clearance teams use separate and permanently 
assigned rest and sanitary facilities. These are 
disinfected after use.
 ■ Most project meetings take place via video conference.
In addition, the usual measures (such as social distancing 
rules and public health rules) are observed and their 
compliance is monitored. Germany does not expect the 
COVID-19 pandemic to affect the output of clearance 
operations in 2020. If COVID-19 were to be brought onto the 
site, it is assumed that due to the separation of clearance 
teams, operations would only be partially affected. However, 
Germany also noted that the further course of the pandemic 
in Germany cannot be predicted.71
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Land released through survey and clearance dropped in 2019 compared with the previous year. Operators also confirmed 
21.6km2 of contamination in two governorates.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Iraq should report comprehensively on cluster munition remnants (CMR) survey and clearance, providing data 
disaggregated by operator and region for Federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI).
 ■ Iraq should provide an annual work plan setting out goals for survey and clearance.

















































NATIONAL ESTIMATE, FOR FEDERAL IRAQ ONLY
178KM2
CLUSTER MUNITION  
CONTAMINATION: HEAVY
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2023 
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
IRAQ
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(20% of overall score)
6 5 Iraq continues to find CMR contamination not previously recorded in the database 
underscoring the limitations of initial survey conducted after the 2003 war, but 
improved survey is generating more accurate data on CMR hazards. 
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
6 6 The DMA is responsible for planning, tasking, and coordinating mine action but is 
overshadowed by powerful government ministries. CMR operations are concentrated 
in southern governorates overseen by the Regional Mine Action Centre-South 




(10% of overall score)
5 5 The DMA has engaged with international organisations to strengthen gender 
diversity in mine action but progress remains slow. Demining operators employ 
women in administrative and support roles and community liaison, but opportunities 
for employing them in clearance operations depend on regional social norms that 
vary according to locality and are particularly limited in the main CMR-affected 




(10% of overall score)
5 5 Iraq’s mine action authorities operate Information Management System for Mine 
Action (IMSMA) data management systems but cumbersome procedures and 
reporting gaps can leave operators without access to timely or reliable data. CMR 
data, however, are concentrated in the RMAC-S database where operators have 
reported improving access and accuracy. Iraq submits regular Article 7 reports  
but KRI data is lacking.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
6 5 Planning and tasking for survey and clearance of cluster munition affected areas  
has benefitted from good coordination between RMAC-S and operators. 
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
7 6 After testing and applying a new technical survey methodology in operations in 
2018, based on the Cluster Munition Remnant Survey (CMRS) in south-east Asia, 
Federal Iraq adopted it as a national standard in 2019 citing the benefits for accurate 
mapping, planning, and clearance. 
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 4 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
5 5  Although output dipped in 2019, Federal Iraq has released significant amounts of 
CMR-affected areas through survey and clearance. 
Average Score 5.8 5.3 Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ Higher Council of Mine Action
 ■ Directorate of Mine Action (DMA)
 ■ Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Agency
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Ministry of Defence
 ■ Ministry of Interior (Civil Defence)
 ■ Al Khebra Company for Demining
 ■ Al Waha Demining Company
 ■ Baghdad Mine Action Organisation
 ■ Ta’az Demining Company
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Danish Demining Group (DDG)
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)




UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Federal Iraq reported CMR contamination of 178.64km2 at the end of 2019 (see Table 1), around 7% less than at the end of 
2018,1 despite operators newly identifying hazardous areas in two governorates covering 21.6km2.2 The KRI also has CMR 
contamination but the extent is unknown. Iraq provided no data for the KRI but Mines Advisory Group (MAG) conducted CMR 
clearance in three Kurdish governorates in 20193 and some areas close to the border with Turkey have yet to be surveyed. 
Table 1: Cluster munition- contaminated area in Federal Iraq (at end 2018 and 2019)4















N/R = Not reported
Federal Iraq’s contamination dates back to the Gulf War of 1991 and the United States (US)-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
following the path of allied forces advance from the south to Baghdad. Coalition aircraft also struck Iraqi army positions  
in the northern governorate of Kirkuk. The most heavily affected areas are the southern governorates of Basrah, Muthanna, 
and Thi Qar, which account for nearly 90% of Iraq’s CMR contamination. The most commonly found items there are BLU-63  
and BLU-97 submunitions. Other CMR found in the area include BLU-61 and M42 submunitions.5 
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Cluster munitions, however, make up only a modest part of Iraq’s overall landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) 
contamination. Four southern governorates alone have close to 1,000km2 of minefield and substantial areas affected by 
ERW. Central and northern areas liberated from Islamic State have hundreds of square kilometres affected by mines of 
an improvised nature and the KRI reports more than 200km2 of known mined area as well as ERW contamination in areas 
bordering Turkey that have yet to be surveyed because of insecurity.6 See Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020  
report on Iraq for further information on the mine problem.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The mine action programme in Iraq is managed along regional lines. The DMA represents Iraq internationally and oversees 
mine action for humanitarian purposes in Federal Iraq, covering 15 of the country’s 19 governorates.7 Mine action in the KRI’s 
four governorates is overseen by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), which reports to the Council of Ministers 
and is led by a director general who has ministerial rank.
FEDERAL IRAQ
The inter-ministerial Higher Council of Mine Action,8 which reports to the Prime Minister, oversees and approves mine action 
strategy, policies, and plans. The DMA “plans, coordinates, supervises, monitors and follows up all the activities of mine 
action.” It draws up the national strategy and is responsible for setting national standards, accrediting, and approving the 
standing operating procedures (SOPs) of demining organisations and certifying completion of clearance tasks.9 
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The DMA said it asked the government for $30.6 million 
a year for survey and clearance10 but has not reported 
how much it received or provided details of government 
expenditure on any aspect of mine action.
Coordinating the planning, tasking, and information 
management among all the actors has remained a significant 
challenge. As a department of the Ministry of Health and 
Environment, the DMA has less authority than the politically 
powerful Ministries of Defence and Interior, which manage 
significant explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and mine 
clearance capacity, as well as the Ministry of Oil. Additionally, 
the DMA’s status is not formally established by law.11`
Rapid turnover of directors has also hampered management 
and policy continuity. Essa al-Fayadh, who was at least the 
tenth director since 2003, was transferred to a different office 
in February 2019. Deputy Minister of Health and Environment, 
Kamran Ali, took over as acting director of the DMA until 
June 2019 when Khaled Rashad Jabar al-Khaqani, a former 
DMA director, was reappointed to the position. As of June 
2020, his appointment had still not been confirmed. The 
DMA, meanwhile, appointed a new operations manager in the 
second half of 2019 and changes in Iraq’s political leadership 
in 2020 raised the possibility of further management changes. 
The DMA oversees three Regional Mine Action Centres (RMACs): 
 ■ North: covering the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, 
Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salah ad-Din.
 ■ Middle Euphrates (MEU): Babylon, Baghdad, Karbala, 
Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wassit.
 ■ South: Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar. 
RMAC South, located in Basra City, maintains its own 
database and is responsible for tasking operators in its area 
of operations. RMAC North and MEU were located in Baghdad 
but RMAC North also opened a satellite office in Mosul in 
August 2019.12
Federal Iraq’s spending on the DMA and mine action 
is unknown. The sector remains heavily dependent on 
international donor funding, most of it channelled through 
UNMAS and bilateral funding to clearance operators. In 
the past two years, the Iraqi government and donors have 
given priority to tackling massive contamination by mines of 
an improvised nature in areas liberated from Islamic State, 
leaving scant resources for tackling ERW contamination in 
others areas of Iraq, including the substantial CMR threat in 
the south. 
KRI
IKMAA functions as a regulator and operator in the KRI. 
It reports directly to the Kurdish Regional Government’s 
Council of Ministers and coordinates four directorates in 
Dohuk, Erbil, Garmian, and Sulimaniya (Slemani). Financial 
constraints halved salaries for all staff for the last three 
years and resulted in a number of posts being left vacant,  
but in 2019 payment of salaries resumed and IKMAA 
planned to fill vacant posts.13 
IKMAA did not respond to requests for information about  
its capacity, priorities, and operating results. 
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
The Iraq National Strategic Mine Action Plan specifically 
refers to gender equality and gender mainstreaming 
within mine action activities as objectives of an effective 
programmatic response.14 Most operators employ women 
in administrative office roles, many also have a significant 
representation of women in community liaison and risk 
education functions, and some also employ women in 
clearance teams, including as team leaders. The extent to 
which women participate varies significantly according to 
cultural sensitivities in different parts of the country.15 
The DMA has had a Gender Unit since 2017. It was led in 
2019 by the deputy head of the Planning Department16 and 
is said to encourage women to apply for employment in 
mine action.17 UNMAS developed terms of reference for the 
Gender Unit and designed and implemented a training plan. 
It also developed the Gender Unit’s first Action Plan laying 
out activities designed to mainstream gender throughout 
the DMA. Additional support provided by UNMAS included 
two training workshops for risk education, planning 
teams on developing gender-sensitive indicators and 
mainstreaming gender issues in their activities. IKMAA also 
reportedly established a Gender Committee in 2019 and 
UNMAS reported developing terms of reference setting out 
responsibilities and a reporting structure.18 
UNMAS conducted a baseline assessment of the DMA’s 
gender policy and practice in 2019, which concluded it had 
succeeded in raising awareness of gender both internally 
and in other government institutions engaged in explosive 
hazard management. Despite that progress, UNMAS 
observed challenges remained for recruitment, promotion 
and involving women in all levels of decision-making. UNMAS 
observed that “a highly patriarchal society, male dominated 
work force and general misunderstanding of what exactly 
‘gender in mine action’ means in the day to day practical 
application of activities, continues to hinder widespread 
changes in mind sets and behaviours”.19




INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The DMA and IKMAA maintain databases using Information 
Management System for Mine Action New Generation (IMSMA 
NG) with technical support from iMMAP, a commercial service 
provider based in Erbil and working under contract to the 
United States (US) Department of State’s Office of Weapons 
Removal and Abatement (WRA).
Federal Iraq’s mine action database is located at the DMA’s 
Baghdad headquarters. RMAC-S maintains a database in 
Basrah, receiving reports from demining organisations in its 
area of operations, which is synchronised with Baghdad’s at 
intervals determined by the volume of data to be uploaded.20 
Operators are required to submit results to DMA in hard copy 
in Arabic delivered by hand every month. DMA then uploads 
results manually into the database. The procedure meets 
Iraqi legal requirements, which do not recognise electronic 
copies, but can cause delays of several months before results 
of survey and clearance are uploaded. As a result, operators 
say task orders issued by the DMA have often lacked the 
most up-to date information.21 
In March 2019, RMAC-S started receiving data reports 
electronically as well as in hard copy. Improvements in 
cluster munitions survey are strengthening the quality of 
available data through RMAC-S database. In the mine action 
sector in general, operators report limited access to data and 
expressed concern about the limited quantity and quality of 
data available with task orders.22 
The DMA gave operators access to an online dashboard 
presenting mine action data and in 2019 introduced an Online 
Task Management System which it claimed as the first in the 
world and through which operators can request IMSMA data 
relating to specific tasks. Operators said the utility of these 
tools was limited by the slow entry of operating results into 
the database, the variable quality of data, depending on the 
source, and the patchy availability of information on land use 
and livelihoods, which is useful for planning and prioritisation 
but is not shared systematically.23
There were big discrepancies between official data (reported 
by RMAC-S and in Iraq’s Article 7 report covering 2019) and 
results reported by NPA, which appear to reflect delays by 
the national authorities in uploading data to the national 
database. Furthermore, Iraq’s Article 7 report covering 2019 
did not include clearance of CMR-contaminated area by MAG 
in the KRI.
PLANNING AND TASKING
Iraq does not have a strategic plan for clearance of CMR. Few resources have been available for survey and clearance as a 
result of the priority given to clearance of areas liberated from Islamic State occupation.24 Against that background, RMAC-S 
said it gave priority to survey to better define contamination and clearance of areas that are close to communities, which have 
experienced recent casualties, or where contamination hinders development projects.25
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Iraq has national mine action standards for mine and battle area clearance (BAC), non-technical survey, and technical survey 
but they were written in 2004–05, exist in Arabic only and do not specifically address cluster munitions. However, the DMA has 
applied the Cluster Munition Remnant Survey (CMRS) methodology to CM operations since 2018, and in 2019 adopted CMRS as 
a national standard citing the benefits it has delivered for survey, planning and clearance.26 
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Iraq provided no information on national organisations engaged in survey or clearance of CMR in 2019 but in Federal Iraq 
clearance is undertaken by the Army and the Ministry of Interior’s Civil Defence and all demolitions are conducted by the Army. 
In Federal Iraq, donors supported only two international organisations tackling CMR. Danish Demining Group (DDG), working 
in Basrah governorate operated with a total staff of 40, including two BAC teams with 24 deminers and two four-person survey 
and quality control teams,27 operations were affected by the suspension of its registration by the NGO Directorate in May 2019, 
resulting in the stand down of operations teams for several months.28 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)’s Basrah-based operation employed a total of 96 staff, including 6 BAC teams with 57 personnel 
and two non-technical survey and one technical survey teams, working mainly in Basrah and Muthanna governorates.29 In the 
KRI, only MAG reported working on CMR tasks.30
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Iraq reported release in Federal Iraq of 30.67km2 of CMR-contaminated areas in 2019, including 24.48km2 through survey 
and 6.2km2 through clearance.31 The total was close to 30% less than the previous year, which Iraq attributed to funding and 
capacity constraints. In addition, and not included in Iraq’s Article 7 report, almost 0.4km2 was cleared by MAG in the KRI, 
albeit without finding any CMR. 
 
On assessment of the data, Mine Action Review believes that in 2019 no more than an estimated 4.74km2 of CMR-contaminated 
area was cleared by international and national operators (see Table 5). 
SURVEY IN 2019
Iraq reported releasing 24,478,323m2 through a combination of non-technical and technical survey in 2019. It said all the 
release occurred in the southern governorates managed by RMAC-South but gave no other details.32 
NPA confirmed 19.88km2 as CMR-contaminated in 2019, a little over half of it in Muthanna governorate and the rest in Basrah33 
and DDG identified confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) affecting 1.7km2 in Basrah.34 The two operators released a total of 
15.2km2 through non-technical and technical survey (see Table 2), with DDG cancelling 11.2km2 through non-technical survey  
in Basrah and NPA reducing 4.1 km2, most of it in Muthanna.35
Table 2: CMR-contaminated area released through survey by international NGOs in 201936
Operator Governorate Area cancelled through NTS (m²) Area reduced through TS (m2)
DDG Basrah 11,227,925 0





Federal Iraq reported release of 6.2km2 through clearance in 2019, 14% less than in 2018, a decline attributed to lack of 
capacity and meagre funding. A reported total of 9,905 CMR were destroyed during clearance in 2019. Big discrepancies 
between official data (see Table 3) and results reported by NPA (see Table 4) appear to reflect delays by the national  
authorities in uploading data to the national database. Mine Action Review believes that in 2019 no more than 4.74km2  
of CMR-contaminated area was cleared by international and national operators (see Table 5).
Iraq’s Article 7 transparency report for 2019 did not include KRI data. The clearance that MAG reported conducting in the  
KRI is believed to have raised the total area released by Iraq to around 6.6km2 (see Table 3) but did not lead to destruction  
of any cluster munition remnants.37
Table 3: CMR clearance in 2019 (as reported by the national authorities)
Region Authority Operator Area cleared (m2) CMR cleared





RMAC MEU Baghdad Mine Action 311,705 6
Federal Iraq total 6,195,478 9,905
KRI39 MAG 385,005 0
Totals  6,580,483 9,905




Table 4: International NGO CMR clearance in 2019 (as reported by the operators)40







DDG Basrah 116,005 25 0 0
NPA Basrah, Missan, Muthanna 3,206,523 1,533 36 886
Sub-totals 3,322,528 1,558 36 886
MAG Diyala, Dohuk, Sulaymaniyah (KRI) 385,005 0 0 385
Totals 3,707,533 1,558 36 1,271
International operators active in Federal Iraq recorded 
less clearance than the amount attributed to them by the 
DMA. This is especially the case with NPA (see Table 4). 
DDG reported clearance of 116,005m2 with the location of 
25 CMR in Basrah governorate in 2019, marginally less than 
the previous year.41 NPA’s clearance also dipped to 3.2km2 
in 2019, down 15% from the previous year, but the density 
of contamination in the tasks it tackled, particularly in 
Muthanna, meant that it found more than double the number 
of CMR. The levels of contamination identified in Muthanna 
prompted the Army, which is responsible for all demolitions 
of explosive ordnance, to assign an EOD officer permanently 
to NPA’s operations for that purpose.42 
Table 5: CMR clearance in Iraq in 2019 (Mine Action Review 
calculation)







Baghdad Mine Action 311,705
Total 4,738,778
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR IRAQ: 1 NOVEMBER 2013
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2023
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE
Under Article 4 of the CCM, Iraq is required to destroy all 
CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as 
possible, but not later than 1 November 2023. The extent 
of Federal Iraq’s CMR contamination alone ensures that it 
will not complete clearance by its Article 4 deadline in three 
years’ time. How much longer it will need will depend on 
the levels of funding received from the government and 
international donors. Their priority in the last three years  
has been tackling dense mine contamination in areas 
liberated from Islamic State. 
The rate of clearance continued to fluctuate in 2019, dropping 
14% in Federal Iraq in 2019. But despite the limited capacity 
available for CMR operations, Iraq has released more than 
90km2 through survey and clearance in the last three years, 
underscoring the potential for accelerating progress towards 
fulfilling Iraq’s treaty obligations if donor support enables 
more capacity to be deployed for cluster munitions survey 
and clearance. The United States and its NATO allies could 
provide useful support to the process of survey, planning and 
clearance by providing data on their cluster munitions strikes 
in the course of the Gulf Wars.43 
Table 6: Five-year summary of CMR clearance
Year Federal Iraq (km2) KRI (km2) Totals (km2)
2019 4.3 0.4 4.7*
2018 7.2 044 7.2
2017 4.4 0.3 4.7
2016 2.9 0.2 3.1
2015 8.2 0.6 8.8
Totals 27.0 1.5 28.5
* Based on Mine Action Review calculation
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KEY DATA LAND RELEASE OUTPUT




The national programme in the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic (Lao PDR) continued to make solid progress in the 
destruction of cluster munition remnants (CMR) in 2019. Lao 
PDR was granted a five-year extension to its Article 4 deadline 
at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions (CCM). Based on data from national and 
international operators, land release by clearance in 2019 was 
a 26% increase on the previous year, at more than 45.6km2, 
largely thanks to greater capacity resulting from new funding. 
Evidence-based survey methodology is now being applied 
routinely to identify confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). 
Efforts were also ongoing to clean up historical errors in data 
records and strengthen information management systems 
and processes. However, the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) process for international clearance operators remained 
excessively time-consuming and burdensome, resulting in 
avoidable delays to land release operations. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Procedures for issuing, amending, or renewing MoUs 
should be streamlined to avoid inefficiencies and 
excessive delays.
 ■ Cooperation and coordination between clearance 
operators should be further strengthened. In 
particular, the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) 
should ensure that UXO Lao data from historic tasks, 
which is not already on the database, be made readily 
available to international operators to help inform 
survey and clearance operations. 
 ■ The NRA should ensure the Information Management 
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database is 
comprehensive and up to date, especially given the 
increased volume of data resulting from the ongoing 
nationwide cluster munition remnants survey (CMRS). 
 
 ■ The NRA should prioritise the development of a 
planning and prioritisation system to support the  
CMR survey and clearance process.
 ■ The NRA and clearance operators should  
strengthen coordination with provincial, district,  
and village‐level authorities during implementation  
and planning of CMRS and clearance, incorporating 
gender considerations.
 ■ Lao PDR should elaborate annual sector-wide 
work plans for survey and clearance of CMR, in 
collaboration with its implementing partners. 
 ■ Lao PDR should establish a country coalition, 
 to bring together all stakeholders on a quarterly 
basis to discuss progress and challenges in  



















































NO RELIABLE ESTIMATE OF  
CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION
CLUSTER MUNITION  
CONTAMINATION: MASSIVE
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2025 
LAO PDR WILL REQUIRE MULTIPLE EXTENSIONS BEFORE REACHING COMPLETION
LAO PDR
* Non-technical survey (NTS) and technical 
survey (TS) are conducted in Lao PDR, but are 
focused on finding evidence of cluster munition 
contamination as part of a nationwide survey. 
The output of the Cluster Munition Remnants 
Survey (CMRS) being undertaken in Lao PDR 
is the creation of evidence-based confirmed 
hazardous areas (CHAs).
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(20% of overall score)
7 7 Lao PDR does not yet have a reliable estimate of CMR contamination, but is 
undertaking a nationwide survey that should produce an evidence-based assessment 
of the full extent of CMR contamination. At least 2,873 villages are believed to be 
affected by CMR. 
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
6 7 In 2019, a new Director was appointed both to the NRA and to national clearance 
operator, UXO Lao. There is strong national ownership from the NRA and mine 
action in Lao PDR is also firmly linked to the government’s sustainable development 
planning. However, MoU procedures continued to remain complex and heavy, 
causing notable delay and significantly impeding the implementation and expansion 
of survey and clearance.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
7 7 In early 2019, Lao PDR finalised a manual for trainers on gender mainstreaming in the 
UXO Sector. The government also partnered with the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC) to deliver a Regional Workshop 
on Gender Equality and Empowerment in mine action in October 2019, in Vientiane. 
Clearance operators report having gender policies in place or are in the process 
of implementing such policies, consult with women and girls during survey and 




(10% of overall score)
6 6 Lao PDR submitted its CCM Article 4 extension request on time and it was granted 
at the Meeting of States Parties in September 2019. There are ongoing efforts to 
correct historical data in IMSMA and to improve information management systems 
and processes to ensure the quality and transparency of data, especially given the 
increased volume of data resulting from the ongoing nationwide CMRS. IMSMA 
VPN has been introduced, and is now used by all international clearance operators, 
which has helped improve the accessibility of data and the speed and quality of data 
entry and the reporting process. The National Mine Action Standard (NMAS) on IM 
was reviewed and updated in 2019, but might only be formally approved once other 
relevant chapters of NMAS have also been updated.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
6 6 In its 2019 Article 4 extension request, Lao PDR outlined a work plan for the five-year 
extension period, with three potential clearance output estimates, each with 
measurable benchmarks, dependent on the level of funding and capacity obtained. 
Unfortunately, there was no sector-wide annual work plan for Lao PDR for 2019, as 
there had been for 2018, but one was being elaborated collectively in 2020 for 2021. 
No comprehensive national-level guidance on the prioritisation of clearance tasks 
exists, but a project began in 2019 to create a nationwide prioritisation matrix.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
8 8 Lao PDR’s UXO Survey Standards, which specify the minimum standards and 
requirements for the survey of all cluster munition-contaminated areas, are well 
adapted to the local threat and context and adopt an evidence-based land release 
methodology, in line with international best practice. Land release operations in Lao 
PDR are conducted by a range of implementing partners, which includes the national 
operator UXO Lao; international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), HALO Trust, 
HI, MAG, and NPA; commercial clearance operators; and teams of the Lao Army.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 4 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
8 7 Lao PDR remains focused on the continued nationwide CMRS of CMR contamination, 
with the amount of CHA identified increasing by at least 17%, compared to the 
previous year. At the same time, clearance output of international clearance 
operators in 2019 increased by more than 25% compared to 2018, largely due  
to an increase in clearance capacity thanks to DFID funding. 
Average Score 7.1 7.0 Overall Programme Performance: GOOD
CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ National Regulatory Authority (NRA) Board
 ■ National Regulatory Authority (NRA) 
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ UXO Lao 
 ■ Humanitarian teams of the Lao People’s Army
 ■ Commercial operators
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ The HALO Trust
 ■ Humanity and Inclusion (HI)
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
 ■ Commercial operators
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) 
 ■ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
 ■ Tetra Tech
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STATES PARTIES
LAO PDR
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Lao PDR does not yet have a reliable estimate of CMR contamination,1 but is undertaking a nationwide CMRS that should 
produce an evidence-based assessment of the full extent of CMR contamination.2 US bombing data indicate 70,000 individual 
target locations across Lao PDR.3 Fourteen of the country’s eighteen provinces are contaminated: Attapeu, Bolikhamxay, 
Champasak, Houaphanh, Khammouane, Luang Prabang, Oudomxay, Phongsaly, Saravan, Savannakhet, Vientiane Capital, 
Vientiane Province, Xekong, and Xiengkhouang.4 Of these, nine are heavily affected: Attapeu, Champasak, Houaphanh, 
Khammouane, Luang Prabang, Saravan, Savannakhet, Xekong, and Xiengkhouang.5 
As at the end of 2019, survey had been conducted in 1,966 villages in ten of the most contaminated provinces, resulting in 
10,838 CHAs, totalling over 1,115.5km2 of CMR-contaminated area (see Table 1).6 The nationwide survey is ongoing and has  
yet to be completed in any province.7 The amount of CHA is expected to continue to increase and may double or even triple  
over the next five years.8 As at the end of 2018, 9,284 CHAs had been identified totalling 858km2.9 
Table 1: CMR survey results (at end 2019)10
Province No. of villages No. of CHAs Total area (km2)
Attapeu 144 1,429 133.36
Bolikhamxai 24 11 0.90
Champasak 93 297 14.62
Houaphanh 72 345 36.49
Khammouane 111 477 82.35
Luang Prabang 59 205 22.24
Saravan 527 2,066 92.17
Savannakhet 320 3,558 156.68
Xekong 210 1,225 84.11
Xiengkhouang 406 1,225 492.61
Totals 1,966 10,838 1,115.53
In both its 2019 Article 4 deadline extension request and its Article 7 transparency report covering 2019, Lao PDR estimated 
that the total CMR contamination is approximately 8,470km2, a figure unchanged since its September 2011 clearance statement 
to the CCM Second Meeting of States Parties. As stated above, this figure is, however, increasing as the nationwide survey 
progresses and the survey will help determine the extent of cluster munition contamination more accurately.11
Lao PDR certainly has the world’s highest level of contamination by unexploded submunitions as a result of the Indochina 
War of the 1960s and 1970s. The United States conducted one of the heaviest aerial bombardments in history, dropping more 
than two million tonnes of bombs between 1964 and 1973,12 including more than 270 million submunitions (known locally as 
bombies). The failure rate is not known, but Lao PDR reports it may have been as high as 30 percent, and an estimated 80 
million submunitions are thought to have remained unexploded at the end of the war.13
During the period of its Article 4 extension request (2020–25), Lao PDR will focus survey on the most heavily contaminated 
provinces currently being surveyed, but the remaining affected provinces will also need to be surveyed in order to quantify 
the extent of CMR contamination nationwide.14 According to the co-chairs of the UXO Sector Working Group, the United States 
and UNDP, significant and efficient planning will be needed if the national survey is to be completed during Lao PDR’s five-year 
extension period.15
Through non-technical survey at the village level, the current baseline of CMR contamination is being established through 
inclusive consultation with women, girls, boys, and men, including, where relevant, from minority groups.16
According to Lao PDR’s 2019 Article 4 deadline extension request, between the time Lao PDR became a State Party to the CCM 
on 1 August 2010 (when the Convention as a whole entered into force) and the end of 2018, a total of 41,088 hectares (410.9km2) 
was cleared, with the destruction of 518,368 submunitions. This includes clearance by humanitarian operators, commercial 
operators, and humanitarian clearance teams of the Lao Army.17 
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Lao PDR also has extensive contamination from other explosive remnants of war (ERW), including both air-dropped and 
ground-fired unexploded ordnance (UXO), though the extent of contamination is not known. Clearance operators have 
reported the presence of at least 186 types of munition in Lao PDR. These range from 20lb fragmentation bombs to 3,000lb 
general-purpose bombs, as well as artillery shells, grenades, mortars, and rockets.18 Lao PDR is also contaminated, but to  
a much lesser extent, by anti-personnel mines and anti-vehicle mines (See Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 
report on Lao PDR for more information).
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The NRA, created by government decree in 2004 and active 
since mid 2006, has an interministerial board composed 
of representatives from government ministries and is 
chaired by the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare.19 The 
Prime Minister of Lao PDR approved a new decree, “On the 
Organisation and Operations of the National Regulatory 
Authority for UXO in Lao PDR” in February 2018. The decree 
defines the position, role, duties, rights, organisational 
structure, and the working principles and methods of the 
NRA.20 A new Director of UXO Lao was appointed in 2019.
The NRA acts as the coordinator for national and international 
clearance operators and serves as the national focal point 
for the sector. This includes overall management and 
consideration of policy, planning, projects, and coordination 
of the implementation of the national strategy nationwide, 
as well as NRA planning and coordination functions at the 
provincial and district levels.21 Effective coordination is 
particularly needed to help prioritise clearance of the huge 
number of CHAs already in the database as a result of the 
ongoing CMRS.22 A new Director of the NRA was appointed  
in June 2019.23
Lao PDR contributed $30,911 towards rental of the NRA office 
in 2019 and training of UXO Lao deminers. It also makes 
in-kind contributions to mine action through tax exemptions 
for visas, and importing vehicles and equipment for 
humanitarian operators.24 Clearance operators are, however, 
required to pay visa fees for expatriates and the previous tax 
concession of tax exemption for international experts was 
removed from all MoUs after 2018.25 
The Lao government adopted UXO clearance as a ninth 
Millennium Development Goal in 2010, targeting removal 
of all UXO from priority agricultural land by 2020.26 This 
target has not been met, and the nationwide survey to 
establish the baseline of CMR, including contamination 
in priority agricultural land, is ongoing. Subsequently, 
during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
summit in September 2016, Lao PDR launched sustainable 
development goal (SDG) 18, “Lives Safe from UXO”, which 
focuses on freeing the country from UXO. The Eighth National 
Socio-Economic Development Plan (2016–20) also reflected 
the importance of UXO clearance for realising Lao PDR’s 
development targets.27 In its annual report, the government 
said that focus in 2019 had been on implementing the 
UXO Sector National Strategic Plan, Safe Path Forward II, 
2011–2020 in order to further the achievement of the Eighth 
National Socio-Economic Development Plan. Priority was 
also given to the implementation of the Poverty Eradication 
Plan, as well as the SDG 18. In addition, the NRA focused on 
the priority development areas, development projects, and 
improved agricultural land for Lao ethnic groups.28 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
provides programmatic and technical support to the NRA 
and UXO Lao, including with regard to information sharing 
and coordination, albeit at a reduced capacity compared 
to previous years.29 Further capacity development in 
information management, quality management, and 
operations support, is provided primarily to UXO Lao, and to 
a lesser extent the NRA, through a United States (US)-funded 
grant manager, Tetra Tech.30 In 2020, the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is providing 
support to the development of Lao’s new national strategy, 
information management, and risk management.31
There is a UXO Sector Working Group (SWG), led by the 
chair of the NRA board, and co-chaired by UNDP and the 
US Ambassador in Vientiane, which meets annually and 
brings together key stakeholders, including donors, to 
share information and enhance coordination and resource 
mobilisation.32 The most recent SWG meeting was convened 
in August 2020.33 The NRA planned to diversify the sources of 
funding throughout the extension period, including engaging 
the private sector and non-institutional donors. The Lao 
government also planned to approach new potential donors, 
such as China, India, and Russia.34
International clearance operators have good cooperation and 
coordination with the NRA at the national level but also at 
provincial and district levels. Lack of resources and capacity 
of some of the provincial NRAs can, however, impact their 
ability to fulfil their roles. Humanitarian clearance operators 
are involved in key decision-making processes by the NRA, 
including though participation in Technical Working Groups 
(TWGs).35 There have been four TWGs, namely: for survey 
and clearance, information management, UXO/mine risk 
education, and victim assistance. The TWGs, which are held 
regularly, are designed to promote information sharing and 
progress in the four thematic aspects.36 In addition, following 
the Second Regional CMRS workshop in 26–30 August 
2019, convened by the US Office of Weapons Removal and 
Abatement (WRA), a fifth, separate CMR survey working 
group was established, involving clearance operators, and 
other key stakeholders.37 The survey working group has  
been collecting data on the depth at which CMR are found.38
The United Kingdom Department for International 
Development (DFID) grant in 2019 has helped to strengthen 
cooperation and coordination between clearance operators, 
with monthly coordination meetings held with HALO, Mines 
Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).39 
Lao PDR also conducted two exchange to Cambodia and 
Vietnam in September 2019 and February 2020, which were 
considered very useful by all three national authorities.40
Operators were consulted during the elaboration of Lao PDR’s 
2019 CCM Article 4 extension request.41 When commenting on 
the extension request in September 2019, the CCM Article 4 
Analysis group recommended the establishment of a country 
coalition in Lao PDR to enhance coordination in implementing 
the work plan included in its extension request.”42 
Despite some efforts by the NRA to clarify the procedure for 
MoUs, MoU procedures in Lao PDR remain lengthy, complex, 
and labour-intensive. They continue to cause significant delay 
and impede the implementation and expansion of survey 
and clearance, including by preventing the procurement 
and import of equipment.43 Operators are required to report 
and secure approval for completed projects before an MoU 
for a new project can be approved. The lack of an MoU 
prevents expansion of operations or procurement of new 
equipment.44 Typically it takes a minimum of six months for 
an MoU to be approved; sometimes it is significantly longer, 
and the process may even take several years to complete. 
Unfortunately, some donor funding could not be spent in 2019 
due to delays in the MoU process and had to be returned 
to the donor.45 Furthermore, even after formal approval 
of an MoU, operators may still experience challenges 
importing necessary equipment46 or small items of additional 
equipment, which require time-intensive MoU amendments.47 
NPA reported that it took nine months to get three trucks and 
two 4x4 vehicles released from customs, even with an MoU.48
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Donors have urged the Government of Lao PDR to facilitate the MOU process, however guidelines continued to change for 
each MoU process. The NRA acknowledged delays and accepted that improvements could be made on the part of the national 
and local authorities involved in the MoU process. However, the NRA has said previously that some of the delays are due to 
incorrect reporting or a failure to follow correct MoU guidelines by clearance operators.49 MoUs for The HALO Trust and NPA 
were finally signed on 21 June 2019.50 MoUs with Humanity and Inclusion (HI) and MAG were signed previously. 
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
While the NRA has yet to develop a gender and diversity 
policy, gender is integrated into all core UXO documents 
including work plans and the national strategy, and relevant 
mine action data is disaggregated by sex and age. Women 
are consulted in group discussions as part of survey and 
clearance activities, but the needs of women and children 
had yet to be fully taken into account for prioritisation and 
planning. Of the 41 employees at the NRA, 13 (31%) are 
women, including three of the nine NRA Officers.51
Following the establishment of a partnership in 2018 between 
UN Women, the NRA, and the Lao Women’s Union on how 
to promote gender rights in the UXO sector, a “Manual for 
Trainers on Gender Mainstreaming in the UXO Sector, Lao 
PDR” was piloted during a workshop in December 2018 and 
published in 2019.52
In partnership with government of Lao PDR, ARMAC 
delivered a Regional Workshop on Gender Equality and 
Empowerment in ASEAN Mine/ERW Action in October 2019, 
in Vientiane. The two-day workshop, funded by Canada, with 
training led by the GICHD, brought together representatives 
from 10 ASEAN member States to share their experience 
and approaches to incorporating gender equality and 
perspectives into their national mine action programmes. 
Participants were encouraged to analyse their work through 
a gender lens to consider how projects and activities are 
implemented and how the priorities and capabilities of 
women, girls, boys, and men and other diverse groups are 
accounted for in programme development and design.53 
The HALO Trust, HI, MAG, and NPA all reported having gender 
policies in place, and that they disaggregate mine action data 
by sex and age, and consult with women and girls during 
survey and clearance operations.54 
HALO reported that all its teams are gender balanced and 
there is equal access to employment for qualified women and 
men in HALO’s survey and clearance teams in Lao PDR. As 
at the end of 2019, HALO Laos employed 222 female national 
staff (42%) out of a total of 526, of whom 189 (85%) were 
employed in operational roles in survey and clearance teams. 
Of the programme’s 20 most senior managerial positions,  
half were filled by women.55 
HI provides equal opportunities to employment for qualified 
women and men in its survey and clearance teams in 
Lao PDR, and trains and promotes women to managerial 
positions. HI has mixed non-technical survey teams, with 
employees of different ethnic origins and persons with 
disability, including UXO survivors. It has a commitment to 
ensure that 50% of staff trained/recruited are women, and 
in 2019–20 was conducting in-house EOD-2 training that 
involves three women and three men recruited in 2018 for 
the Houaphanh project. Overall, women account for half of 
HI’s survey and clearance personnel in Lao PDR and half of 
managerial level/supervisory positions.56 
MAG employed a weighted application system during its 
recruitment process for the new DFID grant in early 2019, in 
order to prioritise groups in Lao society that are traditionally 
disadvantaged. It devised a scoring system for use during the 
newly introduced electronic shortlisting process, awarding 
points for indicators of disadvantage (e.g. single parents/
widows, ethnic minorities, those from flood-affected villages, 
low level of education, and women), helping ensure more 
members of disadvantaged groups were interviewed. The 
shortlist scores were also considered alongside the interview 
scores, helping to offset the disadvantage that individuals 
with low literacy or little interview experience face. Overall, 
women account for 37% of operational roles in MAG’s survey 
and clearance teams in Lao PDR and 44% of managerial 
level/supervisory positions (26% of operational managers 
and 50% of support managers).57 
NPA’s Lao PDR programme has a Gender Action Plan 
2019–20 and in November 2019 a one-day workshop on 
gender mainstreaming and equality was held for all 350 
NPA field staff in Pakse. The training provided staff with 
an introduction to gender mainstreaming in mine action, 
including promoting women’s leadership in the UXO sector.58 
NPA also prioritises ethnic and language minorities, and 
women, as part of its recruitment process. While NPA survey 
and clearance teams are gender inclusive, they are not 
yet gender balanced. In 2019, women made up over 26% of 
NPA Lao PDR’s staff members, an increase from 2018. This 
included 79 women (27%) in a total of 296 operational staff, 
9 women (22%) in a total of 40 support staff, and 2 women 
(25%) in a total of 8 expatriate staff members. Approximately 
30% of managerial positions in the programme were held  
by women.59 
UXO Lao ensures that all groups affected by CMR 
contamination, including women and children, are consulted 
during its survey and community liaison activities. This 
requirement is included in its standing operating procedures 
(SOPs). UXO Lao also ensures its survey and community 
liaison teams are inclusive and gender balanced, to facilitate 
access and participation from all groups.60 UXO Lao reported 
that it offers employment opportunity to all and is trying 
to increase the number of women in survey and clearance 
teams and in management positions.61 UXO Lao said that it 
advocates for equality in the workplace and that its human 
resource policies encourage female applicants at all levels, 
and has one female unit chief. Of its 1,396 staff employed, 
371 (27%) are female, of whom 74% work in the field: seven 
as team leaders and three as specialist explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) personnel.62
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The national IMSMA database has several data problems, 
including incorrect or incomplete historical data (mainly that 
of UXO Lao data stored as hard-copy documents in provincial 
UXO Lao offices); missing data from the migration to IMSMA; 
and delays in entering corrected data into the database.63  
The NRA has identified the need for better quality control of 
data in the IMSMA database.64 It is reported to be continuing 
to improve data quality, focusing again on the quality of forms 
and correcting data errors in 2020.65 It has also stressed that 
upgrading information management systems will be crucial 
given the greatly increased volume of data resulting from 
the ongoing nationwide CMRS.66 The TWG on information 
management met quarterly in 2019.67
A 2017 report by Sterling International, the former US 
contractor before Janus and Tetra Tech, said analysis of data 
in the NRA IMSMA database found errors affecting up to 9,300 
entries, or 14% of the 67,000 entries on the database. Sterling 
believed that the errors could affect 22% of the area recorded 
in the database as cleared or technically surveyed. The 
errors included operators’ misreporting of coordinates and 
mistaken entry of reports into IMSMA. Other errors included 
use of the wrong GPS format or the wrong map datum. The 
result was to put many tasks in the wrong location. Sterling 
found that the errors occurred mostly with UXO Lao’s work, 
and mostly between 2004 and 2010, but that it affected 
“many” organisations.68 Efforts to correct historical data 
within IMSMA (including incorporation of correct current 
data) are ongoing. It is also important that village-level data 
corrections made by operators during the nationwide CMRS 
are updated in IMSMA in a timely manner.69 
When the organisation conducting the CMRS is different to 
the one holding historical records, the nationwide CMRS 
demands good cooperation and timely sharing of data 
relating to villages between clearance operators. This 
pertains to historical information on EOD roving tasks, area 
clearance, and accident data.70 Communication between 
international operators and UXO Lao is continuing to improve. 
However, while UXO Lao does provide its data on historical 
tasks to international operators to help inform desktop 
studies before sending in survey teams, data is often slow 
to be made available.71 Delays in the timely provision of 
historical data by UXO Lao are understood to be partly 
connected to the lack of an appropriate and clear structure 
for the granting of permissions for data sharing at the 
provincial level. UXO Lao reported that it is not permitted to 
share corrected data not in IMSMA directly with operators, 
unless approval is granted by the NRA.72
With capacity development support from NPA, revisions to 
the Information Management (IM) NMAS were submitted 
to the NRA for consideration in 2019, and will be formally 
approved once other relevant chapters of NMAS have also 
been updated. IM SOPs for the NRA, including IM process 
maps and guidelines, were also drafted and submitted 
for translation into Lao as well. The UXO sector is said 
to be positive about the revised draft IM NMAS which 
better defines the minimum requirements, and roles and 
responsibilities of different organisations in IM.73
International clearance operators believed there was scope 
for the data gathering forms to be strengthened to also 
ensure socio-economic and impact data is also available 
for use in planning and prioritisation.74 As at May 2020, final 
proposed revisions to IMSMA forms had been accepted 
by the NRA, but not officially approved yet. Collection of 
socio-economic data started in June 2020,75 but as at August 
operators had still to receive any revised IMSMA forms with 
added socio-economic data. 
Following additional NPA capacity development in 2019 
under DFID funding, four provincial authorities in the south 
are now in a position to access and use the IMSMA database. 
The same training package and approach was also used to 
conduct IMSMA training in the remaining 11 provinces by  
the NRA.76
Operators reported that data submitted to the NRA were 
typically updated in a timely manner and accurately.77 IMSMA 
VPN was tested from July to September 2018, with technical 
support from NPA, and was considered successful and 
subsequently rolled out. As at August 2020, all operators, 
except for UXO Lao, were using IMSMA VPN.78 It has helped 
improve the accessibility of data, the speed and quality of 
the data entry, and the reporting process, with crosschecks 
raising any discrepancies for correction.79 However, IMSMA 
is still not fully accessible to operators, who can only access 
their own data in the system and have to formally request the 
additional data.80
Expanding the use of IMSMA to support survey planning and 
the review of all historical operational data (both electronic 
and paper), will help ensure that non-technical survey is 
followed up by robust technical survey operations.81 In 
addition, the information management system in Lao PDR 
must also be equipped to record operator conclusion reports, 
in order to know how many villages have been surveyed.82 
The NRA’s IM unit has a system in place to record conclusion 
reports, but not all operators submit the information.83
Lao PDR provides regular updates on its progress in Article 
4 implementation, both in its annual Article 7 transparency 
reporting and in statements at the CCM meetings of States 
Parties. It submitted a timely CCM Article 4 deadline 
extension request, which was granted at the CCM Ninth 
Meeting of States Parties in September 2019. 




As part of efforts to implement the CCM Vientiane and 
Dubrovnik Action Plans, the Lao Government adopted  
“Safe Path Forward II, 2011–20”, a 10-year national strategy 
for the UXO sector. The strategy’s goal is “to reduce the 
humanitarian and socio-economic threats posed by UXO to 
the point where the residual contamination and challenges 
can be adequately addressed by a sustainable national 
capacity fully integrated into the regular institutional  
set-up of the Government.” 
Safe Path Forward II was reviewed in June 2015, when the 
NRA set a number of specific targets for the remaining five 
years up to 2020.84 Many of these were superseded in March 
2016 when the NRA issued a landmark paper committing to 
time-bound nationwide non-technical and technical survey 
through the CMRS project, with a view to producing Lao 
PDR’s first baseline estimate of CMR contamination.85 There 
was a corresponding multi-year work plan 2016–20 for 
implementation of the Safe Path Forward II strategy,86 which 
called for spending on clearance of $57 million, and targeted 
clearance for 2017−21 of 45km2 a year, considerably in excess 
of previous clearance rates.87 
A new national strategic plan for the UXO Sector is being 
elaborated for 10 years, in line with SDG 18 under the 2030 
SDG agenda.88 A GICHD-facilitated strategy stakeholder 
workshop, planned for March 2020 in Vientiane, unfortunately 
had to be postponed due to the COVID-19 outbreak. As a 
result of continued travel restrictions related to COVID-19, 
the GICHD was planning to support the NRA by facilitating an 
online strategy stakeholder workshop before the end of 2020. 
This workshop will result in a “theory of change” approach 
that will provide the foundation for Lao PDR’s new national 
strategy.89 Through its US-funded agreement between Tetra 
Tech and the NRA, the United States is continuing to “support 
the Lao Government as it formulates its 10-year National 
Strategic Plan for the UXO Sector, a plan that will map the 
path to achieving SDG 18 – the elimination of UXO as a barrier 
to national development by 2030.”90
In a positive development, a first-ever sector-wide annual 
work plan for Lao PDR for 2018 was developed in an inclusive 
manner with input from all relevant stakeholders and 
subsequently approved by the NRA Board.91 Unfortunately, 
stakeholders were not bought together to help inform 
elaboration of the annual sector-wide work plan for 2019, in 
the same way as for 2018, reportedly due to lack of budget. 
Instead the ministry collected the data to inform the 2019 
plan.92 A consultative workshop was, however, held in June 
2019 to support the development of the sector-wide work 
plan for 2020;93 and a workshop was also held in September 
2020 with all stakeholders, including UXO Lao and the four 
international NGOs, to discuss elaboration of a sector-wide 
work plan for 2021.94 
In 2018, Lao PDR began a national CMRS baseline survey, 
with funding from the United States, and the baseline 
survey is ongoing. The first phase of the survey involves six 
province-wide surveys (in Attapeu, Champasak, Saravan, 
Savannakhet, Xekong, and Xiengkhouang) by HALO Trust, 
MAG, and NPA of all villages suspected or confirmed as 
CMR-contaminated, according to the NRA’s village list.95 In 
September 2018, Lao PDR announced that three additional 
contaminated provinces would be added to the national 
survey plan in 2019 and another five provinces in 2020–21, 
with the aim to have 14 provinces fully surveyed by end of 
2021.96 However, survey has fallen behind schedule.97
According to Lao PDR’s 2019 Article 4 deadline extension 
request, “all sector activities are implemented in order to 
achieve SDG18 “Lives Safe from UXO”, to remove the UXO 
obstacle to national development and the activities should 
be implemented in line with the strategic documents and 
policies”.98 The UXO Sector has been further integrated into 
the national development agenda, such as the National Policy 
on Rural Development and Poverty Eradication, including the 
National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2016–20), on the 
approval of priority development areas.99 
WORK PLAN ESTIMATES FOR THE EXTENSION REQUEST 
PERIOD (2020–25)
Lao PDR’s CCM 2019 Article 4 extension request includes  
a five-year work plan for survey and clearance, with  
progress dependent on the level of funding it secures.  
There will be a strong concentration on survey during the 
extension period, with a focus on the six most contaminated 
provinces to be completed as soon as possible, followed by 
the others. Clearance will take place simultaneously with 
survey activities.100
Based on existing capacity, over the five-year period of 
Lao PDR’s extension (1 August 2020–31 July 2025), 25 
non-technical survey teams will survey 1,463 cluster 
munition contaminated villages (292 villages per year), at a 
total cost of US$4.5 million and 76 technical survey teams 
would survey 2,873 villages at a predicted total cost of 
US$38 million (US$7.6 million per year). Re-survey is to be 
conducted as required, if new evidence of CMR is reported 
and found.101 
As at the end of 2018, more than 9,284 CHAs, equivalent 
to 858km2 in size, had already been identified through the 
ongoing CMRS and entered into IMSMA, representing several 
years of clearance efforts based on current clearance 
capacity. The NRA predicts that the number of CHAs 
containing CMR will significantly increase during the five-year 
period of the extension request, at a rate far faster than the 
CMR-contaminated areas can be cleared.102
In its 2019 Article 4 extension request, Lao PDR outlines 
three different estimates for CMR clearance, based on three 
different scenarios for available resources. The first outlines 
predicted clearance output based on existing resources 
during 2020–25; namely 108 teams, with a total clearance 
output of 50km2 per annum, at a cost of US$12.5 million per 
year. This would result in clearance of 250km2 at a cost of 
$62.5 million, during the five-year extension request period.103 
This seems highly ambitious, based on current output.
The second estimate predicts clearance output based on the 
additional resources needed to address the 800km2 of CHA 
already recorded in IMSMA as at end of 2018. This would see 
annual clearance output incrementally increased from 60km2 
per annum in 2020 to 280km2 per annum in 2024, with total 
clearance output of 800km2 during the five-year extension 
request period, at a total cost of US$200 million.104
The third estimate predicts clearance based on the additional 
resources needed to address 1,600km2 of CHA, which 
includes the further 800km2 of CHA predicted to result from 
CMRS during the five-year extension request period, at a total 
cost of US$400 million.105
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Prioritisation of clearance is a critical step in the land 
release cycle and a key component of an integrated 
survey and clearance programme, especially given the 
large and increasing number of CHAs produced by the 
ongoing nationwide CMRS. However, at present, there is no 
comprehensive national-level guidance on the prioritisation 
of clearance tasks and prioritisation systems and criteria 
vary markedly between the operators.106 The co-chairs 
of the UXO Sector Working Group, the United States and 
UNDP, believe a prioritisation plan will need to be developed 
for the entire UXO Sector, including both commercial and 
humanitarian operators.107 The sector would benefit from the 
strengthening of the capacity and participation of the NRA at 
the provincial level and of district officers from the Labour 
and Social Welfare authorities. Operators also stressed the 
need for community participation in the process.108 The NRA 
acknowledges difficulties in sector planning and prioritisation 
by local authorities.109 Prioritisation workshops commenced 
in 2019 and continued into 2020, and a plan was currently 
being developed.110 
Under the new DFID contract which commenced in 2019, 
NPA is assisting the NRA in developing national capacity and 
creating a nationwide prioritisation matrix, with input from 
fellow DFID consortium partners, HALO Trust and MAG.111 
However, due to a delay in the MoU process and the resulting 
reduction in the implementation timeframe of the DFID 
capacity development project, the planning and prioritization 
outputs of the DFID-related work plan were reduced.112 
Clearance operators expected the issue of a nationwide 
prioritisation matrix to gather further traction during 2020. 
As at August 2020, the prioritisation matrix was still being 
elaborated.113
At the micro level, prioritisation of clearance tasks in Lao 
PDR is in part dictated by the wet and dry seasons. During 
the dry season, operators are able to access and clear paddy 
fields, while in the wet season, they focus on clearing grazing 
and community land.114
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The “Lao PDR UXO Survey Standards” (UXO Survey 
Standard No. 21/NRA) specify the minimum standards 
and requirements for the survey of all cluster 
munition-contaminated areas in Lao PDR.115 The standards 
were developed in a participatory manner with assistance 
and input from the mine action community in Lao PDR and 
were completed in September 2017, before being officially 
approved by chair of the NRA on 4 July 2018.116 The standards 
are said to conform to the International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS)117 and are fully reflected in the SOPs  
of clearance operators, who reported that they are well 
adapted to the local threat and context.118 
The NRA plans to formally review the national standards at 
least every three years, in collaboration with stakeholders, 
to ensure they evolve to meet changing circumstances and 
the introduction of new technologies and methodologies.119 
MAG said that the NRA had planned to review and revise the 
national standards in 2020, in collaboration with NGOs, but 
this was postponed due to the impact of COVID-19.120
Prior to 2014, UXO operators in Lao PDR primarily carried 
out general survey on areas intended for clearance and 
roving clearance tasks, based on request and reports from 
villagers.121 CMRS has resulted in clearance being directed 
to cluster munition strikes, across land boundaries where 
necessary, and away from the clearance of areas with low 
or no CMR contamination. There has been a significant 
improvement in the number of CMR destroyed per hectare 
cleared since 2015.122 As part of the new CMRS procedure, 
and the corresponding national standard, non-technical 
survey is to be carried out on whole villages (i.e. all land 
within a village boundary), not just individual areas of 
land, with the aim to identify evidence points for follow-on 
technical survey. An additional aim during survey is to 
correct errors or omissions in historical data in IMSMA  
or in operator files.123 
The survey approach has been strengthened over the last 
couple of years, with more emphasis on the importance 
of desk assessment of historical data and comprehensive 
non-technical survey. Technical survey is only carried out 
based on CMR evidence points and is also conducted on 
whole villages.124 Technical survey works outwards from 
the initial evidence point, searching no less than 50% of each 
50 metre by 50 metre box with a detector, with emphasis on 
finding a submunition. As soon as a submunition is found, 
technical survey moves to the adjacent boxes. If cluster 
munition fragments are found, searching must continue until a 
submunition is found or at least 50% of the box is covered.125
Operators continue to refine their cluster munition survey 
methodology in a bid to accelerate operations, including using 
the technique of “skipping boxes”, in which teams finding 
CMR in one survey box skip one or more of the immediate 
neighbouring boxes and then survey the next box. Skipping 
boxes is permitted in the national survey procedure, and 
where appropriate has now become standard practice for 
technical survey teams, where the focus is on identifying the 
boundaries of CHAs.126 
CHAs are established based on red boxes and include a 
50-metre fade-out from the place submunitions are found 
during technical survey, unless fade-out extends into 
inaccessible or commercial concession areas (responsibility 
for survey and clearance in commercial concession areas is 
then that of the concession holder).127 
According to the national survey standards, clearance 
must only be conducted in CHAs, unless either “official 
agreements with the NRA permit a dispensation” or “the UXO 
clearance is being paid for by a client and 100% clearance 
without survey is a requirement of the agreement”.128 
The NRA maintained the need to retain some flexibility to 
accommodate donor stipulations which sometimes require 
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full clearance of UXO in non-CHAs, for development projects 
such as schools, and there is an official procedure for such 
instances.129 In late 2016, the Prime Minister issued Order 
No. 43/PM, which stipulates that development projects in 
provinces and districts affected by UXO must undergo survey 
and clearance before project implementation, and these 
development projects must also allocate funding for survey 
and clearance.130 
Except in the case of permanently inaccessible land or 
commercial concession areas, CHAs that are incomplete or 
have not been created using the technical survey process 
are not to be entered into IMSMA.131 Interpretation and 
understanding as to what constitutes “inaccessible” is not 
clearly defined and can vary between clearance operators,132 
but according to the national survey standards, dense 
vegetation and seasonal flooding are not valid reasons for 
the non-completion of technical survey.133 Clearance teams 
deployed to CHAs are required to have the knowledge and 
necessary equipment to operate in difficult areas such as 
steep hillsides and dense jungle terrain, which requires strong 
monitoring mechanisms to ensure that the physical obstacles 
do not reduce the quality of the survey and clearance work.134 
The minimum clearance depth in Lao PDR depth is 25cm, 
which is intended to capture all surface and shallow CMR 
contamination.135 There is said to be recognition of the need 
for a review of the minimum survey and clearance depth, 
which currently stands at 25cm. Reviewing empirical data on 
the depths of submunitions found and their condition (i.e. the 
degradation factor), would support any review process.136 
With regard to completion of CHAs/cluster munition 
footprints, international clearance operators reported 
difficulty conducting CMRS in certain areas, due to national 
security or restrictions to access land due to cultural 
sensitivities and beliefs.137 Furthermore, in technical survey 
tasks in areas of massive contamination, with overlapping 
strikes, it is not always possible to continue to fade-out, as 
the confirmed areas extend too far.138
HI has suggested that as CMRS can be time consuming, 
clearance could replace CMRS earlier where it is well 
established that there is CMR contamination, as clearance 
would cover the entire CHA anyhow, including a 50m buffer 
zone.139 Similarly, in places with severe contamination, UXO 
Lao is in favour of having the option to forego survey and 
move directly to clearance.140 
Based on the areas in which it is operational, NPA 
reported that typically CHAs cover the strike area and 
submunitions are not being found outside of CHAs polygons 
during clearance;141 an indication of the effectiveness of 
evidence-based survey.
MAG uses Evidence Point Polygon (EPP) mapping 
methodology to support CMRS planning. The technique, 
pioneered by MAG, uses historical and ongoing operational 
data from GPS-recorded EOD spot tasks involving 
submunitions to plot what are termed Initial CHAs (iCHAs). 
Within the boundaries of iCHAs, including fadeout, no 
technical survey is required, resulting in time and resources 
efficiencies. However, in order to be effective, this technique 
relies on accurate and reliable EOD spot-task data, which is 
not always available. In areas where MAG is applying EPP 
mapping, it uses its own EOD data.142 
According to the NRA, understanding of the CMRS process, 
especially at the local and field levels, is sometimes limited.143 
Stakeholders across the mine action sector in Lao PDR 
agreed on the importance of strengthening coordination with 
village authorities as an integral component of the survey 
process, ensuring that communities understand and accept 
the results of survey. It is especially important that villagers 
fully understand that, despite demolition of UXO during 
the CMRS process, CHAs identified through survey remain 
hazardous until full clearance has taken place, which may  
not be for many years.144 
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Land release operations in Lao PDR are conducted by a range of implementing partners, which includes humanitarian 
operators such as the national operator UXO Lao; international NGOs, HALO Trust, HI, MAG, and NPA; commercial clearance 
operators; and humanitarian teams of the Lao People’s Army.145 
With regard to survey capacity in 2019: The Lao Army 58 (humanitarian demining unit) deployed one non-technical survey 
team, totalling five personnel and four technical survey teams totalling twenty-eight personnel;146 HALO deployed 2 
non-technical survey teams, totalling 4 personnel and 15 technical teams, totalling 134 personnel;147 HI had 1 non-technical 
survey team of 2 personnel and 1 technical survey team of 6 personnel;148 MAG had 4 non-technical survey teams, totalling  
19 personnel and 22 technical survey teams, totalling 176 personnel;149 NPA had 24 CMRS (non-technical survey and  
technical survey) teams totalling 120 survey personnel (5 searchers per team, excluding team leaders);150 and UXO Lao  
had 10 non-technical survey teams totalling 42 personnel (including team leaders) and 16 technical survey teams totalling  
177 personnel (including team leaders).151
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Table 2: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2019152
Operator Manual teams Total clearance personnel Machines Comments
Lao Army 58 5 45  45  Capacity increased to 7 teams from  
November 2019.
HALO 20 218  0 HALO’s clearance capacity increased from  
4 to 20 teams from June 2019, due to the  
DFID funding. Medics are included as HALO  
has technician medics.
HI 2 10  0 In addition, two drivers are trained in clearance.
MAG 30 240  2 MAG’s clearance capacity increased in both  
Xieng Khouang (11 new teams) and Khammouane 
(12 new teams) provinces, due to DFID funding. 
Mechanical assets refer to two JCBs.
NPA 9 108  0 From January-June seven teams were 
deployed, with two additional teams deployed 
from July with DFID funding.
UXO Lao 85 850  2* 10 members for each team (1 team leader,  
1 deputy team leader, 1 medic, 1 driver, and  
6 deminers). *Two Komatsu tracked excavators 
that have been fitted with an attachment to crush 
BLU-26s and other small submunition types.
Total
More than 1,471 
clearance personnel
N/K = not known
UXO Lao, the oldest and largest clearance operator in Lao 
PDR, is a government organisation operating under the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare,153 operating in nine 
provinces (Attapeu, Champasak, Houaphanh, Khammouane, 
Luang Prabang, Savannakhet, Saravan, Xekong, and 
Xiengkhouang).154 In Luang Prabang, UXO Lao operates with 
funding from Norway and management support from NPA.155 
A new Director of UXO Lao was appointed in 2019.
The HALO Trust’s survey and clearance efforts are focused 
on Savannakhet province, where in 2019 it operated in 
the districts of Nong, Phin, Sepon, and Vilabouly, and also 
expanding operations into Atsaphantong and Phalanxai.156 
HI is conducting survey and clearance in Houaphanh 
province, where it also provides capacity building support 
to the provincial NRA, through provision of equipment and 
training in information management and quality management. 
HI also conducted a needs assessment mission in Phongsaly 
Province with the NRA in October 2019, and implements 
projects in Champasak, Savannakhet and Vientiane 
Provinces, relating to other fields (such as disability  
inclusion and health and rehabilitation).157
MAG is the largest international survey and clearance 
operator in Lao PDR, and is operational in Xiengkhouang 
province, in the north, where it is conducting technical survey 
of all villages as part of the nationwide survey project and 
Khammouane province in the south where its main focus 
in 2019 was on surveying 30 priority villages in Boulapha 
district, one of the most heavily contaminated areas in Lao 
PDR.158 In addition to its own teams, MAG subcontracted 
two NPA technical survey teams from September 2018 to 
February 2019, in a six-month project under the Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs grant to carry out CMRS in 
Khammouane province.159 As at March 2019, MAG had 
assumed all of the activities under the project and was 
conducting both survey and clearance.160 
NPA is operational in the four southern and heavily 
contaminated provinces of Attapeu, Champasak, Saravan, 
and Xekong. It expanded operations into Champasak from 
July 2019. As mentioned above, NPA was also subcontracted 
by MAG to carry out CMRS in Khammouane for six months, 
after which MAG conducted follow-on clearance of the CHAs 
created by NPA. This joint, fixed-term project was completed 
in February 2019. NPA also acts as the project coordinator 
for Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ bilateral support 
to Lao PDR, through UXO Lao’s operations in Luang Prabang, 
in the north of the country.161 In addition to its survey and 
clearance operations, NPA supports capacity development of 
the NRA and UXO Lao. NPA increased capacity development 
support in 2019 under new DFID funding, in particular with 
respect to information management.162
The capacity of the Lao armed forces was increased from  
five to seven humanitarian demining teams in November  
2019, funded by the Lao PDR Ministry of Defence.163 According 
to the NRA, the humanitarian clearance teams of the Lao 
Army are a valuable asset, conducting survey and clearance 
in the same way as national and international clearance 
operators, and with good coordination between the NRA 
and the army. In addition, the army was being trained to 
use IMSMA. Lao Army teams (completely separate to the 
humanitarian teams) not coordinated by the NRA started 
clearance of UXO to enable construction work on the $6 
billion Laos-China high speed railway.164
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From October 2018 to March 2019, Russian and Lao armed forces worked in partnership to survey and clear 1km2 of land 
in Bolikhamxay province, with equipment supplied by Russia. The partnership project is part of a broader framework 
of cooperation between the governments and armed forces of the two countries.165 During October 2018 to March 2019, 
servicemen from the International Mine Action Centre of the Russian Armed Forces completed joint tasks with members of the 
U-58 mine clearance team of the Laos People’s Army. Russia reporting clearing just over 1km2 in Lao PDR, during which 344 
items of explosive ordnance were destroyed. As part of the same project, it also reported training 20 deminers from the Lao 
PDR Army and provided demining equipment.166 The partnership has continued and in 2020 the Russian and Lao Armed Forces 
were conducting a joint project in Xiengkhouang province.167
The use of drones is now permitted to assist CMR operations in Lao PDR, but requires several separate certifications and 
licenses before approval for an MOU can be sought from the NRA.168 MAG secured a drone permit in late 2019, but as of June 
2020 was not yet using the drone for survey or clearance operations.169 HI had yet to secure approval from local authorities  
for the use of drones to secure disposal sites and EOD spot tasks, but was continuing efforts.170 
DEMINER SAFETY
One member of MAG staff was injured in an accident in September 2019 when a BLU3B fuse which was thought to be scrap 
metal exploded. The quality management (QM) team of the NRA investigated the accident, using an accident collection form. 
The incident was also thoroughly investigated in line with MAG’s SOPs and the findings were shared with the NRA, and other 
operators were briefed on the incident.171
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
According to NRA figures, total release of CMR in 2019 through humanitarian clearance was nearly 46km2, with the destruction 
of 42,085 submunitions. A further 19km2 was released through commercial clearance, with the destruction of 1,742 
submunitions. See table 4 below.172 In addition, 36,313 submunitions were destroyed during spot tasks and survey.173 
The total combined number of submunitions destroyed during non-technical survey, technical survey, clearance, and spot 
tasks in 2019 was reported as 80,140.174
SURVEY IN 2019
A total of more than 245.82km2 of CHA containing CMR was identified in 2019 (see Table 3);175 an increase on the equivalent 
210km2 of CHA containing CMR identified in 2018 (but which excluded the Lao Army 58 data, which was not available).176 For 
the purposes of reporting, the 5,195 submunitions destroyed during non-technical survey and 24,591 submunitions destroyed 
during technical survey in 2019 are already included in the 36,313 submunitions destroyed during spot tasks, in the NRA’s 
annual UXO sector report for 2019.177














Lao Army 58 1,857,500 387,500  72 0 0 0
HALO Trust 41,907,500 13,223,202  2,860 32 648 1
HI 1,567,500 783,750  92 0 8 0
MAG 164,213,561 167,610,011  13,352 0 33 0
NPA 64,593,000 22,648,964  3,153 4 260 0
UXO Lao 60,575,325 41,169,405  5,062 2 1,172 0
Totals 334,714,386 245,822,832 24,591* 38 2,121 1
* Already included in clearance data totals
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As at June 2020, HI had identified 44 suspected minefields in 19 villages, during non-technical survey in Houamuang district of 
Houaphanh province, where it is currently operating.179 HI was forced to suspend technical survey of CHAs in early 2019, due to 
the discovery of landmines during clearance of CHAs. Technical survey of the suspended CHAs only recommenced in late 2019, 
in areas identified as safe from mines, for example where land was in agricultural use. HI also developed a new “clearance 
while surveying” (CWS) procedure, to allow for safe release of CMR contamination in areas where there is a potential risk of 
landmines. CWS involves the commencement of full clearance from the CMR evidence point.180 HI believes that the NRA should 
coordinate and organise training, and adjust the standards accordingly, with regard to CMRS in areas also affected by mines.
In 2019, NPA nearly doubled the amount of land covered by technical survey, compared to 2018 (when survey only started  
in June, due to the delay in adopting the national standard). It concluded survey in 270 villages in 2019, compared to 70  
the year before.181 
CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, a total of nearly 45.77km2 of CMR contamination was cleared by humanitarian NGOs and the humanitarian demining 
teams of the Lao Army, with the destruction of 42,085 submunitions (see Table 4).182 This is an increase in the area released 
through clearance, compared to the equivalent 36.7km2 cleared in 2018 (but which excluded the Lao Army 58 data, which  
was not available).183
A further 19.30km2 was cleared by commercial operators and non-humanitarian teams of the Lao Army, with the destruction  
of 1,742 submunitions (see Table 4).184













Lao Army 58 692,304 245 0 430 0
HALO Trust 2,070,187 1,047 2 653 0
HI 499,043 714 1 14 1
MAG 9,869,304 6,485 7 1,142 0
NPA 4,017,895 3,924 0 300 0
UXO Lao 28,620,390 29,670 20 8,542 3




Lao Army 4,207,087 0 0 6 0
AusLao 11,266,445 20 22 37 0
Milsearch 415,181 295 0 82 0
MMG 884,987 76 5 265 0
OUMMA 205,833 1,339 0 0 0
PL 2,324,658 12 0 5 0
Sub-totals 19,304,191 1,742 27 395 0
Grand Totals 65,073,314 43,827 57 11,476 4
In addition, a further 36,313 submunitions were destroyed 
during spot tasks and/or during non-technical survey and 
technical survey by the Lao Army 58 (217 submunitions), 
HALO Trust (5,111 submunitions), HI (1,644 submunitions),  
MAG (15,600 submunitions), Milsearch (8 submunitions), NPA 
(6,224 submunitions), and UXO Lao (7,509 submunitions), along 
with 113 bombs, 9,958 other items of UXO, and 34 mines.186 
According to Lao PDR’s Article 7 report, a total of nearly 
65km2 was cleared in 2019 (see Table 5), across 14 provinces, 
with the destruction of nearly 79,400 CMR, in addition to 40 
mines, 170 big bombs, and 21,055 items of other UXO, during 
clearance, technical survey, and spot tasks.187 However, as 
occurred in previous years, this total includes clearance 
by the Lao Army (separate to the humanitarian teams) and 
commercial companies, including many tasks which did 
not contain CMR. Clearance reported in the provinces of 
Luangnamtha and Xaisomboun, which are not reported as 
being of CMR by Lao PDR, suggests this might be the case 
for 2019 data too. The figures reported in Lao PDR’s Article 7 
report differ slightly to those reported in the NRA’s 2019 UXO 
Sector Annual Report.188
The amount of land cleared by UXO Lao in 2019, was a 
slight decrease on the previous year,189 while HALO, MAG 
and NPA all increased the amount of area cleared in 2019, 
compared to the previous year, due to increased clearance 
capacity as a result of DFID funding. HALO Trust increased 
clearance output by around 300% (thanks to an increase 
from four clearance teams in December 2018 to 20 teams by 
the end of 2019);190 MAG increased clearance output by 200% 
compared to 2018;191 and NPA by over 60% compared to the 
previous year, which it also attributed to more efficient use of 
detectors and improvement in team management.192 
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During 2019, NPA piloted the use of new Vallon large-loop 
detectors for cluster munition survey and clearance as 
part of efforts to expand the UXO/mine action toolbox and 
efficiency of operations. Sixty staff were fully trained on the 
use of these detectors in the field, and initial results showed 
considerable increases in land release output of up to 50% 
in certain areas (especially paddy fields). As such, the use 
of large loop detectors will be expanded throughout NPA’s 
programme in 2020.193
All clearance organisations in Lao PDR are required to have 
a documented internal QM system, covering both quality 
assurance (QA) and quality control procedures (QC).194 
External QM inspections of clearance organisations are 
carried out by the NRA.195 However, the NRA’s QM capacity 
is extremely limited, with only two QM teams to cover 
sector-wide clearance.196 The NRA has been seeking funding 
to increase its QM capacity to four teams.197 
Table 5: CMR clearance by province in 2019198 
















ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR LAO PDR: 1 AUGUST 2010
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2020
ARTICLE 4 EXTENDED DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2025
LAO PDR WILL REQUIRE MULTIPLE EXTENSION REQUESTS BEFORE REACHING COMPLETION
Under Article 4 of the CCM, Lao PDR is required to destroy 
all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon 
as possible, but not later than 1 August 2025, having been 
granted a five-year extension (the maximum that can be 
requested per extension request under the CCM) in 2019. 
Based on current capacity and output, Lao PDR will not 
reach completion by its deadline and will require multiple 
extensions to its Article 4 deadline. According to the NRA, 
based on current resources and land release practices, 
“progress towards reaching a residual level of contamination 
as provided for in the CCM is decades away”.199 
As at end of 2019, 1,115.5km2 of CHA had already been 
identified through the ongoing nationwide CMRS,200 and 
as the baseline survey continues the area of confirmed 
contamination/CHA is expected to continue to increase 
rapidly. An estimate of the true extent of CMR contamination 
will not be known until the nationwide CMRS is completed.201
Clearance of CMR in Lao PDR will take many years and will 
require long-term national capacity and funding. According to 
Lao PDR’s 2019 Article 4 extension request, annual clearance 
output based on current capacity and resources available 
is approximately 50km2 per year on average,202 but annual 
humanitarian clearance output over the last five years has 
been significantly less (see Table 6). 
Table 6: Five-year summary of CMR clearance







*2014–15 were transition years from request-based to evidence-based clearance, 
and so include a higher proportion of clearance of land that did not contain CMR.
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The NRA has highlighted the challenges in balancing 
resources for survey and clearance. While nationwide CMRS 
is essential to quantify the extent of actual contamination 
in Lao PDR, there is also a need for follow-on clearance in 
priority areas, which also demands significant resources.203 
Commencement of DFID-funded clearance operations in  
Lao PDR in 2019 has helped increase clearance output of 
HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA. In addition, the United States  
has planned to support increased clearance capacity of  
both international clearance operators and UXO Lao,204  
which MAG and NPA reported will result in an increase  
in their clearance capacity in 2021.205
In its Article 7 report covering 2019, Lao PDR reports the 
need to expand and increase the capacity of the Lao PDR 
Army teams.206 It is only in the past few years that the 
Government of Lao PDR has allocated funds in its budget for 
UXO clearance, directed to the Lao Army dedicated teams.207 
Lao PDR has identified several challenges in Article 4 
implementation. These include insufficient funding (in 
particular to the NRA and UXO Lao), and the need to 
strengthen coordination and collaboration among sector 
stakeholders in order to increase effectiveness and efficiency 
of the mine action sector in Lao PDR.208 Existing clearance 
capacity is not sufficient to address the area of CHA identified 
for clearance through the ongoing nationwide CMRS. 
Furthermore, because the number of CMR found per hectare 
during clearance is now much higher, thanks to application of 
evidence-based land release methodology, more explosives 
are needed for the destruction of CMR. This increases 
operational costs as explosives in Lao PDR are reportedly 
among the most expensive in the region.209
In addition to insufficient clearance capacity, in its Article 7 
report covering 2019, Lao PDR also cites mountainous terrain; 
unpredictable funding; and outdated clearance equipment 
as other challenges (e.g. in distinguishing between CMR and 
scrap metal) and the national authorities highlight the need 
for more advanced clearance equipment and vehicles.210
As mentioned previously, and currently impacting HI’s 
operations in Houaphanh province, discovery of mines 
during CMRS significantly impedes operations.211 Other 
operational challenges in clearance tasks include heavy rains 
during the wet season; high scrap-metal contamination and 
fragmentation from other UXO; difficulty accessing tasks due 
to flooding and vehicles getting stuck in the mud; and the 
proximity of high-voltage pylons and power lines.212 
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Lao PDR is still determining the extent of its baseline of CMR contamination and is many years from completion, but planning 
for sustainable national capacity to address previously unknown cluster munition contamination following completion  
(i.e. residual contamination) will be essential.
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The Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) continued to make strong progress in releasing cluster munition-contaminated area  
in 2019. Lebanon has requested a five-year extension to its Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 deadline, and in 
line with its new National Mine Action Strategy for 2020–25, is aiming to complete clearance of known cluster munition remnant 
(CMR) contamination by the end of 2025. As part of efforts to re-survey all cluster munition-contaminated areas by the end of 
2020 to help inform Article 4 planning, LMAC cancelled 1.90km2 in 2019. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ LMAC should complete non-technical re-survey of all remaining cluster munition-contaminated areas, to help  
more accurately determine its baseline of contamination. 
 ■ Evidence-based non-technical and technical survey should routinely be used to confirm and identify the area of 
actual CMR contamination prior to clearance. 
 ■ The integration and consolidation of the LMAC and Regional Mine Action Centre (RMAC) databases and servers 
should be completed as soon as possible. 
 ■ LMAC should ensure consistent application of national mine action standards (NMAS) across the country with 
respect to metal detection requirements and the interpretation of metal-free.
 ■ LMAC should determine how it plans to address CMR contamination in especially difficult terrain, such as deep 
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(20% of overall score)
7 6 LMAC conducted a significant amount of non-technical survey in 2019, as part 
of efforts to complete re-survey of all CMR tasks by the end of 2020. This will 
further improve the accuracy of LMAC’s estimate of CMR contamination, following 
its database review and readjustment of the CMR baseline in 2018. The baseline, 
however, still includes CHAs with an estimated standard size of 10,000m2 (for 
hazardous areas recorded without defined boundaries), whose true size may differ 
markedly. For the purposes of Article 4 planning LMAC has increased the standard 
sized area estimation by 250% to factor in fadeout.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
9 9 LMAC continued to demonstrate effective programme management in 2019, 
maintaining biannual Mine Action Forum meetings as an effective mechanism in 
which to discuss challenges with, coordinate, and present progress in Article 4 
implementation to all relevant stakeholders. It also held quarterly technical working 
groups (TWG) meetings. Regrettably, due to political and financial unrest in Lebanon, 
none of the 50 billion Lebanese Pounds (approximately US$33 million) for CMR 
clearance over five years (2019–23), was allocated in 2019. However, the capacity  
of LMAC, which is nationally funded, was increased with the establishment of the 
RMAC in the north-east and to meet the increased demand for training courses.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
7 7 LMAC has taken action to mainstream gender in its mine action programme, 
including through data disaggregation, inclusive survey, and participation in courses 
at its regional demining school. Gender and diversity considerations are included in 
the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 and LMAC has appointed a new gender 
focal point who will help mainstream gender-sensitive policies and procedures, and 




(10% of overall score)
7 7 During 2019, efforts continued to integrate RMAC’s information management 
database with the LMAC server and to fully synchronise the two databases. LMAC is 
also in the process of migrating to Information Management System for Mine Action 
(IMSMA) Core and is checking and cleaning data as part of the process.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
8 8 LMAC has a new National Mine Action Strategy for 2020–25. The new strategy, which 
was elaborated with support from the EU-funded UNDP project, in a participatory 
approach with all stakeholders, includes an objective to complete clearance of all 
known cluster munition-contaminated areas by the end of 2025. 
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
8 8 Revised NMAS adopted in 2018 became effective from the start of 2019. Further 
revisions to the standards were made in late 2019 to incorporate updates in IMAS 
related to improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD) and risk assessment. They 
include enhancements such as a reduction of the required clearance depth for CMR, 
improvements to the fadeout specifications, and, for the first time, use of technical 
survey for CMR tasks. Land release methodologies for CMR are now more efficient  
as a result of these changes. In addition, LMAC has increased its non-technical capacity 
and it now permits organisations to conduct non-technical survey of their tasks prior  
to initiating clearance. 
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 4 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
7 6 In 2019, LMAC cancelled nearly 1.9km2 of cluster munition-contaminated area, as part 
of efforts to complete re-survey of CMR tasks by the end of 2020. This was significantly 
more cancellation than the previous year. Clearance output of more than 1.2km2 in 2019 
was a modest increase on output in 2018, as remaining clearance tasks are increasingly 
occurring on more difficult terrain. Lebanon has submitted a request for a five-year 
extension to its Article 4 deadline to 1 May 2026, and plans to complete clearance by the 
end of 2025.
Average Score 7.5 7.1 Overall Programme Performance: GOOD
CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAA)
 ■ Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC)
 ■ Regional Mine Action Centers (RMAC-N and RMAC-RB)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)/Engineering Regiment (ER)
 ■ Lebanese Association for Mine and Natural Disaster 
Action (LAMINDA)
 ■ Peace Generation Organization for Demining (POD)
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ DanChurchAid (DCA)
 ■ Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian  
Demining (GICHD)
 ■ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
 ■ UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
 ■ United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
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UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2019, Lebanon had 814 confirmed hazardous 
areas (CHAs) containing CMR covering a total area of almost 
9km2 (see Table 1).1 This is a decrease in CMR contamination 
compared to the end of 2018, when 864 CHAs were confirmed 
to contain CMR, over a total area of more than 11.8km2,2 and 
is mostly due to cancellation and clearance of CMR in 2019.
Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by province  
(at end 2019)3
Province CHAs Area (m2)
Beqaa 98 602,715
Janoub and Nabatiyeh (South) 657 8,016,896
Jabal Loubnan (Mount Lebanon) 57 322,370
Shimal (North) 2 20,000
Totals 814 8,961,981
In 2018, Lebanon reviewed its baseline of CMR contamination 
and changed the way it reflects clearance data. According 
to LMAC, a significant problem had been a difference in the 
way land release figures were recorded between the RMAC 
and LMAC. In many cases, actual clearance output of tasks is 
greater than the original task size recorded in the database, 
due to large fade-out requirements.4 Upon task completion, 
LMAC was reducing its initial baseline by the original 
task size in the database, whereas RMAC was adding the 
additional cleared area in excess of the task size to the initial 
database and then reducing the whole size of the clearance 
task from the database. LMAC has now corrected the national 
CMR baseline retrospectively to reflect its approach.5
Also as part of its 2018 database review process, LMAC 
decided to change the standard size of CHAs with no 
defined boundaries (and in which there is no mine threat), 
to 10,000m2, based on the fadeout distance for cluster 
munition clearance and LMAC’s experience to date.6 But 
operators have found that the standardised 10,000m2 (per 
task) area is in some instances an overestimate and in other 
instances an underestimate of the actual task size.7 LMAC, 
however, believes that this is the best approach for this type 
of hazardous area and to be conservative in its Article 4 
planning it has increased the size of these areas by 250% to 
factor in fadeout.8
The accuracy of the baseline is further complicated by the 
fact that clearance undertaken in the aftermath of the 2006 
cluster munition strikes was not conducted in accordance 
with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and 
was mostly limited to rapid surface clearance.9 This included 
emergency clearance undertaken by the Lebanese Armed 
Forces (LAF) in and around infrastructure, schools, and 
roads, and clearance contracted out to non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), commercial operators, and 
government groups by the UN Mine Action Coordination 
Centre – south Lebanon (MACC-SL), which assumed the role 
of coordinating CMR clearance in 2007, in cooperation with 
the National Demining Office (now known as LMAC).10 
LMAC’s recent efforts to adjust its database baseline to one 
that more accurately estimates total CMR contamination  
is a positive step, but the true size of these clearance tasks 
will vary and is hard to estimate without survey.11 It is, 
therefore, also extremely positive that LMAC is re-surveying, 
through non-technical survey, all remaining CMR tasks, 
which it hoped to complete by the end of 2020.12 In addition, 
technical survey will be required on tasks where the exact 
location of CMR contamination is not known and with a view 
to locating evidence points (i.e. submunitions), from where  
to start clearance.13
Previously, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) undertook a 
pre-clearance non-technical survey of 443 CMR clearance 
tasks between September 2013 and April 2014,14 which 
resulted in MAG recommending 96 tasks for cancellation, 
covering an estimated 2.8km2.15 LMAC decided to cancel 
51 of these, totalling an area of 1.7km2.16 The remaining 
tasks now being cancelled, where appropriate, as part of 
the non-technical survey project in 2019 and 2020,17 and 
where required, are subject to technical survey to determine 
whether or not CMR contamination actually exists.18
CMR contamination is largely the result of the conflict with 
Israel in July–August 2006. During the conflict, Israel fired an 
estimated four million submunitions on south Lebanon, 90% 
of which were dispersed in the last 72 hours of the conflict.19 
An estimated one million submunitions failed to explode.20 
Some Israeli bombing data have been provided — most 
recently through UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) — but 
has proved to be very inaccurate.21 In addition, some CMR still 
remain from earlier conflicts with Israel in 1978 and 1982,22 
and there is a small amount of new CMR contamination on the 
north-east border with Syria, resulting from spill-over of the 
Syrian conflict onto Lebanese territory in 2014–17.23 Types of 
submunitions found in Lebanon include AO-2.5 RT, BLU-18, 
BLU-26, BLU-61, BLU-63, M42, M43, M46, M77, M85, MK118, 
and MZD-2.24 Some areas contain unexploded submunitions 
resulting from both ground-launched and air-dropped cluster 
munitions, which can further complicate the picture.25 
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Lebanon is also contaminated by other unexploded ordnance (UXO), booby-traps, and anti-personnel mines (see Mine Action 
Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Lebanon for more information).




NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Established in 1998 by the Council of Ministers, the Lebanon 
Mine Action Authority (LMAA) is the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Defence and is chaired by the Minister of Defence. 
The LMAA has overall responsibility for Lebanon’s mine 
action programme. In 2007, a national mine action policy 
outlined the structure, roles, and responsibilities within the 
programme, and LMAC was tasked to execute and coordinate 
the programme on behalf of the LMAA.26
LMAC, part of the LAF, is based in Beirut. Since 2009, the 
RMAC-N, based in Nabatiyeh, which is a part of LMAC, has 
overseen operations in south Lebanon and western Beqaa, 
under LMAC supervision.27 At the end of 2018, a new regional 
centre, RMAC-RB, was established in the north-east of 
Lebanon in the village of Ras Baalbek, to oversee the mine 
action operations in this region.28 To a large extent LMAC has 
a well-functioning capacity, but, as they are army officers, 
the senior management of LMAC and RMAC are typically 
routinely rotated (every couple of years), which can hamper 
development and continuity in the management of the three 
mine action centres.29 The current director of LMAC started 
in March 2019, replacing his predecessor who had served 
as director for two years.30 LMAC increased its capacity in 
2019 with the establishment of RMAC-RB and to meet the 
increased demand for training courses.31
A new standing operating procedure (SOP), developed 
for LMAC in 2020, was reported to be in its final stage of 
approval as at March 2020. This SOP specifies the roles of 
each section of LMAC and clarifies the responsibilities and 
cooperation between sections. It is hoped that it will help  
new LMAC staff and reduce the impact of staff rotations.32
UN Development Programme (UNDP) personnel, funded 
by the European Union (EU), are also seconded to 
LMAC, providing support for capacity building, including 
transparency reporting, strategic reviews, Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database entry, 
community liaison, and quality assurance (QA). In 2019, there 
was one team of six UNDP personnel supporting LMAC.33 
EU funding for UNDP institutional support to LMAC, which had 
been due to finish at the end of 2019, but which would have 
resulted in a gap in capacity development,34 was extended for 
the first six months of 2020. During this period, UNDP was 
providing expertise and support on operational efficiency, 
prioritisation, research into clearance in difficult terrains, and 
risk education for Syrian refugees.35 With regard to difficult 
terrain, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) will also partner with LMAC on a study  
that was expected to start in the third quarter of 2020.36 
In addition, UNDP also mobilised funds for the first half of 
2020 from the Norwegian Embassy, in order to: assist with 
the strengthening of national capacity to document and 
prioritise clearance operations in line with Mine Action Forum 
recommendations; help LMAC to meet its national, regional, 
and international obligations and coordination functions and 
ensure follow-up of Mine Action Forum action points; and to 
support LMAC in effectively communicating its results and 
establishing partnerships.37 LMAC will seek to extend UNDP’s 
support beyond the second quarter of 2020.38
A “Mine Action Forum” has been established in Lebanon in 
close partnership between LMAC and Norway. The forum was 
the result of a two Lebanon-focused workshops, the first of 
which took place in November 2016, convened by Norway and 
the Netherlands in their capacity as CCM Co-Coordinators 
on clearance, and facilitated by the GICHD. The second 
workshop, in January 2018, convened in partnership between 
Norway and LMAC, resulted in the establishment of the Mine 
Action Forum. The forum meets twice a year, with UNDP 
designated as the secretariat to follow up on action points 
and develop progress reports.39 It provides an informal 
platform for LMAC to continue open dialogue and information 
sharing between the national authorities, implementing 
partners, and donors, on priorities and needs for the 
survey and clearance of cluster munitions and landmines 
in Lebanon.40 It is an example of what a “Country Coalition” 
under the CCM could look like, but in the case of Lebanon 
it was agreed the forum should be broadened to include 
landmines, and not just CMR. 
As of writing, the most recent Mine Action Forum was held 
on 22 January 2020, during which LMAC presented and 
discussed the new 2020–25 national mine action strategy, 
operational efficiencies, and a new explosive ordnance risk 
education (EORE) project.41 LMAC also presented its Article 
4 deadline Extension Request plan at the January 2020 Mine 
Action Forum meeting.42
The Mine Action Forum in Lebanon has resulted in better 
coordination and greater transparency as well as on 
enhancements to land release methodology, enshrined in the 
revised NMAS. These measures have all served to strengthen 
donor confidence and mobilise additional resources.43 
There is good coordination and collaboration between  
LMAC/the RMAC and clearance operators, with the operators 
consulted before key decisions are taken.44 International 
clearance operators reported that an enabling environment 
exists for mine action in Lebanon, with no obstacles regarding 
visas for international staff, approval of memoranda of 
understanding (MoUs), or the importation of equipment.45 
A technical working group (TWG) was established in March 
2018, under the auspices of LMAC, based on recommendations 
of the Mine Action Forum and following the release of the 
revised NMAS. The TWG, which meets quarterly, provides 
a useful forum for LMAC/the RMACs to meet collectively 
with clearance operators to review and discuss field issues, 
including implementation of revisions to the NMAS, identify 
issues, and suggest further NMAS revisions and potential  
ways to improve operational efficiencies.46 
As in the previous year, Lebanon reported contributing  
US$9 million annually in 2019 towards mine action in 
Lebanon (for both mine- and CMR-related work): to support 
costs associated with the running of LMAC (facilities and 
staff); the LAF Engineering Regiment companies working in 
demining (four teams, two of which work on CMR; in addition 
to mechanical and mine detection dog (MDD) support); risk 
education; and victim assistance.47 
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In addition, the Lebanese government had committed an 
additional 50 billion Lebanese Pounds (approximately 
US$33 million) to CMR clearance over five years (2019–23), 
to increase the number of CMR clearance teams and help 
meet Article 4 obligations under the CCM. Corresponding 
clearance contracts with DanChurchAid (DCA), LAMINDA and 
POD were finalised at the end of 2018, but signature by the 
Minister of Defense was delayed due to the announcement 
of a new government at the end of January 2019. NGOs took 
the decision to go ahead and begin CMR clearance operations 
in February 2019, using their own funds. However, they 
subsequently elected to stop operations after three months, 
pending formal signature of the clearance contracts by the 
Minister of Defence.48 Unfortunately, due to political and 
financial unrest in Lebanon, the clearance contracts were 
not signed and none of pledged additional national funding 
was spent during 2019.49 LMAC is expecting that an average 
of US$3 million national funding for CMR clearance will be 
allocated to CMR clearance yearly,50 less than half of what 
had been previously pledged.
A Regional School for Humanitarian Demining in Lebanon 
(RSHDL) has been established in partnership between 
Lebanon and France, with technical mine action support 
provided by a French military officer, to support the 
development of the curriculum on explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD, levels 1, 2, and 3) in compliance with IMAS.51 
The Regional School became operational in 2017, enabling 
civilian and military personnel from Arab and other 
countries to benefit from an array of courses and workshops 
on demining.52 In 2019, it provided training to national, 
regional, and international participants, including courses on 
non-technical survey, EOD, operational efficiency, and gender 
and diversity.53
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
The gender and diversity-related policy applied at LMAC 
is that of the LAF military rules. According to LMAC, all its 
personnel are familiar with these rules and the specific 
provisions related to gender equality and inclusion, 
safeguarding, and behavioural codes.54 
LMAC reported that it has taken several actions to 
mainstream gender in its implementation plan, including 
through inclusive policies, data disaggregation in risk 
education and victim assistance, and participation 
in courses at the RSHDL.55 In agreement with LMAC, 
the GICHD conducted a gender and diversity capacity 
assessment mission to Lebanon in July 2019. The aim was 
to reinforce a sustainable national capacity for gender and 
diversity mainstreaming in the LMAC and contribute to the 
achievement of gender equality and inclusion.56 In August 
2019, LMAC reported that it had appointed a new gender focal 
point, who will help mainstream gender-sensitive policies 
and procedures and monitor their implementation in the mine 
action centre and across the national programme.57 
Lebanon’s new National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, approved 
by the LMAA in June 2020, includes considerations on gender 
and diversity.58 Of the five objectives in the new strategy, the 
fifth states that, “The specific needs and perspective of women, 
girls, men and boys from all groups of society are considered, 
in order to deliver an inclusive HMA [mine action] response”. 
LMAC also acknowledges in the strategy that mine action 
“is a male-dominated environment and we have therefore a 
particular responsibility to empower women and ensure that 
we have a gender sensitive approach to our work”.59 Gender 
and diversity considerations will be further detailed in LMAC’s 
strategic implementation plan, which was being elaborated in 
the course of 2020, to support the new strategy.60
Of LMAC’s 157 personnel, 16 (10%) are female. The number 
of staff at LMAC is determined by the LAF headquarters but 
LMAC states that it consistently requests that the percentage 
of women be increased.61 With respect to operational roles, 
two women work for the operations section and one woman is 
a member of the non-technical survey team. With respect to 
managerial/supervisory level positions at LMAC, six women 
work in management and five in information technology (IT).62 
LAMINDA did not report the percentage of female deminers, 
but did report that women are employed in LAMINDA’s 
clearance teams and that one female staff member is in a 
managerial position, as clearance team leader.63
MAG, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), and POD all reported 
having gender policies in place.64 
MAG reported that it consults women during survey and 
community liaison activities; that all its community liaison 
teams are mixed; and that its data is disaggregated by sex 
and age. Overall, women account for 16% of operational roles 
in MAG’s survey and clearance teams in Lebanon, and 28%  
of managerial level/supervisory positions.65 
NPA is in the process of developing an implementation plan 
for its organisational gender policy for Lebanon, based 
on recommendations from the GICHD. It reported making 
progress in encouraging more women to apply, resulting in a 
5% increase in the proportion of women hired for operational 
roles. NPA planned to conduct training in gender equality, 
safeguarding, and code of conduct in 2020.66 NPA reported 
that its survey and community liaison teams are gender 
balanced, and 20% of employees in operational roles in NPA’s 
survey and clearance team in the south are women as are 
32% in its Arsal operations, which commenced in 2018. A total 
of 20% of NPA’s managerial level/supervisory positions are 
held by women. NPA disaggregates data by sex and age.67
Women and children are consulted during survey and 
community liaison activities.68 According to LMAC, Lebanon’s 
baseline of CMR contamination has been developed over 
many years. As per Lebanon’s NMAS, non-technical survey 
teams consult with women, girls, boys, and men, including, 
where relevant, minority groups, in order to make sure all 
available information is included.69




INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
During 2019, efforts continued to integrate RMAC’s 
information management database with the LMAC server 
and to synchronise the two databases.70 Harmonisation and 
consolidation of the LMAC and RMAC databases will enable 
IMSMA reports to be sent directly to LMAC for approval, 
improving the accuracy and efficiency of the process. The 
integration will also help better protect data while decreasing 
maintenance costs.71 As at March 2020, harmonisation of the 
two databases had been completed and servers installed to 
maintain the database, but LMAC was awaiting resolution of a 
technical issue to ensure the two servers are properly linked.72 
Furthermore, LMAC is migrating from its current version 
of IMSMA (New Generation) to IMSMA Core, which it hopes 
will help facilitate the production of clearer reports that can 
be translated into dashboards for stakeholders, including 
donors, to monitor and follow.73 As at March 2020, migration 
of data to IMSMA Core had begun, but the process takes 
time.74 In the process of migration, LMAC has discovered 
some overlap between its records of Dangerous Areas 
and minefields. Non-technical survey teams are therefore 
checked these overlaps on the ground and the database 
clean-up was completed in July 2020.75 LMAC personnel will 
receive GICHD training on IMSMA Core and LMAC planned to 
launch it by the end of 2020.76
Operators believe that IMSMA Core will enable better direct 
access to data, which will enhance understanding of broader 
CMR contamination and assist in identifying tasks where 
further non-technical and technical survey could be valuable.77 
Disclaimed areas in the database are those for which 
the owner of the land has not granted permission for 
implementing agencies to conduct land release operations. In 
such cases, the land owner has to sign a personal disclaimer 
taking full responsibility for any kind of explosive remnant of 
war (ERW) hazard including CMR on the land. LMAC is trying 
to end the disclaimers, the records of which were mainly 
taken before 2009. There is a high probability that the sites 
will be cancelled during the re-survey currently in process, 
when the owners are found to be using the land. If clearance 
is required, survey and community liaison teams, along 
with local authorities, will encourage landowners to allow 
clearance in order to ensure the land is free from hazards 
and will provide assurance of measures that will be taken to 
prevent disruption to the use of the land.78 According to its 
2020 Article 4 deadline extension request, there were 116 
disclaimed areas on the database, totalling 338,932m2.79 
Lebanon’s latest revision of NMAS, allows technical survey 
of CMR-contaminated areas. By May 2019, LMAC had updated 
data forms to allow for the correct reporting of land reduced 
through technical survey.80 However, NPA reported some 
initial confusion over terminology when reporting on the 
output of non-technical survey.81
According to LAMINDA, there are now daily reporting sheets 
for items and clearance.82 MAG started work on “survey123” 
in 2019, during which it reviewed data forms and data flow,  
in preparation for the launch of the project in the second half 
of 2020.83 
PLANNING AND TASKING
In September 2011, LMAC adopted a strategic mine action plan 
for 2011–20.84 The plan called for clearance of all CMR by 2016 
and for completion of mine clearance outside the Blue Line by 
2020. Both goals were dependent on capacity, but progress  
fell well short of planning targets, which were not met. 
LMAC has developed a new National Mine Action Strategy 
for 2020–25, with support from the EU funded UNDP project, 
in a participatory approach with national and international 
implementing agencies, mine action NGOs, UN agencies, and 
donors.85 One of the objectives of the new strategy is to complete 
clearance of all known cluster munition contaminated areas by 
the end of 2025.86 The new strategy was signed by the LMAA in 
June 2020. A mid-term and final external review are planned, as 
well as annual reporting on progress.87 LMAC is also elaborating 
a strategic implementation plan for 2020–25, based on the new 
strategy and in collaboration with implementing partners, to 
operationalise the new strategy with objectives, outputs, and 
indicators. LMAC expected to complete the implementation plan 
in August 2020. LMAC also plans to develop annual plans.88
Lebanon submitted a request to extend its Article 4 deadline, 
which will be considered by States Parties at the CCM Second 
Review Conference in November 2019. Clearance operators 
were consulted by LMAC on the extension request, including 
in a workshop prior to the request being elaborated.89 
Lebanon has requested a five-year extension to 1 May 2026, 
but aims to complete clearance by the end of 2025, in line 
with its new strategy. 
LMAC planned to complete re-survey (non-technical) of all 
remaining CMR tasks by the end of 2020 and prior to the start 
of the new extension period (May 2021). It estimates that after 
cancellation of uncontaminated areas, approximately 8.7km2 
of CMR-contaminated area will require clearance (including 
technical survey, where appropriate). The projected 
clearance rates in Lebanon’s extension request are based on 
an average of the last three years and while LMAC anticipates 
that application of the new, more efficient, methodologies 
adopted will increase this average, it also expects that any 
gain will be offset by the more difficult terrain of land which 
now remains to be cleared.90 
Table 2 outlines the predicted annual clearance output and 
capacity up to the end of 2025. Planned output takes into 
account fadeout and the possible increase in the area to be 
cleared in the 10,000m2 sites, using a factor of 2.5.91 LMAC 
plans to conduct technical survey, where appropriate, but  
has not provided predictions of the amount of area expected 
to be reduced through technical survey.
Table 2: Planned CMR clearance and capacity92
Year 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Cleared m2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.5 1.5
Teams 26 26 26 21 21
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Reprioritisation is needed, as most of the remaining tasks fall between priorities 2 and 3, and reprioritisation has not occurred 
for some time.93 According to LMAC, increased urbanisation; clearance of the Blue Line; spill-over from Syria creating new 
contamination, including improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and the sudden increase in residents, have combined to result 
in a change to overall clearance priorities. LMAC plans to work with operators to develop an updated prioritisation approach, 
including focusing on the socio-economic impact of contamination.94 
LMAC will use updated information from the non-technical re-survey of CMR tasks to reprioritise tasks based on humanitarian 
and socio-economic impact.95
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Lebanon developed its first NMAS in 2010.96 Adopting a 
consultative and constructive approach with its implementing 
partners, in 2017, LMAC initiated a project, supported by 
UNDP and other partners, funded by the EU, to revise and 
harmonise national standards with IMAS, as well as to add new 
modules not present in the original standards.97 The revised 
NMAS, formally approved in March 2018, have a solid focus 
on land release and evidence-based decision-making, in line 
with the IMAS, and based on recommendations and analysis 
of operational data. Notable enhancements in relation to 
battle area clearance (BAC) included reduction of the required 
clearance depth of CMR from 20cm to 15cm changes to 
fadeout, and were made effective from 1 January 2019. 
The minimum fade-out distance from any pertinent evidence 
point is agreed with LMAC, depending on the topography of 
the task. In the absence of an agreed fadeout, the default is a 
50-metre radius from the last evidence point.98 In addition, and 
of particular significance, the new NMAS now allow technical 
survey to be used for CMR tasks. In 2019, standards on the use 
of explosives detection dogs (EDDs) for technical survey were 
incorporated into IMAS, following a successful trial in 2018.99 
These changes to the NMAS should significantly improve the 
efficiency of CMR land release in Lebanon, potentially by as 
much as 30%, according to LMAC.100 
Historically, clearance tasks assigned to operators by LMAC 
were typically deemed to already reflect non-technical survey 
data, and LMAC did not formally permit operators to conduct 
additional survey on assigned tasks prior to clearance.101 
In the last couple of years, LMAC has increasingly begun to 
rely on non-technical survey and technical survey to more 
accurately define the presence or absence of an explosive 
threat.102 In 2019, extensive non-technical survey was 
conducted by LMAC, in addition to some non-technical survey 
by MAG, and LMAC aimed to have re-surveyed all CMR tasks 
by the end of 2020 in order to have a clearer estimation of the 
remaining contamination for Article 4 planning.103 
Results from non-technical survey will also help determine 
which tasks, on a case-by-case basis, are appropriate for 
technical survey (systematic or targeted).104 As the use 
of EDDs for technical survey requires special operating 
conditions (temperature, wind speeds, levels of vegetation 
etc.), manual technical survey will also be applied on a 
case-by-case basis. Each decision over the percentage and 
type of technical survey has to be approved by the operations 
section head in LMAC.105
LMAC has also agreed with the NGO operators the option 
for each to have a non-technical survey team to re-survey 
each new task prior to starting clearance. As at March 
2020, the NGOs had non-technical survey teams or were 
negotiating with donors to establish them,106 and where 
necessary, clearance operators are now permitted to conduct 
non-technical survey prior to clearance operations.107 
Furthermore, operators now have an opportunity to discuss 
specific land release considerations with LMAC for assigned 
clearance tasks, which arise during the pre-clearance 
assessment stage of operations. Such discussions might 
result in the refining of the task size or approved land release 
specifications (e.g. use of technical survey, for all or part of 
the task, rather than full clearance).108 International NGOs 
see collaboration between LMAC and clearance operators 
on application of evidence-based non-technical survey 
and technical survey, where needed, as being essential to 
targeted clearance.109
Further updates made to Lebanon’s NMAS in late 2019, 
which included the introduction of a new NMAS (07.14) 
on Risk Assessment and a new standard (09.31) on IED 
Disposal (IEDD), which were adopted in March 2020.110 With 
regard to technical survey, the NMAS no longer specifies a 
minimum percentage of area over which technical survey 
must be conducted, which permits LMAC to reduce technical 
survey when appropriate, especially on the Blue Line 
minefields and for CMR.111 The NMAS also allows for areas 
under full clearance to be reduced (or in part reduced), 
based on information gathered during clearance, as well 
as for the original task boundaries to be changed based on 
experience during clearance. Changes were also made to 
the NMAS (09.31) on demolitions.112 A continuous review of 
the national standards is executed based on field expertise 
and recommendations from implementing agencies and on 
updates of the IMAS.113
NPA noted that a more uniform approach is needed to the 
enforcement of NMAS across Lebanon, citing an example of 
LMAC QA teams issuing non-conformity reports when any 
metal is found subsequent to clearance, while the NMAS 
requires metal to be removed only if it is larger than the 
respective test-piece.114
NPA has found that there can also be a relatively large time 
lag between completion of clearance and final handover 
of land back to the community, an issue which, it believes, 
should be explored and addressed.115




OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2019, CMR clearance was conducted by international operators DCA, MAG, and NPA; and national operators POD and 
LAMINDA. Clearance capacity fluctuated throughout 2019, but totalled around 25 NGO clearance teams.116 In addition, the 
Engineering Regiment of the LAF also conducted CMR clearance in 2019.117
The LAF Engineering Regiment has two BAC teams and in addition, three of the Engineering Regiment and Combat Engineering 
companies cover rapid-response callouts across Lebanon.118 The LAF has seven MDD teams119 for technical survey and for 
use as a secondary asset supporting clearance, but none of these is used for CMR. Through the Engineering Regiment, LMAC 
provides mechanical assistance to clearance operators that lack this capacity.120 In Lebanon, machines are mostly used as 
secondary assets to support clearance teams (e.g. for ground preparation, rubble removal, or for fadeout); in areas where 
manual clearance is difficult; and for technical survey and low threat hazardous area (LTHA).121 Often, however, the terrain is 
not suitable for machines.






DCA 3 N/K  0 0
LAMINDA 3 24  0 0
LAF/ER 2 16  0 1
MAG 12 72  0 3 1 mechanical team
NPA 4 24  0 0 NPA does not deploy dogs for clearance, 
but does have 2 EDDs and 2 handlers 
deployed for technical survey
POD 4 44  0 0
Totals 28 180  0 4
* Clearance personnel may also conduct technical survey. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters. *** Clearance teams also work on technical survey tasks.  
N/K = not known. 
With respect to non-technical survey capacity, in 2019, there were six non-technical survey teams:123 LMAC had three teams;124 
MAG had two teams, with a total of four personnel;125 and NPA had one team with three personnel.126 
With respect to technical survey, MAG has one team of five personnel127 and NPA had one technical survey team of four 
personnel (including 2 EDD dog handlers and two manual searchers).128 NPA’s technical survey team is now fully integrated 
into NPA operations and is being tasked by the RMAC as follow-up to previous non-technical survey, to confirm CMR 
contamination prior to areas being tasked for clearance.129 NPA reported that it was moving towards a multi-task approach  
to be able to respond to changing priorities and operational constraints.130
NPA believes that EDDs could be beneficial in technical survey to help reduce areas containing low density ERW (including 
CMR) and IED contamination in north-east Lebanon, on the border with Syria.131 One of the advantages of using EDDs is that 
dogs detect explosives, not metal, which can help speed up the technical survey process by avoiding unnecessary excavation 
of the scrap-metal signals that are generated by manual detectors. In addition to NPA’s technical survey with EDDs, MAG and 
NPA are both conducting manual technical survey.132 
As part of non-technical survey on the north-east border of Lebanon, contaminated during spill-over of the Syrian conflict in 
2014–17, drones were used for the first time, and proved very helpful in helping inform survey efforts.133 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of nearly 3.3km2 of CMR-contaminated area was released in 2019, of which nearly 1.3km2 was cleared, over 0.1km2 was 
reduced through technical survey, and nearly 1.9km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey.134
In addition, nearly 0.3km2 of new CMR contamination was added to the database in 2019,135 which was mainly discovered by 
shepherds in mountainous areas, resulting in rapid response tasks.136 
SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, almost 1.90km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey (see Table 4) and a further 0.12km2 was reduced through 
technical survey (see Table 5). In addition, nearly 0.27km2 was identified as being CMR-contaminated.137 
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Non-technical survey output in 2019 marked a significant 
increase compared to 2018, when 20,314m2 of newly 
suspected area in the Arsal region on the north-east border 
with Syria was cancelled through non-technical survey.138 
The increase in non-technical survey output in 2019 was 
the result of an increased emphasis on re-surveying CMR 
tasks, to help inform planning for Lebanon’s 2020 Article 4 
extension deadline request.139
Of the total CMR contaminated area cancelled in 2019, 
359,505m2 was cancelled by MAG in the south of Lebanon  
and the remainder by LMAC non-technical survey teams.140
Technical survey output in 2019 was broadly comparable to 
2018, when 103,000m2 was reduced through technical survey.141
NPA is using EDDs for technical survey of CMR tasks, but 
this requires special conditions (wind speeds, temperature, 
vegetation levels, etc.), and while it helps to reduce some 
areas where no evidence of CMR is found, output is relatively 
low.142 It reported days lost for technical survey due to harsh 
weather conditions in early 2019; the use of strong smelling 
pesticides on land preventing the EDD from operating 
effectively; and an injury to one of the dogs for an extended 
period in 2019. In 2019, NPA only deployed EDD for technical 
survey in south Lebanon, but it planned to expand their use  
to the north-east in 2020.143
Table 4: Cancellation through non-technical survey  
in 2019144




South of Lebanon 807,020
Total 1,897,236
Table 5: Reduction through technical survey in 2019145





* Included in clearance table data.
CLEARANCE IN 2019
Lebanon reported clearing more than 1.26km2 of CMR-contaminated land in 2019, destroying in the process 4,037 submunitions 
(see Tables 6 and 7).146 This includes 289 submunitions destroyed during rapid response/EOD spot tasks.147 Clearance during 
the year was a modest increase over the 1.15km2 of CMR-contaminated land cleared in 2018.148 Clearance rates are influenced 
by the type of terrain and the depth of CMR, which in some locations is deeper than 15cm.149 Additionally, there were 31 less 
working days in 2019, compared to 2018, because of the internal unrest.150
According to LMAC, all cluster munition-contaminated areas cleared in 2019 were found to have CMR.151 MAG reported that it 
cleared one cluster munition-contaminated area task in the South and 11 in north-east Lebanon, in which no submunitions were 
found.152 LMAC clarified that all CMR tasks in the north-east are located where CMR had been destroyed by the LAF. In the south, 
CMR clearance tasks are also located where CMR have been found previously, including through LAF rapid response.153
Table 6: CMR clearance by region in 2019154
Province Area cleared (m²) Submunitions destroyed*
Bekaa 517,264
Mount Lebanon 50,535
South of Lebanon 693,233
Totals 1,261,032 4,037
* Figures include items destroyed during technical survey.
Table 7: CMR clearance in 2019 by implementing agency155








* Figures include items destroyed during technical survey.
Tables 6 and 7 include the destruction of 1 submunition  
by NPA and 129 by POD during spot tasks in 2019, and  
159 submunitions destroyed by the LAF in rapid-response 
missions.156 
NPA reported a decrease in clearance, compared to 2019,  
due to the increased difficulty of tasks (thick vegetation,  
steep and rocky terrain, and high metal content), as well  
as 20 operational days lost (compared to 2018) due to  
poor weather and protests, including the blocking of  
roads to hospitals.157




ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR LEBANON: 1 MAY 2011
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2021
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (FIVE-YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED): 1 MAY 2026
Under Article 4 of the CCM, Lebanon is required to destroy 
all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon 
as possible, but not later than 1 May 2021. Lebanon will not 
meet this deadline and submitted a request for a five-year 
extension for consideration at the Second CCM Review 
Conference in November 2020. 
Originally, clearance of CMR-contaminated land had been 
expected to be completed by the end of 2016, in accordance 
with the 2011–20 national strategy.158 However, meeting 
this target was contingent on securing the number of BAC 
teams needed, which did not happen, and progress against 
the strategy fell well behind schedule.159 Progress was also 
hindered by the historical lack of non-technical survey and 
technical survey, which often resulted in inefficient land 
release and unnecessary clearance of uncontaminated land.
LMAC aims to complete clearance by the end of 2025, in line 
with objective 4 of Lebanon’s Mine Action Strategy 2020–25.160 
This is, however, contingent on LMAC securing the same level 
of international funding it has received over the last three 
years and on the government of Lebanon contributing the 
envisaged US$3 million of annual national clearance funding 
for the first three years of the extension period. The extension 
request also assumes that there will be no additional 
contamination; that the political and security situation in 
Lebanon will remain stable; and that operations will not be 
affected by that or other factors.161
Lebanon has cleared approximately 7.41km2 of cluster 
munition-contaminated area in the last five years (see Table 8). 
In its 2020 Article 4 extension request, Lebanon is using the 
same average clearance rates as in previous three years, 
despite the fact that new methodologies should increase 
this average. This is intended to compensate for the difficult 
terrain in many of the remaining area, which will slow down 
the rate of clearance.162
Table 8: Five-year summary of CMR clearance







* In addition, a further 99,641m2 of re-clearance was conducted.
There is a concern that funding in some cases risks being 
diverted from BAC towards other objectives, such as mine 
clearance on the Blue Line, or clearance in the north-eastern 
border with Syria.163 Furthermore, LMAC reported that 
donors mostly look to fund clearance of high-impact sites, 
whereas many of the remaining CMR tasks are viewed as 
moderate or low impact. LMAC is, however, encouraging 
donors to maintain funding to help it complete CMR clearance 
and its CCM Article 4 obligations.164 With national capacity 
(LAF teams) only, LMAC calculated that it would take until 
2048 to reach Article 4 completion.165
A significant challenge in Lebanon’s Article 4 implementation, 
is posed by “difficult terrain” such as deep and very steep 
canyons and cliffs where survey and clearance are almost 
impossible to conduct using current methods and assets 
and represent additional risk to searchers and MediEvac. 
LMAC recognises that suspected or confirmed cluster 
munition-contaminated areas on difficult terrain need to be 
released in order to comply with its Article 4 obligations.166 
According to LMAC, there are two types of scenarios related 
to the challenge of difficult areas, which may require different 
approaches from an Article 4 compliance perspective:  
i) CHAs in which all known CMR contamination has already 
been cleared, but where part of the normal 50 metre fade-out 
falls within an area of difficult terrain; and ii) CHAs or SHAs 
located within difficult terrain, given the footprint of known 
cluster munition strikes.
In relation to the first scenario, LMAC considers that in cases 
where its quality management procedures can determine, 
with confidence, that all evidence of CMR contamination 
has been identified and removed, then the deployment of 
additional clearance assets into inaccessible areas where 
no evidence of contamination exists may be unnecessary. 
Regarding the second scenario, where the footprint of the 
cluster munition strike covers part of a difficult terrain, this is 
registered in the database as CHA and requires clearance.167 
LMAC plans to undertake a study, in partnership with GICHD, 
to find a solution on how to address this terrain and satisfy 
the requirements of the CCM.168 
The COVID-19 pandemic impacted the whole of Lebanon’s 
mine action programme and all operations were suspended 
from 12 March for more than two months. After the relaxation 
of general mobilisation measures by the government of 
Lebanon, a TWG meeting was held and the phases for 
restarting operations and necessary safety measures 
relating to COVID-19 were developed and adopted. Operations 
resumed in early May 2020, under the new guidelines 
and safety measures, and as at July 2020 NGO clearance 
operators were fully operational.169
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PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
According to LMAC, a tolerable level of residual risk will remain, as areas not previously identified as containing CMR may 
be found in the future. LMAC appreciates the importance of the need to start the process to build a sustainable national mine 
action capacity that can deal with the residual contamination post Article 4 compliance. According to LMAC, the strategic 
implementation plan which will support the new National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, will address an exit strategy and 
long-term risk management and capacity.170 
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Having previously declared fulfilment of its Article 4 obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in 
September 2013 at the Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Mauritania reported in its CCM Article 7 transparency report covering 
2019 that it had discovered previously unknown cluster munition-contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control. Once 
circumstances regarding the COVID-19 pandemic permit, the National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development 
(Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD) plans to conduct an assessment of suspected 
and confirmed cluster munition-contaminated areas, along with newly reported mined areas, with the support of Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA). 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Mauritania should clarify whether the cluster munition-contaminated areas in question are currently under 
Mauritania’s effective control. If so, and they are also under its jurisdiction, the authorities should proceed to 
undertake an assessment mission with NPA as soon as funding and restrictions regarding COVID-19 permit.  
If, however, the areas are under Mauritania’s effective control but not under its jurisdiction, discussions need  
to be held as a matter of urgency with others concerned, in particular Morocco and the Saharawi Arab  
Democratic Republic.
 ■ Mauritania should confirm whether the identified areas are newly discovered or if any of the areas were already 
recorded as contaminated but were previously thought to be not under Mauritania’s jurisdiction or control.
 ■ Mauritania should report more accurately and consistently on the extent of cluster munition remnant (CMR) 
contamination, including using the classification of suspected hazardous area (SHA) and confirmed hazardous  
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CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ National Humanitarian Demining Programme for 
Development (Programme National de Déminage 
Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD)
NATIONAL OPERATORS




 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Having previously declared fulfilment of its Article 4 
obligations in September 2014 at the Fourth CCM Meeting 
of States Parties, in 2019 Mauritania reported newly 
discovered cluster-munition-contaminated areas.1 These 
areas are reported to be located in the “Tighert 2” region 
of Tires-Zemmour in the north of Mauritania, which borders 
Western Sahara. In Form F of its latest CCM Article 7 
transparency report, the locations of the areas are listed as 
Boudheir, Boukhzame, Dhar el kelba, Elmetlani, Lekhneigue, 
Lemreir, and Tamreiket. Based on the testimonies of local 
people, the authorities have estimated that contamination 
covers a total area of 36km2. According to Mauritania, 
submunitions are visible on the ground and many camels 
have been killed, with the last discovery of submunitions 
occurring on 21 November 2019.2 It is unclear how the size  
of the contaminated areas have been determined.
In Annex 1 of its Article 7 report, Mauritania also lists 
Oudyatte Bouzeyanne and Oudyatte Lekhyame as 
cluster-munition-contaminated locations (in addition to those 
mentioned in Form F), declaring that the size of the area for 
each site is unknown.3 The map in Annex 1 of the Article 7 
report appears to show a huge polygon within which are all 
of the suspected or confirmed hazardous areas. Therefore, 
CMR contamination, if confirmed, is likely to cover an area 
significantly less than 36km2.4 
Prior to reporting discovery of new contamination in 2019, 
Mauritania had previously declared the completion of CMR 
clearance in 2013.5 Contamination resulted from use of MK118, 
BLU-63, and M42 cluster munitions during the 1975–78 conflict 
over Western Sahara. Contamination was located in the 
northern border areas, around the village of Bir Moghrein in 
the region of Tiris Zemmour.6 In Mauritania’s first CCM Article 
7 report, submitted in 2013 and covering 2012, it was reported 
that CMR contamination totalled 10km2, covering eight areas 
north of the village of Bir Moghrein in the north-east of the 
country.7 Following survey by NPA in 2013, the estimated area 
was revised substantially downwards.8
Mauritania reported that it previously cleared a total of over 
1.96km2 of cluster-munition-contaminated area in 2014, with 
the destruction of 1,246 submunitions, across nine locations: 
Agwachin, Aldouik, Ayadiyatt, Bir Mariam, Eweineget, Gharet 
El hemeid, Oudeyatt bozeyan, Oum Edhbaitt, and Teghert.9 
However, based on its technical and non-technical survey, 
NPA revealed that after cancellation through non-technical 
survey of 70,000m2 of area suspected to contain CMR in 
2012, the total area confirmed to contain CMR, and which 
was subject to clearance in 2013, actually totalled 2.4km2. 
Clearance covered the same nine sites listed above.10
It is unclear whether all of the newly identified 
cluster-munition-contaminated areas are under Mauritania’s 
effective control, and, if so, whether they are also under  
its jurisdiction. If the areas are under Mauritania’s effective 
control but not under its jurisdiction, Mauritania will  
need to discuss this as a matter of urgency with others 
concerned, in particular Morocco and the Saharawi Arab 
Democratic Republic. 
Mauritania has also reported discovering anti-personnel mine 
contamination.11 Please see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the 
Mines 2020 report on Mauritania for more information.





NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The PNDHD, which was created in 2000, coordinates mine action operations in Mauritania.12 Since 2007, the programme  
has been the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior and Decentralisation, with oversight from an interministerial  
steering committee.13 The PNDHD has its headquarters in the capital, Nouakchott, and a regional mine action centre (RMAC)  
in Nouadhibou. 
Mauritania’s national budget for demining and related activities in 2019 was MRU 3 million (approx. US$75,000). It is 
seeking an additional US$300,000 of international assistance to conduct non-technical survey, technical survey, marking, 
awareness-raising campaigns, and quality management.14
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
It is not known if the PNDHD has policies in place relating to gender and diversity in its mine action programme, and gender 
and diversity are not referenced in Mauritania’s Article 7 report.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The national mine action database is held at the PNDHD. As at December 2017, Mauritania had strengthened its information 
management capacity by providing additional training to an information management specialist and migrating to Version 6 of 
the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) software.15
In its Article 7 report covering 2019, Mauritania did not disaggregate cluster-munition-contaminated areas into CHAs and SHAs, 
in line with best practice and IMAS.
PLANNING AND TASKING
According to its latest Article 7 report under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), submitted in 2020, part of the 
international cooperation and assistance sought by Mauritania is to support its efforts to draft a new mine action strategy, to 
replace the existing strategy which was expiring in 2020.16
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Survey and clearance operations are conducted in accordance with the Mauritanian National Mine Action Standards (NMAM), 
which are said to accord with IMAS. The NMAM include standards on non-technical survey, technical survey, mine clearance, 
and quality control (QC). The NMAM, were adopted in 2007. They were revised with the help of the Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and in partnership with operators, most notably NPA in 2010, and were translated into 
Arabic in 2011.17 The NMAM are supposed to be reviewed once every three years.18 
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In accordance with a 2006 decree, all clearance activities were conducted by the Army Engineer Corps operating under the 
PNDHD. In 2011, NPA signed a memorandum of understanding with Mauritania to provide support for both mine clearance 
and battle area clearance (BAC) in the country. NPA subsequently worked in Mauritania both as an operator and in a 
capacity-building role as a technical advisor for PNDHD until the end of 2015.19
The PNDHD has requested NPA’s support in 2020 to conduct an assessment mission to determine the details of mined areas 
discovered since its declaration of APMBC Article 5 completion in November 2018. As part of the planned mission, NPA will 
also investigate the newly discovered cluster-munition-contaminated areas, as well as the mined area.20
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Mauritania did not release any cluster munition contaminated area in 2019.
SURVEY IN 2019
Mauritania did not release any cluster-munition-contaminated area through survey in 2019.
CLEARANCE IN 2019
Mauritania did not release any cluster-munition-contaminated area through clearance in 2019. Mauritania’s CCM Article 
7 report includes reference to submunition(s) being discovered in November 2019, but does not specify how many were 
discovered and whether they were destroyed.21
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR MAURITANIA: 1 AUGUST 2012
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2022
UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
Under Article 4 of the CCM, Mauritania is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as 
possible, but not later than 1 August 2022. 
Mauritania had previously reported completing clearance of CMR in 2013, almost nine years before its treaty deadline. In its 
declaration of Article 4 compliance, Mauritania stated that as of 9 September 2013 it had made every effort to identify all areas 
under its jurisdiction or control contaminated by CMR, and that as of that date it had cleared and destroyed all CMR found, in 
accordance with Article 4(1) of the CCM.22
Mauritania plans to conduct an assessment mission, with the support of NPA, as soon as restrictions due to COVID-19 permit, 
in order to obtain additional information on the mined areas and inform its APMBC Article 5 planning.23 The assessment 
mission will presumably also cover investigation of CMR-contaminated areas, as envisaged by NPA.24 The PNDHD requires 
international funding and cooperation to address contaminated areas in northern Mauritania.25
Mauritania is seeking international assistance to enable it to mark the confirmed and suspected “dangerous zones”, clear 
contaminated areas, and destroy items of unexploded ordnance found. It is looking to train and capacity build PNDHD staff; 
renew office equipment (IT, furniture); renew marking and demining equipment; and carry out awareness campaigns, marking 
operations, demining and demolition, as part of a five-year plan.26
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Mauritania has reported under the APMBC that it “will remain committed to dealing with any residual contamination” for 
mines,27 but no details have been provided on its plans to establish a long-term sustainable national capacity to address  
either previously unknown mined areas or CMR-contaminated areas, following completion.
Previously, PNDHD had reported that one of the main aims of Mauritania’s work plan for 2017–20 was to establish a strategy 
for residual contamination.28





1 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.
2 Ibid.
3 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Annex I.
4 Ibid.
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6 Ibid.
7 Article 7 Report (covering 2012), Form F.
8 Article 7 Report (covering 2013), Form F; and Declaration of Compliance with Art. 4(1)(a) of the CCM, 3 September 2014.
9 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.
10 Email from Melissa Andersson, Country Director, NPA, 13 May 2015.
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12 Decree No. 1960/MDAT/MDN establishing the PNDHD, 14 August 2007; and Third APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, received June 2020, p. 2.
13 Decree No. 001358/MDAT establishing the Steering Committee of the PNDHD, 3 September 2007; and Third APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request,  
received June 2020, p. 2.
14 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form I.
15 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2017), Form D.
16 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2019), pp. 13–14.
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18 Third APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, received June 2020, pp. 5 and 8.
19 Emails from Alioune ould Menane, PNDHD, 1 September 2016; and Melissa Andersson, NPA, 12 September 2016 and 13 March 2017.
20 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 20 May 2020.
21 Ibid.
22 Declaration of Compliance with Art. 4(1)(a) of the CCM, submitted by Mauritania, 3 September 2014.
23 Third APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, received June 2020, pp. 1 and 10; and APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 9.
24 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 4 August 2020.
25 Third APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, received June 2020, p. 10; and CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form I.
26 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.
27 Third APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, received June 2020, p. 3.
28 Email from Alioune ould Menane, PNDHD, 23 July 2018.
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KEY DATA LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
CLEARING CLUSTER  
MUNITION REMNANTS 
2020
CLUSTER MUNITION  
CONTAMINATION: MEDIUM
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Montenegro has fulfilled its Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 obligations, having completed clearance of 
remaining cluster munition remnant (CMR) contamination on 20 July 2020, and Montenegro declared it had fulfilled its  
Article 4 obligation as at 21 July, ahead of its 1 August deadline. Completion was facilitated by the creation of a “Country 
Coalition”, in which Norway, as the lead support State/donor, partnered with Montenegro, with Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 
as the implementing partner. This Coalition enabled effective planning and completion of CMR clearance by Montenegro’s 
Article 4 deadline. 
Land release operations re-started in October 2018, implemented, with the support of NPA, by the Department for UXO 
[Unexploded Ordnance] within the Directorate for Emergency Situations. Operations had been scheduled to be completed by 
the end of April 2020, but this was delayed by two and a half months due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on operations. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Montenegro should ensure sustainable national capacity is in place to address any CMR discovered since its  











































COMPLETED CLEARANCE OF ALL 
KNOWN CMR-CONTAMINATED AREAS
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2020 
REPORTED FULFILMENT OF ARTICLE 4 OBLIGATIONS
MONTENEGRO














(20% of overall score)
9 7 Montenegro completed clearance of all known CMR contamination in July 2020.  
This was achieved following re-commencement of land release operations in  
October 2018, following earlier non-technical survey in 2012–13. 
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
8 6 The Country Coalition, formed in 2018 between Montenegro, Norway (as the lead 
support State/donor), and NPA as the implementing partner, provided an excellent 
forum in which to effectively plan for completion of clearance by Montenegro’s 1 
August 2020 Article 4 deadline. The Directorate for Emergency Situations, within the 
Ministry of Interior, was responsible for overseeing CMR survey and clearance, and 
provided an enabling environment with strong national ownership. While national 
resources (both technical and financial) were relatively limited, Montenegro did 
provide funding for its UXO team and for quality management of CMR operations.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
7 7 The capacity of the national mine action programme in Montenegro was small, 
but there was a gender policy in place. NPA’s survey and clearance personnel 
were seconded from its programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina and while all NPA 
operations staff deployed in Montenegro were male, NPA’s Programme Manager was 
a woman and there was one additional female member of staff. Women and children 




(10% of overall score)
6 5 There is no national information management system in place, such as the 
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). While Montenegro 
did report disaggregated CMR contamination data and land release data to Mine 
Action Review, in its CCM Article 7 transparency report it did not disaggregate CMR 
contamination data into suspected hazardous area (SHA) and confirmed hazardous 
area (CHA) or disaggregate land reduced through technical survey from land 
released through clearance. 
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
8 8 There was no national mine strategy in place, but a joint working group was 
established and the Ministry of Interior and NPA elaborated a work plan to plan and 
prioritise CMR survey and clearance operations and achieve fulfilment of Article 4  
by its deadline of 1 August 2020.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
8 7 While no national mine action standards exist, CMR survey and clearance operations 
were conducted in accordance to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and 
to national standing operating procedures (SOPs). Evidence-based survey was used 
to release uncontaminated land and confirm CMR contamination prior to clearance. 
Explosive detection dogs (EDDs) were deployed for three months in 2019, to support 
manual technical survey. Survey and clearance capacity was sufficient to enable 
Montenegro to complete CMR clearance in July 2020, ahead of its deadline.
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 4 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
9 6 Montenegro completed CMR in July 2020, ahead of its Article 4 deadline. A total 
of 1.27km2 of CMR contaminated area was released in 2019 through non-technical 
survey, technical survey, and clearance, and remaining CMR contamination was 
released in 2020. Montenegro has a sustainable national capacity to address any 
residual CMR discovered post-completion.
Average Score 8.1 6.6 Overall Programme Performance: VERY GOOD
CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ The Directorate for Emergency Situations,  
Ministry of Interior
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ The Department for UXO (within the Directorate  
for Emergency Situations)
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ None
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UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Clearance of remaining known CMR contamination was 
completed on 20 July 2020 and Montenegro declared it had 
fulfilled its Article 4 obligation on the following day, 21 July. 
At the end of 2019, contamination had totalled almost 0.5km2 
(two confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totalling 0.2km2 
and two suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) totalling nearly 
0.3km2), in Golubovci municipality.1 Prior to re-starting 
land release operations in October 2018, remaining 
CMR contamination had stood at almost 1.72km2 across 
three municipalities (Golubovci, Rožaje, and Tuzi).2 The 
contamination was identified during detailed non-technical 
survey conducted between December 2012 and April 2013. 
During the survey, NPA made 87 polygons of SHAs and CHAs 
across 11 locations in three municipalities. Contamination 
was found to affect five communities.3 Due to snow, it 
was not possible to survey two suspected areas of CMR 
contamination during the 2012–13 survey, at Bogajice and 
Murino in Plav municipality.4
Having secured new funding from Norway, CMR land release 
operations re-started in late 2018 and hazardous areas were 
re-surveyed through non-technical survey, prior to tasking of 
technical survey and clearance.5 As part of the non-technical 
survey, the two sites in Plav municipality, inaccessible during the 
earlier non-technical survey because of snow, were cancelled.6 
Montenegro became contaminated with CMR in 1999 during 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing of 
Yugoslavia as part of the war over Kosovo. NATO air strikes 
in Montenegro between March and June 1999 included use of 
22 cluster munitions of four different types: AGM-154A JSOW 
guided missiles, BL755s, CBU-87/Bs, and MK-20 Rockeye 
IIs. These scattered a total of some 4,000 submunitions 
(BLU-97A/B, BL755, MK-1, and MK118).7 In addition, there was 
CMR contamination in Rožaje, which was the result of the 
dumping of cluster munitions by the Yugoslav army.8
Some unexploded submunitions were collected by Yugoslav 
army units immediately after the NATO air strikes. This 
initial clearance was carried out in haste, without applying 
international standards for explosive remnants of war (ERW) 
clearance, and for the most part only visible submunitions 
were destroyed.9 Following Montenegro’s independence, 
CMR removal was conducted by the Ministry of Interior in 
response to notifications from the public.10 
CMR clearance according to international standards was  
only carried out in one of the three affected municipalities  
in Montenegro. In 2007, UXB Balkans, a commercial operator 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), conducted clearance 
operations in two locations within the communities of  
Besnik and Njeguši (in the municipality of Rožaje). In total, 
some 378,000m2 was cleared with the destruction of 16  
MK-1 submunitions.11 
Montenegro’s initial CCM Article 7 transparency report 
had declared that, as at 27 January 2011, “there are no 
contaminated areas in Montenegro.”12 In July 2011, however, 
the director of the Regional Centre for Divers’ Training and 
Underwater Demining (RCUD) confirmed that unexploded 
submunitions had been found in 2007.13 Montenegro informed 
a CCM intersessional meeting in 2012 that clearance by 
military units after the air strikes in 1999, during which 
more than 1,800 submunitions were collected, had not been 
conducted “fully according to humanitarian mine action 
standards” and that it planned to conduct a survey to assess 
the remaining threat.14 This led to the 2012–13 NPA survey 
described above.15
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR
Montenegro is also heavily contaminated with multiple types of ERW from the First and Second World Wars, with items of UXO 
discovered daily throughout the country, on land as well as in rivers and the sea.16 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Directorate for Emergency Situations, established in 2006 by the Ministry of Interior, is responsible for mine action 
in Montenegro, performing the role of a national mine action centre.17 Prior to 2017, due to lack of human resources and 
equipment, the role of the national mine action centre had previously been undertaken by RCUD, which was set up in 2002.18 
In December 2017, NPA organised a workshop in cooperation with the Ministry of Interior of Montenegro’s Directorate for 
Emergency Situations, on the “Application of standard operating procedures for technical survey and clearance of areas 
contaminated with cluster munition remnants with special emphasis on internal and external quality control”. The aim of the 
workshop was to familiarise Directorate staff with standing operating procedures (SOPs) relating to technical survey and 
clearance of CMR and to train them on how to undertake quality control (QC) of those operations. The five participants from the 
Directorate successfully completed the training.19 The Directorate is responsible for external quality monitoring and issuing of 
QC certificates in operations on CMR-contaminated area.20 In addition, in 2018, personnel from the Directorate were trained by 
NPA in non-technical survey.21 
A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in July 2018 between the Ministry of Interior and NPA for a Norwegian 
funded project to complete CMR clearance. The partnership took the form of a Country Coalition, a concept launched under 
Germany’s presidency of the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in 2017. Norway, as the lead support State/donor, partnered 
with the Montenegrin national authority, with NPA as the implementing partner. The aim of the Country Coalition was to achieve 
fulfilment of Montenegro’s Article 4 clearance obligations by its August 2020 deadline, and cooperation and collaboration 
between the Directorate for Emergency Situations, its UXO Department, and NPA were both effective and professional. 





The approach included establishment of a joint working group to support the planning and prioritisation of CMR tasks;  
a clear division of roles and responsibilities; transparent discussions and sense of common ownership; and an enabling 
environment for mine action.22 NPA provided capacity development support to national authorities regarding refresher  
training on destruction of BLU-97 and MK118 Rockeye submunitions, and the development of new SOPs for both  
non-technical and technical survey.23
All activities performed by the Ministry of Interior team, including destruction of submunitions and external QC, were  
nationally funded.24
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
National authorities in Montenegro reported that a gender policy is in place, and that procedures for conducting non-technical 
survey include ensuring a gender-balanced approach to survey teams and consulting with all members of the community, 
including women and children.25 
There is equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams in Montenegro, and women 
account for 20% of operational roles, and 30% of managerial level/supervisory positions.26 
Implementing partner NPA has a gender equality policy in place and provided coaching and support for key staff on the  
policy in 2019. While NPA’s Programme Manager and Administration Officer in Montenegro were both women, its survey  
and clearance team were seconded from NPA’s programme in BiH and were all men.27
Relevant data was disaggregated data by sex and age by both the Ministry of Interior and NPA.28
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
There is no national information management system in place, such as the information management system for mine action 
(IMSMA). NPA is supporting the Department for UXO within the Directorate for Emergency Situations in providing all data  
from the CMR programme to the Ministry of Interior, upon completion.29
Although Montenegro submitted its Article 7 transparency report (covering 2019) in a timely manner, the quality and accuracy 
of information on CMR contamination, as well as on survey and clearance outputs, could be improved. In its Article 7 report, 
the total area of remaining CMR contamination was not separated into SHAs and CHAs, and land reduced through technical 
survey in 2019 was not disaggregated from release through clearance, even though this data was available and was reported 
to Mine Action Review.30
PLANNING AND TASKING
RCUD and NPA signed an MoU in December 2012 under which NPA agreed to fund and implement a two-phase project  
— the “Cluster Munition Convention Completion Initiative for Montenegro”. This involved first, non-technical survey, and  
then, technical survey and clearance of areas where the presence of CMR was confirmed. NPA agreed to set up a database  
and to develop capacity for non-technical survey and quality management.31 The non-technical survey was completed but 
funding for the second phase of the project involving technical survey and clearance, originally expected to start in 2013  
and continue throughout 2014,32 was not secured. 
In May 2018, in a welcome development, Norwegian government funding was secured for the CMR survey and clearance 
operations necessary for Montenegro to release remaining CMR-contaminated areas and fulfil its CCM Article 4 obligations. 
An MoU between the Ministry of Interior and NPA was signed in July with CMR land release operations beginning in October 
2018. There was a work plan in place aimed at completion of Montenegro’s Article 4 clearance obligations by its 1 August 
2020 deadline, and plans for realisation of the CMR completion project were entered into the medium-term work plan of the 
Montenegro government.33
Following the signature of the MoU, a joint working group was established to support the planning, prioritisation, and 
collaboration for CMR tasks.34 Criteria for prioritising CMR-contaminated areas for clearance were agreed between the  
national authorities and NPA,35 designed to enable access based on national priorities, including aviation needs, geographic 
locations and linkages, and weather conditions.36
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In March 2018, the Directorate for Emergency Situations reported that it had prepared a rule book on the destruction of 
UXO and was currently working on drafting national mine action legislation.37 In February 2019, it reported that mine action 
legislation was in place.38
No national standards exist for survey and clearance of CMR in Montenegro, but operations were conducted according to 
the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and to national SOPs developed for non-technical survey, technical survey, 
clearance, and use of explosives detection dogs (EDDs).39 Aviation security procedures require that SOPs for CMR survey  
and clearance operations at Podgorica airport be adapted to meet specific international standards.40
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The Department for UXO within the Directorate for Emergency Situations has only five staff, who are primarily dedicated to 
clearance of UXO other than submunitions, which comprises the bulk of ERW contamination in Montenegro.41 Due to lack of 
funding, responsibility for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) has remained with the police.42
Having previously completed a nationwide non-technical survey in April 2013, NPA, re-started CMR land release operations  
in October 2018, thanks to Norwegian government funding.43 
Non-technical survey capacity in 2019 totalled four personnel, comprising one NPA staff,44 working with three trained 
personnel from the Ministry of Interior.45 NPA technical survey/clearance capacity in 2019 comprised six deminers. Two EDDs 
and two dog handlers, supported by a team leader, were also deployed by NPA for three months, working alongside the manual 
team for technical survey.46
In late February 2019, Ministry of Interior/NPA received a thermal camera drone for six months, to assist with non-technical 
survey.47 The Ministry of Interior worked with NPA to support thermal drone testing in Montenegro, which was conducted in 
July and December 2019. In addition, representatives from Montenegro also participated in a global thermal drone workshop 
held by NPA at the Ministry of Interior in Podgorica, in October 2019.48 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of 1.27km2 of CMR contaminated area was released in 2019, of which almost 0.27m2 was cleared, over 0.51m2 was 
reduced through technical survey, and almost 0.49m2 was cancelled through non-technical survey.49 
SURVEY IN 2019
A total of more than 1km2 of CMR-contaminated area was released through survey in 2019, all in the municipality of Golubovci. 
Of this, nearly 0.49km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey by the joint Ministry of Interior/NPA team and over 0.51km2 
was reduced through technical survey.50 
While Montenegro did report disaggregated data to Mine Action Review, it did not disaggregate land reduced through technical 
survey from land released through clearance in its Article 7 report covering 2019, in which technical survey output was 
reported as clearance.51 
Survey output in 2019 was a significant increase compared to 2018, when 15,163m2 of CMR-contaminated area was cancelled 
and 92,190m2 reduced.52 
During non-technical survey in 2019, one previously unrecorded area of CMR contamination, totalling 51,000m2, was added to 
the database.53
CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, NPA cleared nearly 0.27km2 of cluster munition-contaminated area in the municipality of Golubovci, during which  
64 submunitions were found by NPA and destroyed by the Ministry of Interior. All areas cleared in 2019 contained CMR.54
Montenegro did not disaggregate land reduced through technical survey from land released through clearance in its Article 7 
report covering 2019, and so reported, incorrectly, the full 782,305m2 as clearance.55
NPA achieved 92% of clearance planned in 2019, due to challenges encountered in the clearance tasks at the airport, which 
included civil and military restrictions, high levels of metal contamination, soil type, and required pausing of operations due  
to flights.56
Clearance in 2019 marked an increase on 2018, when 17,430m2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared.57






Clearance of the all remaining known CMR contamination was completed on 20 July 2020, in the municipality of Tuzi,58 
and Montenegro declared it had fulfilled its Article 4 obligation as at the following day.59 Between January and July 2020, 
the remaining 343,185m2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was released (of which 92,945m2 was cancelled through 
non-technical survey; 194,200m2 was reduced through technical survey; and 56,040m2 was cleared), during which 15 
submunitions were destroyed.60
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR MONTENEGRO: 1 AUGUST 2010
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2020
FULFILLED ARTICLE 4 OBLIGATIONS ON 21 JULY 2020
CMR clearance was completed on 20 July 2020 and 
Montenegro declared it had fulfilled its obligations under 
Article 4 obligation of the CCM as at 21 July, ahead of 
its 1 August 2020 deadline.61 In its communiqué to the 
Implementation Support Unit of the CCM, dated 29 July  
2020, Montenegro said that “the official declaration of 
compliance will be submitted as soon as it is finalised.”62
Following completion of earlier non-technical survey in 2013, 
land release operations only recommenced in Montenegro  
in October 2018, supported by the establishment of the 
Country Coalition between Norway, Montenegro, and NPA.  
It had been expected that CMR clearance operations would  
be completed by 30 April 2020, but progress was impacted  
by the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused clearance 
operations to be suspended from 16 March to 1 June 2020.63
Table 1: Five-year summary of CMR clearance







PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION  
According to NPA, Montenegro has a sustainable national capacity in place to address CMR discovered following Article 4 
completion, with respect to information management as well as for survey and clearance.64
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1 Email from Milovan Joksimović, Head, Department for UXO, Directorate for 
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KEY DATA LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
CLEARING CLUSTER  
MUNITION REMNANTS 
2020
MINE ACTION REVIEW ESTIMATE
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2019, Somalia again made no progress in implementing its obligations under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions 
(CCM). No overview of the extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants (CMR) exists. No survey specific to CMR was 
conducted and no clearance of CMR was reported again in 2019, as in previous years. A planned review of survey records in 
the national database by the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) was still ongoing as at August 2020.  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Somalia should ensure timely survey and clearance of CMR in accordance with its CCM obligations, alongside 
efforts to address mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) other than CMR.
 ■ Somalia should elaborate a plan for Article 4 implementation, including determining a comprehensive baseline  
of CMR contamination.
 ■ Somalia should commit resources to mine action operations. 
 ■ SEMA’s status within the Federal Government of Somalia should be officially recognised and national resources 
budgeted annually for its operating costs. 
 ■ Continued efforts should be undertaken to support SEMA to manage the Information Management System for Mine 
Action (IMSMA) database. Regular updates from the database should be shared with all implementing partners.
 ■ Somalia should elaborate a new National Mine Action Strategic Plan, updating the National Mine Action Strategic 
Plan 2018–2020 (which had still to be formally endorsed by the Federal Government as of writing).
 ■ Somalia should develop a resource mobilisation strategy and initiate dialogue with development partners on  





































CLUSTER MUNITION  
CONTAMINATION: LIGHT
LESS THAN5KM2
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2026 
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
SOMALIA
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(20% of overall score)
3 3 No baseline of CMR contamination has been established.
NATIONAL  
OWNERSHIP AND  
PROGRAMME  
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)
4 4 A new director of SEMA was appointed in 2019 and SEMA continued to receive 
capacity development support. However, there is a lack of national ownership as  
the Federal Government of Somalia has still not formally recognised the Authority  
as a government institution or funded its operations.
GENDER AND 
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)
5 5 Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 includes provisions on 
gender and diversity. SEMA has advocated action on gender and diversity within 
survey and community liaison teams. However, there are challenges to achieving 
gender mainstreaming within Somalia as a patriarchal society. Clan affiliation is  




(10% of overall score)
6 5 SEMA has assumed full ownership and responsibility for the national mine action 
database, however, it has been reported that the database is neither up to date  
nor accurate. Somalia submitted its initial CCM Article 7 report in October 2019.  
In mid-September 2020, Somalia submitted its Article 7 report covering 2019.
PLANNING  
AND TASKING 
(10% of overall score)
5 5 Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 was still awaiting 
final approval as at June 2020. SEMA met with operators in 2019, to discuss 
setting indicators for planning and prioritisation. Operators reported that while 
improvements had been made in tasking by SEMA the process would benefit  
from it taking greater ownership.
LAND RELEASE  
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)
5 5 A process to revise Somalia’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines was due 
to be completed in 2019 but was still awaiting approval as of writing. The current 
standards are not deemed to meet the requirements for Somalia. 
LAND RELEASE  
OUTPUTS AND  
ARTICLE 4 
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)
2 2 No CMR contamination was surveyed or cleared again in 2019, and no progress 
towards addressing CMR contamination has been reported in the past six years. 
Somalia is not currently on track to meet its Article 4 deadline of 2026.
Average Score 4.0 3.9 Overall Programme Performance: POOR
CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)
 ■ Mine Action Department, within the Somaliland  
Ministry of Defence (formerly the Somaliland Mine  
Action Centre, SMAC)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ Federal Member States (FMS) NGO consortium
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ The HALO Trust
 ■ Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
 ■ Ukroboronservice
 ■ Danish Demining Group (DDG)
OTHER ACTORS
 ■ United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 




UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
The extent of CMR contamination in Somalia is unknown. 
There were no reports of previously unrecorded CMR 
contamination being added to the database in 2019.1 However, 
according to SEMA, CMR are suspected in areas along the 
border with Kenya, in the north of Jubaland state. It stated 
that in the old version of the national database managed by 
the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), five areas 
suspected to contain CMR contamination were recorded 
in Jubaland and that verification of this information was 
ongoing.2 No further survey of CMR-contaminated areas 
has been possible in recent years, primarily due to lack 
of funding, according to SEMA.3 There is no reported CMR 
contamination in Somaliland.
In 2013, dozens of PTAB-2.5M submunitions and several 
AO-1-SCh submunitions were found within a 30km radius 
of the town of Dolow on the Somali-Ethiopian border in 
south-central Somalia.4 CMR were also identified around the 
town of Galdogob in the north-central Mudug province of 
Puntland, further north on the border with Ethiopia.5 More 
contamination was expected to be found in south-central 
Somalia’s Lower and Upper Juba regions.6 
Submunitions have been sporadically found in previous 
years, including most recently in 2017, when UNMAS 
reported that it was shown two photos of the body of a 
BL755 submunition being used in what it assessed to be an 
improvised explosive device (IED) in Kismayo, Lower Juba 
region.7 Previously, three reports of CMR were made in 2016: 
several BL755 submunitions were reportedly found near 
Bu’ale, Middle Juba region in January, which were claimed by 
Somali media to have been recently used; a modified BL755 
submunition was found in Bardera (Baardheere), Gedo region 
in March; and one PTAB-2.5M submunition was reportedly 
found in Dinsoor, Bay region in September.8 In 2015, UNMAS 
reported that eight reports were submitted in September 
from Rabdhure, in Bakool region of South West state, 
showing empty RBK-250-275 cluster bomb containers, which 
can contain both AO-1-Sch and PTAB-2.5M submunitions.9 
The Ethiopian National Defence Forces and the Somali 
National Armed Forces are thought to have used cluster 
munitions in clashes along the Somali-Ethiopian border 
during the 1977–78 Ogaden War.10 The Soviet Union supplied 
both Ethiopia and Somalia with weapons during the conflict. 
PTAB-2.5 and AO-1-Sch submunitions were produced by the 
Soviet Union on a large scale.11
In January 2016, Somali media reports alleged that the 
Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) had used cluster munitions 
during an intensive bombing campaign in Gedo region, in 
response to an attack on KDF forces at an African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base in El Adde in which 150 
Kenyan soldiers were reportedly killed.12 Photos appeared to 
show that the KDF used United Kingdom (UK)-manufactured 
BL755 submunitions in the area of Bu’ale, and subsequently 
it was reported that al-Shabaab had discovered unexploded 
submunitions of the same BL755 type, which it used in IEDs.13 
A UN Monitoring Group investigated whether Kenyan forces 
had used cluster munitions but was unable to conclude 
that the KDF had dropped the BL755 submunitions during 
airstrikes on Gedo in January 2016. It noted, however, the 
absence of reports of unexploded BL755 submunitions among 
legacy unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination in Somalia. 
Kenya denied using cluster munitions in the January 2016 air 
campaign, calling the Monitoring Group’s report “at best, a 
fabricated, wild and sensationalist allegation”.14 
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES 
Somalia is contaminated with ERW other than CMR, primarily as a result of conflict in 1990–2012. Contamination exists across 
its three major regions: south-central Somalia (including Mogadishu), Puntland (a semi-autonomous administration in the 
north-east), and Somaliland (a self-proclaimed, though unrecognised, state that operates autonomously in the north-west). 
Landmines along the border with Ethiopia, mainly as a result of legacy minefields, also exist in south-central Somalia. 
Contamination in Somaliland consists of mines and ERW (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on  
Somalia and Somaliland for further information of the mine problem).15
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Mine action management in Somalia continues to be divided into two geographical regions: south-central Somalia and 
Somaliland. The respective centre responsible for mine action in each of these areas is SEMA in Somalia and the Mine Action 
Department within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence. 
SEMA maintains a presence across Somalia through its five Federal Member States (FMS): the Puntland State Office, Galmudug 
State Office, Hirshabelle State Office, South West State Office, and Jubaland State Office.16 Under each of the five states is an 
independent consortium of national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) implementing mine action activities.
SEMA was established in 2013 as the mine action centre for Somalia. But due to a lack of parliamentary approval of draft 
legislation on its mandate, SEMA has not received funding from the Federal Government of Somalia since the expiry of its grant 
in 2015.17 Salaries at SEMA have been covered by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) from 2017 onwards and NPA has committed 
to do so until SEMA is granted parliamentary approval, pending available funding in 2021–22, which has ensured SEMA’s 
survival.18 UNMAS supported SEMA state offices with operational incentives from January to March 2020.19 As at August 2020, 
a UNDP project to support SEMA with capacity development, project implementation and salaries was under discussion.20
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A new director of SEMA was appointed towards the end of 
2019, the third in as many years, although outside of this 
position staff turnover within SEMA is relatively low. NPA 
expressed concern about the lack of commitment from the 
Federal Government of Somalia to mine action and the impact 
that it may have on fundraising efforts by operators if no 
serious efforts are being made by the Somali government 
towards official approval or financial support of SEMA.21 
In 2019, as part of the United Kingdom Department for 
International Development (DFID)-funded consortium project 
with The HALO Trust, who provide technical training and 
support with quality assurance (QA) to SEMA, NPA continued 
its capacity development work with SEMA. In 2019, key 
activities included supporting information management 
and operational planning, providing QA and quality 
control (QC) training, support in donor liaison and treaty 
meetings, support for quarterly coordination meetings and 
workshops, and providing training in financial, administrative 
and logistical procedures. In addition to SEMA capacity 
development support, NPA also trained the non-technical 
survey, explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) and 
community liaison capacity of the local SEMA implementing 
partners in Puntland and Galmudug.22 
SEMA began conducting quarterly meetings with all mine 
action implementing partners in 2018, with a focus on 
monitoring of operations. Operators considered this a 
major step forward towards improving the cooperation, 
consultation, and coordination between SEMA and the 
clearance operators within Somalia.23 
PUNTLAND
The SEMA Puntland State Office, formerly known as PMAC, 
was established in Garowe with UN Development Programme 
(UNDP) support in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional 
government, the Puntland State Office has coordinated mine 
action with local and international partners, throughout 
2019 the implementing partners were NPA and the Puntland 
Risk Solution Consortium.24 It runs the only police explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) team in Puntland, which is 
responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance.25
SOMALILAND
The Mine Action Department within the Somaliland Ministry 
of Defence manages mine action in Somaliland.26 The HALO 
Trust has reported an enabling environment for mine 
action with international staff able to easily obtain visas, 
memorandums of understanding (MoUs) can be drawn up 
with line ministries, and there are favourable tax regulations 
in place (as for international NGOs in other sectors). 
The HALO Trust is seeking to establish a committee for 
“Explosives Hazards Management” within the government 
to collectively discuss progress, challenges, and support for 
Article 5 implementation in Somaliland.27
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 
recognises gender and diversity as cross-cutting issues for 
the national mine action programme, in line with Somalia’s 
National Development Plan objectives to “implement gender 
equality in education and mainstream gender in all of its 
programmes with a focus on adolescent girls”. The National 
Mine Action Strategic Plan stipulates that the mine action 
programme must reflect gender objectives and ensure the 
specific needs of women, girls, boys, and men are taken 
into account, including through delivery of gender-equality 
programming and adoption of a gender-sensitive approach 
by consortia and implementing partners. The Plan also 
recognises the importance of conducting context analyses in 
areas of mine action operations to clarify important gender 
and diversity issues, such as clan affiliation, movement 
patterns of local populations, and barriers to participation 
for different gender and age groups.28 SEMA reported that 
gender and diversity have also been integrated into the 
national mine action standards.29
In May 2019, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that 
it does not have an internal gender or diversity policy 
or implementation plan. It acknowledged that this was 
“unfortunate”, and pledged that it would strive for gender 
balance in the future, by ensuring equal employment 
opportunities for qualified men and women.30 
SEMA also reported that within the federal State national 
mine action NGO consortia, there was a focus on gender in 
survey and community liaison teams to ensure the inclusion 
of all affected groups, including women and children.31 
Operators are working towards gender-balanced survey 
and clearance teams. This is a challenge in Somalia as 
a traditionally patriarchal society where women are not 
usually encouraged to engage in physical work or to take up 
leadership roles.32 SEMA confirmed that data collection was 
disaggregated by sex and age, and gender taken into account 
in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and 
clearance activities,33 although it is unclear how gender is 
being taken into account.
All operators confirmed that clan affiliation was also an 
important consideration when recruiting and deploying 
operational staff. It is important that the hiring process 
includes people from across the different clan and ethnic 
groups to ensure diversity and that there is sensitivity to 
this when teams are deployed.34 Employing more women 
typically enables operators to access all strata of Somali 
society to gain information and take into account the views 
of all relevant groups.35 In Somaliland, one third of the 
population are nomadic pastoralists, with many transiting 
between Somaliland and Ethiopia. HALO in Somaliland 
ensures that it employs survey staff from both a rural and 
urban background, and from various regions in Somaliland, 
to ensure that there is a strong understanding of all sections 
of Somaliland society.36




In 2019, NPA’s non-technical survey/community liaison/EORE teams were said to be gender balanced as was senior 
management. However, no women were working in the clearance teams, apart from medics.37 In total, 25% of HALO Trust’s 
workforce were women in 2019 and 18% of its operational personnel were women. In Somalia, 40% of women employed by 
the HALO Trust are in operational roles, while in Somaliland it is 47%. Women also occupy several managerial roles in both 
Somalia and Somaliland. In 2019, eight of the twenty new deminers hired by HALO were women.38 UNMAS have been hiring 
local people on short-term contracts to assist clearance teams which has enabled a larger number of women to be hired and 
has brought the average overall female participation in mine action up to 25%. Women also constituted 27% of leadership 
(managerial/supervisory) positions in the UNMAS Somalia programme.39
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
In 2017, ownership of the national IMSMA database was fully transferred from UNMAS to SEMA, with support and 
capacity-building from NPA.40 NPA reported that IMSMA operators within SEMA were carrying out data verification and 
entry.41 Under the database reporting formats, CMR are recorded separately from other types of ERW.42 According to UNMAS, 
however, SEMA’s database is neither up to date nor accurate.43 As at August 2020, SEMA was meeting with operators to discuss 
synchronising operator data with the national database.44
The Mine Action Department, the mine action authority in Somaliland, manages a separate IMSMA database. The HALO Trust 
stated that its data undergo monthly QA before being reported to the Mine Action Department, which uploads it onto the 
central database. In Somaliland, HALO creates its own data collection forms, which it says ensure accurate collection of data 
by its survey teams.45
Somalia’s national mine action strategic plan stipulates the submission of annual transparency reports for the CCM, along 
with those under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). In October 2019, SEMA submitted its first CCM Article 
7 transparency report, which included the limited amount of information about CMR contamination. In mid-September 2020, 
Somalia submitted its Article 7 report covering 2019, reporting no survey and clearance during the year.
PLANNING AND TASKING
Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 
was developed with input from SEMA, UNMAS, international 
operators, national NGO consortia, and international 
institutions in late 2017.46 As at May 2020, with the strategic 
plan about to expire, it was still awaiting approval by the 
Minister for Internal Security.47
The plan focuses on setting “achievable” goals over the 
three-year period. The strategy’s five goals, identified by 
SEMA, are as follows:
 ■ To enhance SEMA’s ability to lead and enable effective 
and efficient mine action
 ■ To develop the Somali mine action consortia into a wholly 
national mine action capacity
 ■ To engage with stakeholders in order to understand, and 
better respond to, their mine action needs
 ■ To achieve a mine-impact-free Somalia 
 ■ To comply with treaties binding Somalia on mines and 
other explosive threats.
The strategy notes Somalia’s status as a State Party to the 
CCM and its reporting obligations and commits to complying 
with the Convention, but does not contain specific provisions 
on survey and clearance of CMR. 
SEMA was developing a mine action work plan for 2020, in 
cooperation with the SEMA state offices, and operators, but 
it was not finished as of August. NPA is planning to support 
SEMA with an implementation plan for 2021.48
In Somaliland, The HALO Trust has encountered a lack  
of political will to conclude a strategic plan or handle  
residual risk.49
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no national mine action legislation in Somalia. UNMAS developed National Technical Standards and Guidelines 
(NTSGs) for Somalia in 2012–13.50 SEMA conducted a review of the NTSGs in 2019 with technical support from NPA and  
in compliance with IMAS. As at May 2020, the NTSGs were awaiting approval from the Ministry of Internal Security.51
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OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS 
In 2019, one international NGO, The HALO Trust, conducted battle area clearance (BAC) operations in Somalia and Somaliland, 
along with UNMAS-contracted commercial clearance company, Ukroboronservice. NPA also conducted clearance in 2019, but 
only of mined areas.












61 0 0 Increase from 2 MTTs and 4 MDTs in 2018
Conduct BAC and mine clearance 
HALO Somalia 4 38 0 0 HALO Somalia only conducted BAC in 2019
HALO Somaliland 34 259 0 2 Decrease from 2018
Conduct BAC and mine clearance
Totals 48 358 0 2
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.  
MTT= Mobile multi-tasking team MDT= Manual demining team.
UNMAS, through its implementing partner Ukroboronservice, deployed four mobile multi-tasking teams (MTTs) and six  
manual demining teams (MDTs) which are trained to carry out non-technical survey, mine clearance, BAC, EOD. In addition,  
16 community liaison officers conduct non-technical survey. Operational capacity increased in 2019 compared to 2018.  
In 2020, if funding from the European Union (EU) is approved, capacity may increase further.53
In 2019, The HALO Trust in Somalia conducted only BAC. In addition, HALO deployed eight non-technical survey teams totalling 
20 personnel in Somalia, and two teams totalling eight personnel in Somaliland. The HALO Trust expected to recruit an 
additional eight non-technical survey and clearance/technical survey teams in 2020. No changes in capacity were expected  
in Somaliland in 2020. In 2019, the HALO Trust conducted tests on the application of thermite torches in Somalia and hosted  
a preliminary trial of Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR) technology for explosive detection in Somaliland.54
NPA continued only mine clearance in 2019 in Somaliland/Puntland but terminated its operations in the disputed area at 
the end of November 2019 and closed its office at the end of January 2020.55 In 2020, NPA was conducting mine clearance in 
Puntland and non-technical survey, impact assessment and explosive ordnance risk education in Galmudug and Puntland, 
entering into partnerships with each of the local NGO consortia.56
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
There was no reported release of land contaminated with CMR in 2019. No new contamination from CMR was reported.57  
This was also the case in 2018.
The HALO Trust reported that they re-surveyed an area in Galmudug in 2019 which was recorded as contaminated with  
CMR but after finding no evidence, they cancelled the area.58
According to SEMA, the primary reason that no national CMR survey had been carried out was a lack of funding for activities.59
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOMALIA: 1 MARCH 2016
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2026
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
Under Article 4 of the CCM, Somalia is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, 
but not later than 1 March 2026. 
It is too soon to say whether Somalia will meet its Article 4 deadline though it is not currently on track to do so. SEMA has 
informed Mine Action Review that key challenges which could prevent Somalia from meeting its 2026 deadline, based on 
current capacity, are a lack of funding and the fact that Somalia as of yet has not conducted a general survey to have a 
comprehensive picture of remaining CMR contamination.60




HALO Trust echoed these concerns, stating that survey is far 
from complete due to limited access, combined with the fact 
that active conflict continues in the country.61 At the same 
time, NPA felt it still remained possible for Somalia to meet 
its Article 4 obligations in time, as contamination from CMR 
is believed to be relatively low and manageable. Success is 
dependent on access to suspected areas and the availability 
of funding.62 These concerns were also repeated by UNMAS 
who believed that it is unlikely Somalia will meet its Article 4 
obligations due to lack of access, continued insecurity,  
and the lack of available resources to carry out survey  
and clearance.63
Table 2: Five-year summary of CMR clearance







1 Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F; and emails from Mustafa Bawar, 
Head of Programme Management Office, UNMAS, 23 August 2020; Claus 
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The United Kingdom (UK) has said that UK bombing data for the Falkland Islands shows there is no evidence that cluster 
munitions were dropped on the four remaining minefields in Yorke Bay, which totalled an estimated 226,958m2 as at end of 
March 2020.1 As all other hazardous areas (including both cluster munition-contaminated and mined areas) in the Falkland 
Islands have already been released, there are no remaining areas in which cluster munition remnants (CMR) are suspected  
or confirmed. 
If any CMR or other items of explosive ordnance are found following the conclusion of the United Kingdom’s demining 
programme on the Falkland Islands, the authorities have confirmed that they will be addressed by the Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD) team from the Royal Air Force Armament Engineering Flight on the Falkland Islands, which has an “enduring” 
military presence there.
CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
 ■ National Mine Action Authority (chaired by the United 
Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development 
Office (FCDO) and comprising representatives from the 
Ministry of Defence, the Falkland Islands Government, 
and a strategic advisor)
 ■ Fenix Insight (Demining Project Office)
NATIONAL OPERATORS
 ■ SafeLane Global (formerly Dynasafe BACTEC,  





ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2020 




UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
There are no longer any areas known or suspected to contain 
CMR in the Falkland Islands.2 
The Falkland Islands were contaminated as a result of use 
of BL755 cluster bombs by British forces against Argentine 
positions during the 1982 armed conflict. While the Ministry 
of Defence conducted extensive battle area clearance (BAC) 
of CMR after the end of the conflict, it said in 2009 that the 
majority of those CMR remaining were contained within 
existing minefields that would be cleared in due course.3 As 
the United Kingdom had not previously specified which, if 
any, of the remaining mined areas may contain CMR based 
on analysis of UK bombing data, it had remained unclear 
whether or not these mined areas could also contain CMR. 
Mine Action Review had therefore continued to deem the 
United Kingdom to have an Article 4 obligation. In May 2020, 
the United Kingdom said that bombing data showed that the 
remaining mined areas had not been bombed. Therefore, 
the suspicion of CMR potentially remaining within uncleared 
minefields has now been removed.
Previously, in February 2009, the Ministry of Defence stated 
that: “According to historical records either 106 or 107 
Cluster Bomb Units (CBU) were dropped by British Harriers 
and Sea Harriers during the conflict. Each CBU contains 147 
BL755 submunitions and using the higher CBU figure (107), 
a total of 15,729 submunitions were dropped. Using a 6.4% 
failure rate assessed during in-service surveillance over 15 
years, we would estimate that 1,006 would not explode. Given 
that 1,378 BL755s were cleared in the first year after the 
conflict and that a further 120 have been found and disposed 
of since (totalling 1,498), clearly there was a slightly higher 
failure rate. Even if the rate had been closer to 10% and 1,573 
had failed, we can only estimate that some 70 remain but that 
due to the very soft nature of the peat found on the islands, 
many of these will have been buried well below the surface. 
We believe that the majority of those remaining are now 
contained within existing minefields and these will be cleared 
in due course.”4 





In 2015, the United Kingdom affirmed that no known areas of 
CMR contamination exist outside suspected hazardous areas 
(SHAs) on the islands, in particular mined areas, all of which 
are fenced and marked.5 In 1982–84, BAC was undertaken 
over large areas looking for submunitions and other 
unexploded ordnance (UXO). The United Kingdom conducted 
CMR clearance in the aftermath of the Falklands conflict, 
along with comprehensive perimeter marking of mined areas 
potentially containing remaining CMR. Based on bombing 
data, areas where unexploded submunitions were expected 
to be found were targeted “very quickly”, and a large number 
were located and destroyed. Demining operations involved 
both surface and subsurface clearance.6 
The United Kingdom had previously stated that potential CMR 
contamination has, in part, been taken into account during 
mine clearance operations on the Islands, with two areas, Fox 
Bay 8W and Goose Green 11, selected for clearance partly 
based on records indicating that cluster munitions had been 
dropped there. No CMR were found in these two areas.7 
Since October 2009, mine clearance operations in the 
Falkland Islands resulted in the destruction of a total of 21 
submunitions and 1 cluster munition container.8 In 2010, the 
United Kingdom reported destruction of two submunitions in 
Stanley Area 3, during clearance operations across four mined 
areas in 2009-10.9 In June 2015, it reported destruction of 19 
submunitions during clearance operations in January to April 
2015, also in Stanley Area 3.10 UK records suggest that four 
cluster bombs were dropped in this area.11 In June 2017, the 
main body of a BL755 cluster munition container was found in 
“minefield GG08”, during BAC in the Goose Green region. GG08 
has now been declared cleared of all explosive ordnance.12 
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
As referenced previously, the Falkland Islands is also contaminated by anti-personnel mines (see Mine Action Review’s 
Clearing the Mines 2020 report on the United Kingdom for further information) and other explosive ordnance. At the end of 
March 2020, contamination had been reduced to four mined areas totalling an estimated 226,958m2, all of which are located in 
Yorke Bay. All four mined areas have already been technically surveyed and the United Kingdom planned to have completed 
clearance by the end of 2020.13
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
A National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established in 2009 to regulate, manage, and coordinate mine action on the 
Falkland Islands. The NMAA is chaired by United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) and 
comprises representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Falkland Islands Government, and the programme’s strategic 
advisor. The NMAA ensures mine action is conducted in accordance with United Kingdom and Falkland Islands’ legislation,  
and its approval is required before cleared areas are declared completed. It meets at least once every six months, and the  
land release contractors (SafeLane Global; formerly Dynasafe BACTEC) and the Demining Project Office (Fenix Insight), are 
invited to brief the NMAA “as appropriate”.14 
In addition, there is a Suspect Hazardous Area Land Release Committee (SHALARC), which is a non-decision-making body 
based in the Falkland Islands, composed of a local officials and a representative of the British military. SHALARC provides 
a forum for the contractors to discuss issues of concern or interest to the committee, and includes explanation of the land 
release process, including when land has been released for public use.15
Survey and clearance operations in the Falkland Islands are entirely funded by the UK Government.16 The first four phases of 
demining (2009 to March 2016) cost £11 million (approx. US$14.5 million at the time),17 and an additional £27 million (approx. 
US$35.5 million at current exchange rates) was committed on Phase 5 through to March 2020.18 Since 2018, the United 
Kingdom has sought additional financing to ensure the Programme will be fully funded through to completion, which will bring 
the total investment in demining of the Falklands from £38 million to £44 million (approx. US$54 million).19 
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
The UK reported that it makes every effort to ensure that the different needs and perspectives of women, girls, boys, and men 
are considered in planning and implementation of mine clearance activities on the Falkland Islands.20
The UK government and its contractors adhere to an equal opportunities approach to recruitment for the demining 
programme in the Falkland Islands.21
The NMAA requires its contractors, SafeLane Global and Fenix Insight, to meet contractual conditions to prevent unlawful 
discrimination, either directly or indirectly, on the basis of race, colour, ethnic or national origin, disability, sex or sexual 
orientation, religion or belief, or age. The provisions also stipulate that the Contractor must adhere to the current relevant 
codes of practice or recommendations published by the Equality and Human Rights Commission.22 
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Fenix Insight has an organisational gender policy which it applies to its demining, though there is limited opportunity to 
pursue it on the Falklands given the deployed “team” is composed of only one (male) person. SafeLane Global has an equal 
opportunities policy and selects employees based on qualification and experience, without gender restrictions. Of management 
level positions employed by SafeLane Global in the Falkland Islands, women occupy one third, but none of the survey or 
clearance staff is female.23 According to SafeLane Global, no female deminers presented themselves during the recruitment 
phases for the Falkland Islands operations and only one female applicant applied for a surveyor position, but was unsuccessful 
as she was not the most qualified candidate for the role.24
Within the FCDO (the national authority), women are involved in the programme in key positions: Senior Responsible Officer, 
Deputy Senior Responsible Officer, and Project Manager.25
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The information management system is managed at two levels. The Strategic Advisor maintains the public statement of 
progress through a “Cumulative Totals” spreadsheet (as demonstrated in the attached annex to the United Kingdom’s 
2018 Article 5 deadline extension request). This forms the basis of the declarations to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention (APMBC) Meetings of States Parties. Also, the Demining Project Office and the Land Release Contractor use an 
operational-level planning and information management tool which guides the work and ultimately leads to the Handover 
Certificate at the conclusion of each task.26
Historically, the United Kingdom has not collated data on area cancelled and on area reduced,27 and does not disaggregate  
land released through technical survey from land released through clearance in its reporting.28
PLANNING AND TASKING
The United Kingdom is in the fifth and final phase of mine clearance, which includes tackling the most technically-challenging 
and environmentally-sensitive minefields.29 The United Kingdom had expected that eight mined areas would remain upon 
completion of Phase 5(b) in March 2020, covering an estimated 163,460m2.30 In April 2020, the United Kingdom reported that 
only four mined areas in fact remained, totalling an estimated 226,958m2, all of which are located in Yorke Bay.31
In April 2020, the United Kingdom confirmed that it had sought additional financing to ensure the Programme will be fully 
funded through to completion.32
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The United Kingdom does not have its own national mine action standards, but survey and clearance operations on the 
Falkland Islands are reported to meet or exceed the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), by adapting IMAS to meet the 
specifics of the situation on the Falkland Islands.33 Each project’s Statement of Requirement contains the standards specific to 
the tasks being addressed.34 
The United Kingdom reported that it has “followed the principles set out in IMAS 09.10 (Clearance Requirements) and is very 
conscious of the statement that “The beneficiaries of humanitarian demining programmes must be confident that cleared 
and released land is safe for their use. This requires management systems and clearance procedures which are appropriate, 
effective, efficient and safe.” The UK and its contractors have used all reasonable effort to achieve the best practicable 
outcome. On the issue of post clearance safety, the UK continues to use the principles set out in UK Health and Safety 
legislation to reduce the residual risk to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) which is similar to the IMAS concept  
of ‘all reasonable effort’.”35





OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The Land Release Contractor in the Falkland Islands is 
selected by international competitive tender prior to each 
phase, as required by the European Union. SafeLane Global 
(formerly Dynasafe BACTEC), was awarded the land release 
contract for the current and final phase of demining operations 
in the Falkland Islands, as for the previous four phases.36 
SafeLane Global’s operational capacity in the Falkland Islands 
in 2019 remained constant at seven manual clearance teams 
totalling 56 manual deminers (excluding team leaders and 
medics) and 16 mechanical assets, including sifters which are 
critical to the project.37
The Demining Project Office, which implements the policies 
of the NMAA and monitors the land release operations on 
the Falkland Islands, is also awarded through competitive 
tender. Fenix Insight has been awarded responsibility for the 
Demining Project Office for all five stages of demining.38
Drones have been used for reconnaissance over large 
areas not accessible behind minefield fences and for aerial 
mapping. Use of drones to overfly SHAs helped to identify 
mine “dump” locations, row markers, and other evidence that 
might have otherwise taken a manual team several days to 
locate. The United Kingdom deems the use of drones to be 
an excellent addition to the demining toolbox and continues 
to use them when appropriate.39 Yorke Bay, where the 
remaining mined areas are located, is a very large sandy 
area with dunes up to 10 metres in height. Aerial drones 
provide a viewpoint that is not otherwise available.40
Technical survey during phase 5(b) helped determine the 
most effective clearance methods given the unique conditions 
of the four remaining minefields at Yorke Bay and have 
informed the clearance plan. Technical survey identified 
where block excavation down to the rock or clay layer 
could take place, suggesting a combination of techniques 
(mechanical and manual clearance where necessary) and 
types of equipment to use, including sifting buckets, dump 
trucks, and screening machines.41 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
No submunitions were found in the Falkland Islands in 2019, but 319 anti-personnel mines, 108 anti-vehicle mines, and 6 items 
of UXO were destroyed during survey and clearance operations which saw the release of 15 SHAs.42
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR UNITED KINGDOM: 1 NOVEMBER 2010
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2020 (HAS FULFILLED ARTICLE 4 OBLIGATIONS)
The United Kingdom has fulfilled its obligation under Article 4 to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as 
soon as possible, but not later than 1 November 2020. In May 2020, the United Kingdom confirmed that UK bombing data for 
the Falkland Islands showed there is no evidence that cluster munitions were dropped on the four remaining minefields in 
Yorke Bay, which as at the end of March 2020, totalled an estimated 226,958m2.43 According to the United Kingdom, bombing 
data records have been analysed many times since 1982 and all known BL755 strike targets were checked by British Troops 
over the years. All items found were destroyed.44
The United Kingdom had not considered itself to have an obligation under Article 4 of the CCM, and had reported that it 
considered that it had made every effort to identify all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control.  
It believes any remaining CMR, if found to exist, to be “residual.”45
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Full and accessible records of all survey and clearance undertaken will be retained by national authorities in the Falkland 
Islands and the United Kingdom.46 As reported above, the United Kingdom has bombing data of the cluster munition strikes on 
the Falkland Islands and has cleared all cluster munition contaminated areas. The United Kingdom believes there is a very low 
risk of previously unknown mine contamination being discovered post completion, but that it remains a possibility as there is 
no complete record of mines laid on the Falkland Islands. 
If a mine or other item of explosive ordnance is found following the conclusion of the demining programme, it will be addressed 
by the EOD team from the UK’s Royal Air Force Armament Engineering Flight on the Falkland Islands, which has an “enduring” 
military presence there.47 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Angola should ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Angola should confirm whether it believes that cluster munition remnants (CMR) remain on its territory. 
 ■ Angola should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR on territory under its 
jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
 ■ Angola should elaborate specific land release and residual contamination targets that refer to CMR contamination. 
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent to which Angola is affected by CMR is still unclear. 
There are no reports of confirmed contamination. According 
to Angola’s national mine action authority, the National 
Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian 
Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem 
e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH), 18 submunitions were 
found and destroyed in 2018, and a total of 164 submunitions 
were found and destroyed in 2017 as a result of explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks and community call-outs.1 
In the APMBC Article 5 implementation Workplan 2020–2025, 
it is reported that 24 submunitions were found and destroyed 
in 2017–19.2 There were no reports of submunitions being 
found in 2019 by either CNIDAH or operators and prior to  
2017 CNIDAH had not previously reported on the discovery  
of submunitions.3
CNIDAH reported that no CMR specific survey or clearance 
was carried out in 2019 and the national database does 
not contain any polygons pertaining to areas of CMR 
contamination.4 None of the international mine action 
operators working in Angola has reported finding any 
significant areas of CMR contamination or submunitions since 
2008.5 In 2018, in November, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) 
reported that a single Russian-made AO-1-Sch submunition 
was brought in for destruction by a local community member 
to its operations near to Kapuluta village, Luvuei commune, 
in Moxico province. As at April 2019, community liaison teams 
had been sent to survey the surrounding farmlands for 
further information, but MAG did not have any evidence that 
additional CMR would be found.6 
Previously, the last reported instance of an international mine 
action NGO locating CMR was in August 2016, when The HALO 
Trust found two Alpha submunitions in Cunene province. The 
submunitions were reported by local residents to a HALO 
Trust survey team during re-survey operations.7 Prior to this, 
HALO Trust reported finding and destroying 12 submunitions 
in 2012. The HALO Trust informed Mine Action Review that 
these were isolated cases and noted that it had seen very 
little evidence of cluster munition strikes in Angola. With 
these exceptions, as at May 2019, NGO clearance operators in 
Angola had not found any other CMR in more than ten years.
The HALO Trust has also reported that the majority of CMR 
destroyed over the course of its operations were the result 
of the disposal of old or unserviceable cluster munitions 
identified by HALO Trust’s Weapons and Ammunition Disposal 
(WAD) teams in military storage areas, some of which were 
earmarked for destruction by the Angolan Armed Forces. 
Between 2005 and 2012, HALO Trust WAD teams reported 
destroying a total of 7,284 submunitions.8 In 2018, The HALO 
Trust confirmed it had not been asked by the military to do any 
further destruction of cluster munition stockpiles since 2012.9
CMR contamination was a result of the decades of armed 
conflict that ended in 2002, although it is unclear when, or  
by whom, cluster munitions were used in Angola.10
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Angola is heavily contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) other than CMR (see Mine Action 
Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Angola for further information).
ANGOLA




NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Angola’s national mine action programme is managed by two 
mine action structures. CNIDAH serves as the national mine 
action authority and reports to the Council of Ministers or, 
in effect, to the Presidency of the Republic. Surprisingly, the 
other coordination body, the CED, reports to the Ministry of 
Social Action, Family, and Women’s Promotion (MASFAMU). 
The CED’s main role is to coordinate and manage four 
national operators: The Demining Brigades of the Security 
Unit of the President of the Republic, the Angolan Armed 
Forces, the National Demining Institute (INAD) and the 
Brigades of the Angolan Border Guard Police. And while 
Presidential Decrees stipulate the mandates of both CNIDAH 
and the CED, there are clear overlaps and ambiguities as 
to the exact division of labour and their related roles and 
responsibilities.11 
Tensions between these entities lessened significantly in 
2019 as CNIDAH, over the past three years, has focused 
on reorganising the mine action sector and the CED is now 
more aligned with their approach and more concentrated on 
getting the job done.12 As at April 2020, CNIDAH was in the 
process of changing its legal status from a commission to the 
Angola National Demining Agency (ANAM), which, it is hoped, 
will strengthen coordination mechanisms and information 
sharing between the different national bodies.13
Angola’s mine action programme has faced critical 
challenges in securing financial resources in recent years.  
In 2019, a draft resource mobilisation strategy was developed 
and, as at April 2020, was still under review.14 According 
to the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025 Objective 
5 the resource mobilisation strategy will be developed and 
approved before the end of 2020 with CNIDAH taking the lead 
in its development.15
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
Gender and diversity are integrated into Angola’s National Mine Action Strategy 2020-25 as a cross-cutting issue. However, 
while the Strategy pledges that Angola’s mine action programme will ensure that gender and diversity considerations are 
taken into consideration in the planning, implementation and monitoring phases of all mine action projects, it does not say 
how this will be done and there is no mention of gender or diversity in Angola’s APMBC Article 5 Implementation Workplan 
2020–2025.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Angola’s mine action programme has long suffered from significant problems with information management, in particular the 
poor quality of the CNIDAH national database. Throughout 2019, the database was reconciled, updated, and quality assured.16 
CNIDAH reported that, as at November 2019, the national IMSMA database had been fully reconciled with operators’ data, and 
the previous data backlog and overinflated contamination figures have been cleared. As a consequence, CNIDAH and operators 
now consider the national database to be a reliable source of information.17 
PLANNING AND TASKING
Angola’s National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025 was developed by CNIDAH, in 2019, with support from the GICHD. There  
are five objectives within the strategy, two of which refer to explosive ordnance although there is no specific mention of CMR.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
While national mine action standards (NMAS) are in place in Angola, they do not contain provisions specific to CMR survey  
or clearance. 
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Four international NGOs conducted demining for humanitarian purposes in Angola in 2019: APOPO, The HALO Trust, MAG,  
and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). None of the operators carried out any CMR-specific survey or clearance in 2019.
122   Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2020
1 CNIDAH, “Angola Mine Action Programme 2019–2025”, Newsletter, 1st Edn, February 2019, at: bit.ly/2E2HVfo. The CNIDAH newsletter reported that 85 
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16 Emails from Manuel João Agostinho, APOPO, 9 March 2020; and from GICHD, 13 May 2020.
17 Statement by Angola on Article 5 implementation, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, November 2019; Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 August 2020.
18 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, NPA (on behalf of CNIDAH), 1 April 2020.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
There was no reported survey or clearance of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2019 and no CMR were found during 
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks.
PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
Angola is a signatory, but not a state party, to the CCM. It was reported to Mine Action Review in April 2020 that CNIDAH  
was in the process of engaging the government of Angola to ratify the CCM.18 In addition to its legal obligations as a treaty 
signatory, Angola has obligations under international human rights law to clear any CMR on its territory as soon as possible. 
It has not publicly reported a date as to when it might be able to declare its territory free of CMR contamination nor a strategy 
for doing so. 
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 ■ The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) should ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter  
of priority.
 ■ DRC should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants 
(CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ The Congolese Mine Action Coordination Centre (CCLAM) should specify what arrangements it is making for the 
long-delayed survey of Aru and Dungu territories.
 ■ The DRC should submit a detailed work plan, including a timeline for survey and/or clearance of all remaining  
CMR contamination and prompt, regular, and comprehensive reports on the progress of survey and clearance.
 ■ The DRC should detail its plans for sustainable capacity to tackle previously unidentified hazards.
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
The DRC has a small amount of contamination by CMR but 
has not produced an up-to-date estimate and the precise 
extent remaining is not known. CCLAM reported in mid-2019 
that DRC had six areas of confirmed CMR contamination in 
four provinces and covering a total of 81,484m2 (see Table 
1).1 Mine Action Review believes at least three of these areas 
have already been cleared, but has received no further 
information from CCLAM in this regard. 
The first estimate of CMR contamination came from a national 
survey that CCLAM said was carried out in tandem with a 
survey of anti-personnel mine contamination in 2013–14. 
Five confirmed hazardous areas covering 17,590m2 were 
found to contain CMR, all of which have since been cleared. 
The survey did not, however, cover Aru, a territory in Ituri 
province, and Dungu, a territory in Haut Uele province, where 
insecurity prevented access by survey teams. The DRC’s 
most recent National Mine Action Strategy 2018–19, prepared 
with support from the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and finalised in November 
2017, said that in addition to mines and explosive remnants of 
war (ERW), “some areas contaminated by submunitions have 
also been reported but the areas affected remain negligible”.2 
Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by province  
(at end 2018)3
Province Territory CHAs Area (m2)
Ituri Aru 3 40,750
South Kivu Shabunda 1 719
Tanganyika Kalemie 1 37,000
Tshopo Bangelema 1 3,015
Totals 6 81,484
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The mine action sector is overseen by the Commission Nationale de Lutte Antimines (CNLAM), a multi-sectoral body which is 
supposed to meet twice a year and is composed of deputies from both parliamentary chambers, officials from four ministries, 
and representatives of five civil society organisations linked to mine action.4 
Management of the sector is under CCLAM, which was established in 2012 with support from the United Nations Mine Action 
Coordination Centre (UNMACC) and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS).5 It is responsible for setting strategy, accrediting 
operators, information management, budgeting, and resource mobilisation. Law 11/007 of 9 July 2011 underpins the national 
mine action programme.6 CCLAM took over from UNMAS as the national focal point for demining in early 2016 overseeing 
accreditation, issuing task orders, conducting quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) and managing the national  
database but lack of capacity remained a concern for operators.7 The government has provided funding for CCLAM’s  
operating expenses, amounting to US$530,000 in 2018, but has not provided funding for operations.8
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UNMACC, established in 2002 by UNMAS, previously coordinated mine action through offices in the capital, Kinshasa,  
and in Goma, Kalemie, Kananga, Kisangani, and Mbandaka. UNMACC was part of the UN Stabilization Mission in the  
DR Congo (MONUSCO). In 2014, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 2147 (2014), humanitarian mine action  
was removed from MONUSCO’s mandate.9 UNMAS, working in 2019 with 18 international and 18 national staff, continues  
to support CCLAM in planning and implementing CCLAM’s 2018–19 mine action strategy and building CCLAM’s capacity  
on information management.10 
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The national mine action strategy for 2018–19 stipulated that all mine action activities, particularly those related to risk education 
and victim assistance, must reflect the different needs of individuals according to age and gender, in a non-discriminatory manner. 
It also stated that the principles of non-discrimination against women as set out in the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) are to be respected, ensuring 
that women are involved in all essential stages of mine action (planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation), and that 
activities take into account the special needs of women and girls.11 
CCLAM reported that approximately 30% of operational staff in survey and clearance teams were female in 2019, but only 
around 7% of managerial or supervisory positions were held by women, reportedly due in part to barriers presented by local 
customs about the employment roles appropriate for women. CCLAM reported that mine action survey teams are gender 
balanced and that efforts are undertaken to ensure that all community groups, including women and children, are consulted.  
It also noted, however, the need to continue raising awareness on gender equality in certain communities as local customs  
can discriminate against women undertaking certain categories of work.12
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
CCLAM took over responsibility for information management from UNMAS in 2016 but has lacked the capacity and resources  
to manage data and operate effectively the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.  
The 2018–19 national strategy acknowledged a need to build staff capacity, improve data collection, update the database on 
a regular basis, and provide data disaggregated by age and gender.13 Continuing issues in 2019 included gaps in data; lack of 
maintenance; reporting on land release that did not comply with international terminology; misreporting items of unexploded 
ordnance (UXO) as mines; and a lack of verification of incoming reports.14
UNMAS continued its long-running support to the database in 2019, assisting monthly updates of data to improve operational 
coordination, collaborating on developing an information management work plan, and providing a range of computer and 
digital hardware.15 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) has also provided refresher training for CCLAM staff in use of IMSMA and  
the associated Geographic Information System (GIS).16 
PLANNING AND TASKING
The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–19, prepared with support from UNMAS and the GICHD, focused on seeking to fulfil  
the DRC’s Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention’s Article 5 obligations by 2020, one year ahead of its extended 2021 deadline.17 
The strategy also set out the objective of completing procedures for ratifying the Convention on Cluster Munitions by the end  
of 2018, a plan which has yet to be implemented.18 
The strategy identified three strategic pillars: effective and efficient management of the explosive threat; ensuring the national 
programme had the capacity to manage residual contamination in a sustainable manner; and that the legal framework of 
the mine action programme was strengthened through the adoption of national laws and other implementing measures and 
adherence to relevant treaties.19 None of these goals was met.
Tasking continues to be challenged by the remote location of many hazardous areas and database weaknesses, including 
misidentification of ERW as mine contamination and the addition of hazards to the database without robust evidence of the 
presence of explosive ordnance. Instead of prioritising tasks, NPA adopted a province-by-province approach as a more  
efficient way to deal with the logistical challenges and costs of tackling tasks separated by big distances.20
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The DRC has 24 national standards developed with support from the GICHD21 and the national strategy for 2018–19 called 
for revision of the standards and awareness raising of their content through training.22 CCLAM reported in June 2019 it had 
revised the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) during 2018, amending mainly the standards relating to 
demining techniques and safety of deminers.23
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The number of operators active in the DRC has fallen in the past two years to the point where DanChurchAid, NPA, and TDI 
were the only international organisations active in survey and clearance in 2019. 
NPA operated with three teams conducting non-technical survey and manual mine clearance as well as explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) spot tasks in 2019.24 NPA continued survey in early 2020, but operations ended in February 2020 and the 
programme officially closed at the end of March 2020.25
TDI continued operating in 2019 under contract to UNMAS, working with two teams and a total of twenty-four deminers. It 
carried out surveys in Ituri and Tanganyika provinces. It also conducted spot EOD and risk education in support of the UN 
peacekeeping operation, MONUSCO, working in the territories of Aru (Ituri province), Kalemie (Tanganyika province), and 
Shabunda town (South Kivu province).26 
UNMAS contracted three national NGOs - Afrique pour la Lutte Antimines (AFRILAM), Bureau des Actions de Développement et 
des Urgences (BADU) and Groupe Africain de Déminage, Développement et Environnement (GADDE) to conduct non-technical 
survey and explosive ordnance risk education in Ituri (Irumu, Djugu, Aru), and South Kivu (Kabare, Shabunda), Tanganyika 
(Kalemie, Moba).27
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
The DRC did not report outcomes of survey and clearance in 2019. In 2019, TDI, through two multi-task teams contracted by 
UNMAS, released a total of 174,315m2 of battle area, including cluster munition-contaminated area. Of this total 107,194m2  
was released by clearance.28
SURVEY IN 2019
Non-technical survey conducted by TDI’s teams in 2019 cancelled 57,760m2 of suspected hazardous area in Ituri province and 
reduced 9,045m2 through technical survey. They reduced another 316m2 in Tanganyika province.29
CLEARANCE IN 2019
TDI teams cleared 107,194m2 of battle area, including cluster munition-contaminated area, in three provinces in 2019 (see Table 2), 
a significant increase over the clearance of 43,000m2 reported by CCLAM for the previous year. TDI destroyed 150 submunitions  
in 2019, most in the course of EOD spot tasks. A further 17,050m2 was cleared between January and 14 March 2020.30
Table 2: Battle area clearance by TDI in 201931
Province Territory Area cleared (m2) Submunitions destroyed* Total UXO destroyed
Ituri Aru, Djugu, Irumu 30,617 12 63
South Kivu Kabare, Shabunda 11,162 25 56
Tanganyika Kalemie, Moba 65,415 113 272
Totals 107,194 150 391
* Includes items destroyed in the course of EOD spot tasks.
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PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
The battle area cleared by TDI in 2019 far exceeds the area thought to be contaminated by CMR, underscoring the need for 
CCLAM to provide an updated summary of CMR-contaminated areas that were cleared in the last three years, the confirmed 
CMR hazards still outstanding, and any areas that still require survey.
As a CCM signatory, DRC had set a target of ratifying the convention by the end of 2018 but has left that target unfulfilled and 
has provided no clarity on its plans for survey or clearance of CMR nor a timeline for completion.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Azerbaijan should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Azerbaijan should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition 
remnants (CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
The precise extent of contamination from CMR in Azerbaijan is unknown, as Armenian forces currently occupy a significant 
area of the country, where the contamination exists. There may also be some residual contamination in territory under 
government control.1
Large quantities of cluster munitions were dropped during the 1988 conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Following 
the cease-fire in 1994, tensions flared up again in April 2016 when fighting broke out briefly along the Line of Contact 
(LOC). While ground fighting was confined to areas close to the LOC, artillery fire penetrated more than 10km into 
Nagorno-Karabakh, and included use of cluster munitions. The HALO Trust has calculated the four days of hostilities added 
2.4km2 of CMR contamination, all of which has since been cleared.2 However, no CMR contamination has been reported 
on the Azerbaijan-controlled side of the LOC (see the Mine Action Review Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants report on 
Nagorno-Karabakh for further information). In July 2020, fighting broke out between Azerbaijan and Armenia around the 
Tavush region in north-east Armenia, some 300km (190 miles) from Nagorno-Karabakh. There were, however, no reports  
of cluster munitions being deployed.3
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Other areas are confirmed or suspected to contain explosive remnants of war (ERW): both unexploded ordnance (UXO) and 
abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). These include former military testing areas and a former shooting range.4 Azerbaijan  
is also contaminated with landmines, the extent of which is unknown (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report 
on Azerbaijan for further information).
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), which functions as both the national mine action authority and mine 
action centre, was established by presidential decree to plan, coordinate, manage, and monitor mine action. It also conducts 
demining, along with two national operators it contracts: Dayag-Relief Azerbaijan (RA) and the International Eurasia Press 
Fund (IEPF). No commercial company is active in mine action in Azerbaijan.5 In March 2020, the mine action programme was 
restructured and RA’s field personnel were incorporated within ANAMA while RA as an organisation will continue to provide 
logistical support to ANAMA.6
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provides capacity development to ANAMA and was planning to so until 
December 2020.7 As at July 2020, ANAMA and UNDP were discussing the possibility of extending the project until 2023.8
As at June 2020, Azerbaijan was still in the process of adopting a national mine action law, with draft legislation under review 
by the Cabinet of Ministers.9 The process has been ongoing for six years already. Once adopted, it will regulate mine action in 
Azerbaijan, governing issues such as licensing, accreditation, quality assurance (QA), and tender procedures.10 
The Azerbaijani government funds 90% of ANAMA’s operating costs and 90% of all survey and clearance in Azerbaijan.11 
AZERBAIJAN
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STATES NOT PARTY
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
ANAMA does not have a gender policy. No women are working in any operational roles in survey and clearance in Azerbaijan. 
In 2019, however, women made up 11% of mine action programme staff, mainly through administrative roles in ANAMA. They 
also participate in mine risk education sessions and are consulted during survey.12 One of the goals of the UNDP-ANAMA 
capacity strengthening project is to introduce a gender-sensitive approach to mine action to Azerbaijan.13 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
ANAMA uses an old version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, and was working with 
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to upgrade to the latest IMSMA Core in 2019–20.14
PLANNING AND TASKING
The existing mine action strategy was for 2013–18.15 Its main aims were said to be to continue mine and ERW clearance in 
support of government development projects and to provide safe conditions for the local population in affected regions.16  
The strategy has not yet been replaced though in June 2020, ANAMA reported that a new strategy was in the process of  
being developed.17 In the absence of a new multiyear strategic plan, tasks are prioritised according to the state development 
plan and instructions from the government.18
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Azerbaijan has its own National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), which were adopted in 2001 and subsequently revised in 2003, 
2004, and 2010 in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and best practice.19 No major modifications 
to the standards were made in 2019.20
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2019, the Azerbaijan mine action programme had more than 300 deminers/explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel as 
well as mine detection dogs and machines. In addition, to its clearance capacities ANAMA deployed five technical survey teams 
in 2019 totalling 45 personnel.21 Mine detection dogs (MDDs) and mechanical assets are used to support reduction through 
technical survey and manual clearance operations.22
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
No CMR survey or clearance took place in 2019. Some battle area clearance (BAC) took place in the region of Garadagh with 
17,744m2 cleared and 517 items of UXO found and destroyed.
No target date has been set for the completion of CMR clearance in Azerbaijan.23 ANAMA’s long-term strategy is to be ready  
to start clearance of the occupied territories as and when this is possible.24 In May 2019, Azerbaijan stated that it will only 
accede to the CCM once all of its territories are liberated from occupation by Armenia and all internally displaced persons  
and refugees return to their lands.25
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Cambodia should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Cambodia should apply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants 
(CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ Cambodia should more accurately establish the extent of CMR contamination, through completion of the national 
baseline survey (BLS) and through further systematic and comprehensive evidence-based survey of suspected 
hazardous areas (SHAs) generated by the BLS. 
 ■ The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) should work with operators to elaborate 
a specific strategy for survey and clearance of CMR, with realistic annual targets for land release and an 
accompanying resource mobilisation plan.
 ■ The CMAA should improve CMR planning and prioritisation guidelines and implement a more targeted and 
systematic clearance prioritisation process for confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). 
 ■ The CMAA should review existing national standards on CMR clearance.
 ■ The CMAA should continue to work to establish an up-to-date and accurate national database that is open to all 
mine action stakeholders. 
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
CMR resulted from intensive bombing by the United States 
during the Vietnam War, concentrated in north-eastern 
provinces along the borders with the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic and Vietnam. The US Air Force dropped at least 26 
million explosive submunitions, between 1.9 million and 5.8 
million of which are estimated to have not exploded.1
Cambodia has extensive CMR contamination but the full 
extent is not known. As the end of 2019, CMR contamination 
was estimated at over 716km2 across 18 provinces: 1,748 
SHAs totalling more than 638.5km2 and 374 CHAs totalling 
more than 77.5km2 (see Table 1).2 Cambodia’s National 
Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 stated that known CMR 
contamination covers 645km2,3 and the estimate at the end of 
2018 had risen to 738km2 as progress in the BLS continued.4 
A large proportion of the CMR contamination is located in the 
eastern provinces close to the border with Vietnam.5
The BLS was implemented between 2009 and 2012 across 
124 districts. In 2015, the CMAA introduced the land 
reclamation non-technical survey and baseline survey 
(LRNTS+BLS) methodology, a stand-alone process to 
re-survey or re-verify SHAs identified during the BLS. The 
re-survey/re-verification efforts, which are nearly complete, 
have helped more accurately define the extent of remaining 
mine contamination and cancel those areas currently on 
the database that are found to have no evidence of mine 
contamination and/or which meet the CMAA criteria for 
reclamation.6 Fifty-three districts were surveyed in 2019 and 
as at end of 2019 only nine districts in one province remained 
to be surveyed.7 The re-survey was expected to be concluded 
by the end of the year.8 The majority of the remaining districts 
are in the eastern and southern parts of the country.9 
In the eight provinces in the east and north-east of Cambodia, 
where most of the CMR are concentrated, the Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA)/Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) 
partnership project had completed the BLS in seven eastern 
provinces (Kampong Cham, Kratié, Modulkiri, Ratanakiri, 
Stung Treng, Svay Rieng, and Tboung Khmum) and the 
resulting BLS reports were in the process of being added to 
the national database. The NPA/CMAC project had aimed to 
complete the BLS in Prey Vang province by the end of 2020, 
but the impact of COVID-19 has meant that it will not be 
completed before the end of February 2021.10 
Furthermore, the BLS historically employed a landmine 
survey methodology. Non-technical survey applied during 
the BLS was sometimes limited in scope and therefore failed 
to comprehensively or accurately take into consideration all 
CMR evidence. Empirical evidence of the inaccuracy of SHA 
polygons generated from the BLS has been demonstrated 
in a number of instances during subsequent clearance of 
BLS-generated polygons. The BLS often resulted in inflated 
polygons, containing large amounts of uncontaminated land. 
In other cases, the polygons cleared are far larger than the 
original SHA polygons recorded during BLS. Furthermore, 
there are numerous examples of explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) reports of CMR in Ratanakiri province in areas already 
surveyed as part of the BLS and in which no SHAs were 
generated as part of the BLS process.11 
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NPA emphasised that as the BLS only generates SHAs, extensive technical survey will be required in all eastern provinces to 
more accurately determine the extent and location of CMR contamination and to identify CHAs for clearance.12 Similarly, Mines 
Advisory Group (MAG) believes that a more comprehensive and systematic survey, appropriate to CMR and incorporating best 
practice from across the region, is required to better determine the scale of the CMR problem. Any such process should use the 
data generated through the BLS as a point of departure and must be evidence-based.13 Standards for Cluster Munition Remnants 
Survey (CMRS) methodology in Cambodia were endorsed in November 2019 and applied from the start of January 2020.
A backlog of CMAC data for entry into the national database has also impacted the results of the BLS, but is in the process of being 
resolved. CMAC, with support from NPA, is working to upload over 5,000 records onto the national database. As at July 2019, a total 
of 86% of the backlog had been uploaded and efforts were ongoing in 2020. The remaining records are EOD tasks conducted by CMAC 
in eastern Cambodia that are missing supporting documentation. CMAC and CMAA are in the process of working out how this data 
will be reported and entered.14
Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by province (at end 2019)15
Province CHA Area (m2) SHA Area (m2)
Battambang 0 0 1 26,872
Kampong Cham 34 5,795,141 216 44,378,487
Kampong Chhnang 0 0 22 3,515,933
Kampong Speu 0 0 85 12,366,578
Kampong Thom 0 0 341 59,063,686
Kampot 0 0 2 103,392
Kandal 0 0 56 5,525,570
Kratié 93 25,939,397 161 55,150,986
Mondulkiri 0 0 37 19,851,804
Phnom Penh 0 0 17 1,512,696
Preah Sihanouk 0 0 14 2,984,350
Preah Vihear 0 0 45 177,054,294
Prey Veng 34 6,665,072 82 16,393,245
Ratanakiri 70 10,131,073 187 49,447,318
Stung Treng 20 3,860,097 170 126,764,747
Svay Rieng 38 7,788,260 178 42,132,121
Takeo 0 0 10 1,973,835
Tboung Khmum 85 17,361,723 124 20,264,446
Totals 374 77,540,763 1,748 638,510,360
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Cambodia estimated that in 2018 it had around 468km2 of ERW contamination apart from CMR.16 ERW contamination, including 
air-dropped bombs and ground artillery, is heaviest in the eastern provinces. Cambodia also has an estimated 817km2 of 
anti-personnel mine contamination concentrated in, though not limited to, west and north-west Cambodia (see Mine Action 
Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Cambodia for further information). 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The CMAA was established by royal decree in 2000 with 
the mandate to regulate, monitor and coordinate the mine 
action sector in Cambodia.17 It has been reported that the 
CMAA has strengthened over the recent years, with roles 
and responsibilities more clearly defined.18 The Cambodian 
Mine Action Centre (CMAC) was established in 1992. Before 
the existence of the CMAA, CMAC had the responsibilities 
to regulate and coordinate the sector as well as undertake 
clearance. Since 2000, CMAC’s activities have been limited 
to conducting demining, risk education, and training.19 CMAC 
conducts both humanitarian and commercial survey and 
clearance in Cambodia and is the country’s largest mine 
action operator.20
Provincial Mine Action Committees (PMACs) and Mine Action 
Planning Units (MAPUs) were established in 2004, tasked 
with establishing clearance priorities in consultation with 
affected communities to ensure that clearance addresses 
their housing, agricultural, and infrastructure needs.21 MAPU 
planning and prioritisation units meet regularly with all mine 
action operators to plan annual mine action activities.22




The Cambodian government established the Technical 
Working Group on Mine Action (TWG-MA) as a consultative 
mechanism between the government and implementing 
partners.23 It meets on a bi-annual basis and is attended by 
the CMAA, relevant ministries, operators, and donors.24 The 
Mine Action Coordination Committee (MACC) and several 
Technical Reference Groups (TRGs) have been established by 
the CMAA to facilitate coordination and feedback at a strategic 
and technical level in areas such as survey and clearance, 
risk education, victim assistance, information management, 
gender, and capacity development.25 The TRG on survey and 
clearance meets on a quarterly basis.26 During a TRG meeting 
in March 2020, clearance operators proposed the creation of a 
separate TRG for the survey and clearance of CMR, which was 
agreed by the CMAA.27 The CMAA subsequently established 
a TRG on CMR survey and clearance to share best practice 
among operators and address challenges related to the CMRS 
process. The first meeting of the newly formed TRG was 
scheduled for October 2020.28
The operating environment in Cambodia is permissive, 
with the Cambodian government open to the presence of 
international operators and supportive in administrative 
actions such as the granting of visas, approval of Memoranda 
of Understanding (MoUs), and importation procedures. The 
CMAA is open to the trialling and use of innovative clearance 
methods and tools to improve efficiency.29 
The UN Development Programme (UNDP), NPA, and the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) all support capacity development of the CMAA. NPA, 
as part of a United Kingdom Department for International 
Development (DFID)-funded partnership that includes MAG 
and The HALO Trust, focuses on information management, 
planning and prioritisation, gender mainstreaming, quality 
management, and strategic planning.30 
The GICHD provides information management and risk 
management support to the CMAA. In 2019, GICHD support  
to capacity development included stakeholder workshops  
on the IMSMA Core migration; initial development of the  
new database; support on developing residual capacity in  
line with Cambodia’s mine action strategy; and workshops  
on risk management and national mine action standard 
(NMAS) development.31 
The Cambodian government contributes funding towards 
clearance and the management of the sector,32 which 
includes covering expenses of the CMAA in 2019 and 
providing funds to support planning and prioritisation, quality 
assurance/quality control (QA/QC), database management, 
Cambodia mine victim information service (CMVIS), and 
risk education activities.33 The cost of the database unit 
is, however, shared by NPA and UNDP.34 The Cambodian 
government also provides a 10% in-kind contribution to any 
new donor funding.35 From 2010 to 2018, the Cambodian 
government has reported contributing just under 30% of 
the total funding to the mine action sector (US$99.49 million 
of US$340.2 million).36 Cambodia funds mine and ERW 
clearance by CMAC and the National Centre for Peacekeeping 
Forces Management, Mines and Explosive Remnants 
of War Clearance (NPMEC) in support of infrastructure 
development.37 Indirectly, tax exemptions on mine action 
equipment have contributed to humanitarian demining.38 
Cambodia has reported that it will need an estimated $118.9 
million for CMR clearance in 2020–25.39
Cambodia is not yet a State Party to the CCM but made 
accession by 2020 a goal of the National Mine Action 
Strategy 2018–2025.40 In April 2019, the CMAA stated that 
the Cambodian government was ready to accede to the CCM, 
but “for security reasons” is not willing to do so until other 
countries in the region also accede.41
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The CMAA has developed a Gender Mainstreaming in Mine 
Action Plan (GMAP 2018–2022), an objective of the National 
Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, which consists of six goals. 
These include: 
 ■ Preparation of guidelines to aid gender mainstreaming 
across all mine action
 ■ Capacity building of relevant stakeholders to implement 
the GMAP 2018–2022
 ■ Female representation and participation in planning  
and prioritisation, risk education, and in mine action  
and advocacy at all levels.
The Three-Year Implementation Plan 2018–2020 sets out 
activities in support of these goals.42 NPA, as part of its 
capacity development, is supporting the CMAA with training 
on gender mainstreaming in mine action, on implementation 
of the GMAP 2018–22 and the development of associated 
guidelines, and on how to use gender- and age-disaggregated 
data in planning and prioritisation processes.43 Guidelines 
for gender mainstreaming in mine action were approved 
in December 2019. Trainings were provided to MAPU and 
quality management team (QMT) staff on the new guidelines, 
as well as on implementation of the GMAP 2018–22.44 Sex 
and age disaggregated data (SADD) has been integrated 
in all reporting forms, which can help inform planning, 
prioritisation, risk education, and advocacy.45 Furthermore, 
the GICHD conducted a gender and diversity baseline 
assessment of the CMAA in 2019 and has a joint action plan  
to support gender and diversity mainstreaming efforts for  
the remainder of the GMMAP strategy period.46
A CMAA Gender Mainstreaming Team (GMT) was established 
to coordinate with the TRG on Gender (TRGG), one of 
five TRGs ensuring coordination of the sector. The TRGG 
is composed of representatives from UNDP, Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs (MoWA), Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans 
and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSVY), MAPU, operators, and 
international and national organisations working in mine 
risk education (MRE) and victim assistance (VA).47 Of CMAA’s 
employees, 23% are female, but only 5% of managerial/
supervisory level positions are held by women. Overall in  
the mine action sector in Cambodia, 876 (25%) of the 3,446 
staff are female, an increase from the 15% of women staff  
in 2015.48
Survey and community liaison teams are said to be 
inclusive and mixed gender. Women are given access to job 
announcements and female candidates are given priority 
during the recruitment process. Women and children in 
affected communities are consulted during village meetings 
and community liaison activities, including regarding 
prioritisation. This commitment is reinforced by the demand 
for all reporting forms to have SADD and by the provision of 
training to MAPU and QMT staff.49 
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CMAC says it provides equal employment opportunities to 
both men and women. As at May 2020, women made up 12.5% 
of CMAC’s workforce. CMAC operates in accordance with 
Cambodian Labour Law and is actively recruiting women to 
reach 15% female employment. Women currently work across 
all levels of the organisation, including in managerial level/
supervisory positions. Two of the six directors were women.50 
During non-technical survey and pre-clearance impact 
assessments, MAG deploys mixed-gender community liaison 
teams to gather information on the suspected location of 
mines and the impact on the community. In its survey and 
clearance teams, 42% of staff are women as are 24% of their 
managerial level/supervisory positions.51 MAG planned 
to conduct a detailed gender analysis in 2020, at both the 
programming and organisational level, in order to promote 
meaningful gender equity and mainstreaming, and ensure an 
increased proportion of women in operational supervisory 
and management roles within the programme.52
NPA takes the needs of women and children in communities 
affected by CMR-contaminated areas, into account in the 
prioritisation, planning, and tasking of its survey and 
clearance activities. It is working towards achieving gender 
equality in Cambodia both in the composition of its survey and 
clearance teams and in the consultation of all groups affected 
by CMR contamination.53 Overall, 53% of NPA’s employees in 
Cambodia are women, including 60% of operational staff and 
65% of managerial level/supervisory positions.54
According to CMAA data, as at March 2019, NPMEC had a total 
of 294 employees (290 operational), all of whom were men.55
All international operators in Cambodia disaggregate 
relevant mine action data by gender and age.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The CMAA upgraded to the Information Management System 
for Mine Action New Generation (IMSMA NG) in 2014. As at 
June 2020, the CMAA was in the process of upgrading its 
information management system to IMSMA Core.56 As part 
of this process, a significant backlog of data was resolved 
in 2019/20, before migration of existing data to IMSMA Core 
could begin in earnest. International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS) minimum data requirements will be incorporated as 
Cambodia migrates to IMSMA Core.57 
The CMAA’s database unit (DBU) is responsible for collecting, 
storing, analysing and disseminating data in support of 
planning and prioritisation.58 Improvements to information 
management are ongoing in Cambodia,59 and include the 
development of tools to allow for mobile data collection in  
the field and which allow MAPU and QMTs to make online 
data entries and verify data submitted by operators.60
Strengthening the national information management 
system for mine action is an objective of the National 
Mine Action Strategy 2018–25.61 NPA has been conducting 
capacity development activities with the CMAA under 
a DFID consortium project.62 This included introduction 
of a web-based application for MAPUs to enable better 
prioritisation of the tasks for operators’ annual work-plans, 
which is expected to increase the effectiveness of mine 
clearance across the sector in Cambodia.63 It also included 
the development of an NMAS on information management. 
Regular TRG meetings are held with operators to share 
progress and challenges.64 As part of an information 
management capacity assessment of the CMAA’s DBU, 
operators (CMAC, HALO, and MAG) agreed that data  
collection forms are consistent.65
The CMAA shares all available data with operators on a 
monthly basis. In 2018, the DBU set up a virtual private 
network (VPN), which allows operators to send their 
daily data input directly into the DBU IMSMA database. 
The DBU controls the quality of all submitted reports and 
approves them via this online network.66 According to 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) operators, the CMAA 
has issued clear directives on the submission of data via  
VPN into the CMAA IMSMA system.67
CMAA have introduced a new reporting form following the 
endorsement of the national standard on CMRS in November 
2018.68 The new reporting form, the CMTS, in conjunction 
with the standard, should aid the improvement of both the 
effectiveness of the CMRS and the reporting of the survey 
results to the national database.69
Between August and December 2019, NPA/CMAC deployed 11 
BLS teams in the eastern provinces, creating a huge number 
of records. Due to lack of capacity, there had been a delay 
in entry of the BLS reports into the national database, but 
NPA confirmed in September 2020 that the backlog of 2019 
had been resolved and data entry of records for 2020 was 
ongoing.70
As mentioned previously, issues remain with the accuracy of 
historical information on CMR contamination data, collected 
under the BLS.71





Cambodia’s National Mine Action Strategy 2018−2025 was 
officially launched in May 2018 with eight goals for clearance 
of mines, CMR, and other ERW. It includes targets for tackling 
CMR contamination as the second of its eight goals. It called 
for “release of prioritised cluster munition-contaminated 
areas of 43.4km2 of total 130.2km2 by 2025” and specified two 
CMR-related objectives:72 
 ■ Plan and prioritise CMR-contaminated areas to be released 
 ■ Conduct survey and release confirmed areas of CMR 
contamination, develop national standards for survey 
and clearance, implement the CMRS methodology and 
increase survey and clearance capacity.
The accompanying Three-Year Implementation Plan 2018–20 
sets out the activities and indicators that will need to be 
completed in order to meet these goals and objectives. This 
includes the development of the planning and prioritisation 
guidelines on CMR which were finalised by the CMAA in 2018, 
although according to operators, they lack clarity and are not 
systematically applied.73
Since March 2018, the CMAA, NPA, and CMAC have been 
working together as part of a United States (US)-funded project 
to define and draft a comprehensive plan, that references the 
Cambodian National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, to make 
eight targeted provinces in eastern Cambodia free from the 
humanitarian impact of ERW, including CMR.74 The significant 
deployment of BLS teams in 2019 and early 2020 was expected 
to contribute to more accurate data on the scope of CMR 
contamination and to inform the third draft of the work plan.75 
The third work plan was elaborated in July 2020, with  
a long-term objective of reducing the effects of landmines,  
CMR, and other ERW to a level requiring a reactive response 
capacity only. Specific objectives include resolving data 
backlogs; completing the BLS in districts allocated by the 
CMAA to CMAC/NPA; capacity building of CMAC staff to conduct 
updated CMRS methodology and conduct CMRS in target 
provinces; and to release prioritised CMR-contaminated areas.76
The CMAA maintains the annual national clearance work 
plan made up of all the provincial clearance work plans. 
MAPUs are responsible for developing their own work plans 
in accordance with the planning and prioritisation guidelines. 
The PMACs approve the MAPU’s work plans, which are then 
endorsed by the CMAA. The MAPUs use the provincial work 
plan to monitor clearance performance and report progress 
to the PMAC and the CMAA.77 
The current planning and prioritisation practices in Cambodia 
follow a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. 
The top-down approach involves CMAA establishing a list 
of priority villages based on agreed criteria. The bottom-up 
approach involves MAPUs coordinating at the provincial level 
to develop a clearance list, again, using agreed criteria.78 
However, the prioritisation process for the selection of CMR 
tasks is not as well established as the prioritisation process 
for mined areas, largely due to the absence of comprehensive, 
verifiable CMR data. Task prioritisation begins with the 
MAPU as part of the annual work plan development process. 
Although the exact prioritisation criteria are not as well defined 
for CMR clearance as they are for landmine clearance, the 
process typically works as follows: consultation with village 
leaders > commune workshop > SHA reconnaissance > SHA 
prioritisation > district workshop > provincial workshop 
> work plan finalisation.79 The end use for most clearance 
tasks is agriculture and often the land is already being 
cultivated regardless of CMR contamination. This makes 
it difficult to produce clear prioritisation criteria, so the 
survey and the clearance plan is based on village-by-village, 
commune-by-commune, and district-by-district approaches.80
According to NGO operators, survey and clearance task 
dossiers are issued in a timely and effective manner.81
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Mine action is conducted according to Cambodian Mine Action 
Standards (CMAS), which are broadly consistent with IMAS 
and enable evidence-based land release efforts and do not 
impede any activities.82 
The CMAA approved the CMRS methodology in principle in 
2017 and signed a national mine action standard for CMRS 
(CMAS-16) in November 2018, which is being implemented 
by operators.83 CMAS-16 is based on the experience of other 
programmes implementing the CMRS method across the 
region. Implementation of CMAS-16 began in January 2019 
and is ongoing. 
The CMAA has agreed that operators can apply 
evidence-based technical survey to SHA polygons generated 
through the BLS, which are often inflated, in order to reduce 
the area and ensure a more efficient use of resources.84 
Previously, operators were expected to fully clear the 
entire BLS polygon regardless of whether technical survey 
had defined a much smaller CHA within the original SHA. 
The CMRS methodologies were to be further discussed 
during a US-funded regional CMRS workshop in August 
2019.85 The CMAA said that while no changes were made 
to CMRS methodology in 2019, it will consider reviewing 
methodology.86 It is expected that further modifications to 
standards and methodology relating to CMR will be discussed 
through the CMR-specific TRG on survey and clearance.87
In 2019–21, the CMAA, with support from NPA with DFID 
funding and in consultation with other mine clearance 
operators, is in the process of developing new standards.88 
New standards on animal detection, mechanical demining, 
information management, and the environment were 
elaborated in 2019,89 although final copies of all standards 
had not yet been shared with operators as at April 2020.90 
National standards on explosive ordnance risk education 
(EORE), accreditation of demining organisations and 
licensing of operations and on the monitoring of demining 
organisations were still in progress as at June 2020,91 as  
well as planned review of the BLS and land release chapters 
in 2021–22.92
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National standards are reflected in operators’ standing operating procedures (SOPs).93 Updates to the SOPs are conducted 
as and when required, such as when a need is identified through the CMAA-led TRG which has been the case for standards 
relating to landmines and is expected to be the case also for those relating to CMR. Reviews are conducted in consultation  
with all operators, and against IMAS and best practice.94 A comprehensive review of CMAS in 2020 was mooted; this was  
also referenced in the National Strategy.95
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
CMR clearance in 2019 was undertaken by national operators, CMAC and Cambodian Self-help Demining (CSHD), and 
international operators MAG and NPA (see Table 2). 










CMAC 12 100 4 dogs (10 
handlers)
1
CSHD 1 15 0 0
MAG 5 47 0 0 Excludes one team leader, one deputy 
team leader, and one medic per team, plus 
operational supervisory/ managerial staff. 
Excludes MAG’s roving EOD capacity.
NPA 2 5 4 0 Two manual teams of five staff, with two 
explosive detection dogs (EDDs) in each team.
Totals 20 167 8 dogs 1
With regard to survey capacity, CMAC had 11 non-technical 
survey teams, totalling 44 survey personnel and four 
technical survey teams totalling 16 personnel;97 MAG had two 
non-technical survey teams, totalling four survey personnel 
and one technical survey team, of ten survey personnel;98 and 
NPA had one non-technical survey team, with four survey 
personnel and two technical survey teams, totalling eight 
survey personnel.99 
NPA and CMAC have an ongoing CMR survey and clearance 
partnership project in eastern Cambodia targeting the seven 
provinces in the east of the country (Kampong Cham, Tbong 
Khmun, Pre Veng, Svay Rieng, Kratie, Stung Treng and 
Modulkiri) which are believed to account for most of the CMR 
contamination. Under this project CMAC Demining Unit 5 (DU5) 
teams conduct CMRS and clearance while NPA is providing 
mentoring and monitoring of all aspects of the project. In 
addition, CMAC conducts EOD with one team based in Takeo 
province (mainly working around Takeo and Kandal provinces 
around Phnom Penh, but sometimes further afield). CMAC’s 
DU5 (191 CMAC staff) has been fully supported by NPA since 
2014 with funding from the United States.100 The objectives  
of the project were to resolve the CMAC data backlog, 
complete baseline survey in the remaining districts allocated 
to NPA/CMAC, develop the capacity of CMAC staff to conduct 
CMRS in the targeted provinces, and to release prioritised  
CMR contaminated areas in the targeted provinces.101
In 2018, with regard to both mine and ERW survey capacity, 
CMAC deployed 25 non-technical survey personnel 
across five teams, but there had been no plans to deploy 
non-technical survey teams in 2019. CMAC also deployed 
a total of 202 technical survey personnel across 30 teams 
of between five and seven staff each. In 2019, the number 
of technical survey personnel was due to increase to 231 
across 37 teams.102 CMAC also employs explosive detection 
dogs as the primary clearance tool for CMR-contaminated 
areas while machines provide support for field preparation 
and brush-cutting. In 2019, a pilot was planned for dogs to 
also conduct CMRS,103 but no data were made available on 
whether CMAC conducted the pilot. Data on CMAC’s capacity 
in 2019 was not provided upon request. 
As well as having its main operational base in the west of the 
country focused on minefield survey and clearance, MAG also 
has an operations base in Ratanakiri province concentrating 
on CMR survey and clearance. MAG uses the data from EOD 
tasks to plot initial CHAs using its Evidence Point Polygon 
(EPP) mapping approach pioneered in the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic.104 MAG also continues to trial advanced 
detection systems for CMR survey and clearance, provided by 
the US Humanitarian Demining Research and Development 
programme, and uses drones to conduct non-technical 
survey, task planning, and post-impact monitoring.105
NPA conducted a successful trial of explosive detection dogs 
(EDDs) for technical survey in 2018, and did not deploy EDDs 
for technical survey of CMR in 2019.106 NPA deploys drones for 
aerial mapping of both technical survey and BAC tasks. Drones 
are also used during EOD tasks and for quality assurance. 
NPA has also been conducting field tests of all-terrain vehicles 
(ATVs) and have found them particularly useful in transporting 
personnel and EDDs in hard to reach areas.107




LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Based on data provided by the CMAA, in 2019, clearance operators in Cambodia cleared a total of over 25.2km2 of 
CMR-contaminated area, destroying 5,749 submunitions in the process. A further 2,718 submunitions were destroyed during 
EOD spot tasks.
A total of more than 33.3km2 was confirmed by operators through technical survey in 2019, while nearly 4.5km2 was reduced 
from the baseline survey through technical survey.
SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, CMAC, MAG, and NPA confirmed nearly 33.32km2 as 
containing CMR (see Table 4), an increase on the 26.5km2 of 
CMR-contamination confirmed through technical survey in 
2018. In addition, almost 4.48km2 of CMR-contaminated area 
was reduced through technical survey, primarily by CMAC 
(see Table 3). This represents a decrease compared to 2018, 
when and 8.2km2 was reduced.
MAG surveyed significantly more CMR-suspected area in 
2019, compared to 2018, due to a dedicated CMRS team 
established in October 2018.108
CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, more than 25.23km2 of CMR-contaminated area was 
cleared by CMAC, CSHD, MAG, and NPA (see Table 5). This is a 
marked reduction on the equivalent 39.6km2 cleared in 2018. 
According to the CMAA, several reasons help to explain for the 
decrease in the amount of land released in 2019 compared to 
the previous year. These include the lack of area meeting the 
criteria for priority clearance; high mineral content, as well 
as high degrees of clutter and complexity in clearance tasks; 
training to enhance staff capacity; and considerable movement 
between task sites.109 These raise considerable concern about 
priority setting and tasking in Cambodia.
Table 3: CMAA data on area of CMR-contaminated area 
reduced through technical survey in 2019110*





* Submunitions destroyed during technical survey are included in the  
clearance table.
Table 4: CMR-contaminated area surveyed and confirmed 
through technical survey in 2019111*





* Submunitions destroyed during technical survey are included in the  
clearance table.
Table 5: CMR clearance in 2019112
Operator Province Area cleared (m²) Submunitions destroyed* Other UXO destroyed
CMAC Kampong Cham 4,065,186 1,197 131
CMAC Kampong Thom 529,114 135 19
CMAC Kratié 2,547,552 490 59
CMAC Mondulkiri 1,183,111 280 16
CMAC Prey Veng 2,922,381 425 230
CMAC Stung Treng 2,100,097 461 2,565
CMAC Svay Rieng 3,879,872 756 2,613
CMAC Tboung Khmum 3,732,056 983 173
CSHD Kampong Thom 576,778 90 56
MAG Ratanakiri 2,655,961 551 10
NPA Ratanakiri 1,039,494 381 1
Totals 25,231,602 5,749 5,873
* Includes submunitions destroyed during technical survey.
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According to CMAA, during EOD spot tasks in 2019, a further 2,718 submunitions were destroyed: 261 by CMAC; 3 by CSHD; 
2,147 by MAG; 252 by NPA; and 55 by the HALO Trust.113 
MAG’s clearance output increased in 2019, compared to the previous year, due to one additional clearance team deployed from 
late 2018.114 CMR were found in all MAG’s clearance tasks completed through standard tasking processes. MAG also cleared 
five emergency tasks at the request of the government (4 x health centres, 1 x cemetery) where no items were found, with a 
total area of 59,794m2.115
PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
Cambodia has committed to address 80% of the total known CMR contamination by 2025: 499km2 of an estimated total 
of 645km2 in the National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025. The remaining 20% of CMR will be categorised as “residual” 
contamination and dealt with accordingly. To reach the clearance goal, Cambodia planned to release 62km2 every year from 
2018 to 2025, of which 30% would be through land reclamation/cancellation and the remaining 70% through land release 
methodology. Based on this analysis, Cambodia calculated that approximately 44km2 will need to be released annually 
through technical survey and full clearance. From 2014 to 2016, Cambodia released an average of 11km2 per year through 
technical survey and clearance, but it expected to achieve vastly increased clearance output through improved land release 
methodology, innovative technology, and animal detection systems.116 
The implementation of CMRS should mean that operators are more effective in their approach and focus clearance on CHAs 
while reducing SHAs through technical survey. However, the CMAA will need to ensure that the standard is being applied 
consistently by all operators and in the most efficient and effective way possible. 
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Goal seven of Cambodia’s National Mine Action Strategy 2018−2025 is to establish a sustainable national capacity to address 
residual threats after 2025. Reference to the issue is also included in the foreword signed by the Cambodian Prime Minister 
and noted throughout the document. Objectives include reviewing by 2020 the legal, institutional, and operational framework, 
strategy, and capacity needed to address the residual threats.117 
In Phase I (2018−22) of the national strategy Cambodia planned to “develop a comprehensive residual threats strategy; establish a 
residual threat legal and institutional framework; and establish residual threats regulatory and operational frameworks including 
coordination, planning, and prioritisation, and sustained information management system”. In Phase II (2023−25), Cambodia 
plans to “develop residual threat capacity in preparation to transition from the traditional mine action program; determine 
resource mobilisation schemes to support the development of residual threat capacity and its future activities; and to conduct 
post-programme evaluation of achievements and outcomes after the conclusion of the strategy in 2025 to evaluate performance, 
lessons learned, recommendations for efficiencies and improvements in any remaining mine action”.118
In 2018, the GICHD presented a case study on the Management of Residual ERW in Cambodia, and hosted a Long-Term Risk 
Management workshop and an exchange visit between the CMAA and the national mine action centre in Sri Lanka.119
The CMAA has said it is likely that the Royal Cambodian Army will be tasked with addressing explosive threats after 2025.120
Operators believe that the establishment of a residual-risk-management framework will be essential to define and manage  
the long-term risk posed by CMR.121
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Georgia should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority. 
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Georgia is believed to be free of cluster munition remnants (CMR), with the possible exception of South Ossetia, which is 
occupied by Russia and inaccessible to both the Georgian authorities and international non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
demining operators.1 
CMR contamination in Georgia resulted from the conflict over South Ossetia in August 2008, in which both Georgian and 
Russian forces used cluster munitions. After the end of the conflict and through to December 2009, The HALO Trust cleared 
some 37km2 of submunitions and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Georgian-controlled territory.2 In May 2010, 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) completed clearance of its tasked areas.3 In 2016, two submunitions were reported in the Shida 
Kartli region and then destroyed by the State Security Agency, as part of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs. 4 In 
2017, The HALO Trust conducted survey in the Shida Kartli region to investigate each of the call-outs.5 During survey, a three 
submunitions were found, which were identified as residual contamination and destroyed.6 One submunition was destroyed in 
2019 (see Land Release Output section below).
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Georgia remains contaminated by other unexploded ordnance (UXO), likely in South Ossetia and also within Georgia in former 
firing ranges, and by anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on 
Georgia for further information). 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Humanitarian Demining Control Division (HDCD), renamed after a reorganisation in January 2019, sits under the State 
Military Scientific Technical Centre, known as DELTA, within the Ministry of Defence (MoD).7 The primary task of the HDCD is to 
coordinate mine action in Georgia. The Georgian government funds the running costs of the HDCD as well as the Engineering 
Brigade, which carries out some survey and battle area clearance (BAC).8 The HALO Trust is funded by international donors.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
DELTA and The HALO Trust each have gender and diversity policies in place. HALO Trust supports use of mixed-gender teams 
to conduct survey, which allows for greater engagement with women and children.9 HALO Trust’s EOD teams in Abkhazia are 
mixed ethnic Georgian and ethnic Abkhaz and comprise both men and women.10
There is equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams in Georgia, including for 
managerial level/supervisory positions although proportionately the number of women remains low. In Abkhazia, The HALO 
Trust works with local women’s organisations to increase the visibility of its work to a female audience. As at May 2020, 30%  
of its operational and management staff were female and at the end of 2019 the HALO Trust employed its first female BAC  
team leader.11 
GEORGIA
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The HDCD uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and, according to The HALO Trust,  
the data is accurate. Data archives go back to 2009 and are regularly updated, based on HALO Trust’s operations reports and 
on work by the Engineering Brigade.12 The data in the national information management system is accessible to the HALO 
Trust.13 HALO Trust uses its own IMSMA-compatible data collection forms that DELTA has approved while the HDCD quality 
assurance/quality control (QA/QC) team also have its own forms.14
PLANNING AND TASKING
Georgia has a national mine action strategy. Its main aims and targets are focused on clearing the remaining mined areas 
and other areas contaminated with ERW.15 The annual work plans for 2019 centred on BAC within the The Tbilisi Administered 
Territory (TAT) does not include the autonomous republics of Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, which are outside of Georgia’s 
effective control.16
In 2019, due to access not being granted to the remaining minefields, The HALO Trust had suspended all operations in 
Tbilisi Administered Territory, apart from one two-month task clearing abandoned explosive ordnance at Chonto, near the 
Administrative Boundary Line with South Ossetia, which it completed in July. The Abkhazia programme continued operations 
at Primorsky and HALO also responded to EOD call-outs.17
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
As at May 2020, Georgian National Mine Action Standards and National Technical Standards and Guidelines were still under 
development. The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and International Ammunition Technical Guidelines are being 
translated into Georgian.18
The HALO Trust has standing operating procedures (SOPs) in place for all its activities, including survey, mine clearance, and 
EOD. No modifications or enhancements were made to these SOPs in 2019.19
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The HALO Trust, which is the only international operator working in the country, conducts survey and both BAC and mine 
clearance.20 In 2019, the HALO Trust deployed 33 personnel to conduct BAC at Primorsky.21 DELTA retains a small demining  
and EOD capacity in Tbilisi Administered Territory. 
In Tbilisi Administered Territory, quality management (QM) is conducted by DELTA. In Abkhazia, The HALO Trust is responsible 
for its own QM.22
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
No CMR survey or clearance took place in 2019. One submunition was destroyed during an EOD spot task but this was found to 
be residual contamination not evidence of a broader problem.23
It is believed that, with the possible exception of South Ossetia, Georgia is now free from CMR. Georgia has reported that, in the 
areas cleared by The HALO Trust in Abkhazia which are currently outside its control, external QA/QC could not be completed. 
Georgia, therefore, cannot confirm whether this land is free of contamination.24
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Georgia is said to have a residual risk capacity for CMR with plans in place for dealing with residual risk and liability.25
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IRAN
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Iran should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Iran should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants 
(CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
 ■ Iran should report publicly on the extent and location of CMR and prepare a plan for their clearance and 
destruction. 
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent of CMR contamination in Iran is not known. Some contamination is believed to remain from the Iran-Iraq war in 
1980–88,1 when cluster munitions were widely used in Khuzestan and to a lesser extent in Kermanshah. Iraqi forces used 
mostly French- and Russian-made cluster munitions in attacks on oil facilities at Abadan and Mah-Shahr, and Spanish-made 
cluster munitions in attacks on troop positions at Dasht-e-Azadegan. Air Force explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams 
cleared many unexploded submunitions after attacks but contamination remains around Mah-Shahr and the port of Bandar 
Imam Khomeini, according to a retired Iranian Air Force colonel.2
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Iran also has areas containing anti-personnel mines (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Iran for 
further information).
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
The Iran Mine Action Centre (IRMAC) was established as the national mine action centre in 2005, taking the place of a mine 
action committee within the Ministry of Defence. IRMAC is responsible for planning, data, managing survey, procurement, and 
the accreditation of demining operators. It also sets standards, provides training for clearance operators, concludes contracts 
with demining operators, and ensures quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) of their operations. It coordinates mine 
action with the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Interior, the Management and Planning Organisation of Iran, 
and other relevant ministries and organisations, and handles international relations.3 Several IRMAC staff are believed to be 
serving or former military personnel, including its Director, while others are civilians employed by the Ministry of Defence.
IRMAC is said to have a branch in every affected province. Available demining assets, such as mechanical assets, vary from 
province to province.
In March 2019, Iran hosted a three-day international roundtable on “humanitarian mine action: challenges and best practices”, 
attended by representatives from other states, national and international demining organisations, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). The aim of the roundtable was to share 
knowledge and experience on mine action, challenges, and best practices.4 
In November 2019, Iran opened its first international humanitarian demining training centre in Tehran.5
Iran is believed to have dedicated significant resources and effort to clearing areas on its territory contaminated by  
mines, CMR and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), but the results of survey and clearance have not been made  
publicly available.
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
IRMAC actively maintains a national mine action database but it is not known to what extent it is comprehensive, up-to-date, 
and able to disaggregate CMR contamination and clearance output from that of other explosive ordnance.
IRMAC reported that it has a geographic information system (GIS), web-based, integrated information management system, 
which integrates information on quality, safety, and the environment.6
LAND RELEASE 
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
IRMAC combines the roles of regulator and operator, 
with demining teams and support staff deployed in the 
five affected provinces. In Kurdistan province, IRMAC is 
conducting verification, mainly through mechanical clearance. 
IRMAC also responds to calls from the local community 
reporting items of explosive ordnance. Demining capacity 
in Kurdistan province is believed to stand at around 12 
personnel, a reduction on earlier capacity.7
Commercial operators include AOM, Immen Sazan Omran 
Pars International, Immen Zamin Espadana, and Solh 
Afarinan-e Bedoun-e Marz (SABM). Three other companies, 
Imen Gostaran Mohit (IGM), Moshaver Omran Iran, and ZPP 
International, undertake QA/QC.8 
Petroleum Engineering and Development Company (PEDEC), 
the development arm of the National Iranian Oil Company 
(NIOC), contracts and monitors commercial operators 
conducting clearance of Iran’s oil and gas producing areas 
which are concentrated in mine-affected areas of western 
and south western Iran bordering Iraq.9 
Commercial mine and ERW clearance in Iran is conducted 
to ensure that land is free from explosive ordnance before it 
is used for economic purposes or developed. It is separate 
to humanitarian demining of areas known or suspected to 
contain explosive ordnance in order to make the land safe 
for civilian use, which comes under the remit of IRMAC. In 
a number of countries, commercial demining is applied to 
areas whether or not there is firm evidence of a threat from 
explosive ordnance. 
The Iranian Army and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
assisted demining efforts to support the response to the  
flash flooding which affected Iran in March and April 2019.10
International operators are not believed to have been active 
in Iran since 2008.
There is no available information on quality management 
procedures. In the past, very high levels of casualties were 
recorded during demining in Iran. IRMAC reported that since 
its establishment, in 2005, 200 deminers have been killed or 
injured during clearance of mines and ERW, which equates  
to one accident for every 15,000 mines or ERW detected.11
According to IRMAC, more than 2 million mines and over  
1 million items of ERW have been destroyed since the start  
of its programme.12
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS 
No data was available on CMR survey or clearance in 2019, as was the case in the previous year. 
As at August 2020, 18 submunitions had been discovered in the first seven months of the year, during ERW clearance of 
some 7km2 in a commercial clearance project in Khuzestan province in the south-west of Iran.13 As part of the project, which 
is almost completed, the Pasargad Energy Development Company (PEDC) has a demining department and subcontracts a 
demining contractor and QA/QC.14
CLEARING CLUSTER  
MUNITION REMNANTS 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Libya should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Libya should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants 
(CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
 ■ All parties to the conflict in Libya should ensure that forces loyal to them do not use cluster munitions.
 ■ As soon as political conditions permit, Libya should enact mine action legislation, establish an interministerial 
national mine action authority, and adopt a national mine action strategy.
 ■ Libya should, at the earliest opportunity possible and as soon the security situation permits, conduct a baseline 
survey to identify the extent of contamination from CMR and begin systematic clearance. 
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
CMR contamination in Libya is largely the consequence of 
armed conflict in 2011 and renewed conflict since 2014, but 
the extent of contamination is unknown. In 2011, armed 
forces used at least three types of cluster munition, including 
MAT-120 mortar projectiles, RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M cluster 
bombs, and DPICM-like submunitions delivered by 122mm 
cargo rockets.1 Additional contamination by CMR occurred as 
a result of kick-outs from ammunition storage areas bombed 
by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in 2011.2
Since the overthrow of Qaddafi in 2011, Libya has remained 
mired in conflict as tribal and armed groups struggle to take 
over power. In early 2015, fighting between Libya’s rival armed 
groups saw reported use of cluster munitions, including 
RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M bombs, in attacks on Bin Jawad near 
the port of Es-Sidr in February, and in the vicinity of Sirte in 
March. The Libyan Air Force, controlled by the internationally 
recognised government of the time, had bombed both 
locations, though it denied using cluster bombs.3 According to 
Cluster Munition Monitor, there are indications that additional 
attacks may have occurred since that time, including in 2016, 
2017, and 2018.4 According to the Monitor, further evidence of 
cluster munition use may have gone unrecorded due to a lack 
of media and independent reporting from the ground, and the 
Monitor was unable to independently verify and confirm this 
evidence of possible use.5
Since April 2019, Libya’s governance has been divided 
between the two entities engaged in an armed conflict,  
the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (or GNA) 
and the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), led by 
commander Khalifa Haftar, who laid siege to Tripoli  
beginning in April 2019.6
In May 2019, LNA forces loyal to General Haftar were accused 
of using cluster bombs in attacks in and around Tripoli.7 On  
15 and 16 August 2019, aircraft of forces affiliated with the  
LNA/aligned to Khalifa Haftar used cluster munitions in an 
attack on Zuwarah International Airport, according to the UN 
Panel of Experts report from December 2019.8 According to 
reports by Human Rights Watch, forces aligned to Khalifa 
Haftar also used cluster munitions in an airstrike in a 
residential area in Tripoli on or around 2 December 2019. 
Human Rights Watch visited the site on 17 December 2019 
and found remnants of two RBK-250 PTAB 2.5M cluster 
bombs, as well as evidence that high-explosive air-dropped 
bombs were also used in the attack. The area was not known 
to be contaminated by cluster munitions before the attack.9
As at March 2019, Humanity and Inclusion (HI) reported being 
aware of three areas of CMR contamination through its own 
operations. One cluster munition-contaminated area was 
confirmed in 2017, through non-technical survey in the Nafusa 
mountains region, near the town of Kikla, in north-west Libya. 
Then, in 2018–19, further cluster munition strikes were also 
discovered by HI in Tawargha and Al Karareem.10 
According to the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC), cluster 
munition contamination in Libya has been largely removed 
and remaining contamination is limited to a small number of 
areas.11 Most recently, LibMAC confirmed it had evidence of 
RBK-250-275 cluster bomb use in three areas: Al-Hira Bridge 
(Al-Sawani); the Bir al-Ghanam area south-west of Tripoli 
(Nafusa Mountains); and Aziziya (south of Tripoli).12
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Libya is also contaminated by other unexploded ordnance (UXO), anti-personnel mines including those of an improvised nature 
(see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Libya for further information), and by other improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs).13 According to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), ongoing conflict has resulted in significant 
explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in cities across Libya.14
LIBYA
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Mine action exists in a fragmented and violent political 
context. Following years of armed conflict, a new UN-backed 
“unity” government, the GNA, was formally installed in a 
naval base in Tripoli in early 2016. It has subsequently faced 
opposition from two rival governments and a host of militia 
forces. In April 2019, Khalifa Haftar, a military commander 
based in the west of the country, launched an offensive 
to take control of Tripoli and topple the GNA, and fighting 
continued into the first half of 2020.
LibMAC was mandated by the Minister of Defense to 
coordinate mine action in December 2011.15 Operating under 
the UN-backed Government of National Accord, LibMAC’s 
headquarters are in Tripoli, in the west of the country, 
and it also has offices in Benghazi16 and Misrata.17 The 
operating costs and salaries for LibMAC are funded by the 
United States Department of State and administered by ITF 
Enhancing Human Security (ITF).18 
ITF also provides capacity building support to LibMAC. 
In order to further increase LibMAC capacity, a new ITF 
operations technical advisor was deployed on 1 February 
2019, primarily to advise LibMAC’s Chief of Operations 
and provide advice on improvement of internal LibMAC 
procedures. In early April 2019, however, ITF was forced to 
evacuate its technical advisor due to the lack of security.19
UNMAS has largely been operating from Tunis since 
November 2014, from where it provides institutional and 
operational capacity-building, training, including in explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD), and coordinates with national 
authorities and implementing partners to carry out mine 
action activities to mitigate the threat posed by ERW and 
provide technical advice and advisory support on arms and 
ammunition management. The UNMAS Libya Programme  
is an integral part of the United Nations Support Mission  
in Libya (UNSMIL).20 
In January 2019, most UN staff returned to Tripoli, but due 
to the hostilities that commenced in April 2019 and the 
deterioration of security, most subsequently returned to 
Tunis to operate remotely again. In 2019–20, UNMAS was 
providing non-technical survey, risk education, and EOD 
response in various locations across Libya, including in 
Tawargha, Tripoli and Benghazi, to facilitate humanitarian 
activities, early recovery, and to prepare for the safe return 
of displaced people.21
UNMAS prioritises capacity enhancement of Libyan mine 
action actors and supports LibMAC in coordination with 
Implementing Partners. Since 2015, UNMAS has trained 
more than 70 National Safety Authority (NSA) operators 
and Military Engineers in advanced EOD; 30 officers from 
eastern Libya in non-technical survey; provided advanced 
medical first responder training to 72 EOD operators from 
Benghazi; and trained several operators to address the 
threat from explosive hazards in Sirte. UNMAS also provided 
EOD equipment to national actors and assisted LibMAC in 
developing the Libyan Mine Action Standards which are now 
being implemented.22 In 2017/18, the United States Office of 
Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA) and the United 
Kingdom financed training of 70 IED operators in Sirte, 
conducted by JANUS, and with participants from the NSA  
and Military Engineers).23
In 2019, The HALO Trust worked closely with LibMAC to build 
their capacity to quality assure and accredit mechanical 
clearance. HALO Trust ran a workshop in the LibMAC Tripoli 
office, covering all aspects of mechanical clearance. In 
addition, HALO provided translated quality assurance  
forms for quality assuring task sites and for accrediting  
the armouring of mechanical assets; and also conducted 
armour testing of different materials to provide a baseline  
of information for LibMAC.24
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
LibMAC is not thought to have a gender and diversity policy 
for mine action in place. Of the twenty employees at LibMAC, 
three are women, including one in the Risk Education (RE) 
department (whose responsibilities include providing RE 
to women and children), one in logistics, and one in an 
administrative role.25
The HALO Trust reported that its Libya programme seeks 
to comply with HALO’s general gender and diversity 
policy. However, due to rigid gender norms that largely 
impede women’s free movement and ability to work in a 
mixed-gender office setting, particularly reinforced in  
areas with strong Islamist influence such as Sirte, HALO  
has reported that the recruitment of women, including  
for non-operational roles, has proved difficult. In 2019,  
four of HALO’s thirty employees in Libya were women  
(one international staff and three national staff), including  
one female community liaison officer in Sirte.26 
HALO’s approach to community liaison, including 
door-to-door risk education prior to clearance, targeted 
risk education task sites, and specific events to reach out 
to women in particular, is designed to reach out to women 
and men equally. This is especially important, given that 
women are largely absent from public life. In particular, 
the introduction of pre-clearance focus group discussions 
with women and men separately helps to ensure that 
subsequent community liaison/risk education activities are 
targeted to the needs of all beneficiaries.27 With regards to 
diversity, in Sirte, HALO Trust recruits equally among the 
tribes and seeks to consult all ethnic groups during survey 
and clearance processes. HALO makes task prioritisation 
recommendations based on humanitarian need, although 
all task orders are issued under the authority of LibMAC.28 
The HALO Trust disaggregates relevant mine action data by 
gender and age.29
HI reported in 2019 that it had a gender policy in place and 
disaggregates data by sex and age.30 HI’s risk education 
team, which also conducted community liaison, was gender 
balanced. Two of HI’s project managers and two project 
officers were female, but women were not employed in 
survey and clearance, as this was deemed culturally 
unacceptable for now.31 HI stopped mine action operations  
in Libya in April 2019.32
148   Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2020
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
LibMAC receives technical support for IMSMA from the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and UNMAS. In 
March 2019, HI reported that LibMAC had recently announced details of a new effort to bring the IMSMA database up to date 
and ensure the data are reliable.33 With support from the GICHD, LibMAC planned to transition from IMSMA to IMSMA Core  
in mid 2020.34
IMSMA is accessible to clearance organisations and data collection forms are reported to be consistent and enable collection  
of necessary data.35 
Since early 2019, The HALO Trust has been working closely with LibMAC to cover mechanical clearance in the Libyan IMSMA 
database. The planned transition to IMSMA Core will allow data entry for mechanical clearance.36 
PLANNING AND TASKING
No national mine action strategy is currently known to exist for Libya.
LibMAC does, however, prioritise survey and clearance operations and is responsible for issuing task orders. Prioritisation 
is, in part, informed by data collected and reported to LibMAC by operators such as the Danish Demining Group (DDG), during 
non-technical survey or EOD, and by reports from the local community.37 According to HI, LibMAC generally tasks according  
to geographic area and the nearest available assets.38
HALO Trust reported that prioritisation is based on humanitarian need with residential areas, community infrastructure, and 
key access points taking precedence. In Sirte, this means the two neighbourhoods where fighting was heaviest in 2016. In 
preparation for future clearance along the Tripoli frontlines, areas with significant verified evidence of fighting (as determined 
by HALO Trust’s Tripoli ERW Hazard Mapping and Information Management (IM) project) will be prioritised for survey.39
The Tripoli ERW Hazard Mapping and IM Project uses open-source data collation and geolocation techniques to map potential 
ERW contamination along the Tripoli frontlines by collecting information on active fighting incidents, weapons systems, and 
ammunition used, and ERW-related accidents and displacement. The online data collection portal, linking to a live database 
that is shared with LibMAC and other stakeholders, is used to track historical data starting from 4 April 2019 up to recent 
events. Mapping ERW contamination along the frontlines enables LibMAC to coordinate and direct specialist clearance  
capacity as well as risk education teams to the most highly contaminated areas.40
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no national mine action legislation in Libya, but National Mine Action Standards (LibMAS), in Arabic and English,  
have been elaborated with the support of the GICHD and UNMAS, and were approved by the GNA in August 2017. The LibMAS 
are available on the LibMAC website.41 According to international clearance operators, the national mine action standards  
are aligned to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), reproducing it word-for-word in many parts.42 
While the LibMAS are broad and not overly restrictive, they may, however, be open to different interpretation by various 
stakeholders and do not necessarily reflect local circumstances and conditions, including the specific context of clearance  
in urban areas. An example of this is the lack of urban specific characteristics of direct versus indirect evidence, which may 
lead to more general consideration of evidence and result in less accurate task boundaries.43 
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS 
Mine action operations have been conducted by the army engineers, a police unit, and the Ministry of Interior’s NSA, also 
known as Civil Defence.44 Military engineers reportedly lack mine detectors and are working with basic tools.45 The NSA is 
mandated to conduct EOD in civilian areas.46 These institutions liaise with LibMAC but are not tasked or accredited by them,  
nor do they provide clearance reports to the Centre. 
The deteriorating security situation resulted in the withdrawal of UNMAS and international mine action operators from 
Libya in mid 2014. International clearance operators active in Libya include DanChurchAid (DCA), DDG, and HALO Trust.47 
HI’s survey and clearance operations stopped in April 2019 and the project formally ended in June of that year.48 National 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) operator, Free Fields Foundation (3F), was also operational and another national 
operator, the Libyan Demining Group (LDG), was in the process of becoming established as at February 2019.49 LDG is believed 
to have been accredited by LibMAC, but was not currently operational as at the time of writing. Local organisations Peace 
Organization from Zintan and World Without War (3W), from Misrata, which had been trained by HI in 2016 and received 
accreditation for non-technical survey,50 subsequently had their operations suspended for not fully following standards and  
in addition, neither organisation had secured funding.51
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DCA is operational in Libya clearing residential, commercial, 
education, medical, and agricultural sites of mines and ERW, 
and providing training in clearance, search, and EOD, to help 
strengthen the capacity of national authorities. DCA also 
conducts risk education. Now in its ninth year of working in 
Libya, DCA has offices in Al-Bayda, Benghazi, Misrata, Sirte, 
and Tripoli.52 
DDG set up in Benghazi in December 2017. It had hoped 
to expand non-technical survey and EOD capacity in 
Benghazi from the late summer of 2018. In Sabha, DDG had 
one non-technical survey team and one EOD team, which 
it was managing remotely. Security issues in the south 
continue to disrupt mine action operations and prevent 
continuous operations. In Tripoli, DDG works through its 
national implementing partner, 3F. 3F operates under DDG’s 
accreditation and standing operating procedures (SOPs),  
and has an operational contingent of 37, composed in three 
EOD teams and one non-technical survey team.53
GCS, which finished its operations in 2019, was working 
in partnership with Libyan NGO 3F to clear ERW from an 
ammunition storage area on a military airbase in Misrata. 
The area comprised 37 bunkers destroyed by NATO airstrikes 
in 2011.54 As of March 2019, GCS and 3F had collected a 
cumulative total of more than 200 tons of ERW and scrap 
metal of which 40 tons were successfully destroyed through 
bulk demolitions and burning. An estimated 12,500m2 of 
battle area clearance (BAC) was also conducted around the 
ammunition storage area.55
The HALO Trust has been present in Libya since November 
2018, and has offices in Misrata, Sirte, and Tripoli. HALO 
deployed one four-strong survey/community liaison team in 
2019, in partnership with DCA. In September 2019, LibMAC 
accredited the first mechanical clearance teams in Libya, with 
clearance at HALO’s first task site beginning in October. HALO 
deployed two mechanical clearance teams, each consisting of 
one team leader, one operator, and two deminers. The teams 
shared a single mechanical asset in 2019, while awaiting 
physical delivery of additional assets. As at July 2020, HALO 
Trust was training non-technical survey teams in Tripoli and 
aimed to introduce mechanical clearance in 2020 in response 
to newly suspected mined areas in southern Tripoli.56 
The HALO Trust and DCA are currently working in partnership 
in Sirte under a joint three-year European Union (EU) 
Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (ICSP) 
contract, which started in February 2019. Under this contract, 
HALO provides three mechanical clearance assets and two 
mechanical clearance teams (MCTs). In January 2020, the 
first EU-funded MCT was deployed in Sirte. The first of three 
mechanical clearance assets, a medium-range front-loader, 
was procured and upgraded locally in Libya in January 2020.57
A separate 18-month UK Conflict, Stability and Security Fund 
(CSSF) contract in which HALO Trust had also partnered 
with DCA in Sirte ended on 31 March 2020. During this 
project HALO had led on mechanical clearance and DCA had 
provided the supporting EOD capacity, along with a joint 
non-technical survey team and mine risk education team.58 
HALO Trust and DCA conducted a socio-economic assessment 
of Sirte and a field assessment for areas of possible mine 
and ERW contamination which potentially require mechanical 
clearance.59 CSSF continue to provide funding in Sirte to 
HALO who provide mechanical clearance teams as well as 
non-technical survey and community liaison teams.60
Humanitarian access to Libya for survey and clearance 
operations, remains challenging for all operators. HALO, for 
example, experienced delays in the granting of multiple-entry 
visas and limited movement between locations due to 
ongoing conflict and changing frontlines. In Libya, the 
provision of security is highly localised; tribe-affiliated 
armed groups, with oftentimes shifting allegiances, control 
cities and towns down to neighbourhood level. This in turns 
requires humanitarian actors to have good knowledge of 
armed group conglomerates on the one hand and to liaise 
with many interlocutors on the other hand. The risk of 
arbitrary detention for local staff is high, either due to tribal 
background or due to suspected affiliation with opposing 
armed groups.61
HALO is mitigating security risks to its staff by maintaining 
working relationships with key interlocutors in both East 
and West Libya, including LibMAC, ministries, and municipal 
authorities. Community liaison in Benghazi, Misrata, Sirte, 
and Tripoli is key to ensuring community acceptance. In 
Sirte specifically, HALO recruits equally among the tribes. 
International staff are sometimes needed to cut across tribal 
lines when negotiating access.62 
HI conducted EOD spot tasks in 2019 in Tawerga, Misrata, 
but was hindered by security issues. It stopped survey and 
clearance operations in April 2019 and the project formally 
ended in June 2019, although its victim assistance work in 
Libya continues.63
A number of other Libyan civil society organisations are also 
reported to carry out mine action operations, but they are not 
accredited by LibMAC. 
UNMAS provides institutional and operational 
capacity-building, training, including in EOD, and coordinates 
with national authorities and implementing partners to 
carry out mine action activities to mitigate the threat posed 
by ERW and provide technical advice and advisory support 
on arms and ammunition management. The UNMAS Libya 
Programme is an integral part of UNSMIL.64 (See Programme 
Management section for further details).
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
There were no reports of planned CMR clearance during 2019 although several operators engaged in EOD operations. 
In 2018, HI reported clearing 4,151m2 of CMR in an area in Tawerga, in Misrata.65 
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SURVEY IN 2019
There were no other known reports of survey of CMR during 2019, although data from LibMAC, UNMAS, and several clearance 
operators were not made available.
In 2018, HI confirmed a total of 110,430m2 as CMR-contaminated, which it reported to LibMAC.66
According to ITF’s annual report, in 2019, LibMAC personnel opened 84 new tasks mostly for risk education and non-technical 
survey activities performed by international and local NGOs in Benghazi, Sirte, and Tawargha where LibMAC personnel 
conducted 52 QA/QC missions. LibMAC also conducted 23 accreditation procedures for international and local NGO teams  
to perform non-technical survey, risk education and EOD activities/tasks.67
According to a January 2020 report of the Secretary-General on UNSMIL, “The Mine Action Service project in Benghazi, 
[mandated] to conduct emergency clearance and map explosive hazards, has removed 40 items of unexploded ordnance and 
completed non-technical surveys of 24 sites. The surveys will inform future clearance operations and support the protection  
of civilians and stabilization.”68 The report did not, however, specify the type of unexploded ordnance.
CLEARANCE IN 2019
There were no known reports of clearance of CMR during 2019, although data from LibMAC, UNMAS, and several clearance 
operators were not made available.
In 2018, HI cleared 4,151m2 of CMR contamination, in an area in Tawerga, in Misrata, during which 11 submunitions  
were destroyed.69
PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LibMAC describes the following challenges to implementation of mine action operations: the high level of contamination; 
ongoing conflict and the continued presence of Islamic State; the difficulty in convincing internally displaced persons to delay 
their return until the ERW threat is addressed; security and access to priority areas; the limited ERW and EOD capacity in 
Libya; the vast geographical area; and limited governmental and international support.70 Security conditions continued to  
pose a challenge to mine action in Libya.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Serbia should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Serbia should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants 
(CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
 ■ Serbia should consider using its armed forces to conduct clearance of CMR as they are already clearing other 
unexploded ordnance (UXO).
 ■ The Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) should conduct non-technical and technical survey, rather than full 
clearance, in instances where survey represents the most efficient means to release part or all of areas suspected 
or confirmed to contain CMR. 
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2019, Serbia had 10 areas confirmed to contain CMR covering almost 1km2, while a further three areas over 
almost 1.4km2 were suspected to contain CMR (see Table 1).1 This was a decrease of 0.12km2 of total CMR-contaminated area 
at the end of 2018,2 following clearance operations in the municipality of Niš. Some CMR contamination in Raška and Sjenica 
municipalities recorded as SHA in 2018, was recorded instead as CHA in 2019, following confirmation of CMR.3
Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by municipality (at end 2019)4
Municipality Village CHAs Area (m2) SHAs Area (m2)
Bujanovac Borovac 2 210,881 1 281,169
Raška Lisina 1 190,359 0 0
Sjenica Čedovo 4 163,924 0 0
Sjenica Vapa 3 432,912 0 0
Tutin Istočni Mojstir 0 0 1 514,682
Užice Bioska 0 0 1 585,268
Totals 10 998,076 3 1,381,119
CHAs = confirmed hazardous areas SHAs = suspected hazardous areas
CMR resulted from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air strikes in 1999. According to Serbia, cluster munitions struck 
16 municipalities: Brus, Bujanovac, Čačak, Gadžin Han, Knić, Kraljevo, Kuršumlija, Niš City-Municipality of Crveni Krst Niš 
City-Municipality of Medijana, Preševo, Raška, Sjenica, Sopot, Stara Pazova, Tutin, and Vladimirci.5 
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Serbia is also contaminated by other UXO, including aircraft bombs, both on land and in its internal waterways, and by 
anti-personnel mines6 (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Serbia for further information).
SERBIA
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
According to a Government Decree on Protection 
against Unexploded Ordnance, the Sector for Emergency 
Management, under the Ministry of Interior, acts as the 
national mine action authority (NMAA).7 The NMAA is 
responsible for developing standard operating procedures 
(SOPs); accrediting demining operators; and supervising  
the work of SMAC.8 
SMAC was established on 7 March 2002, with a 2004 
law making it responsible for coordinating survey and 
clearance; collecting and managing mine action information 
(including casualty data); and surveying SHAs. It also has a 
mandate to plan demining projects, conduct quality control 
(QC) and monitor operations, ensure implementation of 
international standards, and conduct risk education.9 As 
from 1 January 2014, according to a Government Decree 
on Protection against Unexploded Ordnance, the Sector for 
Emergency Management, under the Ministry of Interior, is 
responsible for accrediting demining operators. Previously, 
SMAC was responsible for doing so.10
A new director of SMAC was appointed by the Serbian 
government in July 2019.11 There are seven people employed 
at SMAC: five SMAC employees, plus an Assistant Director 
for Legal Affairs and Operational Support and an Assistant 
Director for Economic Affairs, International Cooperation and 
European Integration.12
SMAC is fully funded by Serbia, including for survey activities, 
development of project tasks for clearance of contaminated 
areas, follow-up on implementation of project tasks, and 
quality assurance (QA) and QC of demining. Around €160,000 
per year is allocated to the work of SMAC from the national 
state budget.13 In addition, the UXO disposal work of the 
Sector for Emergency Situations of the Ministry of Interior 
is also state funded.14 Furthermore, in 2019, Serbia also 
contributed national funding towards the establishment of  
an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training centre.15
Since 2015, Serbia has also been allocating national funds for 
survey and clearance, with roughly €100,000 allocated per 
year.16 In 2018, the Serbian Government allocated double the 
amount of national funds previously dedicated to demining 
operations to €200,000 (which were matched with United 
States and South Korean funding and tendered through 
ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF)). Serbia continues to 
seek additional international funding.17 At the request of 
the national authorities, national funding was increased to 
€350,000 for survey and clearance operations in 2019.18 The 
same amount had been allocated by the Serbian government 
for demining operations in 2020,19 but this was subsequently 
reduced by 20% due to the COVID-19 crisis and efforts by 
the Serbian government to tackle it. Serbia will try to match 
national funds with donor funds through the ITF.20 However, 
for the time being, and due to funding restraints, SMAC will 
continue to prioritise its national funding to mine survey and 
clearance, rather than CMR, to contribute towards meeting 
its obligations under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention (APMBC).21
SMAC also provides expertise in risk education and in 
training in survey and clearance, pursuant to Article 30 of the 
Law on Ministries, and in late 2019, the Serbian government 
approved funds for the establishment of a Training Centre 
within SMAC. In cooperation with representatives of the 
Ministry of Education – Institute for the Advancement of 
Education, SMAC has developed a training programme for 
educators (instructors) for mine and ERW education, which 
will be officially verified. Together with experts from the 
Ministry of Interior, SMAC plans to provide different training 
modules, including on ERW recognition, international mine 
action standards, and medical aspects.22
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
SMAC does not have a gender policy in place and does not disaggregate relevant mine action data by sex and age. However,  
it does ensure women and children are consulted during survey and community liaison activities, and SMAC cooperates  
closely with the local authorities and other relevant stakeholders in this regard. SMAC also ensures ethnic or minority  
groups are consulted.23 
There is said to be equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance operations, but  
country/operator-wide, only 15% of those employed in survey and clearance teams in Serbia are women.24
At SMAC, 70% of employees are women, of which 65% of managerial/supervisory level positions are held by women.25
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
SMAC uses its own information management system. Following on from initial discussions several years ago, in early  
2020, SMAC informally discussed the possibility of the installation of the Information Management System for Mine Action 
(IMSMA) with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and planned to intensify discussions in  
the forthcoming period.26 
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PLANNING AND TASKING
The Government of Serbia adopts SMAC’s annual work plan.27 The 2020 work plan includes plans to address both 
anti-personnel mines and CMR.28 
Serbia prioritises the release of areas which directly affect the local population, such as those close to settlements where local 
people have abandoned their houses and stopped cultivating land due to fear of landmines.29 SMAC also noted that donors 
themselves sometimes also influence the choice of the areas which will be demined first, depending on availability and amount 
of their funds.30
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
According to SMAC, survey and clearance operations 
in Serbia are conducted in accordance with International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS).31 
National mine action standards (NMAS) were said to be in  
the final phase of development as at September 2015.32 In 
April 2017, SMAC reported that, along with the relevant 
national authorities, it was in the process of establishing  
a commission to develop national standards and SOPs to 
define methods and techniques for survey and clearance in 
Serbia.33 However, this process has been hindered due to  
lack of capacity,34 and as at April 2020, the development of 
the NMAS was still only “in progress”.35
Under new directorship in late 2015, SMAC reassessed 
its land release methodology to prioritise full clearance 
over technical survey of hazardous areas.36 This does not 
correspond to international best practice and is an inefficient 
use of scarce clearance assets. In February 2016, a new 
director of SMAC reported to Mine Action Review that while 
SMAC supports the use of high-quality non-technical survey 
to identify areas suspected of containing CMR, it will fully 
clear these areas, rather than using technical survey to more 
accurately identify the boundaries of contamination.37 
As at April 2020, SMAC’s position on its preferred land release 
methodology remained the same under the current Director, 
though there is an acknowledged willingness to conduct 
technical survey in a form “adjusted to the context of Serbia”, 
in response to the stated preference of international donors 
for technical survey above clearance, where appropriate.38 
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
SMAC does not itself carry out clearance or employ deminers but does conduct survey of areas suspected to contain mines, 
CMR, or other explosive remnants of war (ERW). Clearance is conducted by commercial companies and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), which are selected through public tender procedures executed by ITF, supported by international funding.39 
The Ministry of Interior issues accreditation to mine action operators that is valid for one year. In 2019, 23 companies/
organisations were accredited for demining, but only one, the NGO Stop Mines (Pale, Bosnia and Herzegovina), conducted 
clearance of CMR-contaminated area. Stop Mines deployed two clearance teams totalling 15 deminers.40
An EOD department within the Sector for Emergency Management, in the Ministry of Interior, responds to call-outs for 
individual items of ERW, and is also responsible for demolition of items found by SMAC survey teams.41
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of nearly 0.12km2 of CMR-contaminated area was released in 2019, all through clearance.42 
SURVEY IN 2019
No CMR-contaminated area was released by survey in 201943 or in 2018.44 
CLEARANCE IN 2019
A total of 119,334m2 of CMR-contaminated area was cleared in 2019, in the village of Crveni Krst in the municipality of Niš, 
during which four submunitions were destroyed. Clearance was conducted by the Bosnian-registered NGO, Stop Mines.45 
Clearance output in 2019 was an increase on 2018, when no CMR clearance was conducted in Serbia.46 
SMAC did not have available data on the number or type of individual items of ERW destroyed by the EOD department within 
the Sector for Emergency Management during spot tasks in 2019.47
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PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
Less than 1km2 in total has been cleared in the last five years 
(see Table 2), which is ascribed to a lack of funding.
In its last APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, dated 
31 March 2018, Serbia had included a work plan for completion 
of all ERW clearance by 2023, at a predicted total cost of 
€20 million. CMR were not disaggregated from other ERW.48 
Progress in CMR clearance is said to be contingent on funding. 
Serbia predicts that if adequate funds for implementation of 
survey and clearance projects were secured, CMR clearance 
could be finished in two or three years.49 
SMAC had developed four clearance projects for 2019, 
totalling release of 742,615m2, which were submitted to 
ITF for the selection of a contractor through its tender 
procedures.50 However, only the project in Niš (119,344m2), 
was actually funded and implemented in 2019.
SMAC did, however, envisage an increase in CMR land release 
in 2020, with two clearance projects approved in Sjenica 
Municipality (94,496m2) and in Raška Municipality (190,359m2), 
funded by the United States and South Korea through ITF. 
SMAC confirmed in August 2020 that both clearance projects 
had been completed.51 In addition, SMAC expected ITF to 
launch tender procedures for four additional projects funded 
by the United States: three clearance projects in Sjenica 
municipality (totalling 502,340m2) and a technical survey 
project in Tutin municipality (515,000m2). 52 
Table 2: Five-year summary of CMR clearance







PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
SMAC envisages that it will most likely need both national and international capacity to deal with any residual contamination, 
discovered following completion.53 Serbia is already dealing with residual ERW contamination and investing significant funds 
for ERW clearance, which is expected to be ongoing.54
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ South Sudan should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in line with the decision taken by the 
Council of Ministers announced in September 2017.
 ■ South Sudan should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition 
remnants (CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ South Sudan should revise survey requirements for CMR-contaminated areas in its national mine action standards 
to ensure the production of more accurate polygons.
 ■ South Sudan should increase its financial support for mine action operations. Greater assistance from the 
government and international partners should be provided to the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)  
to strengthen its capacity to develop and implement effective policies to address explosive ordnance. 
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2019, South Sudan had a total of just over 141 hazardous areas with a total size of 6.4km2 contaminated with 
CMR, of which 5.5km2 was confirmed hazardous area (CHA) and 0.9km2 was suspected hazardous area (SHA).1 Seven of South 
Sudan’s former ten states have areas suspected to contain CMR (see Table 1), with Central and Eastern Equatoria remaining 
the most heavily contaminated. This is an increase from the just over 5.3km2 across 123 hazardous areas contaminated with 
CMR at the end of 2018.2











CHAs/SHAs Total area (m2)
Central Equatoria 38 1,634,952 3 544,570 41 2,179,522
Eastern Equatoria 74 3,445,849 3 186,927 77 3,632,776
Jonglei 4 50,460 2 0 6 50,460
Upper Nile 4 133,067 0 0 4 133,067
Warrap 1 33,946 0 0 1 33,946
West Bahr El Ghazal 2 45,277 0 0 2 45,277
Western Equatoria 9 150,285 1 175,698 10 325,983
Totals 132 5,493,836 9 907,195 141 6,401,031
In 2017, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) initiated a review of the national Information Management System 
for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and consequently initiated a process of targeted re-survey aimed at better defining the 
estimated size of SHAs. Further re-survey of CMR-contaminated areas is required, but these areas cannot be accessed due  
to insecurity. It is planned that manual clearance teams will carry out re-survey once the security situation allows.4
South Sudan’s national mine action programme has greatly improved the accuracy of estimates of explosive ordnance 
contamination. The total estimate of mine, CMR, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination remaining in 
the country decreased from nearly 89km2 at the end of 2017 to 24.6km2 at the end of 2019.5 Despite continued land release, 
however, CMR contamination has increased over that time as a review of existing records in the database and re-survey 
resulted in three main changes that have proved especially significant with regard to CMR contamination: a number of existing 
task records had been wrongly recorded and were re-classified as CMR-contaminated areas; several overly conservative 
estimates of existing CHAs in the database were increased to better reflect the actual extent of contamination; and previously 
unrecorded areas containing CMR were added to the database.6
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In 2019, 41 hazardous areas covering a total of 1,998,915m2 of previously unrecorded CMR contamination was added to South 
Sudan’s information management database. In addition, there was an expansion by 2,734,216m2 of existing hazardous areas 
which had been recorded in the database but the estimates of size were overly conservative and so they were increased to 
better reflect the expected true extent of contamination.7 This means that despite nearly 3.7km2 of land release in 2019 the 
amount of contamination increased by 1.1km2 from the end of the previous year.
Cluster munitions were used during the decade-long war between Sudan and the SPLA/M that ended in 2005. From 1995 to 
2000, prior to South Sudan’s independence, Sudanese government forces are believed to have air dropped cluster munitions 
sporadically in southern Sudan.
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES 
South Sudan has a significant problem with mines and especially ERW, resulting from large-scale use of explosive weapons 
during armed conflicts in 1955–72 and 1983–2005 (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on South Sudan  
for further information). 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA)—since renamed 
the NMAA—was established by presidential decree in 2006 
to act as the national agency for planning, coordination, 
and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.8 There is no 
national mine action legislation in place.9
In 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1996 tasked UNMAS 
with supporting South Sudan in demining and strengthening 
the capacity of the NMAA. UNMAS (with the NMAA) has 
been overseeing mine action across the country through its 
main office in Juba, and sub-offices in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, 
and Wau. Together, UNMAS and the NMAA accredit, task, 
monitor, and evaluate mine action organisations; conduct 
route verification and clearance; provide escorts for convoys 
on high-threat routes to enable the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance; and collect data and map hazardous areas.10
While it is planned that the NMAA will eventually assume 
full responsibility for all mine action activities, according to 
UNMAS the NMAA continued to face serious financial and 
technical limitations preventing it from doing so effectively in 
2019. It requires substantial resources and capacity building 
assistance if it is to manage the mine action programme.11
UNMAS, mine action operators, and South Sudanese 
government departments are providing capacity 
development to NMAA and other national mine action 
organisations in a project that runs from January 2019 to 
December 2020. The objectives are to develop the managerial 
and operational capacity in key functional and technical 
areas to enable national authorities to assume long-term 
coordination and policy-making roles in mine action; and to 
strengthen the capacity of the NMAA to plan and monitor 
all aspects of mine action, in support of South Sudan’s 
obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC). It is planned that NMAA staff will attend training 
in administration and management, land release, quality 
management, and gender equality and mainstreaming. In 
addition, a resource mobilisation strategy will be developed 
along with the creation of an explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) response capacity to manage residual contamination.12
UNMAS and Danish Demining Group (DDG) are the 
co-coordinators of the mine action sub-cluster. The 
sub-cluster coordinates with the national- and state-level 
Inter-Cluster Working Groups. This enables information to 
be shared on mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), for UN 
agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to 
inform mine action actors about their own priority locations 
for clearance; and for information on mines and UXO to be 
integrated into the annual Humanitarian Needs Overview and 
the Humanitarian Response Plan.13
In 2019, the Government of South Sudan funded the costs of 
NMAA staff salaries and its sub-offices across the country, 
Malakal, Wau, and Yei. As at March 2020, the Malakal and Yei 
offices were suspended due to the security situation.14 The 
NMAA did not, however, provide any funding for survey or 
clearance. The government’s total support was reported as 
US$75,000 for the year.15 
In South Sudan’s 2020 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension 
request, it is estimated to cost US$116.9 million to complete 
all clearance by July 2026, although when costs are broken 
down by year the total amounts to $128.5 million.16 In 2019, 
South Sudan received more than US$41 million for mine 
action which exceeds the costs needed if current levels of 
support are maintained. It is worth noting, however, that 
much of the funding received by UNMAS, which on average 
has contributed around 75% of all sector funding, is used to 
support the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).17
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GENDER AND DIVERSITY
South Sudan’s second national mine action strategy for  
2018–22 includes a section on gender, focusing on how 
different gender and age groups are affected by mines and 
ERW and have specific and varying needs and priorities. 
Guidelines on mainstreaming gender considerations in mine 
action planning and operations in South Sudan are also 
incorporated in the strategy, including on the collection of data 
disaggregated by sex and age.18 UNMAS reported that the 
programme was also implementing the UN Gender Guidelines 
for Mine Action, monitored by a gender focal point.19
 South Sudan’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines 
(NTSGs) contain provisions requiring all community liaison 
teams to tailor activities on the basis of the gendered needs 
of beneficiaries, and to address the specific risks faced by 
women and girls.20 All teams are reportedly gender balanced 
in composition and trained to be inclusive, for example by 
ensuring outreach through non-technical survey and risk 
education is done separately for different age and gender 
groups, and taking local cultural practices into consideration.21 
At the same time, UNMAS reported that task prioritisation was 
predominantly dependent on security and that resources were 
concentrated on tasks within limited geographical areas rather 
than on the basis of gender needs.22 Ethnic identity is taken 
into account within survey and clearance teams to ensure safe 
access and acceptance by the respective local communities.23 
In 2019–20, UNMAS was providing workshops for the NMAA 
and mine action partners on gender equality, gender-based 
violence (GBV), and gender mainstreaming programming 
in mine action with the aim of GBV prevention practices 
being mainstreamed in mine action and there being equal 
opportunity in decision making regardless of gender.24  
As at July 2020, these had not yet happened.25
UNMAS has said there is equal access in employment 
opportunities for qualified men and women in survey and 
clearance teams across the organisations operating in 
South Sudan.26 However, redressing the gender balance 
is a long-term challenge and is dependent on whether 
new vacancies arise. In 2019, however, only 7% of staff in 
operational roles were women, and women accounted for 5% 
of managerial or supervisory positions among international 
staff positions, while no women were occupying managerial 
positions among the national staff.27
All of the community liaison teams within Mines Advisory 
Group (MAG) are mixed gender and MAG reports that it 
consults with all affected community members, including 
women and children. MAG also holds women-only focus 
groups to ensure that their voices are heard. MAG also aims 
to recruit team members from the more than 60 ethnic 
groups within South Sudan and tries to ensure that at least 
one team member speaks the local language of the planned 
area of deployment. As at October 2019, approximately 25% 
of all operational roles within MAG were held by women. This 
follows a concerted effort by MAG to increase the number of 
women in operational roles. There is one international staff 
member who holds a senior managerial position within MAG 
who is female but none of the female national staff members 
holds a managerial position, although women are employed 
as national staff at a supervisory level.28 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
A comprehensive review of all data in South Sudan’s IMSMA database began in 2018, along with re-survey of recorded SHAs 
and CHAs thought to be exaggerated or erroneously recorded. Through the database review it was found that past efforts to 
upgrade the IMSMA software package led to serious data loss, which inhibited efforts to present an entirely accurate record of 
the history of mine action in South Sudan. The ongoing database review has resulted in significant gains in the understanding 
of mine and ERW contamination. UNMAS informed Mine Action Review that, wherever possible, the database disaggregates 
mined areas, CMR-contaminated areas, and other ERW-contaminated areas, including spot tasks.29
In 2020, despite not having acceded to the CCM, South Sudan submitted a voluntary Article 7 report for the first time,  
covering 2019.
PLANNING AND TASKING
South Sudan’s most recent National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2022, developed with support from the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and using funding from Japan, was officially launched in September 2018.30 A 
mid-term strategic review of the plan, goals, and objectives was conducted in January 2020.31 According to UNMAS, the 
strategy has three strategic goals with related targets:32
GOAL 1: 
Advocacy and communication of South Sudan’s mine/ERW problem continues through national and international 
awareness-raising and adoption and implementation of international conventions to facilitate a mine-/ERW-free South Sudan.
GOAL 2: 
The extent of mine/ERW contamination is clarified and confirmed and the problem addressed through appropriate survey  
and clearance, ensuring safe land is handed back to affected communities for use.
GOAL 3: 
Safe behaviour is promoted among women, girls, boys, and men to reduce mine/ERW accidents and promote safe  
livelihood activities.





UNMAS operations staff generate an annual operational clearance plan where priority tasks are identified.33 According to 
UNMAS, the operational focus for 2019–20 was on further clarifying contamination remaining in the database, with re-survey  
of hazards thought to be exaggerated in size.34 
In its 2020 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request South Sudan presents a work plan to 2026, split by region. South Sudan 
estimates that the overall clearance requirement for mechanical clearance teams is 2.88km2 of cluster strike area. In addition, 
there will be a requirement to clear 141 cluster strikes and 30 battle areas extending over 6.4km2.35 These numbers are slightly 
different from the figures presented in the annual clearance tables with nearly 3km2 of mechanical clearance of CMR and 5.02km2 
of manual clearance although this does include a contingency to clear an additional 10% of contaminated area as a margin of 
safety. It is also unclear from the table how much of this clearance refers to CMR and how much to other UXO.36
Table 2: Planned mechanical and manual clearance of CMR- and UXO-contaminated area37


























2025 5 Manual 880,000 manual -634,529 -13
According to its 2019 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request to be considered by the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties 
in November 2020, South Sudan intends to address all contamination from anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, CMR, and 
other ERW by its requested 2026 APMBC Article 5 deadline. To that end, aside from those tasks where specific humanitarian 
interventions are planned, the intention is to be pragmatic in the sequencing of tasks and to deploy clearance teams through a 
prioritisation process that aims to balance security, logistical requirements, and concentration of effort. South Sudan believes 
that this combination will lead to the most efficient clearance that allows for optimal monitoring of clearance efforts.38
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
South Sudan’s NTSGs, which outline the technical 
requirements expected of all demining operators working  
in South Sudan, are adapted from the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS). The NTSGs are annually reviewed 
and revised by UNMAS and the implementing partners 
and then approved by the NMAA.39 These standards and 
guidelines also contain provisions specific to CMR survey  
and clearance.40 
In 2019, revisions were made to the NTSGs for Animal 
Detection Systems, Site Preparation, Marking, Quality 
Management, and Medical Procedures to keep them in line with 
changes to IMAS. An NTSG on “Stop-Operations Policy” was 
also introduced. This policy mandates that any party can and 
should suspend an operation whenever it believes a demining 
situation or operation is becoming unsafe.41 The NTSG 
amendments were made in consultation with the implementing 
partners.42 Amendments were also made to the NTSGs 
for Survey, Battle Area Clearance, and Land Release. The 
revision of the NTSG for Battle Area Clearance included the 
redefinition of the minimum clearance depth for CMR; survey 
and assessment of the cluster munition strike’s footprint 
related to the physical evidence and size of the polygon; and 
quality management of CMR clearance adding layers of Quality 
Control (QC) and a comprehensive recording system.43
However, both UNMAS and MAG have reported that 
a significant number of initial survey reports of 
CMR-contaminated areas have underestimated the extent 
of the contamination. MAG reported that areas were often 
recorded based on the minimum amount of clearance that 
would be required to comply with the NTSGs, which require a 
50 metre fade-out. In MAG’s experience, however, the actual 
CMR-contaminated area has often proved to be significantly 
larger, making it difficult to accurately plan for the time and 
resources needed to address each task. 
MAG begins CMR clearance with the expectation that the 
task area will reach at least 60,000m2 and at times has 
encountered CMR tasks that had to be expanded by more 
than 100,000m2 compared to the original estimate. It further 
reported that the fade-out requirements of the NTSGs 
sometimes resulted in handover of cleared land while 
simultaneously creating a new “hazardous area” comprising 
the fade-out distance.44 UNMAS reported that often in a 
recorded strike area, multiple cluster munition canisters are 
found, with the consequence that the overall contaminated 
area extends well beyond an expected standard footprint.45 
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UNMAS noted that the NTSGs require all mine action teams to conduct regular internal quality assurance (QA), along with QC 
sampling of 10% of each area cleared. UNMAS conducted additional external QA through visits to each clearance task in 2018, 
as well as upon the completion of a clearance task.46 As part of the capacity development project of the NMAA from 2019 to 
2020, 30 QA officers were due to receive training in quality management through workshops and field placements with the aim 
of the NMAA taking ownership for QA of mine action operations.47
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS 
In 2019, UNMAS reported that 29 teams from 4 organisations 
conducted CMR survey and clearance tasks: two international 
demining non-governmental organisations (MAG and 
DanChurchAid (DCA)), and two commercial companies  
(G4S Ordnance Management (G4S) and The Development 
Initiative (TDI)). It estimated the number of operational 
personal involved in CMR survey and clearance at 224 
during the year. The clearance teams (see Table 3) were not 
deployed exclusively on CMR tasks, they also conducted 
EOD, manual mine clearance and/or non-technical survey. 
In addition, G4S deployed four teams totalling 28 personnel 
solely for non-technical survey.48










G4S 2 20 0
G4S 6 36 0
TDI 8 64 0
MAG 5 40 0
MAG 2 20 2
DCA 2 16 0
Totals 25 196 2
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of a nearly 3.7km2 of CMR contaminated area was released through survey and clearance in 2019; of which 0.36km2  
was cancelled through non-technical survey, 0.01km2 was reduced through technical survey, and 3.29km2 was cleared.
SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, a total of 359,388m2 was cancelled through non-technical survey in Eastern Equatoria and Western Equatoria, see 
Table 4.50 This is an increase from the 10,400m2 of suspected CMR contamination cancelled through non-technical survey  
in Jonglei state by G4S in 2018.51
In addition, 13,614m2 was reduced through technical survey  
in Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Western Equatoria 
and Unity, see Table 5.52 This is a decrease from the 
147,300m2 reduced by technical survey the year before.53
Table 4: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 201954
State Operator Area cancelled (m²)
Eastern Equatoria G4S 344,357
Western Equatoria G4S 15,031
Total 359,388
Table 5: Reduction through technical survey in 201955
State Operator Area reduced (m²)
Central Equatoria G4S 533
Eastern Equatoria G4S 3,729
Eastern Equatoria TDI 61
Unity TDI 1,889
Western Equatoria G4S 7,402
Total 13,614






In 2019, a total of nearly 3.3km2 of CMR-contaminated area was cleared with 2,586 submunitions destroyed (see Table 6).56  
This is a decrease of 35% from the 5.1km2 cleared in 2018.57
Table 6: CMR clearance in 2019
State Operator Area cleared (m²) Submunitions destroyed Other UXO destroyed
Central Equatoria G4S 25,233 1 67
Central Equatoria MAG 1,920,222 1,880 48
Eastern Equatoria DCA 87,420 86 2
Eastern Equatoria G4S 274,107 143 18
Eastern Equatoria MAG 129,578 77 0
Eastern Equatoria TDI 323,282 169 7
Jonglei G4S 212,283 129 9
Jonglei MAG 97,677 57 0
Unity TDI 9,500 1 0
Western Bahr El Ghazal TDI 79,477 19 0
Western Equatoria G4S 128,108 24 0
Totals 3,286,887 2,586 151
In addition, three CMR were destroyed during anti-personnel mine clearance, 57 submunitions were destroyed during 
clearance of anti-vehicle mined area and 87 submunitions were destroyed during EOD spot tasks.58
According to UNMAS, the significant decrease in CMR clearance output in 2019 was due to the impact of widespread violence  
in Equatoria, which has the highest concentration of CMR contamination and where the National Salvation Front was 
particularly active.59
PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
South Sudan is not yet a State Party to the CCM and therefore 
does not have a specific clearance deadline under Article 4. 
Nonetheless, South Sudan has obligations under international 
human rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible. 
South Sudan has announced its intention to accede to the 
CCM, which is also a specific objective in the National Mine 
Action Strategic Plan 2018–2022.60 In May 2019, UNMAS 
reported that documents relating to South Sudan’s accession 
to the Convention were under review by the national 
parliament.61 As at September 2020, the legislation was still 
before parliament for adoption.62
Previously, primarily due to the ongoing conflict, it was 
impossible to predict when South Sudan might complete 
clearance of CMR, nor even assess the true extent of 
contamination.63 However, with improvements in the security 
situation, progress in land release of CMR-contaminated 
areas, and a comprehensive database review, in 2019, the 
situation in South Sudan began to look a lot more positive. 
According to South Sudan’s 2020 APMBC Article 5 deadline 
extension request, it is expected that South Sudan will 
complete clearance of all CMR-contaminated areas by the end 
of 2025. In addition, the extension request clearly sets out the 
primary assumptions and risk factors in the implementation 
of land release targets which is contingent on having 
access to contaminated areas and no resumption of fighting. 
Logistical challenges will also need to be overcome due to 
the poor state of South Sudan’s infrastructure and the effects 
of the seasonal rains, which mean that clearance in much 
of the country is only possible for eight months of the year 
given widespread flooding. Furthermore, the methodology 
previously used to clear roads was flawed as several mines 
have recently been discovered on roads that had been 
declared safe resulting in the need for re-clearance. This has 
diverted resources from clearance of CMR.64
South Sudan has also been affected by the COVID-19 outbreak, 
which has led the government to ban all public gatherings and 
introduce social distancing and lockdown measures. As at April 
2020, operators had stood down teams, which will undoubtably 
impact on survey and clearance output.65
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Sudan should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Sudan should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants 
(CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
 ■ Sudan should make every effort to address the last remaining area suspected to contain CMR as soon as possible 
and should elaborate a work plan with how this will be achieved.
 ■ Sudan should ensure that reporting disaggregates submunitions from other unexploded ordnance (UXO) and  
that mine action data is recorded and reported according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land 
release terminology. 
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at April 2020, Sudan’s National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) informed Mine Action Review that only one area suspected to 
contain CMR contamination remained in Sudan.1 The NMAC reported that the area, with an unknown size in South Kordofan 
state, was located in an area not under government control.2
The NMAC previously reported that at the end of 2017, a total of two areas suspected to contain CMR contamination remained 
to be addressed in Sudan, the area in South Kordofan and another in West Kordofan.3 In June 2018, NMAC informed Mine 
Action Review that it had deployed a team to address the remaining hazardous area in West Kordofan, located in Aghabish 
village, Lagawa locality, which it later reported was cancelled during the year as no evidence of CMR was found.4
In 2017, NMAC, which assumed full national ownership for implementing mine action activities upon the United Nations Mine 
Action Office’s (UNMAO’s) closure in June 2011, reported that of the nine open areas reported by UNMAO in 2011, seven were 
cleared in 2011–13.5 In March 2018, NMAC informed Mine Action Review that the size of the seven areas cleared during this 
period totalled 15,318m2 and that 13 PM-1 submunitions were found and destroyed during clearance.6 NMAC has not reported 
any survey or clearance of CMR since 2013. It stated that no new CMR contamination was recorded in 2016–19.7
In the 1990s, Sudanese government forces are believed to have sporadically air dropped cluster munitions in its civil war  
with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Government forces were reported as having used several 
types of cluster munitions, including Spanish-manufactured HESPIN 21; US-manufactured M42 and Mk118 (Rockeye), 
and a Brazilian copy; Chinese Type-81 dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM); Chilean-made PM-1; and 
Soviet-manufactured PTAB-1.5 and AO-1-SCh submunitions. In 2012 and 2015, use of cluster munitions was recorded in five 
separate attacks on villages in South Kordofan state. Each attack involved air-dropped RBK-500 cluster munitions containing 
AO-2.5RT submunitions.8 
In April 2017, the African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) reported the presence of two AO-1-Sch 
submunitions in North Darfur (at Al Mengara village in Al Liet locality). The villagers reported that the bombs were dropped 
in 2008, had been identified by UNAMID at that time, and that the military had stated that they would dispose of the items.9 The 
Sudanese Armed Forces Engineers destroyed the items in February 2018 and no further CMR were reported or identified.10 
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Sudan also has a significant problem with anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, and UXO, primarily as a result of the  
more than 20 years of civil war that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and South Sudan’s independence  
in July 2011 (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Sudan for further information). 
Since South Sudan’s independence, new conflicts in Abyei and in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states have resulted in 
increased UXO contamination in Sudan.11 The extent of mine and ERW contamination within the disputed area of Abyei and the 
Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ) between Sudan and South Sudan is unknown due to security and political issues.12
SUDAN
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and 
the NMAC manage Sudan’s mine action programme. Upon 
the independence of South Sudan, the NMAC assumed full 
ownership of national mine action with responsibility for 
coordinating and supervising the implementation of all 
mine action activities, including quality assurance (QA), 
accreditation, and certification of clearance operators. 
After starting an emergency programme in 2002, UNMAS 
re-established activities in Sudan in 2015, following an 
invitation from the Sudanese Government, in an advisory  
and support capacity.13 As part of its mandate, UNMAS 
provides organisational and individual capacity development 
to the NMAC.14
Sudan is part of the Arab Regional Cooperation Programme 
(ARPC) and as part of this programme, which is coordinated 
by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD), the NMAA attend regional trainings and 
workshops. In December 2019, the NMAA attended the ARPC 
annual conference where they discussed and approved 
recently translated IMAS into Arabic and shared experiences 
of their own national mine action standards (NMAS).15
In 2019, the Government of Sudan contributed a total of 
US$2 million to the running costs of NMAC and for demining 
activities. It has consistently funded the national mine action 
programme at this level for the past four years.16 In addition, 
international donors contributed US$5.84 million through 
UNMAS for mine action in Sudan. UNMAS reported that, in 
2020, a total of $15.8 million would be required to meet mine 
action needs in the country, including demining in South 
Kordofan and Blue Nile states and ERW response in Darfur.17 
In 2018, Sudan reported that as a result of enhanced 
cooperation, both nationally and internationally, in particular 
stemming from a meeting on Sudan of the APMBC’s Committee 
on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance’s 
“individualised approach” initiative in 2017, a number of 
positive developments had resulted. This initiative, Sudan 
reported, alongside nationally convened mine action events 
and donor field visits to mine-affected areas, had resulted in an 
increase in earmarked funds to the mine action programme.18
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
In 2019, NMAC reported that it has a gender and diversity 
policy in place and that gender is mainstreamed in the 
national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 and in the 
national mine action standards. It stated that under those 
standards, all survey and community liaison teams are to be 
gender balanced, and that women and children are consulted 
during survey and community liaison activities. It said 
that gender is also taken into account in the prioritisation, 
planning, and tasking of survey and clearance, as per the 
national standards and the new standard IMSMA forms.19
Mine action data are disaggregated by sex and age.20 UNMAS 
reported working with NMAC and implementing partners to 
improve this aspect of mine action reporting and information 
management because sex and age disaggregated data of land 
release beneficiaries were not being captured in IMSMA.21 
The NMAC says it always encourages women to apply for 
employment in the national programme, whether at the office 
level or in the field. Positively, it reported that almost 40% 
of NMAC staff employed at the managerial or supervisory 
levels are women and 50% of non-technical survey teams 
are female. The first female deminer has also been employed 
but the NMAC acknowledged that there are obstacles to 
hiring women due to “local customs and traditions”.22 UNMAS 
reported that, as at May 2020, around 55% of the new 
non-technical survey teams are female. One female deminer 
started in late 2019, and it is hoped to increase the number  
of female deminers in the future.23
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
As at April 2020, NMAC informed Mine Action Review that it was using the IMSMA legacy version in parallel a newer version: 
IMSMA New Generation (NG).24 In 2018, NMAC began a process of upgrading the IMSMA software to the newer NG version, 
with assistance from the GICHD. Significant efforts to correct errors in the database were also undertaken.25 In 2019, IMSMA 
training was delivered to the suboffices and operators on the new reporting system and reporting forms.26
PLANNING AND TASKING
In May 2019, NMAC reported that a new national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 had been finalised and was awaiting 
approval. The plan aims to fulfil Sudan’s APMBC obligations, and was developed in coordination with the GICHD to replace its 
previous national strategy for 2016–19.27 NMAC stated that detailed annual work plans had been developed for each year under 
the new strategic plan.28 As at April 2020, the strategic plan was still awaiting approval.29




In Sudan’s 2018 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request there was no specific mention of remaining CMR or plans for 
survey and clearance of CMR-contaminated areas. The extension request did contain a detailed work plan with annual survey 
and clearance projections on a state-by-state basis with a total planned release for all types of ordnance of 224 hazardous 
areas with a size of 26.5km2 by 1 April 2023.30 In 2020, in accordance with the terms of its latest APMBC Article 5 deadline 
extension, Sudan submitted an updated work plan for 1 March 2020–31 March 2023, though again this make no mention of 
CMR.31 Sudan reported to Mine Action Review that clearance of remaining CMR contamination would be possible by 2021 if 
there was a change in the security situation and the last known registered cluster munition-contaminated area was under 
Sudanese Government control.32 
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In May 2019, NMAC reported that a review of Sudan’s NMAS had been completed and the revised standards were awaiting 
endorsement.33 As at August 2020, this was still the situation.34 
During 2019, NMAC completed 46 accreditations and 33 QA visits. During 2019, the accreditation of Global Aid Hand was 
reviewed and survey and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) were added to their existing explosive ordnance risk education 
(EORE) accreditation.35
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS 
In 2019, no international NGOs were demining in Sudan. National operators are JASMAR for Human Security (JASMAR), 
National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD), the Friends for Peace and Development Organization (FPDO),  
and Global Aid Hand.36
Table 1: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 201937
Operator
Manual clearance teams (MCTs)/ 
Multi-task teams (MTTs) Total deminers* Dogs and handlers Machines





9 dogs & 3 handlers 0
JASMAR 3 MTTs 12 0 0
Totals 14 teams 80 9/3 0
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. 
Table 2: Operational survey capacities deployed in 201938
Operator NTS teams
Total NTS 
personnel* TS teams Total TS personnel*
JASMAR 3 6 Clearance capacity is also technical survey capacity
NUMAD 0 0
Global Aid Hand 7 14
Totals 10 20
NTS = Non-technical survey TS = Technical survey 
*Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers
According to the NMAC, there was no change in operational capacity from 2018 to 2019 until November when additional 
non-technical survey capacity was deployed by JASMAR and Global Aid Hand.39 According to UNMAS, the MCTs and MTTs  
were not only working on anti-personnel mine clearance but also on priority areas contaminated with anti-vehicle mines 
and ERW. This is because most of the anti-personnel mined areas are located in Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North 
(SPLMN)-controlled areas.40 The clearance capacity was not all operational throughout the year with the FPDO deployed only 
until May 2019. In addition, two of the NUMAD MTTs were tasked with investigating residual risk in Kassala state, which was 
announced free from known mined areas and ERW in 2018. Some of the teams only became operational in October 2019 as the 
season in most of Sudan, especially in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, runs from October to June the following year.41
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
There was no reported survey or clearance of CMR-contaminated areas conducted in 2019. In 2018, one recorded area of 
suspected CMR contamination in West Kordofan was cancelled by NUMAD after no evidence of cluster munitions was found  
in the area.42
PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
Sudan is not a state party to the CCM and therefore does 
not have a specific clearance deadline under Article 4. 
Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human 
rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible. 
In May 2017, NMAC informed Mine Action Review that Sudan 
was “with the spirit of the Convention on Cluster Munitions” 
and that the national authorities were aware of the convention 
and Sudan’s current status as not yet having joined.43 In April 
2020, NMAC stated that there had been no developments with 
regard to Sudan’s accession to the CCM in 2019.44
The main impediment to mine action operations is the 
security situation and the lack of access to most of the known 
impacted communities in Blue Nile and South Kordofan 
states.45 During 2019, access to South Kordofan and Blue 
Nile improved, which allowed for roads to be assessed and 
cleared opening access for humanitarian assistance and 
population movement. It is hoped that with the establishment 
of the transitional government and the onset of peace talks 
between government and opposition groups this may lead to 
a comprehensive nationwide peace agreement. 
In June 2020, Sudan’s transitional government and the head 
of one of the two factions of the rebel group, Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), signed a preliminary 
peace deal. The transitional government and rebel groups 
have until February 2021 to finalise a comprehensive 
deal.46 This would improve accessibility for the mine action 
programme but, Sudan reports, it would also pose a 
challenge as roads and other routes will need to be cleared 
before people can move safely and humanitarian assistance 
can be provided and Sudan does not currently have the 
capacity to do this.47 
In addition, Sudan reported that obstacles to completion 
include: inadequate funding for mine action, outdated 
demining equipment that is not fit for purpose, poor 
infrastructure which also impedes access, and difficult 
climatic conditions.48 A further significant impediment to 
progress is the lack of clearance capacity formerly provided 
by international operators. Sudan has made numerous 
requests for technical and logistical support and appeals  
for international operators to return. 
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Syria experienced multiple attacks with cluster munitions by pro-government forces in 2019. The United Nations Mine Action 
Service (UNMAS) reported that the government had agreed to the participation of international demining organisations in  
mine action.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Syria and Russia should immediately halt the use of cluster munitions.
 ■ Syria should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Syria should apply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants 
(CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Syria’s civil war saw continued use of cluster munitions in 2019 and 2020, adding to what is already believed to be widespread 
CMR in addition to dense contamination by other explosive remnants of war (ERW), including conventional mines and those of 
an improvised nature (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Syria for further information). The extent of 
contamination by any particular category of device is not known. The United Nations estimated in October 2019 that explosive 
ordnance contaminated more than 2,560 communities and 11.5 million people and had caused an average of 184 explosive 
incidents a day throughout the year.1
Syrian government and Russian air forces intensively bombed Idlib governorate and other areas of north-west Syria during 
the first half of 2019, regularly using cluster munitions.2 First responders cited by Human Rights Watch documented 10 
attacks by pro-government forces in May 2019 using Uragan cluster munition rockets in north west Syria.3 The United 
Nations Commission of Inquiry monitoring Syria documented use of cluster munitions in a surface-to-surface missile attack 
by pro-government forces on a camp for displaced persons near the border with Turkey in November 2019.4 Pro-government 
forces struck a school in Idlib governorate with a missile armed with submunitions in January 2020 inflicting heavy civilian 
casualties5 and in February 2020 struck densely populated area of Idlib with what were believed to be URAGAN 9M27K-type 
cluster munitions fired from BM-30 “SMERCH” multiple-barrelled rocket launcher system.6 The Syrian Network for Human 
Right reported at least 24 attacks employing cluster munitions between September 2018 and April 2019, attributing 23 attacks 
to Syrian forces and one to Russian forces.7 
Syrian Civil Defence (SCD) has reported clearing large numbers of unexploded submunitions over the past three years in  
Idlib governorate and to a lesser extent in Dar’a, Hama, and Quneitra over the past two years.8 SCD and other operators  
report encountering mainly Russian-made cluster munitions, including SHOAB-0.5, AO-2.5RT, 9N235, AO1-SCH, and PTAB-1M 
and 2.5M submunitions.9
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Syria does not have a national mine action authority or a national programme for survey and clearance. Mine action has been 
conducted by a wide range of organisations, largely determined by the forces controlling different regions. 
In areas under government control, these have included mainly Russian and Syrian military engineers and civil defence 
organisations. International and national demining organisations conducted clearance in north-east Syria controlled by the 
Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces. Turkey reported its security forces cleared mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
in areas of northern Syria it occupied in October 2019.10
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UNMAS signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Syrian government in July 2018 under which it deployed two 
staff to Damascus in October 2018. After meeting Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mikdad in Damascus in October 2019, UNMAS 
Director Agnes Marcaillou reported the government had agreed to the involvement of international demining organisations. 
They would be registered by the government and coordinated by UNMAS, which stated that discussions were underway on 
plans for survey, marking, and clearance.11 As of May 2020, however, no international demining organisations had registered 
with the government and UNMAS remained focused on training Syrian partners for risk education and community survey. 
Between January and July 2019 teams surveyed 365 areas in Aleppo, northern Hama, and Idlib governorates, marking 370 
explosive items.12
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Russia deployed several hundred military deminers from 
its Armed Forces Demining Centre from 2017 onwards, 
conducting clearance with manual teams supported by 
mine detection dogs and Uran-6 mine detection robots. 
Russian troops also provided training courses for Syrian 
army engineers at Hmeimim air base and at training centres 
established in 2017 in Aleppo and Homs. By the start of 
January 2018, Russian armed forces reported they had 
trained 900 Syrian engineers.13 
Russia started to withdraw troops, including deminers, from 
Syria in 2018 but its Ministry of Defence continued to report 
mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in 
Syria in 2020.14 Russia appealed to other countries in 2018 to 
provide support. Armenia responded by sending an 83-strong 
team to Syria in February 2019, planning to focus its work on 
the northern governorate of Aleppo.15 Armenia rotated a new 
team to replace the first after four months.16
National operators included SCD, widely reported as White 
Helmets, which worked with six clearance teams and three 
community liaison/survey teams in north-west Syria in 2019. 
Three clearance and two survey teams operated in Idlib 
province, a focal point of conflict in 2019, with two clearance 
teams and one survey team working in Aleppo and one 
clearance team in Hama province. Teams mostly destroyed 
CMR and tackled a wide range of other unexploded ordnance 
(UXO). In January 2019, five SCD staff took part in a two-week 
course delivered remotely in humanitarian response to IEDs, 
focusing on search, identification, and threat assessments to 
increase safety in daily search and rescue.17 
AFAK, a Syrian NGO working in partnership with The HALO 
Trust, conducted clearance in the southern provinces of Dar’a 
and Quneitra in the early part of 2019 until a Syrian army 
offensive took control of the area.18 
In areas outside government control in the north-east, 
humanitarian demining organisations and commercial 
companies have conducted large-scale clearance in areas 
recaptured from Islamic State. Tetra Tech worked operated 
in Raqqa, Deir Ezzour, and, after its recapture in 2019, in 
Barghuz. Funded by the United States (US) Department of 
State, Tetra Tech focused on critical infrastructure such as 
hospitals, schools, water pumping stations, and electricity 
generating plants. A small national organisation, Roj Mine 
Control Organization (RMCO), was conducting clearance in 
north and north-east Syria but reportedly sustained heavy 
casualties among its deminers attempting clearance of 
improvised devices.19 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Syria’s continuing conflict prevented progress towards 
a coordinated national programme of mine action. 
Comprehensive information on outcomes of survey  
or clearance in any areas was unavailable. 
SCD reported conducting 753 tasks in three governorates  
in 2019 which resulted in destroying 887 CMR and 143 items 
of other UXO.20






Idlib 327 428 51
Aleppo 289 372 46
Hama 137 87 46
Totals 753 887 143
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
The national estimate of cluster munition remnants (CMR) contamination increased significantly in 2019. The Tajikistan National 
Mine Action Centre (TNMAC) has approved a pilot project by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) to introduce the Cluster Munition 
Remnant Survey (CMRS)/technical survey methodology and subsequently approved NPA’s procedures for use by all operators. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
 ■ Tajikistan should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Tajikistan should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR on territory under 
its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
 ■ The TNMAC should conduct survey to clarify the extent of remaining CMR and ensure timely clearance and release 
of the contaminated areas.
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Tajikistan does not have a comprehensive baseline estimate 
of the extent of CMR contamination but reported more than 
1.5km2 affected by CMR at the end of 2019 (see Table 1), an 
increase of two-thirds on the estimate a year earlier. TNMAC 
said this followed the addition of three confirmed hazardous 
areas (CHAs) totalling 616,191m2.1 NPA, the main operator 
addressing CMR, identified one CHA in 2019 in Darvoz’s 
Sagirdasht municipality covering 288,191m2. The Union of 
Sappers of Tajikistan (UST) confirmed two other hazards 
covering a total of 528,000m2, also in Sagirdasht.2 
CMR are concentrated in central provinces used as summer 
pasture by local communities and for that reason are 
considered high impact. Initial surveys identified hazardous 
areas largely on the basis of recorded accidents and 
local community reports that did not specify the types of 
contamination, underscoring the need for resurvey.3 
Tajikistan traces its CMR contamination back to the civil war 
of 1992–97 but has not clarified who was responsible for 
using cluster munitions.4 Most of the submunitions cleared 
are from the Russian RBK 500 series, model AO 2.5RT/RTM.5
Table 1: CMR contamination (at end 2019)6
Province CHAs Area (m2)
Rasht 3 531,000
Darvoz 6 762,231
Sh. Shohin 1 60,000
Sangvor 1 200,000
Totals 11 1,553,231
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Commission for the Implementation of International 
Humanitarian Law (CIIHL), chaired by the first deputy of the 
Prime Minister, and containing key representatives from 
relevant line ministries, acts as Tajikistan’s national mine 
action authority, responsible for mainstreaming mine action 
in the government’s socio-economic development policies.7
TNMAC is the executive arm of CIIHL and the body 
coordinating mine action, responsible for issuing task orders, 
information management and quality assurance (QA)/
quality control (QC).8 It was set up by government decree 
in January 2014 replacing the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre 
and taking over the process of managing transition to a fully 
nationally-owed programme.9 In 2016, Tajikistan’s Parliament 
adopted a Law on Humanitarian Mine Action, which covers 
all aspects of mine action, and in 2017 it approved a national 
mine action strategy for 2017–20.10
With transition in place, UNDP formally concluded its Support 
to Tajikistan Mine Action Programme (STMAP) project in 
September 2019.11 Any future support will be provided 
remotely from UNDP’s regional hub in Istanbul.12 The end 
of the programme resulted in loss of trained capacity for 
TNMAC as most STMAP staff were on UN salaries and left 
when the programme ended rather than continue on lower 
national salaries. It also raised questions as to whether 
TNMAC had sufficient staff capacity to fulfil its roles, notably 
in relation to planning and developing strategy.13
TAJIKISTAN
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The Ministry of Defence (MoD) plays a major role in Tajikistan’s mine action sector, in particular by conducting demining 
directly,14 but is not engaged in CMR clearance. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Programme Office  
in Dushanbe (OSCE POiD) has supported the MoD to update its multiyear plan, entitled “Ministry of Defence of the Republic  
of Tajikistan Co-operation Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2023.”15
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
TNMAC adopted a gender programme in October 2018 
that was prepared by the Geneva Mine Action Programme 
(GMAP, now a programme of the Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining, GICHD) and is committed to 
improving the situation of women in the mine action sector.16 
A UNDP evaluation concluded TNMAC had made progress 
mainstreaming gender and diversity in mine action but 
the strategy has not yet been systematically implemented. 
Areas for further action included ensuring that training of 
trainers for risk education was gender balanced, introducing 
women QA/QC officers and developing a code of conduct and 
complaints mechanisms.17 
Women account for around one fifth of personnel in survey 
and clearance teams in Tajikistan, and around one quarter 
of managerial/supervisory level positions. TNMAC plans to 
diversify survey teams to help reach a wider audience and 
more sources of information. Relevant mine action data are 
disaggregated by sex and age.18
TNMAC acknowledged it would be a challenge to achieve 
gender balance in view of the predominance of men in the 
military, where service is compulsory for men and voluntary 
for women. TNMAC said where it could identify key positions 
that can be filled by female candidates, such as paramedics 
and/or QA/QC officers, this will be discussed and prioritised. 
In addition, TNMAC will seek to increase female civilian 
capacity in coordination with other implementing partners.19 
The OSCE, which funds three demining teams, also seeks 
to promote gender awareness by collecting comprehensive 
relevant information.20 Meantime, the Ministry of Defence’s 
Humanitarian Demining Company (HDC) multi-task teams 
report to consult with all groups, including women and 
children, during survey and community liaison.21 
NPA has a gender and diversity policy integrated into its 
Tajikistan project proposals and operations. Three of its six 
support staff are women but its 59 operational staff include 
only 13 women (22%) with more men than women in its 
survey and community liaison teams. NPA ensures that all 
groups are included during community consultation activities, 
and says it has a gender balanced community liaison team to 
help ensure this. NPA disaggregates mine action data by sex 
and age.22
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
TNMAC completed an upgrade of its national mine action database from Information Management System for Mine Action 
(IMSMA) version 6.0 to IMSMA Core, which became fully operational in May 2019 making it easier to input, edit, and retrieve 
data. TNMAC also introduced new data collection forms intended to simplify data entry and improve data quality.23 The closure 
of UNDP’s support programme led to loss of trained staff and raised concerns it would be difficult to maintain information 
management standards.24 
PLANNING AND TASKING
Tajikistan’s Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in March 2019 forms 
the basis of its operational planning, superseding the National Strategy on Humanitarian Mine Action 2017–2020. The request 
said land release would concentrate on the Central region and the Tajik-Afghan border, especially the Shamsiddin Shohin 
district as the area most contaminated with anti-personnel mines.25 
Tajikistan does not have a strategic plan that addresses cluster munitions but TNMAC said in May 2020 it targeted completion 
of CMR clearance by 2023.26 
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Tajikistan’s revised National Mine Action Standards (TNMAS) were approved by Decree No. 162 on 1 April 2017. The revised 
standards have been translated into Russian and English.27 
TNMAC agreed to an NPA proposal to introduce the CMRS/technical survey methodology to Tajikistan and conducted a pilot 
project in the central region of the country in July 2019.28 It has approved NPA’s CMRS standing operating procedures (SOPs) 
for use by all operators.29
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OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Tajikistan’s overall operational capacity in 2019 consisted of the Ministry of Defence’s five HDC multi-task teams employing 50 
deminers,30 and NPA’s five multi-purpose teams with 38 deminers. Only NPA conducted survey and clearance of CMR in 2019. 
NPA established a non-technical/targeted technical survey team in 2019 with four surveyors, one paramedic, and one task 
supervisor, as support to TNMAC’s survey of mined and CMR-contaminated areas.31 NPA employed CMRS for the first time in 
Darvoz district confirming a hazard of 288,191m2 in 2019 and conducting a second CMRS task in 2020. Central areas affected  
by cluster munitions are only accessible in summer months between July and September.32
UST started to conduct CMRS in 2020 working with NPA on a task in Darvoz district’s Sagidasht municipality.33 UST, a national 
not-for-profit organisation, is accredited to conduct non-technical survey, risk education, and victim assistance, but is not yet 
accredited to conduct clearance.34
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Tajikistan released 724,420m2 of CMR-affected area through a combination of survey and clearance in 2019, 78% more than the 
previous year when only clearance occurred.35 
SURVEY IN 2019
TNMAC reported release through survey of 201,809m2 in 2019, all of it in reduction through technical survey by NPA.36 
CLEARANCE IN 2019
The only CMR clearance in 2019 was in Darvos district where NPA released a little over half a square kilometre (see Table 2), 
up from 407,571m2 in 2018, and destroying 89 submunitions, compared with 63 the previous year.37 
Table 2: CMR clearance in 201938
Operator Province Areas released Area cleared (m2) Submunitions destroyed UXO destroyed 
NPA Darvos 1 522,611 89 2
Totals 1 522,611 89 2
UXO = unexploded ordnance other than submunitions
TNMAC has given priority to clearance of anti-personnel mines and meeting its APMBC Article 5 clearance obligations and it 
has not elaborated a detailed plan for CM survey and clearance but said it expects to complete clearance to be completed by 
2023.39 Tajikistan’s government was reportedly preparing to establish a working group in late 2020 to consider the possibility 
of acceding to the CCM, bringing greater attention to this sphere of operations.40 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ Ukraine should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Ukraine should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants 
(CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
 ■ Ukraine should undertake a baseline survey of CMR contamination in areas to which it has effective access.
 ■ Ukraine should formally establish a national mine action authority and a functioning national mine action centre  
to manage clearance of CMR and other explosive ordnance.
 ■ Ukraine should elaborate a strategic plan for mine action, including for CMR survey and clearance.
 ■ Ukraine should systematically collect data on contamination from mines, CMR, and other explosive remnants of war 
(ERW), as well as progress in survey and clearance, and establish a centralised database for planning purposes.
 ■ Ukraine should consult with mine action stakeholders and elaborate standardised national criteria for the 
prioritisation of CMR clearance. 
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent of contamination from CMR in Ukraine is not known. Ukraine has said that many unexploded submunitions 
contaminate the Donetsk and Luhansk regions,1 with the most intensive use of cluster munitions said to have occurred in 
and around the city of Debalcevo in Donetsk oblast.2 In 2017 and again in 2020, Ukraine estimated, implausibly, that total 
contamination by mines and ERW (including CMR) could extend over 7,000km2.3 The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MoD)  
has accepted that this is a “rough” estimate.4 
It is further suggested that up to one fifth of the explosive contamination is from mines while the rest is from different ERW, 
including CMR.5 But Ukraine cannot reliably estimate the specific extent of CMR contamination until a baseline survey has been 
completed.6 The heaviest mine and ERW contamination is believed to be inside the 15km buffer zone between the warring 
parties, also called the Grey Zone.7 Non-technical and technical survey are being conducted in the government-controlled area 
(GCA) in eastern Ukraine but ongoing conflict means that evidence-based survey is not possible in the Grey Zone.8
In 2019, the HALO Trust added 74,035m2 of previously unrecorded CMR contamination to the database; Danish Demining Group 
(DDG) did not report any newly discovered areas of CMR contamination in 2019.9
Multiple reports from 2014 and 2015 indicated that both government forces and pro-Russian rebels used cluster munitions in 
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine. This included Smerch (Tornado) and Uragan (Hurricane) cluster munition 
rockets, which deliver 9N210 and 9N235 anti-personnel fragmentation submunitions; 300mm 9M55K cluster munition rockets 
with 9N235 submunitions; and 220mm 9M27K-series cluster munition rockets.10 
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Ukraine is contaminated by considerable quantities of other ERW as well as by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines used 
during the current conflict (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Ukraine for further information). It is 
also affected by unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) remaining from the First World War  
and Second World War11 and Soviet military training and stockpiles. In February 2016, Ukraine said that 32 former military 
firing ranges and the many other areas contaminated with explosive items from past wars covered 1,500km2.12 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
All mine action in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including CMR survey and clearance, are currently planned, coordinated, 
and controlled by the MoD, which operates the Kamyanets-Podilsky Demining Centre.13 Other national bodies involved in the 
sector include the Ministry of Internal Affairs, under which sits the State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU); the Security 
Services; the Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories; the State Special Transport Services (SSTS)  
of the MoD; the National Police; and the State Border Service.14
UKRAINE





The MoD has organisational control of operations, while SESU 
and STSS is generally responsible for conducting clearance. 
SESU established a “Special Humanitarian Demining Centre”  
in 2015 in Kiev. The centre’s remit includes coordination of SESU 
pyrotechnical teams (akin to rapid-response explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) teams) involved in technical and non-technical 
survey, demining, internal quality control (QC) of SESU units, 
information management, and handover of land cleared by SESU 
to local authorities, as well as risk education.15
Ukraine’s parliament adopted a national mine action law on 
6 December 2018, which was signed by the President on 22 
January 2019.16 However, the law could not be implemented.  
It was held to be incompatible with the Constitution of Ukraine 
because it gave authority to Parliament to create mine action 
institutions such as the national mine action authority (NMAA), 
which, as a “state body”, is the responsibility of the Cabinet of 
Ministers. Following presidential and parliamentary elections 
in September 2019, a working group was set up comprised of 
representatives from relevant government ministries and the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), NATO (the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, Project Co-ordinator in 
Ukraine (OSCE PCU) to prepare amendments to the law. In 
June 2020, the “Law on the Amendments to the Law on Mine 
Action in Ukraine” passed its first reading. UNDP, the OSCE 
PCU, The HALO Trust, and DDG drafted comments on a number 
of problematic issues in the draft, including the training and 
insurance of deminers; the possibility for international operators 
to use explosives to destroy items found during clearance 
(currently, only the MoD and SESU can blow up ordnance); 
handover procedures; and liability of actors after handover.17 
Adjustments are expected to be made to the draft of the 
revised Law taking these comments into account before 
its second reading. The amended Law was expected to be 
adopted in October 2020, before the adoption of the national 
budget for 2021.18 The Law establishes a framework for 
humanitarian demining, allocates responsibilities among 
state institutions, and envisages the creation of an NMAA 
and, strangely, two national mine action centres (NMACs). 
One NMAC will operate under the MoD Kamyanets-Podilsky 
Demining Centre while the other will be under SESU’s 
“Special Humanitarian Demining Centre”. Each centre will be 
accredited and have its own quality management capacity. 
Demining responsibility will be divided territorially between 
the two NMACs. The NMACs will be coordinated by the 
NMAA, an interagency body to be chaired by the MoD while 
“special conditions” exist in Ukraine. Thereafter, the Ministry 
of Interior will take charge. National mine action standards 
(NMAS) and the national mine action strategy will be adopted 
by the NMAA.19
Operators participate in monthly mine action sub-cluster 
meetings, chaired by UNDP, which are attended by 
representatives of the MoD, SESU, and MOFA. In addition,  
the OSCE PCU organises regular roundtable meetings on 
specific mine action topics.20
National funding is provided for mine and ERW clearance and 
quality control.21 The MoD and the Civil-Military Cooperation 
Directorate (CIMIC) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have 
supported operator survey and clearance on all matters 
related to security and, in particular, have supported the 
deployment of HALO Trust’s teams in the 15km buffer zone.22 
Ukraine also receives support from foreign partners (OSCE 
and NATO) for clearance equipment.23
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) has been working with the OSCE PCU and the 
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) to 
help foster mine action institutions.24 In 2019, the GICHD 
supported the development of new mine action legislation 
and the NMAS; provided training in quality management and 
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) 
Core; facilitated a regional roundtable on Explosive Ordnance 
Risk Education (EORE) communication approaches; and 
organised a visit to the Lebanon Mine Action Centre for the 
head of the three training programmes.25 The OSCE PCU has 
received funding until December 2021 to support Ukraine 
in establishing an NMAA and an NMAC; elaborating national 
standards and mine action legislation; developing the IMSMA 
database in co-operation with the GICHD; organising training 
in quality management, non-technical survey, and IMSMA; 
and procuring demining equipment for the MoD and SESU.26 
DDG provided capacity development to SESU in 2019 and, 
as at April 2020, was supporting equipment procurement; 
the development of standard operating procedures 
(SOPs); deployment/operational activity (mine clearance, 
non-technical survey); and quality assurance (QA)/
quality control (QC). In addition, DDG provided training on 
non-technical survey, clearance, and data management.27 
In 2019, The HALO Trust provided information management 
support and quality management training to the MoD. In 2020, 
HALO Trust was providing training to SESU on non-technical 
survey, medical support, geographic information systems 
(GIS), risk education, clearance, and quality management.28 
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
As at June 2020, no information had been provided on whether there is a gender policy and associated implementation plan  
for mine action in Ukraine.29
DDG has a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan. It ensures that all affected groups, including women and 
children, are consulted during survey and community liaison activities. However, as at April 2020, only 10% of operational 
roles were filled by women. With regard to managerial/supervisory positions, the Head of Programme and the Information 
Management Officer are both women, and in early 2020 DDG promoted a woman deminer to a Team Leader position.30
The HALO Trust uses mixed gender non-technical survey and community liaison teams. HALO Trust began recruiting women 
for clearance roles in 2017, employing the first female deminers in Ukraine.31 As at April 2020, 16% of operational survey and 
clearance staff were women along with 24% of managerial/supervisory staff.32
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
There are two functioning IMSMA databases in Ukraine, one 
managed by SESU and the other by the MoD, both of which 
collect and analyse contamination and land release data from 
national operators and NGOs.33 The databases are, though, 
claimed to be complementary, as they are separated based 
on region, thematic area, and operational purpose.34 In 2019, 
the GICHD facilitated the transition of the databases to IMSMA 
Core.35 The GICHD and OSCE PCU facilitated the first regional 
IMSMA Core Implementation workshop in Kyiv in September 
2019.36 As at July 2020, in order to ensure the two databases 
are compatible, the GICHD was working with SESU and the 
MoD on a minimum data standard. Once the amendments 
to the Law are adopted, the databases will be coordinated 
by the NMAA’s secretariat (the ministry of the chairman of 
the NMAA).37 The NMAA will be supported by OSCE through 
equipment and training to combine the data from the two 
databases and will be responsible for the official reporting on 
the survey and clearance of landmines, CMR, and other ERW.38
An online map of explosive contamination has been published 
by the MoD with technical support from The HALO Trust, 
using data from DDG, Swiss Foundation for Mine Action 
(FSD), The HALO Trust, and a commercial company, Demining 
Solutions.39 Operators submit survey and clearance data 
to the MoD on a monthly basis and each submitted a report 
at the end of 2019 on all survey and clearance data for the 
year.40 Despite all the capacity development support that 
Ukraine has received on information management the 
quality of official reporting remains poor. The lack of an 
operationalised mine action law has left Ukraine in a legal 
vacuum which makes it very difficult to obtain information  
on operational capacities and outputs. It is hoped that this 
will change once the amendments to the mine action law 
have been adopted.41 
PLANNING AND TASKING
Ukraine does not have a national mine action strategy and, as at May 2020, there were no plans to develop one.42 Ukraine 
submitted its “Annual Action Plan for humanitarian demining in liberated areas in Donetsk and Luhansk” for 2019 in May  
of that year, as requested by the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC.43 
There are currently no standardised criteria at national level for task prioritisation.44 Until an NMAC is established, all tasking 
of operators is managed by the MoD in line with its annual action plan.45 Local government have been helping the MoD to 
prioritise tasks based on humanitarian criteria.46 The MoD approves annual survey and clearance work plans submitted by 
operators. Operators prioritise clearance according to humanitarian impact and in discussion with the local community.47
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
NMAS were finalised by the MoD in September 2018 after multi-year input and review from key stakeholders.48 The NMAS were 
published in April 2019, but will only become compulsory once the new mine action legislation is passed; until then, they are 
not applied.49 In addition, The HALO Trust reported that the NMAS will require further development as many of the terms and 
definitions are not in line with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).50 
In April 2019, the Cabinet of Ministers approved Resolution 372 on “Regulations on marking mine and ERW hazards”, which are 
said to follow the provisions in the IMAS.51 The lack of an NMAC also means that operators’ SOPs are not currently accredited. 
Operators are therefore working in line with IMAS and donor contractual obligations rather than NMAS.52
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The MoD and several other ministries continue to deploy units that undertake clearance and destruction of mines and ERW. 
This includes engineer-sapper units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; the National Guard of Ukraine; the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, which conducts clearance through SESU and also has an engineering department that conducts EOD; the Security 
Service; the State Special Transport Service, which is responsible for demining national infrastructure; and the State Border 
Service, which conducts demining in areas under its control on land and in the sea.53 In its 2020 extension request, Ukraine 
reported that 60 “local administrations” are involved annually in demining in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.54
Three international demining organisations—DDG, FSD, and The HALO Trust—are operating in Ukraine.55 FSD suspended 
demining operations in 2019 due to lack of funding, though they have been actively looking for opportunities to continue 
their programme.56 In addition, the Ukrainian organisations Demining Team of Ukraine and Demining Solutions are active 
in demining in the east of the country.57 In its 2020 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, Ukraine reported that 41 
demining “groups” with a total of more than 500 people were involved in mine action from these organisations.58













HALO 23 276 0 3 Increased from 2018 by 7 manual demining 
teams (91 staff) and 2 mechanical support teams 
(remotely controlled vegetation cutters – 10 staff) 
DDG 2 23 0 0 No change from 2018.
Demining Solutions 1 7 0 0
Totals 26 306 0 3
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.
In 2019, the HALO Trust also deployed 12 non-technical survey personnel across 3 teams and 12 technical survey personnel 
across 2 teams. DDG did not deploy any survey personnel in 2019. The HALO Trust increased its clearance capacity in 2019 
compared to the previous year thanks to increased funding and intended to maintain that capacity in 2020 while increasing the 
number of technical survey teams to three.60 All DDG’s deminers are trained to conduct technical survey and will do so “as and 
when required”. DDG also has three non-technical survey teams totalling six people who conduct non-technical survey during 
the winter stand-down. DDG was due to increase its clearance capacity in 2020 to five teams totalling 34 deminers, also the 
result of increased funding.61
Another step forward in 2019 saw the MoD establish QC inspection teams. They began conducting post-clearance inspection 
visits, which enabled official handover of land to take place for the first time.62 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
HALO Trust cleared more than 68,000m2 of CMR-contaminated area in 2019. Neither the HALO Trust nor DDG conducted any 
survey of CMR-contaminated areas in 2019 (or in 2018). 
DDG did not conduct any clearance of CMR contamination areas in 2019 nor 2018 but cleared 445,009m2 of area that was 
suspected to contain anti-vehicle mines and UXO, destroying nine anti-vehicle mines and three items of UXO.63
The HALO Trust cleared 68,230m2 of CMR-contaminated area in the village of Svatove in Svativskyi district and found and 
destroyed four submunitions. HALO Trust also destroyed one submunition during a spot task.64 This is an increase from the 
49,010m2 HALO cleared in 2018, along with the destruction of two submunitions.65 
Table 2: CMR clearance in 201966
District/Village Operator Area cleared (m²) Submunitions destroyed UXO destroyed
Svativskyi/Svatove HALO Trust 68,230 4 103
Totals 68,230 4 103
UXO = Unexploded ordnance excluding submunitions
No target date has been set for the completion of CMR clearance in Ukraine. Although it is understood that, in addition to 
clearance conducted by operators, some clearance of CMR contamination has been undertaken by the MoD the extent is 
unclear as that information has not been made available by the national authorities.67 
Access to CMR contamination is a problem in certain areas either because of security concerns or because of their proximity to 
active military sites.68 In addition, Ukraine has not had full control over parts of its territory with suspected CMR contamination 
since conflict erupted in 2014. 
Russia has obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible, in particular by virtue of  
its duty to protect the right to life of every person under its jurisdiction, in any areas of Ukraine over which it exercises 
effective control.
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Vietnam is currently in an important period for increased attention towards mine action, as the national programme develops 
its legal framework, structure, policies, and standards. With the adoption of a new national mine action decree in 2019, 
followed up with a more detailed Guiding Circular in February 2020, the Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC) has now 
been officially empowered to start coordinating humanitarian mine action in Vietnam. Progress has already started towards 
establishing a fully functioning national information management database, and national quality management (QM) capacity, 
and there were plans to update national mine action standards in 2020 to bring them more in line with the international mine 
action standards (IMAS).
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
 ■ Vietnam should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Despite not yet being a State Party to the CCM, Vietnam has obligations under international human rights law  
to clear cluster munition remnants (CMR) in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ In collaboration with implementing partners, VNMAC should elaborate a new national mine action strategy  
and annual workplans for CMR, with clear targets for survey and clearance.
 ■ VNMAC should expand non-technical and technical survey and establish a nationwide baseline of CMR 
contamination.
 ■ National Technical Regulations (QCVNs) and National Mine Action Standards (TCVNs) should be updated in line  
with IMAS.
 ■ VNMAC should accelerate development of a fully functional national information management database and  
make Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) data available to all clearance operators and 
relevant stakeholders.
 ■ VNMAC should publish comprehensive annual reports on the results of survey and clearance by all operators.
 ■ VNMAC should more actively engage in regional sector discussions aimed at accelerating the progress of CMR 
survey, particularly on survey efficiencies and effectiveness.
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Vietnam is massively contaminated by CMR but no accurate estimate exists, even to the nearest hundred square kilometres. 
An explosive remnants of war (ERW) impact survey, started in 2004 and completed in 2014, was only published in 2018. It said 
that 61,308km2 or 19% of Vietnam’s land surface area was affected by ERW, but did not specify the area affected by CMR. It 
found, though, that CMR affected 32 of Vietnam’s 63 provinces and cities.1
In Quang Tri, reputedly Vietnam’s most contaminated province, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) is carrying out a province-wide 
survey.2 Estimates of CMR-contaminated area are increasing sharply as survey progresses. As at May 2020, NPA had 
completed non-technical survey of all villages (76% of the total number of villages) made available for non-technical survey 
in Quang Tri province; and technical survey by NPA had confirmed 429km2 (or 9% of the total area of Quang Tri province) as 
contaminated by CMR. It planned to complete technical survey of the remaining villages by April 2021.3 
In Quang Binh province, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has used a desk-top non-technical survey methodology – Evidence 
Point Polygon (EPP) mapping – to map initial confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). The EPP technique, pioneered by MAG, 
uses historical and ongoing operational data from GPS-recorded explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks involving 
submunitions to plot what are termed Initial CHAs (iCHAs). Based on extrapolations of available data, as at June 2019, MAG 
estimated that its historical data would lead to more than 42km² being defined as contaminated. However, because MAG’s data 
does not cover the whole province, overall contamination levels for Quang Binh will be higher than those being defined through 
EPP mapping. From April 2019, MAG deployed one technical survey team in Quang Binh province to complement EPP mapping 
data and to define CHAs for clearance and survey the areas in between adjacent iCHAs, to merge them into one larger CHA.4 
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In Thua Thien Hue province, in collaboration with VNMAC and the provincial authorities, NPA has been implementing CMRS 
in four districts. Initial technical survey to-date has shown that at least 45km2 is contaminated by CMR in the western district 
of A Luoi. EOD and non-technical survey operations by NPA in the province have located potential hazardous areas that need 
technical operations to further define the contamination.5
The United States (US) dropped 413,130 tons of submunitions over Vietnam between 1965 and 1973, reportedly striking  
55 provinces and cities. Vietnam’s Military Engineering Command has recorded finding 15 types of US-made submunitions. 
Most submunition types were air-dropped, but artillery-delivered submunitions were also used in central Quang Binh and 
provinces to the south.6 Most of the CMR that international operators encounter in Quang Tri are BLU types 26, 29, and 61, 
and occasionally Mk 20 Rockeyes,7 as well as BLU 63 in Quang Binh province.8 In Quang Nam, almost all the CMR cleared by 
Danish Demining Group (DDG) were M83 submunitions.9 The Military Engineering Command encountered substantial amounts 
of cluster munitions abandoned by the US military, notably at or around old US air bases, including eight underground bunkers 
found in 2009, one reportedly covering 4,000m2 and containing some 25 tons of munitions.10 
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Vietnam has huge unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination and an unquantified mine problem (see Mine Action Review’s 
Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Vietnam for further information). The ERW impact survey identified the most heavily 
contaminated regions as the central coastal provinces, the Central Highlands, the Mekong River delta, and the Red River delta.11 
The experience of international operators in central Vietnam points to wide variations in contamination types from district to 
district. International operators report encountering mainly projectiles, mortars, grenades, and some aircraft bombs.12 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC) was 
established in 2014 by Prime Ministerial decision (No. 738 
of 2013) to strengthen the direction of mine action and 
provide a focal point for mine action operations,13 although 
management and operations continued to depend largely  
on the Armed Forces. 
In a positive development, Vietnam’s mine action programme 
is now undergoing significant restructuring, following the 
Decree on the Management and Implementation of Mine 
Action Activities, issued in February 2019 (Decree No. 18)  
and subsequent approval of a Guiding Circular which came 
into effect in February 2020 (Guiding Circular No. 195).14 
Under Decree No. 18, while the Ministry of National Defence 
(MoD) will continue to elaborate and preside over the 
national mine action programme, as the lead authority, in 
coordination with other relevant ministries and sectors,15 
VNMAC will, under the direction of the Prime Minister and 
management of the MoD, “monitor, coordinate and implement 
mine action tasks”.16 Guiding Circular No. 195, which details 
a number of articles and methods regarding implementation 
of the Decree, also officially appoints VNMAC as the national 
coordinator of mine action activities in Vietnam.17 Therefore, 
this is an important period for VNMAC, as the national 
programme develops its legal framework, structure, policies, 
and standards. 
While there is still a need for greater transparency from 
VNMAC, international mine action organisations reported that 
their coordination and collaboration with VNMAC improved 
throughout 2019, most notably with VNMAC’s engagement 
with the Landmine Working Group (LWG). The LWG, which 
is co-chaired by NPA and the International Centre (IC), is 
a platform for humanitarian mine action stakeholders in 
Vietnam to meet quarterly to share and discuss updates that 
impact the sector, although in 2019 the LWC only met twice 
and in 2020 as at June, no LWC had yet taken place. In 2019, 
VNMAC participated and engaged in this forum, specifically 
calling on LWG members to help it develop Decree No. 18 and 
Guiding Circular No. 195.18 During 2020, the LWG was due to 
be involved in the planned update to the national regulations 
and standards. International operators hope that VNMAC will 
use the LWG forum for collective discussions on continued 
improvements in coordination and collaboration of mine 
action in Vietnam.19
In addition, VNMAC’s coordination and collaboration with 
the already well-established Quang Tri Mine Action Centre 
(QTMAC) is also starting to develop, and the respective 
provincial and national database units are both working to 
synchronise historical data. VNMAC now produces an annual 
mine action calendar covering the work and activities of all 
international mine action organisations, and in 2019 VNMAC 
initiated a biannual operations report covering the activities 
and results of all international NGOs in Vietnam.20 
MAG, NPA, PeaceTrees Vietnam (PTVT), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), and Golden West all 
provide capacity development support in Vietnam. 
MAG and NPA facilitated and hosted familiarisation visits by 
VNMAC to their offices and task sites, to study operations, 
information management, and quality management (QM).21 
In Quang Tri province, MAG and NPA continued to support 
QTMAC and in particular, provided inputs to establish 
Vietnam’s first provincial mine action centre, to enhance 
its managing and coordinating role, finalise clearance 
prioritisation forms and processes, and they also facilitated 
visits to field operations for piloting the process. Various 
capacity development initiatives were conducted or 
provided for QTMAC staff, including sharing state-of-the art 
technologies in the sector like the use of ArcGIS Online and 
drones for data collection an operations management.22 
During 2019, MAG also worked with the provincial authorities 
and the military in Quang Binh province to coordinate 
operations, and supported the development of a provincial 
Mine Action Strategy. A joint proposal between MAG, 
NPA, and PTVN was signed and approved in May 2020, 
and includes survey, clearance, EOD, risk education and a 
capacity development component regarding establishing a 
provincial coordination committee and mine action database 
in Quang Binh province. Operations commenced in June.23




NPA is implementing three capacity-development 
projects with VNMAC. The first project provides an 
NPA Senior Technical Advisor who works with VNMAC 
senior management on issues related to their strategic, 
organisational, and individual development as well as on 
donor liaison and resource mobilisation. The second involves 
the provision of an NPA Information Management Technical 
Advisor to VNMAC, to assist VNMAC in its establishment 
of a national information management system, including 
mentoring of VNMAC’s Information Management Unit, 
which runs the national database. Lastly, NPA provides 
a Capacity Development Advisor who supports QTMAC 
management in coordination between all mine action actors 
in accordance with the QTMAC policy, as well as supporting 
operational planning/prioritisation and policy and procedural 
development.24 The NPA-VNMAC technical survey project is 
an evolving process to formulate a technical survey standing 
operating procedure (SOP) for Vietnam.
In addition, as part of the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID)’s global mine action programme (GMAP) 
II project in 2019, led by MAG, NPA has the responsibility to 
train four members of the VNMAC’s Consultancy, Survey and 
Quality Management Centre to become the first national QM 
team. The training was completed at the end of March 2020 
and the VNMAC personnel will be certified as QA officers, 
with additional training and mentoring provided during 
2020.25 MAG believes that coordination and collaboration with 
VNMAC has been strengthened as a result of this project.26
PTVT undertakes joint efforts to support and help enhance 
the management and coordination of QTMAC and VNMAC. In 
partnership with Golden West, PTVT hosts field mentoring visits 
of VNMAC and visits and trips of QTMAC and VNMAC to enable 
them to study operations, information management, and QM.27 
VNMAC, the Korea International Cooperation Agency 
(KOICA), and UNDP are collaborating on a US$30 million 
project for ERW survey and clearance (KV-MAP), and to 
support information management resources, risk education, 
and victim assistance in two central provinces (Binh Dinh 
and Quang Binh) for three years (2018–20). A Joint Project 
Management Unit (JPMU), with representatives from 
each of the three organisations, is responsible for project 
management, supported by a UNDP chief technical adviser 
who joined in March 2018, and meets weekly.28 A Joint Project 
Coordination Committee (JPCC), comprising representatives 
from the MoD, VNMAC, UNDP, and KOICA, provides overall 
strategic guidance and oversight and meets twice a year.29
Golden West is providing IMAS-compliant EOD training 
to Provincial Military Commands in Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, 
and Quang Tri provinces to provide a sustained clearance 
response, as well as advising VNMAC on technologies and 
training and supporting US military-to-military EOD training. 
Vietnam was serving as chair of ASEAN and of the ASEAN 
Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC) in 2020.30 Vietnam is 
also a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) for 2020–2021.
There is a well-established process for granting work 
permits and visas to international mine action staff and for 
procurement of demining equipment, although the importation 
of equipment can be lengthy, depending on the nature of the 
items.31 The memorandum of understanding (MoU) approval 
process was reported to be inconsistent between provinces.32 
However, it is hoped with the adoption of Decree No. 18 and of 
Guiding Circular No. 195, processes that enable effective mine 
action at a central level will improve.33
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
As at June 2020, Vietnam had not provided information  
on whether it has a gender policy and implementation plan 
for mine action or on the proportion of female employees  
at VNMAC.
DDG has a gender policy and implementation plan and 
promotes equal access to employment opportunities. DDG 
used community meetings, focus group discussions, and 
household interviews to ensure that consultation with local 
people during survey activities is inclusive. Survey teams 
were for the most part made up of both men and women.34 
Of the three operators, DDG had the highest proportion of 
women employed,35 but ceased operations in Vietnam in 
January 2020 due to lack of funding.36
MAG has a gender policy, which is also incorporated into 
other policies and procedures. It encourages diversity and 
inclusion within its recruitment, training, and promotion 
procedures, ensuring equal opportunities for all staff.37 As 
at June 2020, MAG was employing 727 staff in Vietnam. 
Women account for 25% of MAG’s total operational capacity in 
Vietnam and 22% of managerial/supervisory level positions.38 
MAG’s community liaison teams are gender balanced and 
trained to involve all groups, including women and children.39
NPA follows Vietnamese law in regards to providing equal 
opportunity and non-discrimination in employment. NPA 
continues to work towards gender equality in the recruitment 
process and in the work place. Women are actively 
encouraged to apply for roles and to pursue development 
opportunities once employed.40 NPA employs a total of 278 
staff in Vietnam, of whom 29% are female, including 22% of 
operational staff and 26% of management-level positions.41 
NPA’s non-technical survey teams are gender balanced to 
engage with affected populations regardless of gender or 
age. NPA has found this inclusive process effective for later 
technical survey within the Cluster Munition Remnant Survey 
(CMRS) process.42
PTVN had gender policies in place and encourages diversity 
and inclusion within its recruitment, training, and procedures 
for promotion, ensuring equal opportunities for all staff. It has 
127 staff in Vietnam, 23 of whom are women, including 39% of 
management-level positions and 15% of operational staff. PTVN 
also has six ethnic minority staff in its operational teams.43
MAG’s, NPA’s and DDG’s operations data are disaggregated  
by sex and age.44 
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Data quality and accessibility continues to be a major 
challenge in Vietnam. VNMAC is responsible for national 
information management and uses the IMSMA. However, 
information is not currently shared with mine action 
operators.45 The ERW impact survey report released in 2018 
noted that “regulations on reporting demining activities 
have not been strictly followed”. Authorities had, however, 
received clearance data for Ha Tinh and Quang Tri provinces, 
where international donors have supported operations.46 
VNMAC also receives data from the 2018–20 joint KV-MAP 
project, between VNMAC, KOICA, and UNDP in Binh Dinh  
and Quang Binh provinces.47
However, deficiencies in national-level information 
management are now starting to be addressed by VNMAC, 
made possible by Decree No. 18 and Guiding Circular No. 
195, which makes clear that VNMAC is responsible for the 
management and development of the national mine action 
database. The Director General of VNMAC is responsible for 
regulating the scope, content, and nature of mine action data 
that is allowed to be shared and accessed by the information 
users. As at April 2020, VNMAC was in the process of 
determining how information management will be collected 
nationally and shared.48
A number of data collection forms are used in Vietnam by 
different mine action actors. However, following the adoption 
of Guiding Circular No. 195, it is expected that national 
regulations and standards will be updated to allow for the 
approval of one set of standardised data collection forms 
across Vietnam.49
NPA is working with VNMAC at the national level to establish 
information management units (IMUs) to collect and collate 
information from across Vietnam and give transparent 
access to available data. Throughout 2019, VNMAC’s IMU 
worked to input historical data stored on other databases 
and available data from the provinces; a process which was 
expected to be completed in 2020.50 
At the provincial level, during 2019, QTMAC, MAG, NPA, and 
PTVN hosted a number of visits by VNMAC to share experience 
in project management, including information management 
and operational databases. In Quang Tri province, the 
QTMAC database unit has been running well and is able to 
autonomously collect, collate, analyse, and task operators 
based on information shared by all mine action stakeholders in 
the province (domestic and international, civilian and military. 
Access to the Quang Tri IMSMA database is free and accessible 
to all mine action stakeholders (online website) while ensuring 
data protection.51 The database provides a basis for planning 
and tasking, as well as victim data.
Data hosted at QTMAC’s DBU are believed to be accurate, 
up to date, and reliable, have been the catalyst for greater 
coordination across all stakeholders within the province.52 
Development of information management is an aim of the 
KV-MAP project, the goal of which is to improve available 
information for the UXO/mine action sector to support 
informed policy making and task prioritisation.53 In 2018, 
Database Centers for Mine Action were established in 
Quang Binh and Binh Dinh provinces with training provided 
to provincial staff. As at June 2019, these centres manage 
the data from the KV-MAP project which is then fed into the 
VNMAC database. But the aim is for the KV-MAP DBU to 
report to the provincial DBU to be established at the DOFA.54 
In October 2019, MAG initiated a partnership with NPA and 
PTVN, which includes support to the Quang Binh provincial 
Department of Foreign Affairs to establish a central database 
in the province, based on the Quang Tri database unit model.55 
NPA planned to support the creation of the Thua Thien Hue 
Department of Foreign Affairs database (DOFA) unit from 
June 2020.56
PLANNING AND TASKING
VNMAC would benefit elaborating a national mine action 
strategy and annual workplans for CMR, with clear targets 
for survey and clearance. Vietnam does not yet have a 
strategy specifically targeting CMR. Decision 504, approved 
by the Prime Minister in April 2010, set out a National 
Mine Action Plan for 2010–25. The plan aimed to “mobilize 
domestic and international resources in making efforts to 
minimize and finally create impact-free environment for social 
economic development.” It called for clearance of 8,000km2  
of ERW between 2016 and 2025.57
As at June 2020, no information had been formally provided 
by VNMAC on the realisation of its 2019 goals or on its goals 
for 2020.
As at June 2020, there was no national prioritisation system 
for CMR clearance. However, in Quang Tri province, there is 
a prioritisation plan in place and an effective system for task 
allocation.58 The prioritisation processes and accompanying 
forms were piloted in 2018 and were rolled out in May 2019, 
with QTMAC now managing the province-wide clearance task 
prioritisation process.59 The criteria are established based on 
consultation and agreement between QTMAC and operators. 
The QTMAC tasks all mine action operators in the province 
and annual workplans are approved by provincial authorities, 
in cooperation and dialogue with operators.60 
In Quang Binh province, there is no survey or clearance 
tasking by national or provincial authorities.61 MAG has 
first been applying its own procedures and process to 
prioritise clearance tasks based on scores of consent, 
hazard assessment, and community benefits.62 From the 
adoption of the prioritisation process in Quang Tri, MAG 
has been applying the same procedures and process in 
Quang Binh in agreement with provincial authorities. This to 
ensure consistent approach across provinces and to foster 
standardisation.63 In Quang Binh, MAG produces its own task 
dossiers to the same standard as those in Quang Tri. These 
will be submitted once Quang Binh has a functioning mine 
action coordination body.64 




To address the challenge of effective planning for mine action operations in Quang Binh, NPA in joint consortium with MAG, 
PTVN, and PPC of Quang Binh is proposing a plan for CMRS of the whole province. The survey ambition, based largely on 
non-technical and technical survey, works to delineate contaminated areas in all Quang Binh and aims to better understand  
the nature and extent of contamination in the province, and help inform planning processes.65
In Thua Then Hue province, tasking for NGO operators is decided by provincial authorities in accordance to the provincial 
socio-economic development plan.66
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Vietnam has both National Technical Regulations (QCVNs), which are legally binding and similar in content to standing 
operating procedures SOPs, and National Mine Action Standards (TCVNs), which despite being standards are considered 
optional by VNMAC and the MoD.67 
The existing QCVNs and TCVNs are outdated and not in line with IMAS.68 According to NPA, the current QCVNs are drafted with 
the MoD in mind and without consideration of other operators’ SOPs, equipment use, land release methods, or structure and 
composition of teams. There are issues with the terminology used in TCVNs, chapters contradict themselves, and they read as 
a combination of SOPs and standards.69 However, in a positive development, VNMAC plans to update the QCVNs and TCVNs in 
2020 to bring them in line with IMAS.70 As part of this process, VNMAC will update the SOP on QM and the SOP on technical and 
non-technical survey, and although consideration was given on whether to merge the QCVNs and TCVNs into one document,71 
as at August 2020 the QCVNs were being updated separately.72 Work commenced in May 2020, with the aim to complete the 
required updates by the end of the year, but it will likely take longer to elaborate and approve the new circulars needed. 
Updates will reportedly be made in consultation with LWG members and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD).73
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Most clearance in Vietnam is conducted by the Army 
Engineering Corps and military-owned commercial 
companies; coordination for which does not fall under the 
remit of VNMAC (although Engineering Command teams are, 
however, also deployed as part of the joint KV-MAP project). 
Outside the central provinces, the current strength and 
deployment of military-related demining is unknown.
Since 2016, the Golden West Humanitarian Foundation, 
supported by US funding, has been training and mentoring 
the Provincial Military Commands (PMC) EOD teams in 
Quang Tri, Quang Binh and Ha Tihn. The Quang Tri PMC EOD 
team is now fully integrated into the tasking structure of the 
QTMAC as a valuable asset to the province. The Quang Binh 
PMC are coordinating closely with the KOICA project and 
offering support to them. Officials have previously reported 
that it had 250 mine clearance and battle area clearance 
(BAC) teams nationally. Vietnam reportedly has more than 70 
military-owned companies undertaking clearance related to 
infrastructure and commercial and development projects.74
International operators active in 2019 included DDG, working in 
Quang Nam province; MAG, working in Quang Binh and Quang 
Tri provinces; NPA, working in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Hue 
provinces; and PeaceTrees Vietnam, who have been working 
in Quang Tri province since 1995. DDG ceased operations in 
Vietnam in January 2020, due to lack of funding.75
DDG deployed two non-technical survey teams in 2019, 
totalling four personnel and two clearance teams, totalling  
20 personnel. DDG only operated in Quang Nam province in 
2019, as it was not able to secure funding for its operations  
in Thua Tien Hue province. It subsequently ceased operations 
in Vietnam in January 2020. 76
MAG deployed 39 clearance teams, totalling 390 deminers 
in 2019, and 1 technical survey team, totalling 10 personnel 
from April 2019. This represented an increase of five teams 
compared to 2018.77 In 2019, MAG received permission from 
the Vietnam People’s Army Department of Operations for the 
deployment of drones to support its operations in designated 
areas in Trieu Phong and Hai Lang districts, Quang Tri 
province from May 2019. The permission is renewed every 
three months with the Department of Operations.78
In 2019, NPA had 11 non-technical survey teams (10 pairs of 
survey personnel in Quang Tri and 1 pair in Thua Tient Hue 
province), totalling 22 survey personnel; 25 technical survey 
teams totalling 125 personnel; and 3 manual clearance teams 
totalling 36 deminers (26 in Quang Tri and 10 in Thua Thien 
Hue province).79 NPA planned to start up non-technical and 
technical survey operations in Quang Binh province in 2020.80 
The operational data feedback loop and sharing of knowledge 
between MAG and NPA as part of their partnership in Quang 
Tri continues and will also be replicated in Quang Binh,81 once 
NPA becomes operational there in 2020. 
PTVN operates in Quang Tri province and most of its 
operations are in the two mountainous districts of Huong Hoa 
and Dakrong. It undertakes EOD, clearance, and integrated 
risk education, but does not conduct CMRS. In 2019, PTVN 
deployed 6 clearance teams (totalling 72 technicians/
deminers), 2 EOD teams (totalling 16 technicians), and 2 
clearance support teams of 15 personnel. This represented 
an almost doubling of capacity compared to 2018. All of 
PTVN’s technicians are certified for IMAS EOD Level 1, and 
under a capacity development partnership with Golden West, 
by the end of 2019 PTVN had 11 technicians certified in IMAS 
EOD Level 3 (plus 3 under mentoring) and 31 technicians 
certified in IMAS EOD Level 2. PTVN’s capacity includes 2 
pairs of surveyors, who focus on re-survey CHAs for the 
purpose of planning and evaluation.82
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PTVN also planned to commence operations in Quang Binh 
province in 2020, together with MAG and NPA, with 4 multi-task 
teams totalling 32 technicians. PTVN’s technicians will mostly 
be responsible for EOD spot tasks resulting from the Quang 
Binh hotline and from NPA’s survey, along with joint efforts 
with MAG to conduct clearance of CHAs generated.83
KV-MAP (between VNMAC, KOICA, and UNDP), which 
was initiated in February 2018, calls for ERW survey and 
clearance in the two provinces in 2018–20 to be carried out 
by provincial military teams targeting survey of 200km2 and 
clearance of about 80km2.84 In 2018, operations in Quang 
Binh and Binh Dinh focused on survey, with 21 survey teams 
deployed.85 Clearance began in 2019 and, as of June, 12 
clearance teams were deployed. An additional two survey 
teams have also been deployed to Quang Binh. According  
to VNMAC data provided by UNDP, capacity in 2019 was  
21 survey teams and 64 clearance teams. Technical survey 
operations were completed in April 2020 and the project 
then focused more on clearance, with 85 clearance teams 
deployed for ERW clearance (including CMR).86
In 2018, a Quality Management System (QMS) consisting of 
eleven procedures was developed by VNMAC and the GICHD 
and was piloted in KV-MAP.87 A new 2020 QM SOP was close 
to being finalised as at the start of October, as part of the 
revision of the QCVNs.88 As mentioned previously, under a 
DFID funded project, NPA was helping to establish and train a 
VNMAC QM team, with a view to receiving accreditation in the 
first half of 2020 from VNMAC, with NPA and GICHD support.89 
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
As at writing, national land release data from VNMAC for 2019 had still to be made available.
Based on data reported by international NGOs, in 2019, nearly 157km2 was confirmed as containing CMR by technical survey 
and 6,352 submunitions were found and destroyed in the process. 
A total of nearly 39km2 of CMR-contaminated area was cleared by international NGOs with 7,871 submunitions found and 
destroyed. A further 1,050 submunitions were found and destroyed during spot tasks. 
SURVEY IN 2019
In Quang Tri, ranked as one of Vietnam’s most heavily contaminated provinces, NPA continued to work in a partnership with 
MAG, under which NPA conducted CMRS and MAG cleared the resulting CHAs. As part of the process of refining CMRS, 
NPA continued to adopt a more systematic technical survey approach that included 50-metre fade-out and “skip boxes” 
methodology which have significantly accelerated the process of defining CHA boundaries. A fade-out of 50 metres whenever 
evidence of CMR was found was introduced in April 2016 which was augmented by the introduction, in January 2018, of 
skipping two boxes in each direction of a box with a confirmed evidence point.90 NPA aimed to complete survey of Quang Tri  
by April 2021.91












MAG Quang Binh 7,952,500 7 6,521,349 343 23
NPA Quang Tri 80,182,500 162 147,350,462 5,908 2,835
NPA Thua Thien Hue 1,772,500 2 2,975,000 101 21
Totals 89,907,500 171 156,846,811 6,352 2,879
NPA confirmed 150.3km2 as containing CMR in 2019, an increase on the 113.4km2 confirmed as CHA the previous year, which it 
said was due to an increased number of technical survey teams and the introduction of improved methodology for technical 
survey (CMRS v5).93 The box-skipping methodology has significantly increased the accuracy, effectiveness, and efficiency of 
survey and clearance in Quang Tri province.94 
MAG surveyed 7,952,500m2 in Quang Binh, during which it found and destroyed 343 CMR and 23 other UXO.95
CLEARANCE IN 2019
Operators cleared over 38.5km2 in 2019, an increase of 46% on the 26.3km2 cleared in 2018, however, 2018 did not include PTVN 
clearance data. Clearance data for the PMC in 2019 was not known, including how much CMR-contaminated area was cleared 
in 2019 by provincial military teams coordinated by VNMAC as part of the KV-MAP ERW project.




Table 2: CMR clearance in 201996
Operator Province Area cleared (m²) Submunitions destroyed Other UXO destroyed
MAG Quang Binh 6,942,818 2,422 600
DDG Quang Nam 88,990 23 19
MAG Quang Tri 26,219,397 4,583 5,552
NPA Quang Tri 1,813,572 487 680
PTVN Quang Tri 3,156,776 198 664
PMC* N/K N/K N/K N/K
NPA Thua Thien Hue 321,300 158 95
Totals 38,542,853 7,871 7,610
N/K = not known 
A further 1,050 submunitions were found and destroyed 
during EOD spot tasks in 2019: 5 by DDG, 466 by MAG,  
151 by NPA, and 428 by PTVN.97
DDG deployed battle area clearance teams to areas with 
suspected contamination as estimated by non-technical 
survey teams. Clearance of the area then began from 
evidence points collected by the non-technical survey  
teams and clearance to fade-out was applied to determine  
the boundaries of clearance.98
In Quang Tri, MAG conducts clearance in partnership with 
NPA, which defines CHAs through technical survey. In Quang 
Binh, MAG clears CHAs defined through EPP Mapping. 
MAG’s total clearance of 33.16km2 in 2019 is a significant 
increase on the 24.81km2 the previous year and is due to an 
increase in clearance capacity from the beginning of 2019. 
All CHAs cleared by MAG in 2019 were found to have CMR 
contamination.99 MAG adjusted its methodology in 2019, 
merging a number of CHAs close to each other into larger 
CHAs in Quang Binh province.100
In 2018, Quang Tri PMC was in the process of being organised 
into a functional EOD team so tasks were minimal, but 
outputs are expected to increase in 2019. The Quang Binh 
PMC did no clearance and responded to minimal spot tasks  
in 2018. This was being addressed in 2019.101
Vietnam has not set a target date for the completion of  
CMR clearance. In its national mine action plan for 2010 to 
2025 it called for the clearance of 8,000km2 of ERW from  
2016 to 2025102 but did not specify how much of this should  
be CMR. The lack of a baseline of CMR contamination and  
a lack of information at a national level about ongoing  
survey and clearance across the country makes it difficult  
to understand both Vietnam’s annual progress in reducing 
CMR contamination and how this contributes to the 
completion of CMR clearance.
In the past, the challenge for VNMAC was identifying 
and implementing the legal framework that would allow 
mine action stakeholders to support the decision-making 
process,103 but addressing this should now be possible under 
the Decree 85 and Guiding Circular 195. It is hoped that 
their adoption will enable VNMAC to put in place systems 
and practices to coordinate and strengthen mine action in 
Vietnam, bringing national standards relating to survey and 
clearance operations in line with IMAS, and establishing a 
national information management database accessible to all 
mine action stakeholders to more accurately determine the 
extent of CMR contamination; and to set national priorities  
for clearance.
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Golden West is partnering with the GICHD in a Management of Residual Explosive Remnants of War project to study the 
ERW ageing; develop standards for the collection, cutting, and dissection of ERW; and to draw up and pilot a long-term risk 
management model.104
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More than 3km2 of battle area were cleared in emergency clearance in 2019, along with the destruction of more than 7,000 
unexploded submunitions. In April 2020, YEMAC opened a coordination centre in Aden intended to strengthen programme 
management in areas controlled by the internationally recognised government.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
 ■ Yemen should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.
 ■ Yemen should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants 
(CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ Yemen Mine Action Centre (YEMAC) should expand support for international operators to accelerate training, 
survey and clearance.
 ■ YEMAC should increase transparency by publishing regular, comprehensive reports on developments in its 
management, planning, and implementation of mine action.
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
YEMAC has reported the presence of CMR in six governorates but the extent is not known. Contamination is believed to be heavy 
in Saada and al-Jawf governorates as well as in Amran, Hodeida, Mawit, and Sana’a governorates, including in Sana’a City.1 
Yemen had CMR contamination before 2015 but the escalation of armed conflict since 26 March 2015 has significantly increased 
both its extent and the threat to the civilian population, mainly as a result of airstrikes by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition.2 Human 
Rights Watch said it had recorded Saudi air strikes using cluster munitions dating back to 2009.3 In December 2016, the organisation 
reported that 18 coalition attacks using cluster munitions since 2015 had killed at least 18 civilians and injured 74 more.4 
Human rights groups have documented the use of United States (US) BLU-63 (Sana’a City), BLU-97 combined effect 
submunitions (Saada governorate), CBU-58 and CBU-105 sensor-fused munitions (Amran and Sana’a governorates), Brazilian 
Astros ll munitions (Saada governorate and city), and British BL755 submunitions (Hajjah governorate). They have also 
reported use of ZP-39 artillery-delivered submunitions of indeterminate origin.5
No air strikes using cluster munitions by the Saudi-led coalition have been recorded since May 2017.6 The coalition, however, 
has continued air strikes into 2019, contributing to Yemen’s already significant contamination by explosive remnants of war 
(ERW), including a wide range of rockets, mortars, and artillery shells.7 There is also a significant threat from anti-personnel and 
anti-vehicle mines, including mines of an improvised nature (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report for details).
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Management of mine action in Yemen is divided along the lines of the conflict that erupted in March 2015 between the Houthi 
(Ansar Allah) movement controlling the capital Sana’a and much of the north and west, and the internationally recognised 
government (IRG), operationally based in Aden and the south. The Sana’a-based inter-ministerial National Mine Action 
Committee (NMAC), which previously formulated national mine action policy, is no longer recognised by the IRG, which 
reported it had disbanded in 2019. In the south, YEMAC has fulfilled the double role of regulator responsible for policy and 
planning while also serving as the sole national operator.8 
YEMAC was established in Sana’a in January 1999 as a national mine action agency and nominally maintains a national role 
today, with more than 1,000 staff working in 20 of Yemen’s 21 governorates as at late 2019.9 In practice, however, YEMAC has 
split into two, centred round Sana’a and Aden. The Sana’a office employed around 500 staff, working in northern governorates 
controlled by the Houthi forces. From Aden, YEMAC operated with some 550 staff mainly active in 2019 in Abyan, Aden, Amran, 
Lahej, and Taiz governorates.10 
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In April 2020, YEMAC opened a coordination centre in Aden 
intended to strengthen programme management in areas 
controlled by the IRG. The centre is intended to facilitate 
cooperation with international organisations and will 
have responsibility for accrediting them. It will also have 
departments for planning, information management, and 
quality assurance/quality control.11 The centre convened its 
first coordination meeting on 9 April 2020, but is expected 
to take up to 18 months to become fully operational as staff 
undergo training.12 
YEMAC is supported by Regional Executive Mine Action 
Branches (REMABs) in Aden, set up in 1999; al-Mukalla 
(Hadramout governorate), which opened in March 2004; 
and Saada (April 2016).13 The extent to which they are still 
operational is not clear. YEMAC also has an office in Mokha and 
in 2019 opened offices in Taiz to support operations around 
Hodeida and in Marib for operations in al-Jawf governorate.14 
YEMAC said it had set up “skeleton” offices using its own 
resources pending receipt of financial support for them from 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).15
UNDP provides technical and administrative support to 
YEMAC through a project carried out by three international 
and ten national staff working from a number of different 
offices. The UN supported mine action in Yemen from 1999 
to 2003 through a programme implemented by the UN Office 
for Project Services (UNOPS). From 2003, the programme 
came under full national management. UNDP deployed an 
international adviser to YEMAC at the end of 2014 to support 
planning and programme management. By the end of 2019, 
its Sanaa office comprised two international staff, including 
a chief technical adviser, and three national staff; in Aden it 
had four international and two national staff. UNDP also had 
national field staff in Hodaydah, Mokha and Mukalla.16 
Yemen’s mine action is funded by international donors. UNDP 
estimated Yemen’s annual funding needs at some US$16 
million. At the end of 2019, total donor funding provided or 
pledged amounted to $20.8 million up to the end of June 
2021.17 Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s King Salman Fund agreed 
with Dynasafe Middle East Project Management in 2018 to 
finance a US$40 million demining project.18 The fund provided 
a further US$30.5 million for the project for the year from  
1 June 2019 to 30 May 202019 and in June 2020 said it would 
fund the operation for a third year.20 
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Yemen made no reference to gender and diversity in the mine 
action plans and priorities set out in its Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request 
submitted in 2019. 
UNDP reported placing emphasis on mainstreaming  
gender principles into plans aiming for equal participation  
as beneficiaries, employees, and decision-makers in mine 
action. UNDP’s goals included ensuring survey information  
is collected by organisations representing women and girls 
as well as men and boys; that data are disaggregated by 
gender and age; and that risk education materials address 
the risks associated with all gender roles.21 
The extent to which YEMAC has embraced these ideas is 
unclear. In 2019, it rejected a suggestion that women might 
be included in training for demining teams. Employment of 
women in mine action, however, faces significant obstacles, 
in part due to their position as responsible for family care. 
DDG was unable some women candidates for recruitment 
in the face of resistance from family members. Women in 
management positions often face bullying and disrespect 
from male subordinates.22
Among international operators, Danish Demining Group 
(DDG) employed a female international as head of programme 
and six women nationals among its 25 staff in 2019. Women 
employees included a risk education/non-technical survey 
officer and four risk education staff, three of whom were also 
trained as surveyors. DDG also employed a woman medic.23 
Risk education is conducted separately for women, often 
by women staff, to encourage women’s participation. DDG 
has found that including women in non-technical survey/
community liaison activities is difficult as men often take the 
lead in field activities and tend to overlook the participation 
of women.24
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
YEMAC with support from UNDP and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) was preparing a 
major upgrade of its information management in 2020. YEMAC has operated an Information Management System for Mine 
Action (IMSMA) database but its 2019 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request described it as “outdated” and “not usable”.25 
The GICHD prepared to install IMSMA Core funded by the United States and UNDP, which added an information specialist to  
its Aden staff in 2019, expecting a soft launch of the system in mid-2020.26 In the meantime, UNDP also worked with YEMAC  
on developing data collection forms.27





Yemen does not have a current strategic plan or annual work plans for tackling mines, CMR, or ERW. Mine action in 2019 and 
2020 continued to be conducted on an emergency basis. Yemen’s recent conflicts “have changed the extent and complexity of 
contamination dramatically and in many cases, YEMAC is neither trained nor equipped to deal.”28
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Yemen’s national mine action standards were based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) when they were drawn 
up in 2007, predating most of Yemen’s CMR contamination. YEMAC has acknowledged that the standards were obsolete and 
said standing operating procedures (SOPs) based on the standards were not consistently applied by its clearance personnel.29 
YEMAC was in contact with the GICHD on developing national standards and the new coordination centre, as one of its first 
acts, started reviewing a draft of interim national standards.30
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
YEMAC is believed to have conducted most of the CMR clearance to date as the only operator working in Houthi-controlled 
areas of Yemen, which are the main areas of CMR contamination. YEMAC also remained Yemen’s biggest operator, with the 
number of personnel reportedly rising to more than 1,000 in 2019. They included around 500 staff in the north who were active 
in Sana’a, the northern-most governorate of Saada, bordering Saudi Arabia, and northern districts of Almran governorate.31 
SafeLane/Dynasafe, the only international organisation conducting clearance in 2019, with funding of US$40 million from Saudi 
Arabia’s government through the King Salman Relief and Rehabilitation Fund, reported employing 19 internationals in 2019 
along with some 304 national staff, mainly seconded from YEMAC.32 It expected the number of personnel to rise to around 400 
in the course of 2019 and reported operating 32 multi-task teams working on the west coast and in Lahej, Marib, and Shabwah 
governorates.33 SafeLane’s operating results are not recorded in YEMAC’s database and it did not respond to Mine Action 
Review’s request for information.
DEMINER SAFETY
Yemen’s mine action programme personnel have sustained heavy casualties in the past two years from landmines and 
improvised explosive devices. Casualties attributable to CMR are, however, not known.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
Operating in a context of continuing conflict, YEMAC gives priority to delivering an emergency response to mitigate the threat 
to civilians posed by all forms of explosive hazard rather than focusing on specific devices or large area clearance.
YEMAC reportedly cleared a total area of 3,115,830m2 of mine- and ERW-affected area, including CMR-contaminated area, in 
2019. In the process it destroyed 7,071 unexploded submunitions, compared with 79 reported destroyed the previous year.34
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ While formal accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) is not currently possible for Kosovo,  
as it is not yet recognised as a state by the depository to the Convention, Kosovo should submit a letter to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) stating that it intends to fully comply, on a voluntary basis, with  
the CCM. 
 ■ This should include the submission of a voluntary Article 7 transparency report on an annual basis, as Kosovo  
has proposed in its Mine Action Strategy 2019–2024.
 ■ The Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC) should continue its efforts to ensure timely and efficient clearance of 
cluster munition remnants (CMR), in line with the objectives in its latest mine action strategy and complete 
clearance by the end of 2024. 
 ■ KMAC should promote the implementation of its mine action strategy and mine action programme across the 
Kosovo government.
 ■ KMAC and international mine action operators should increase their collaboration to seek additional funding  
and greater financial stability for mine action. 
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2019, contamination from CMR in Kosovo was 
estimated to cover a total of almost 14.36km2 across 45 
areas, according to KMAC.1 This is a decrease compared to 
the estimated 15.37km2 across 48 areas as at the end of 2018.2 
Kosovo has gained a reasonably accurate assessment of CMR 
contamination remaining on its territory, as a result of two 
decades of mine action activities, including surveys in 2013 
and 2015. The location of most of the contamination is well 
known across Kosovo’s seven districts, with the exception of 
the northern district of Mitrovica, where operator Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA) was in the process of conducting technical 
survey of all tasks to convert suspected hazardous areas 
(SHAs) to confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) based on 
evidence points, to help determine a more accurate and 
evidence-based estimation of remaining CMR contamination 
in this region.3 NPA expected technical survey in Mitrovica 
will result in previously unrecorded CMR-contaminated areas 
being added to the mine action database.4 
The HALO Trust believes Kosovo’s current baseline reflects 
a relatively accurate picture of the remaining contamination, 
but suggests that it would benefit from a critical review and 
further assessment of the existing 2013 survey data. This 
would inform future targeting of survey and clearance of 
remaining contamination, in order to achieve completion 
by the target date of 2024.5 HALO also believes that access 
to NATO bombing data is critical to the sector as a means 
of verifying clearance, without the requirement for costly, 
extensive re-survey, but has experienced challenges in 
obtaining it.6
Contamination is primarily a result of conflict between 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) in the late 1990s; and between the 
FRY and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 
1999.7 During Operation Allied Force, NATO aircraft bombed 
333 locations between 24 March and 10 June 1999, dropping 
1,392 bombs that released more than 295,700 submunitions.8 
Forces of the FRY also used cluster munitions during 
the 1998–99 conflict in Kosovo.9 The failure rate of the 
submunitions was typically between 10% and 15%, resulting 
in tens of thousands of unexploded submunitions lying on and 
under the ground. A large clearance programme followed 
in 1999 under a UN mandate, but this ended prematurely in 
2001, leaving many CMR-contaminated areas still needing to 
be cleared.10
In 2013, The HALO Trust and KMAC conducted a joint 
non-technical survey of cluster munition strikes and 
minefields across Kosovo, with the exception of four 
municipalities in the north. The survey identified 130 CHAs: 
51 cluster munition strikes, covering 7.63km2, and 79 mined 
areas over 2.76km2.11 In 2015, NPA, in coordination with KMAC 
and local municipality authorities, conducted non-technical 
survey of the four northern municipalities.12 The NPA survey 
confirmed 8.9km2 of CMR contamination in three of the 
four municipalities surveyed (Leposavic, Zubin Potok, and 
Zvecan). No CMR contamination was found in the fourth 
(Mitrovica North).13 On the basis of available evidence, NPA 
believed that 83 cluster bombs were dropped in this region, 
dispersing a total of 17,041 submunitions.14 In 2020–21, NPA 
was conducting technical survey of all CMR tasks in the 
northern municipalities.15 
KOSOVO
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OTHER AREAS
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Kosovo is contaminated with anti-personnel mines (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Kosovo  
for further information). It also remains affected by explosive remnants of war (ERW) other than CMR. 
Most ERW consists of unexploded aircraft bombs and items of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). However, explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) teams continue to encounter items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) dating back to World War II.16 
Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR) and Kosovo Security Force (KSF) EOD teams regularly dispose of ERW in response to 
information provided by the public and demining organisations.17 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In January 2011, the EOD Coordination Management 
Section became KMAC, responsible for managing survey 
and clearance of mines and ERW throughout Kosovo. 
KMAC prepares an annual work plan in cooperation with 
international demining non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and coordinates their operations along with the 
national demining teams of the KSF. It also coordinates 
survey, quality assurance (QA), risk education, public 
information, and victim assistance activities.18 KMAC’s role 
and responsibilities as head of the national mine action 
programme under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence 
were established and institutionalised by Kosovo’s 2012  
Law on Humanitarian Demining.19 
In 2019, KMAC had five permanent staff: a Director, a Senior 
QA Officer, a QA Inspector, a Mine Risk Education (MRE) 
Officer, and a Public Information Officer.20
Kosovo’s mine action programme is fully nationally owned, 
with a strong, longstanding commitment from the national 
government. The dedicated team of permanent national staff 
have been employed by KMAC since its creation. This has 
benefitted the programme with the retention of experience 
and institutional memory.21 
NGO operators in Kosovo report having a constructive and 
proactive working relationship with KMAC. HALO Trust staff 
meet with the director of KMAC for monthly coordination 
meetings,22 and, in addition, KMAC’s QA officers visit HALO 
Trust on a quarterly basis to discuss operations planning, 
along with conducting unannounced weekly field visits  
to tasks.23
In 2019, the Kosovo government provided €990,000 in 
financial support to KMAC and to the KSF for mine and CMR 
clearance.24 Kosovo’s current Mine Action Strategy 2019–24 
sets out the objective of intensifying resource mobilisation 
efforts in order to gain greater financial stability.25 While 
a specific resource mobilisation strategy does not exist, 
operators reported that coordinated approaches with KMAC 
were made to potential donors such as the United States  
and the European Union.26 
Unfortunately, the misperception persists that mine, CMR, 
and other ERW clearance in Kosovo was completed in 
2001, whereas the reality is that significant contamination 
remains. Kosovo remains a poor country and needs economic 
assistance to help it complete clearance in a timely manner, 
hopefully in less than five years if sufficient support is 
provided. In 2019, KMAC identified funding and logistical 
support as the two primary areas where it could most  
benefit from assistance from international donors and  
mine action operators.27
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Kosovo’s Mine Action Strategy 2019–24 reflects the 
commitment of the mine action programme to ensure 
that gender is taken into consideration in the planning, 
implementation, and monitoring of all mine action projects, 
with a view to promoting equality and quality.28 The Strategy 
stipulates that all mine action activities and assistance must 
reflect the needs of different ages and gender in a targeted 
and non-discriminatory manner, and that mine action 
and community liaison data are also to be collected and 
systematically disaggregated according to sex and age.29
Both KMAC and KSF have gender policies in place. KMAC 
reported that the KSF’s gender policy aims to facilitate 
the consultation of all groups affected by mines and ERW, 
expressly women and children. Within KMAC, one of its five 
staff (the MRE Officer) is a woman. A total of 5% of KSF staff 
employed in operational mine action roles were women, but 
none is in a managerial or supervisory position.30
Kosovo’s mine action strategy recognises the barriers that 
exist against equal employment in Kosovo society, including 
significant differences in employment levels between men and 
women, despite the number of men and women of working 
age being broadly similar. The Strategy notes that, as at 2019, 
more than four-fifths of women of working age were not 
employed in Kosovo’s labour market, and less than one in 
eight women of working age has been employed annually over 
the past five years. The primary reasons given by women for 
unemployment are child and family care obligations, which 
traditionally fall on women in Kosovo society. 
The Strategy notes the efforts of mine action operators to 
overcome these challenges and barriers to employment, such 
as through child care and parental leave, and gender-sensitive 
recruitment practices that encourage women to apply for 
positions traditionally seen as jobs for men. It further recalls 
the importance of employment of not only multi-gender, 
but also multi-ethnic survey and clearance teams and the 
particular benefits of recruitment in areas affected by high 
unemployment and poor socio-economic conditions.31
194   Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2020
In 2018, The HALO Trust developed a gender policy in 
consultation with the Kosovo Women’s Network, an advocacy 
network of more than 140 member organisations, including 
women’s organisations of all ethnic backgrounds from 
throughout Kosovo, which was adopted in February. The 
policy aims both at increasing the recruitment of women,  
as well as retention of existing female employees. In 2019, 
HALO further developed this policy to include provision  
for increased family leave and child-care allowances for 
those taking care of children, in order to remove barriers  
to women’s employment. Through the Dutch Government,  
HALO Trust contracted the Gender and Mine Action 
Programme (GMAP, a part of the Geneva International  
Centre for Humanitarian Demining, GICHD) to conduct  
gender sensitivity and leadership training in July 2019 
to more than 20 managers in the Kosovo programme, to 
address issues of unconscious bias and inclusion.32
In HALO Trust’s Kosovo programme, 17% of employees 
are women, including in 14% of operational roles in survey 
and clearance teams, although there were no women in 
operational management positions in 2019. HALO also 
ensures that community liaison teams are gender balanced 
and include senior personnel fluent in relevant languages, 
to ensure that community liaison activities are inclusive for 
ethnic or minority groups.33 
Although HALO Trust is committed to increasing the number 
of women in the organisation generally and specifically 
in management roles, without recruitment or expansion 
opportunities, this has proved difficult. In May 2019, 
however, HALO trained and promoted four women to operate 
Handheld Stand-off Mine Detection System (HSTAMIDS) 
detectors – a first for the programme. In 2020, HALO was 
planning to train and promote Assistant Team Leaders, and 
sees this as an opportunity to increase the representation 
of women in operational management.34 Relevant mine 
action data are disaggregated by gender and age, and data 
collected post-clearance is also disaggregated to ensure the 
understanding and analysis of impact of mine action activities 
takes gender into consideration.35
NPA reported that a target of 25% female staff was in place, 
and in 2019, 21% of its staff were women, including one 
of four team leaders, two of six medics, and one of four 
staff in the management team. The proportion of women 
had subsequently increased to 27% by September 2020, 
with more women in management positions. Women were 
especially encouraged to apply for staff positions, and 
given priority over male applicants with equivalent skills 
and experience. NPA confirmed its survey and community 
liaison teams were gender balanced and ensured that the 
participation of all relevant social groups is always taken into 
account when conducting activities in local communities.36 
NPA’s efforts to recruit and train multi-ethnic survey and 
clearance teams was also been a critical factor in allowing 
the deployment of teams in areas of particular ethnic and 
political sensitivities, extending the reach of mine action 
operations in north Kosovo, while also building bridges 
and friendships between the individual staff members and 
through their community liaison activities.37 
According to KMAC, Kosovo’s baseline of CMR contamination 
has been established through inclusive consultation with 
women, girls, boys, and men, including, where relevant, from 
minority groups.38 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
KMAC uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation version for its national mine action 
database. Data are disaggregated between mines, CMR, and other ERW.39 Operators were positive in their assessments of 
the quality and accessibility of data contained in the database and of KMAC’s information management systems in general. 
Operators report to KMAC on a weekly basis.40 However, there continued to be discrepancies between land release data 
reported to Mine Action Review by clearance operators, compared to data reported by KMAC.
According to its most recent mine action strategy, KMAC intended, as a means to show its commitment to the CCM, to submit 
voluntary Article 7 transparency reports on an annual basis.41 In disappointing news, KMAC subsequently advised Mine Action 
Review that Kosovo would only start submitting Article 7 reports when it becomes a member of the UN.42
PLANNING AND TASKING
The GICHD supported the development of Kosovo’s new Mine 
Action Strategy for 2019–24. The strategy, formally approved 
in January 2019 and launched by the Ministry of Kosovo 
Security Services on 4 April 2019, has three goals:
 ■  Mine/ERW threats managed and reduced 
 ■ Communication and awareness raising 
 ■ Management of residual contamination. 
The strategy declares that all known mined and 
CMR-contaminated areas will be addressed by the end of 
2024, leaving only residual contamination to be managed 
accordingly. It contains annual projections for CMR  
clearance, including:
 ■ all high-priority CMR tasks (four as at October 2018) will 
be cleared by 2020; 
 ■ all medium-priority CMR tasks (thirty as at October 2018) 
will be cleared by 2022; and 
 ■ all low-priority CMR tasks (sixteen as at October 2018) 
will be completed by 2024.43
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NPA reported that it had changed its approach in 2020 to 
focus on technical survey of all tasks and therefore would  
not clear all the high-impact CMR tasks in 2020.44
The strategy states it is based on a number of assumptions, 
including that the necessary funding will be secured and that 
no new mined or CMR-contaminated areas are identified. It 
notes, however, that “so far each year 3–4 different affected 
areas have been reported” and that should this trend 
continue, capacity and progress will need to be reassessed 
with regards to the 2024 deadline.45 
As per the strategy, KMAC will develop annual operational 
work plans to implement the strategy’s goals.46 KMAC will 
also request an external mid-term review of the strategy 
in 2022 to evaluate progress and make any adaptations 
according to contextual changes if required.47 
In 2019, KMAC confirmed that it had developed annual 
operational work plans to target anti-personnel mined areas, 
according to impact-based criteria, including risk reduction, 
development priorities, and poverty reduction, along with 
the findings of a nationwide baseline socio-economic impact 
assessment carried out in 2018 by KMAC, with the support 
of The HALO Trust.48 The mine action strategy for 2019–24 
is in alignment with the objectives of Kosovo’s National 
Development Strategy 2016–2021.49
In 2019, The HALO Trust developed a new prioritisation 
system that takes into account the “community profile” 
for a task. This system draws on several factors, such 
as socio-economic status, planned land use, government 
development plans, and demographics. All information is 
collected from government and public data as well as from 
extensive community survey.50
While NPA confirmed that its operations in northern Kosovo 
continued to focus on high-impacted areas, it noted that it 
was also important for NPA to ensure both ethnic Serbian- 
and Albanian-populated areas are prioritised equally, with 
sensitivity towards political, cultural, and ethnic affiliations.51
KMAC reported that it planned to conduct technical survey 
with NPA in 2020 of 21 tasks in the northern municipalities, 
in addition to clearance of eight CMR-contaminated areas.52 
However, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the 
resulting halting of operations for several months, means 
that technical survey will continue into 2020.53
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
National mine action standards for land release are in place 
in Kosovo, which according to KMAC are in accord with the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).54 
Kosovo’s national mine action standards set the standard 
clearance depth for battle area clearance (BAC) at 50cm.55 
There has been a discussion over whether this standard 
clearance depth could be reduced to 30cm in certain forested 
and stony areas, which would enable detectors to be set to a 
medium- rather than high-sensitivity setting and potentially 
result in fewer false indicators needing to be investigated.56 
However, KMAC informed Mine Action Review in 2019 that 
the BAC clearance depth of 50cm is necessary as many of the 
areas targeted with cluster munitions were especially wet and 
muddy, as the bombing campaign took place during a period 
of heavy rain, making it possible for submunitions to penetrate 
to higher than normally expected depths.57 It did, though, state 
that on certain tasks where the ground was entirely stony, a 
reduction in search depth could be considered.58
Data from NPA and HALO Trust largely support KMAC’s 
caution. The HALO Trust’s analysis of devices found by depth 
in 2008–18 show that 22% of all items found by HALO Trust 
teams were at a depth of 30cm or deeper, but this included 
buried cluster bomb units with submunitions still inside.59 
When removing full containers from the analysis, HALO 
found that 96% of items were found 30cm or above and that 
the average depth of items found through clearance was 
12.4cm.60 NPA’s clearance statistics show that 12% of all 
submunitions found in its operations were found at depths 
greater than 30cm. At the same time, NPA raised the issue of 
the potential threat that explosive items located deeper than 
30cm might pose and whether the expected future ground 
use could be considered when setting the search depth.61 
HALO agrees on this issue and has collected data on planned 
post-clearance land use, including crop cultivation depth.62
A 2014 evaluation of Kosovo’s mine action programme, 
conducted on behalf of the International Trust Fund (ITF) 
Enhancing Human Security, concluded that an increase in 
capacity and improvements to land release methodology 
and equipment deployed would be necessary if Kosovo were 
to complete clearance operations by 2024. Since the 2014 
evaluation, a number of significant improvements have been 
introduced to the mine action programme, including the 
introduction of HSTAMID detectors by The HALO Trust, which 
have advanced operational productivity.63 Both The HALO  
Trust and NPA were also using large-loop detectors on certain 
CMR tasks, which enabled further productivity increases.64
In 2018, in another significant advancement in land release 
efficiency, KMAC formally approved the implementation of 
Cluster Munition Remnants Survey (CMRS) methodology 
by NPA to carry out technical survey activities on 
CMR-contaminated areas in Kosovo. According to this 
methodology, which NPA has modified to take into account 
the specific conditions in Kosovo, and in line with the IMAS, 
operators are permitted to enter a cluster munition strike 
area and to walk on ground with subsurface contamination, 
increasing the efficiency of the survey process and offering 
the ability to accurately define confirmed hazardous areas.65 
HALO Trust, which displayed some hesitancy to implement 
a CMRS approach in 2017, reported in 2019 that it was 
interested in defining evidence-based clearance standards 
and felt there could be scope to explore and improve survey 
and clearance standards for addressing CMR, especially 
in regard to recent developments with the implementation 
of CMRS methodology in South-East Asia.66 It believed, 
however, that as general survey has already been conducted 
in HALO Trust’s areas of operations, implementing CMRS 
would duplicate work already carried out to define confirmed 
hazardous areas.67
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OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS 
In 2019, Kosovo’s national mine action programme’s capacity 
consisted of two international operators, The HALO Trust and 
NPA, and national operator, the KSF. HALO Trust and NPA 
continued to conduct BAC in 2019, along with the KSF, which 
also provided a round-the-clock EOD emergency response.68 
KFOR also supports the KSF and Kosovo Police with EOD 
response tasks and organising mine and ERW demolitions in 
Mitrovica and the north of Kosovo, including NPA’s areas of 
operations.69 The demining season is from the end of March  
to the end of November, due to weather conditions.70
HALO Trust’s operational personnel are cross-trained for 
mine clearance and BAC and can move readily between 
activities. On average, in 2019, HALO Trust deployed three 
clearance teams totalling 27 deminers to CMR clearance 
tasks – an overall decrease of 1.2 teams compared to the 
previous year, as a result of donor requirements.71 
NPA’s area of operations cover Kosovo’s five northern 
municipalities of Leposavic, Mitrovica, Podujevo, Zubin 
Potok, and Zvecan.72 In 2019, NPA deployed four teams: one 
six-person team dedicated to technical survey and three 
six-person teams to both technical survey and clearance. 
This represented a doubling of the number of teams, from 
two to four, but as the team size in 2019 decreased from 8 to 
6, overall operational capacity only increased from 16 in 2018 
to 24 in 2019.73 NPA deploys local teams of mixed ethnicities, 
making it possible for NPA to work in previously inaccessible 
areas in north Kosovo and deploy teams to both ethnic 
Serbian and ethnic Albanian areas through the multi-ethnic 
composition of the teams.74
KSF operated five manual clearance teams in 2019, totalling 
60 deminers.75 KFOR supports the KSF and Kosovo Police 
with EOD response tasks and organising mine and ERW 
demolitions in Mitrovica and the north of Kosovo.76
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of more than 2.2km2 of CMR-contaminated area was released in 2019: nearly 1.3km2 through clearance; 0.4km2 through 
technical survey; and 0.5km2 though non-technical survey.77
KMAC reported that one CHA containing CMR, of 60,000m2 in size, was added to the database in 2019.78
SURVEY IN 2019
A total of 911,795m2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was released through survey in 2019, by NPA in north of Kosovo.  
Of this, 542,100m2 was cancelled through non-technical survey and 369,695m2 was reduced through technical survey in 2019.79 
The total amount of CMR-contaminated area released through survey in 2019 was an increase on 2018, when 436,685m2 was 
reduced technical survey, but when no area was cancelled through non-technical survey.80
As noted above, KMAC reported that an CHA of 60,000m2 was added to the database of CMR contamination in 2019.81 
CLEARANCE IN 2019
Collectively, the KSF, The HALO Trust, and NPA cleared 
1.26km2 of CMR contamination in 2019, with the destruction  
of 155 submunitions (see Table 1).82 One additional 
submunition was destroyed by KSF in 2019, during an  
EOD response task.83
This represents a small increase on the 1.24km2 of CMR 
contamination cleared in 2018, when 212 submunitions  
were destroyed.84 








KSF 135,910 4 707
HALO 614,203 133 0
NPA 510,104 18 5
Totals 1,260,217 155 712
According to KMAC, one CMR task cleared in 2019 was found 
not to contain CMR.86
The HALO Trust saw a 13% decrease on its CMR clearance 
output in 2019, compared to the previous year, due to a 
reduction in clearance personnel.87
NPA saw an increase of nearly 48% on the area of 
CMR-contaminated cleared in 2018, due to increased 
clearance capacity. However, the number of submunitions 
found and destroyed decreased in 2019, due to NPA no longer 
working in the core area of cluster munition attacks, as it  
had in 2018.88
As Kosovo has robust national procedures for the 
management of explosives, the KSF, with support from KFOR 
in northern Kosovo, carries out the demolition of CMR and 
items of UXO found by both The HALO Trust and NPA.89




Kosovo cannot formally adhere to the CCM and therefore 
does not have a specific clearance deadline under Article 4. 
Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human 
rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible. 
As stated in Kosovo’s Mine Action Strategy 2019–24, which 
sets completion of mine and cluster munition clearance by the 
end of 2024, completion will only be achievable if sustained 
funding is secured.90 Specific concerns are elaborated in the 
strategy about the need to upgrade old equipment, including 
vehicles to proceed without unnecessary stand-downs or 
costly repairs.91 
The HALO Trust highlighted the need for a review of the 
current data on CMR-contaminated areas, including an 
evaluation of survey polygons, and application of efficient 
land release methodologies, in order to ensure coordinated 
and cost-effective targeting of clearance.92
As at April 2020, KMAC reported that it still expects to clear all 
known CMR-contaminated areas by the end of 2024.93 However, 
less than 5km2 of CMR has been cleared in the last five years 
(see Table 2) and international clearance operators caution 
that capacity will need to be increased and sustained over the 
strategy period, in order to meet the 2024 target date.94 
HALO Trust was doubling its CMR clearance capacity to six 
teams in 2020, starting in March 2020, primarily due to a 
multi-year contract for US funding.95 Similarly, NPA was also 
increasing technical survey/clearance capacity from four 
teams to seven in 2019, thanks to a US contract for 2020–23, 
and it also had two personnel dedicated to non-technical 
survey in 2020.96
While increasing and sustaining funding remained the primary 
obstacle, challenges were also posed by poor weather and 
difficult terrain, according to NPA. It also noted that additional 
CMR-contaminated areas were still being recorded in its areas 
of operations as a result of ongoing survey.97
In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has also impacted 
Kosovo’s mine action programme. From mid- March to 
mid-May the entire mine action sector was closed at the 
direction of KMAC, as the government implemented strict 
lock-down measures across the country, resulting in lost 
productivity which will impact targets. Operators were able 
to partially phase back operations in early May and fully by 
June 2020. HALO is also avoiding use of remote camps due  
to the COVID-19 pandemic which will also affect its original 
2020 work plan.98
Table 2: Five-year summary of CMR clearance







Assuming the target is met, completion of CMR clearance in 
2024 would be 25 years after the end of the conflict between 
the FRY forces and NATO and more than 20 years after the 
UN claimed that clearance was largely complete.
PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
According to Kosovo’s Mine Action Strategy 2019–24, a separate national strategy on the management of residual 
contamination will be developed by KMAC by 2023, in collaboration with other national actors. This will clarify roles  
and responsibilities in order to manage what is expected to be a long-term residual contamination problem.99 HALO  
Trust highlighted the importance of establishing a common definition for residual risk – an existing priority for KMAC  
in its national strategy.100
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should make a formal commitment to respect and implement the Convention  
on Cluster Munitions (CCM).
 ■ The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities and both Armenia and Azerbaijan should refrain from any further use of  
cluster munitions.
 ■ Nagorno-Karabakh should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster 
munition remnants (CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible. 
 ■ Survey and clearance of CMR should resume and the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should provide funding for the work.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Nagorno-Karabakh has extensive contamination by CMR but 
the extent has not been determined precisely. HALO Trust 
reported 213 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covering 
70.48km2 at the end of 2019 (see Table 1). The total area was 
marginally less overall than a year earlier, largely as a result 
of correcting an error in 2018 data for Askeran, but HALO 
also recorded a slight increase in the number and size of 
CMR-affected areas in Hadrut.1
Cluster bombs were dropped extensively across 
Nagorno-Karabakh by the Azerbaijani Air Force during the 
1988 conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Following 
the cease fire in 1994 tensions flared up again in April 2016 
when fighting broke out briefly along the Line of Contact 
(LOC). While ground fighting was confined to areas close 
to the LOC, artillery fire penetrated more than 10km into 
Nagorno-Karabakh, and included use of cluster munitions. The 
HALO Trust calculated the four days of hostilities added 2.4km2 
of CMR contamination, all of which has now been cleared.2 
In late September 2020, hostilities broke out again, involving 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan, with reports 
that cluster munitions were again being fired into Stepanakert. 
Amnesty International ascribed the new use to Azerbaijan.3
Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by region  
(at end 2019)4









NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Nagorno-Karabakh does not have a national mine action centre. The HALO Trust established the Nagorno-Karabakh Mine 
Action Centre (NKMAC) in 2000, which it hoped would consolidate all mine action-related information and respond to requests 
from the government ministries, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and local communities. The project did not, however, 
attract local support and has been moribund for several years.5
Proposals for establishing a national centre were supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in meetings with The HALO Trust 
at the end of 2019 and discussions continued in 2020. HALO reported constructive talks on the issue with the State Emergency 
Services and the Ministry of Agriculture.6 
A mine action coordination committee is responsible for liaising between the local authorities and The HALO Trust. Regular 
coordination committee meetings were held between the local authorities, HALO Trust, and the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) until 2018 when the head of the committee was moved to a new post. The position remains vacant, with HALO 
Trust continuing to lobby for a suitable candidate to fill the role.7
The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities do not provide The HALO Trust with any funding to clear mined areas.8
NAGORNO-
KARABAKH
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GENDER AND DIVERSITY
HALO’s Nagorno-Karabakh programme follows the organisation’s gender and diversity policies, providing equal access to 
employment for women and engaging them in management and operational roles.9 Its most senior national staff member 
is female and women have been employed in both survey and clearance. HALO appointed the first woman for non-technical 
survey in 2019 but from 2020, all HALO survey teams were planned to include at least one woman. Women made up around 
13% of HALO’s staff in 2019, about the same as in the previous year, and expected to hire more women, subject to the 
availability of funding.10
All groups affected by CMR and anti-personnel mines, including women and children, are said to be consulted during survey 
and community liaison activities. Relevant mine action data is disaggregated by sex and age.11 But gender is said to be not 
taken into account in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities.12
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Nagorno-Karabakh does not have a mine action information management system; The HALO Trust operates its own database.13 
No central mechanism exists for systematic sharing of data on mine clearance, underscoring the value of a mine action 
authority. The emergency services share information on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs and advance notice of 
demolitions.14 The Nagorno-Karabakh Army Liaison Officer shares information with The HALO Trust on items found, incidents, 
CHAs, and clearance on a regular basis. HALO is not authorised to share this data with others.15 
PLANNING AND TASKING
There is no national mine action strategy currently in place in Nagorno-Karabakh.16
HALO Trust’s work plan has focused on completing existing tasks, giving priority to areas where confirmed accidents indicate 
the greatest humanitarian threat and where cleared areas are most likely to be put to use. HALO Trust started a nationwide 
survey in 2019, focusing on Martakert as Nagorno-Karabakh’s most heavily mine-contaminated region. When new information 
of contamination is received, such as a mine find or incident, HALO tasks a non-technical survey team to respond within 48 
hours. Otherwise, the survey was due to continue in 2020 on a region-by-region basis.17
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Nagorno-Karabakh has no local mine action standards. The Nagorno-Karabakh police were planning to lobby the government 
to develop standards while The HALO Trust planned to support calls for national standards as part of discussions on creating  
a mine action authority.18
In the meantime, The HALO Trust follows its internal standing operating procedures.19
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The HALO Trust has been the main organisation conducting land release in Nagorno-Karabakh since it started working there 
in 2000. The Nagorno-Karabakh Emergency Service, formerly known as the Rescue Service, conducts EOD spot tasks and has 
reportedly conducted some battle area clearance (BAC). One Nagorno-Karabakh army unit conducts limited demining.20 
Clearance is conducted mostly in the summer months between May and October. In 2019, HALO Trust operated with a total 
staff that peaked at 242 at the end of September before winding down in line with normal practice to 159 at the end of the year. 
At the end of 2019, HALO had 12 manual clearance teams with a total of 79 deminers who conduct both mine clearance and 
BAC together with four non-technical survey teams each with four personnel and two mechanical teams with a total of eight 
personnel. Uncertainty over the level of continued United States (US) funding raised the possibility that HALO Trust would 
reduce staff further in 2020 rather than build up capacity over the summer.21
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
HALO Trust did not conduct any non-technical or technical 
survey of CMR-affected areas in 2019 but cleared 51,160m2  
in Askeran, destroying a single submunition.22
No target date has currently been set for the clearance  
of all CMR contamination in Nagorno-Karabakh.23 HALO  
Trust currently prioritises clearance of mines over CMR  
in compliance with restrictions imposed by donors. 
Fundraising for CMR clearance has proved challenging  
due to Nagorno-Karabakh’s international isolation and the 
territorial restrictions that donors often place on funding.24
CMR has dropped dramatically since 2014 as a result of lack 
of funding (see Table 2).
The outbreak of hostilities in late September 2020 raised 
concerns that significant new CMR contamination could be 
added, in addition to the direct and significant risk to civilians 
arising from the new use of cluster munitions.
Table 2: Five-year summary of CMR clearance
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
 ■ The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) should reaffirm its written commitment to respect and implement 
the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and to clear all cluster munition remnants (CMR) contamination east  
of the Berm as soon as possible.
 ■ The SADR should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR on territory under 
its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
 ■ A resource mobilisation plan should be developed with the aim of attracting international donor support. 
 ■ Greater support should be provided to the Saharawi Mine Action Coordination Office (SMACO) to enable it to 
continue to coordinate mine action in Western Sahara, east of the Berm, and to ensure that capacity development 
efforts are not lost. 
 ■ Mine action in Western Sahara must not become forgotten or overlooked by the international mine action 
community. Support must still be given to address remaining mine, CMR, and other explosive remnants of war 
(ERW) contamination.
 ■ SMACO should revise its strategy to include a more realistic date for completion of clearance of CMR with annual 
survey and clearance targets, and a detailed budget.
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
According to the United Nations Mine Action Service 
(UNMAS), at the end of 2019 Western Sahara east of the 
Berm1 had a total of 40 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) 
containing CMR, with a total size of 1.64km2.2 This is a 
significant decrease in confirmed CMR contamination from  
the 79 areas totalling 2.8km2 reported by UNMAS as 
remaining at the end of 2018.3
Both the north and south of Western Sahara east of the  
Berm are still affected, as summarised in Table 1.4
Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area east of the 
Berm (at end 2019)5




Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) reported completing clearance 
of all known and accessible CMR contamination in its areas of 
operations in Bir Lahlou in December 2018.6
The Royal Moroccan Armed Forces used both artillery-fired 
and air-dropped cluster munitions against Polisario Front 
Military forces during their conflict in Western Sahara from 
1975 to 1991. According to SADR, the Royal Moroccan Armed 
Forces employed BLU-63, M42, and Mk118 submunitions at 
multiple locations in Bir Lahlou, Dougaj, Mehaires, Mijek,  
and North Wadis.7 
While CMR clearance had been projected to be completed 
by the end of 2012,8 discovery of previously unrecorded 
contaminated areas meant this target date was not met. 
According to UNMAS, new strike areas continued to be 
identified in 2013–19 as mine action activities continued and 
additional information was received from local populations.9 
In 2019, 20 CHAs totalling 0.52km2 of previously unrecorded 
contamination were found and added to the database.10
Of the 40 CHAs, 6 cluster munition strike areas with a total 
size of 0.5km2 are located inside the buffer strip and are 
inaccessible for clearance.11 The size of these six areas may 
increase if restrictions on access to the buffer strip are lifted, 
allowing survey and clearance to be conducted.12 Clearance 
of mines and ERW in the buffer strip, restricted areas, 
and the berm itself is not foreseen in MINURSO mission 
agreements, which according to the UN, considerably limits 
the ability of MINURSO military observers to patrol.13 
OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES 
Western Sahara also remains significantly affected by mines and ERW other than CMR due to the conflict (see Mine Action 
Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Western Sahara for further information). 
WESTERN 
SAHARA






NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
UNMAS Western Sahara, formerly the MINURSO Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC), facilitates MINURSO monitoring of 
the ceasefire and ensures the safe passage of UN personnel. On 30 October 2019, MINURSO’s mandate was extended for an 
additional 12 months until 30 October 2020 under UN Security Council Resolution 2494 (2019). UNMAS Western Sahara serves 
as the UN focal point for mine action activities within the MINURSO area of operations. Its contracted teams work only in areas 
east of the Berm. The Royal Moroccan Army conducts its own demining in areas west of the Berm. In 2013–14, the Polisario 
Front, with UN support, established SMACO, which is responsible for coordinating mine action activities in Western Sahara 
east of the Berm, excluding the buffer strip.14
In 2019, UNMAS Western Sahara had a grant of $53,937 to cover capacity building and some operating expenses for SMACO. 
UNMAS also supported SMACO to develop its own internal strategy for 2019–23, which includes a communications and 
resource mobilisation strategy.15
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
UNMAS has reported that gender policies are implemented in accordance with UNMAS, the UN Office for Project Services 
(UNOPS), and MINURSO guidelines, as well as with direction from the Polisario Front.16 UNMAS also reported that gender has 
been mainstreamed into Western Sahara’s national mine action work plans and the SMACO 2019–23 mine action strategy.17 
During survey, efforts are made to consider the needs of men, women, girls, and boys to ensure more effective and efficient 
operations, despite challenges presented by conducting survey activities targeting Bedouin populations.18
UNMAS reported there is equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams in Western 
Sahara, east of the Berm, including for managerial level/supervisory positions. In 2019, 9% of operational roles in SafeLane 
Global (UNMAS’s contractor) were held by women; at a managerial level, this fell to 7%. In SMACO, there is one woman at 
managerial level out of five positions.19
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
According to UNMAS, the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database for Western Sahara, east of 
the Berm, improved as a result of an ongoing data audit initiated at the end of 2015.20 The Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has also provided ongoing support to correct database errors, and an upgrade to the latest 
database software version, IMSMA Core, was scheduled to take place in August 2019.21 This did not occur. As at June 2020,  
the updating of standard operating procedures (SOPs) for information management and the gradual shift to IMSMA Core had 
been suspended because of COVID-19 lockdown.22
PLANNING AND TASKING
In 2019, SMACO developed its strategy for mine action in Western Sahara, east of the Berm, covering 2019–23 in line with the 
newly published global UN Mine Action Strategy 2019–2023. UNMAS reported that, as at August 2020, a strategy for CMR 
clearance was in development.23 There are no specific objectives related to CMR in the strategy for mine action in Western Sahara, 
east of the Berm, but SMACO has established the following general objectives in order to achieve a Western Sahara free of the 
impact of mines and ERW:
 ■ to implement efficient and effective communication with national and international organisations by 2019. 
 ■ to establish an effective mechanism for data collection of accidents and victims which will be shared with partners 
according to the SMACO Data Protection Policy by 2019. 
 ■ to establish sustainable and constant funding of SMACO by 2020. 
 ■ to ensure availability of human resources to comprehensively manage mine action by 2020. 
 ■ to fully implement a professional management structure within SMACO by 2021. 
 ■ to create a discussion platform (think tank) for a national victim rights protection policy by 2022.
 ■ to establish a national employment policy for mine action activities by 2023.24
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As at June 2020, it was not known if Western Sahara, east of the Berm, achieved its objectives for 2019. UNMAS reported only 
that there was no mine action work plan for 2019 or 2020 and that UNMAS Western Sahara mine action activities continued to 
be in support of MINURSO’s mandate.25
UNMAS and SMACO identify priorities for clearance of both minefields and cluster munition strikes east of the Berm in conjunction 
with MINURSO. Priorities are identified based on humanitarian needs for the safety and freedom of movement of local populations, 
while UNMAS Western Sahara facilitates the ceasefire and ensuring the safe passage of UN personnel.26
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Local mine action standards were developed and finalised in 2016 by UNMAS, together with SMACO, and in coordination with 
mine action partners. A first annual review of the standards was completed in November 2018 with a review board consisting 
of representatives from UNMAS, SMACO, and all implementing partners. No significant changes were made, and UNMAS 
reported in June 2019 that translation of the standards into Arabic had been completed and shared with SMACO.27
An external quality management system was in place from 2018 and implemented by UNMAS and SMACO to the east of  
the Berm.28
OPERATORS 
Table 2: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 201929
Operator Manual teams Total deminers* Dog teams Mechanical assets Comments
SafeLane Global  
(for UNMAS Western Sahara)
2 24 0 0 Decrease by 50% 
from 2018 
Totals 2 24 0 0
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers.
SafeLane Global (formerly Dynasafe MineTech Limited, DML) was the implementing operator for UNMAS Western Sahara, 
conducting survey and clearance in 2019. There was a decrease in overall operational capacity from 2018 due to a decrease  
in funding and because Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) had made the “difficult decision” to close down its programme, effective 
on 1 January 2019, after releasing the last known contaminated areas in Bir Lehlou province in August 2018.30
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of almost 1.59km2 of CMR-contaminated area was released through clearance in 2019 with 923 submunitions destroyed.
SURVEY IN 2019
According to UNMAS, no non-technical survey or technical survey of CMR-contaminated area occurred in 2019 or 2018.31
CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, a total of 1,589,492m² was released though clearance in Tifariti in the North region of Western Sahara, east of Berm 
with 923 submunitions found and destroyed.32 This is a huge decrease from the just over 4.8km2 cleared in 2018, albeit with  
the destruction of only 833 submunitions.33
Table 3: CMR clearance in 201934
Operator Region Area cleared (m²)
Submunitions 
destroyed
SafeLane Global (for UNMAS Western Sahara) Tifariti (North region) 1,589,492 923
Totals 1,589,492 923
No CMR were reported destroyed in spot tasks in 2019.35 UNMAS stated that the reasons for the decrease in CMR clearance 
output in 2019 was the decrease in operational capacity following the withdrawal of NPA staff and a decrease in funding.36
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PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
Western Sahara is neither a State Party nor a signatory to 
the CCM and therefore does not have a specific clearance 
deadline under Article 4. However, the SADR submitted a 
voluntary CCM Article 7 transparency report to the UN in 
2014, stating that: “By submitting its voluntary report, the 
SADR would like to reaffirm its commitment to a total ban 
on cluster munitions as well as its willingness to accede to 
the Convention on Cluster Munitions and be bound by its 
provisions”.37 The SADR has obligations under international 
human rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible. 
Under Western Sahara’s draft mine action strategic plan, 
all recorded cluster munition strike areas to the east of the 
Berm, outside of the buffer strip, were to be released by 
2019.38 UNMAS expected to complete clearance of all CMR 
contamination in the Northern Sector (Bir Lahlou, Mehaires, 
and Tifariti districts) east of the Berm by the end of 2018.39 
This did not happen, however, and in SMACO’s new mine 
action strategy 2019–23, the vision is for Western Sahara  
to be free of the impact of mines and ERW by 2023.40 UNMAS 
Western Sahara needs to maintain its level of funding of 
$3.265 million per year and to secure an additional $2 million 
per year to clear all known mine and ERW contamination 
in the territory of Western Sahara, east of the Berm, and 
outside the buffer strip, restricted areas, and the Berm itself 
by this date.41
In 2019, with the loss of NPA as a key mine action 
implementer, along with the end of both German and 
Norwegian funding for clearance, the future of Western 
Sahara’s mine action programme was uncertain. Additional 
resources and capacity, along with support to SMACO, need 
to be secured urgently. There was a massive decrease in 
clearance output from 2018 to 2019 in Western Sahara and 
UNMAS reported that as at June 2020, operations had been 
partially suspended due to the outbreak of COVID-19, putting 
the already unrealistic 2023 completion date even further out 
of reach.42
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ARTICLE 4 OF THE 
CONVENTION ON 
CLUSTER MUNITIONS
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ARTICLE 4: CLEARANCE AND DESTRUCTION OF CLUSTER 
MUNITION REMNANTS AND RISK REDUCTION EDUCATION
1. Each State Party undertakes to clear and destroy, 
or ensure the clearance and destruction of, cluster 
munition remnants located in cluster munition 
contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, 
as follows:
(a) Where cluster munition remnants are located in 
areas under its jurisdiction or control at the date 
of entry into force of this Convention for that State 
Party, such clearance and destruction shall be 
completed as soon as possible but not later than 
ten years from that date;
(b) Where, after entry into force of this Convention for 
that State Party, cluster munitions have become 
cluster munition remnants located in areas 
under its jurisdiction or control, such clearance 
and destruction must be completed as soon as 
possible but not later than ten years after the end 
of the active hostilities during which such cluster 
munitions became cluster munition remnants; and
(c) Upon fulfilling either of its obligations set out 
in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, 
that State Party shall make a declaration of 
compliance to the next Meeting of States Parties.
2.  In fulfilling its obligations under paragraph 1 
of this Article, each State Party shall take the 
following measures as soon as possible, taking 
into consideration the provisions of Article 6 of this 
Convention regarding international cooperation  
and assistance:
(a)  Survey, assess and record the threat posed by 
cluster munition remnants, making every effort to 
identify all cluster munition contaminated areas 
under its jurisdiction or control;
(b)  Assess and prioritise needs in terms of marking, 
protection of civilians, clearance and destruction, 
and take steps to mobilise resources and develop 
a national plan to carry out these activities, 
building, where appropriate, upon existing 
structures, experiences and methodologies;
(c)  Take all feasible steps to ensure that all cluster 
munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction 
or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and 
protected by fencing or other means to ensure 
the effective exclusion of civilians. Warning signs 
based on methods of marking readily recognisable 
by the affected community should be utilised in the 
marking of suspected hazardous areas. Signs and 
other hazardous area boundary markers should, 
as far as possible, be visible, legible, durable and 
resistant to environmental effects and should 
clearly identify which side of the marked boundary 
is considered to be within the cluster munition 
contaminated areas and which side is considered 
to be safe;
(d)  Clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants 
located in areas under its jurisdiction or control; 
and
(e)  Conduct risk reduction education to ensure 
awareness among civilians living in or around 
cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks 
posed by such remnants.
3.  In conducting the activities referred to in paragraph 2 
of this Article, each State Party shall take into account 
international standards, including the International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
4.  This paragraph shall apply in cases in which cluster 
munitions have been used or abandoned by one State 
Party prior to entry into force of this Convention for 
that State Party and have become cluster munition 
remnants that are located in areas under the 
jurisdiction or control of another State Party at the 
time of entry into force of this Convention for the latter.
(a)  In such cases, upon entry into force of this 
Convention for both States Parties, the former 
State Party is strongly encouraged to provide, 
inter alia, technical, financial, material or human 
resources assistance to the latter State Party, 
either bilaterally or through a mutually agreed 
third party, including through the United Nations 
system or other relevant organisations, to 
facilitate the marking, clearance and destruction 
of such cluster munition remnants.
(b)  Such assistance shall include, where available, 
information on types and quantities of the cluster 
munitions used, precise locations of cluster 
munition strikes and areas in which cluster 
munition remnants are known to be located.
5.  If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear 
and destroy or ensure the clearance and destruction 
of all cluster munition remnants referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article within ten years of the 
entry into force of this Convention for that State 
Party, it may submit a request to a Meeting of States 
Parties or a Review Conference for an extension 
of the deadline for completing the clearance and 
destruction of such cluster munition remnants by a 
period of up to five years. The requested extension 
shall not exceed the number of years strictly 
necessary for that State Party to complete its 
obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article.
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6.  A request for an extension shall be submitted to a 
Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference 
prior to the expiry of the time period referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article for that State Party. Each 
request shall be submitted a minimum of nine months 
prior to the Meeting of States Parties or Review 
Conference at which it is to be considered. Each 
request shall set out:
(a)  The duration of the proposed extension;
(b)  A detailed explanation of the reasons for the 
proposed extension, including the financial and 
technical means available to and required by  
the State Party for the clearance and destruction  
of all cluster munition remnants during the 
proposed extension;
(c)  The preparation of future work and the status of 
work already conducted under national clearance 
and demining programmes during the initial ten 
year period referred to in paragraph 1 of this 
Article and any subsequent extensions;
(d)  The total area containing cluster munition 
remnants at the time of entry into force of this 
Convention for that State Party and any additional 
areas containing cluster munition remnants 
discovered after such entry into force;
(e)  The total area containing cluster munition 
remnants cleared since entry into force of  
this Convention;
(f)  The total area containing cluster munition 
remnants remaining to be cleared during the 
proposed extension;
(g)  The circumstances that have impeded the ability 
of the State Party to destroy all cluster munition 
remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction  
or control during the initial ten year period referred 
to in paragraph 1 of this Article, and those that may 
impede this ability during the proposed extension;
(h)  The humanitarian, social, economic and 
environmental implications of the proposed 
extension; and
(i)  Any other information relevant to the request for 
the proposed extension.
7. The Meeting of States Parties or the Review 
Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors 
referred to in paragraph 6 of this Article, including, 
inter alia, the quantities of cluster munition remnants 
reported, assess the request and decide by a majority 
of votes of States Parties present and voting whether 
to grant the request for an extension. The States 
Parties may decide to grant a shorter extension than 
that requested and may propose benchmarks for the 
extension, as appropriate.
8. Such an extension may be renewed by a period of up 
to five years upon the submission of a new request, in 
accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of this Article. 
In requesting a further extension a State Party shall 
submit relevant additional information on what has 
been undertaken during the previous extension 
granted pursuant to this Article.
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS  
AND ABBREVIATIONS
AIM Abandoned Improvised Mines (Afghanistan)
AP mine Anti-personnel mine
APMBC 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
AV mine Anti-vehicle mine
AXO Abandoned explosive ordnance
BAC Battle area clearance
BiH  Bosnia and Herzegovina
CCM 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions
CCW  Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CHA Confirmed hazardous area
CMR Cluster munition remnants
CMRS Cluster Munition Remnants Survey
DCA DanChurch Aid
DDG Danish Demining Group
EDD Explosive detection dog (team)
EO  Explosive ordnance
EOD Explosive ordnance disposal
EORE Explosive ordnance risk education
ERW Explosive remnants of war
EU  European Union
FSD Swiss Foundation for Mine Action
GICHD Geneva International Centre for  
  Humanitarian Demining
GIS  Geographic information system
HI   Humanity and Inclusion
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IED  Improvised explosive device
IMAS International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA Information Management System for Mine Action
IP  Implementing partner
ITF  International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing  
  Human Security
LIS  Landmine Impact Survey
MAG Mines Advisory Group
MDD Mine detection dog (team)
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MRE Mine risk education
MTT Multi-task team
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NMAS National Mines Action Standards
NPA Norwegian People’s Aid
NSAG Non-state armed group
NTS Non-technical survey
OAP Oslo Action Plan
OAS Organization of American States
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation  
  in Europe
PPE Personal protective equipment 
QA  Quality assurance
QC  Quality control
QM  Quality management
SHA Suspected hazardous area
SOP Standing (or standard) operating procedure
TS  Technical survey
TWG Technical working group
UN   United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service
UXO Unexploded ordnance
VA  Victim assistance
VTF Voluntary Trust Fund (United Nations)
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